ing from activities based on the conclusions obtained by this method from the premises is not negative—after this method of inference has been applied for a long time" (20-21). Surely the Humean challenge is not answered by this approach. For the sceptic about induction fails to see any reason for thinking that success after any length of time provides any guarantee of success in the future. And Czerwiński in his "Probabilistic Justification of Enumerative Induction" rests his justification on the assumption that an additional instance of a generalization increases its probability. But again, those who seek, rightly or wrongly, a justification seek a justification for such assertions. This is not to say that these papers are without interest. It is simply that they do not come to grips with the problem they purport to solve. Those with specialist interests in probability and statistics will find things of interest in others of the papers included. Though one may well ask whether Los' sophisticated formal representation of Mill's Methods allows us to understand anything about Mill's Methods or their deficiencies that we could not see if the Methods are described in plain Polish or English as the case may be. On the whole the papers on semantics add more to the existing literature than those on evidence.

Those with an interest in the formal approach to scientific theories will certainly want to read some of the papers in this volume. And for anyone interested in the development of Polish studies in the philosophy of science since the war, this will be an invaluable hand-book. As one sympathetic to the claim that Anglo-Saxon philosophers should be less insular, I can only laud the editors' efforts to acquaint us with these Polish studies. At the same time I would wish to reiterate how unfortunate it is that many of these papers come to us after their utility has somewhat diminished. One hopes that the energies expended in translating those 735 pages will be devoted in future to translating for English journals papers of interest as they become available. If this is done it would be helpful if the very low standard of proof-reading evident in this volume were not continued.

W. H. NEWTON-SMITH

*Willard van Orman Quine.* By ALEX ORENSTEIN. (Boston, Mass.: Twayne Publishers. 1977. Pp. 180. Price $9.95.)

A paradigm, in Kuhn's sense, is a set of problem solutions together with their theoretical backing, which is sufficiently attractive to entice many people to adopt them as a model and work in the same vein. In this sense there are certainly paradigms in philosophy. Logical positivism is one example, ordinary language philosophy another. Both of these have been popular at certain times this century but are now largely discarded. A third example, by no means discarded, is Quineanism. Quine's views on ontological commitment, analyticity, translation, realism, etc., have provided the backbone for much work by philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition in the last twenty years, and continue to do so.

A paradigm has its text-books. These have a dual function. Their overt function is to initiate the novice into the paradigm's preferred methods of procedure. Their covert function is to convince him that this is *the* way of going about things. Orenstein's book is a text-book of Quineanism. The book presents a clear and simple account of the main Quinean doctrines showing how they are used to solve such philosophical problems as the compatibility of empiricism and (apparently) *a priori* knowledge, the realism/nominalism issue and so on, putting each problem briefly in its historical context. Orenstein's book also fulfils the second function of a text-book. The history of logic is seen somehow as culminating in Quine and any comparison of Quine's views with those of others is distinctly one-sided. For example, Carnap's views on ontology are produced only to have the inherent superiority of Quine's views demonstrated

(pp. 68-74). Indeed, not a single serious criticism of Quine is entertained in the whole book and important criticisms of Quine such as those to be found in Strawson's and Grice's paper "In Defence of a Dogma" and Dummett's *Frege* do not get a mention.

For all these reasons, anyone who (as I did) hopes to find in Orenstein's book a searching analysis and evaluation of Quine's views (for which there is certainly great scope) will be sorely disappointed. Any non-beginner in philosophy will obtain little from the book which could not be obtained (with the bonus of Quine's style) by reading *Word and Object*.

The one thing I did come to realize by reading the book (though not because Orenstein points it out) is the extent to which Quine is a logical positivist. Because of Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reductionism and conventionalism—trade marks of logical positivism—one does not normally think of Quine as a positivist. However, Quine's underlying positivism is undeniable.

To start with, Quine works in a problematic essentially defined by positivism. He never writes about moral or political philosophy, aesthetics or the philosophy of religion (despite their close links with epistemology). Positivism of course reduces all these branches of philosophy to the uninteresting. Moreover, even within Quine's field, epistemology, his approach is essentially positivist.

First, there is the demand for regimentation into an extensional canonical language. (See, e.g., the entries under *canonical notation* in *Word and Object*.) The expressing of everything in the language of first order logic was a prime methodological procedure in logical positivist philosophy of science.

Secondly, there is Quine's insistence that to be is to be the value of a bound variable (Orenstein's book, ch. 1) or, to put it another way, that the quantifiers (of our canonical language) must be allowed to range over existent objects only. Now certainly this is not the only technical possibility. We could take as our domain of quantification a set containing not only existent objects but also fictional objects, mythical objects, and other kinds of non-existent entities. So why should Quine insist on his maxim? The answer of course is that the admission of non-existent objects into the domain of discourse would open the door to a number of questions which could be asked about them and could not be answered (*From a Logical Point of View*, p. 4). Such questions should not therefore be askable in a "scientific" language. The ghost of the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness haunts Quine's canonical language.

Thirdly, there is Quine's high esteem for science, particularly physics. (Being unscientific is one of the strongest forms of condemnation a positivist can give.) For example, take the following passage from "Designation and Existence" (quoted in Orenstein's book, p. 54): ". . . nominalism can be formulated thus: it is possible to set up a nominalist language in which all of natural science can be expressed. The nominalist, so interpreted, claims that a language adequate to all scientific purposes can be framed in such a way that its variables admit only of concrete objects". Of course it is open to the nominalist to say "if science cannot be done nominalistically, so much the worse for science". However, Quine obviously does not countenance this move: his positivist allegiance to science makes it impossible.

A fourth and final area where Quine's positivism shows itself is his behaviourism. Quine's behaviourism concerning language learning and intensional notions in general is well-known. (See, for example, Orenstein's book, p. 115.) And behaviourism is the positivist psychology *par excellence*. This last one of Quine's commitments has a certain irony about it. For behaviourism is often motivated by a reductionist view: the view that to make sense, mentalistic idioms must be cashed out in terms of behaviour. Yet Quine of course rejects reductionism in general.

The above four points indicate that Quine is *au fond* a positivist philosopher. Moreover, the positivist assumptions in question are rarely, if ever, argued for by Quine. They are, rather, basic assumptions of his philosophy. Of course, merely to point this

out is not to criticize. However, the fact that Quine's philosophy is, at root, a positivist one does, in this post-positivist age, suggest the direction that a more searching critique of Quine's philosophy might take. Unfortunately we shall have to wait for another book to explore this. And one, moreover, written by someone outside the Quinean paradigm.

GRAHAM PRIEST

*Paradoxes of Knowledge*. By ELIZABETH HANKINS WOLGAST. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 1977. Pp. 214.)

Mercifully, the book itself lacks the petulant tone of the dust-jacket description: ". . . an approach to philosophy that many professional philosophers would prefer to ignore". As the author remarks, it does not present a theory of knowledge so much as a prolegomenon to a theory. At face value it works towards revealing and questioning various rudimentary assumptions which inform the philosophy of knowledge both traditional and modern. But it is a prolegomenon also in the sense that frequently on or near the surface of discussion is the question 'what is the proper concern of a theory of knowledge?'. For this reason it comes as a timely reminder, and antidote, for those ensnared in the latest convolutions of the Grabit and Nogot affairs. Though occasionally dull, the book is also at times absorbing, and arrives, quietly, at some striking conclusions. Among those whose views are discussed are Descartes, Prichard, McTaggart, Malcolm and—especially—Moore. Wolgast is clearly influenced by Wittgenstein and Malcolm, yet some of the sentiments which she entertains are even Popperian: "Knowledge . . . does not belong where there is final and unquestioned authority; it belongs where there are differences and controversy" (p. 204). With the exception of ch. I, "Knowing and what it implies", the material is new.

The key theme of the book is what she calls the "context-sensitivity" of the cognitive verbs 'know' and 'believe'. The meaning of these words shifts against different backgrounds, grows faint as the background recedes and evaporates altogether when there is no background at all. The paradoxes of the title are the tight corners we get ourselves into when we ignore these, and cognate, facts. In the first three chapters knowledge—or perhaps I should say 'know'—is the focus of attention. Context-sensitivity explains why the logic of knowing does not follow the logic of what is known, and hence how it is that we can ordinarily, without paradox, deny knowing the consequences of what we claim to know (ch. 1). It shows up as nonsense the idea that knowledge or belief is some singular identifiable state or condition open to introspective gaze (ch. 2), and undermines Moore's attempts to provide uncontroversial cases of knowledge (ch. 3). Those things which Moore claimed to know, e.g., that he had two hands, are just those where a background is lacking which gives point to saying 'I know'. Context-sensitivity also induces scepticism as to the existence of a class of objects of knowledge, or belief (p. 83). (One might add: "What is the principle of counting for such a class?")

But perhaps we do not say we know in the uncontroversial cases just because such things "go without saying". Wolgast attempts to deal with this objection in the fourth chapter where the focus of attention shifts to expressions of belief. As against what she labels a "package" theory of meaning—the idea that a sentence may be viewed as having a meaning regardless of what use we make of it—Wolgast argues that telling someone something is a crucial ingredient of meaning, and thus that indicative sentences are typically belief-expressing. On this basis a distinction is drawn between uses of sentences which express belief and those which do not. Those which do not are at best "grammatical artifacts" (p. 164). Propositions which are felled by this positivistic hatchet include Moore's '*p* but I don't believe that *p*' (ch. 4), and more strikingly, Descartes's '*sum*' (ch. 5), and most of the ingredients of Moore's common-sense view of the world (ch. 6). Of course these propositions entail and are entailed by many pro-