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Reviews

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REVIEWS

Sainsbury, R. M. *Russell;* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. xiv, 348 £13.95.

This book is the one on Russell in Rutledge's *The Arguments of the Philosophers* Series, and in keeping with the general aim of the series, is not a book in the history of ideas but, rather, concerns the substantive issues in Russell's philosophy. Hence there is only the very briefest of biographical sketches of Russell in the book. Moreover, Sainsbury chooses to concentrate on Russell's 'serious' philosophy and ignore his moral and political writing. Thus, the first half of the book is devoted to Russell's philosophy of language: his theories of meaning, naming and descriptions, and his notion of a perfect language. The second half has chapters on his epistemology, ontology and philosophy of mathematics. This covers the ground fairly well. However, I was surprised that there was no discussion of Russell's views on truth which were both important and integral to the rest of the work.

I found Sainsbury's discussion of Russell's views variable in both quality and interest. It was refreshing to find Russell's views on the philosophy of language discussed in the context of modern philosophy of language. The discussion draws frequently, if sometimes uncritically, on the writings of philosophers such as Peacocke and McDowell. The defence of Russell's theory of descriptions is spirited, but little of novelty emerges from the chapter on names. As to Russell's constructionalism, this issue is so dead it would be difficult for anyone to breathe life into it. The demolition of Russell's views on induction is cogent but a number of Sainsbury's arguments are somewhat less than cogent. For example, Sainsbury asserts (p. 310) that there is an essential difference between the set theoretic and the semantic paradoxes. His reason is that 'systems can be constructed in which one can derive the [set theoretic] paradoxes but not the semantic ones'. If this reason were correct, there would be an essential difference between *any* two paradoxes. (For example the Burali-Forti paradox is derivable in Quine's original ML system but the normal argument for Russell's paradox breaks down.) Moreover, there are a number of infelicities in Sainsbury's treatment of logical matters. For example on p. 277 he appears not to realise that schematic variables are not part of the language. On p. 298 he suggests the wrong set-theoretic definition of arithmetic multiplication. And this has to be one of the worst statements of Gödel's theorem ever (p. 273): 'no consistent logical system with a small number of axioms and rules will permit the derivation of every mathematical truth'.

A very general criticism of the book that I have is this. It would have paid Sainsbury to take a step back occasionally and have a look at the wood, rather than the trees. For although the book disects Russell's view on each particular topic, there is little feeling for how the whole lot hangs together, especially in its historical context. (For example, Russell changed his mind on a number of issues over the years. Often in Sainsbury's book we find Russell's rival views from different periods presented, even side by side, and discussed. But rarely is there any account given of why Russell changed his mind or any attempt to chart the continuities of his development.) It might be urged that this is unnecessary in evaluating Russell's various philosophical claims. But this is to suppose that one can understand properly his various philosophical claims divorced from the problem situations or problematic which gave rise to them, and this is surely false. In

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this respect Jager's book, *The Development of Russell's Philosophy,* is much better.

Perhaps the most important element of Russell's problematic was the empiricistic and subjective idealism he inherited from Hume, and this Sainsbury too would seem to share. For he states, without justification and as 'fairly uncontroversial', that 'beliefs are justifiably held only if one knows evidence for them, and any way of knowing evidence runs back to perception. Perception involves having experiences. So a man's beliefs about the physical world are justified only if he has formed them as the result of having appropriate experiences' (p. 198). This view is anything but uncontroversial. Its subjectivism, empiricism and justificationalism have been the subject of strong attack by modern epistemologists such as Lakatos, Kuhn and Althusser. Indeed, Sainsbury himself notes (p. 12) 'the idea that empirical knowledge has its foundations in sensory experience' is today regarded as 'a highly controversial position requiring elaborate defence'. Despite this, none of the above philosophers, nor their arguments get a mention. Even Popper is mentioned only once (p. 179), and that in a footnote which betrays a misunderstanding of his notion of corroboration.

Sainsbury's subjective empiricism prevents him from producing a thorough and critical assessment of Russell's epistemology. Moreover it mars his discussion of Russell's philosophy of language at some points. For example in Ch. II, §2, Sainsbury discusses Russell's principle of acquaintance. He does this against the background assumption (shared by Russell) that it is subjective experience with which we are acquainted. In the end he rejects the principle. However, he might have done well to reject this subjectivist assumption, which is really the cause of most of the trouble, and then give the principle a run for its money. Another example is Sainsbury's discussion of Russell's views on a perfect language, or to put it in more prosaic terms, on the relation between the structure of a formal language such as that of first order logic and that of English. The view which is most common and most plausible at the moment (and the one implicit in the work of people such as Davidson), is that one needs to distinguish between the surface grammatical structure of English sentences and their deep structure. The surface structure is the form in which a sentence appears, and is derived from the underlying deep structure by the application of meaning-preserving transformations. The deep structure is identified as a suitable formal language, and it is at this level that an explicit semantical and logical theory is given for the language. Sainsbury objects to the program of giving the semantics of English sentences via those of a formal language, 'by proxy' as he puts it. His main reason is that assuming there is a translation manual from English to the formal language (i.e. a suitable set of transformations), 'then semantics by Proxy are needless, since one could as well supply direct semantics for English' (p. 152). I find it difficult to make sense of this objection. The wording seems to suggest that Sainsbury is identifying English with its surface structure. However a Davidsonian would reply that the deep structure of English is just as much English as the surface structure: it is just the reality behind the appearances. Now to argue about whether the formal language taken to be the deep structure of English is really *is* English would seem to be a purely verbal and pointless quibble. Thus Sainsbury's objection, if it has content, must be to the existence of a deep structure, to an underlying mechanism generating appearances. This is, of course, positivism, the logical outcome of Humean empiricism (and a difficult position to maintain). Thus, it is clear that epistemologically, Russel and Sainsbury share the same ground. It is a truism that to get something into perspective you have to get a certain distance away from it. With respect to Russell's philosophy, that is something which Sainsbury only partly achieves.

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Papineau, D. *Theory and Meaning*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. viii, 210, £9.75.

Lakatos's writings on the methodology of science gave little attention to the question of realism. One of the aims of this book is to combine a somewhat modified version of Lakatos's methodology with a defence of scientific realism. Realism here is conceived of in relation to a number of semantical issues, to which a large part of the book is devoted.

The book begins with an account of the paradox of meaning variance and its relation to doubts about the analytic-synthetic distinction. The distinction between sense and reference is then introduced and the question of meaning variance pursued in terms of the reference of the terms in a scientific theory. Related difficulties about the notion of a predicate's extension are explained and it is concluded that 'the extensions of scientific predicates are no less indeterminate than their senses' (p. 67). The question is then raised of how meanings are assigned and three alternatives are canvassed: verificationism, theories based upon truth conditions and theories based on speaker's intentions. Against the last, objections to do with radical interpretation are brought forward. Objections familiar from Dummett are brought against truth condition theories. An approach to scientific theories which purports to avoid the problem of meaning is then examined; Lakatos's methodology of research programmes. It is argued that in fact his approach 'carries with it a *holistic* conception of meaning' (p. 117, italics in the original).

Perhaps the author's main contribution is a suggestion about realism. He proposes that we adopt a holistic theory of truth which can save realism from scepticisim about reference:

> Even if we are not supposing scientific terms to refer determinately to certain of the elements out of which reality is structured ... why should we not think of our theories *as wholes* as being more or less successful attempts to picture reality? (p. 128, italics in the original).

The author then tries to give an account of competition between theories (or rather research programmes) which does not depend upon the assumption that the theories are 'framed in co-referential terms' (p. 147). Two different approaches to the problem are considered and rejected; Field's theory of partial reference and the causal theory of reference. Finally the author defends holistic realism against the objections of Dummett and argues against the indeterminacy of translation, making it clear that his 'reasons for denying the possibility of inter-theoretic translation are nothing to do with the underdetermination of theory' (p. 202).

Let us look briefly at the author's holistic realism. It is first of all not quite clear what that doctrine is. It involves the notion that theories picture reality and that reality has a structure independent of our theories. What is denied is that the parts of the theory correspond to parts of reality. I think that there is a difficulty in such a denial. The author wants to hold that a theory which contains more generalisations than another will offer a more detailed picture of reality. But if the extent to which the theory pictures reality is not dependent upon the relations of its parts to reality, why should we suppose that an internally more complex theory (that is, one with more naturally distinguishable elements) is a better picture of reality? The author claims that his ideas are consistent with the notion of a "perfectly 'true' scientific theory which represents the general aspects of reality just as they are in every detail" (p. 132). I wonder if he is entitled to such a notion. Suppose that we have two theories which are non-equivalent, both of which are free from anomalies (not just currently known anomalies but any anomalies whatsoever) and which both have maximum generality. Which one is the perfectly true scientific theory? To distinguish between them on grounds of correspondence with reality we would surely have to talk about the extent to which their component theoretical statements give a correct account of the structure of the world, and this strategy would be unavailable to a holistic realist.

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The author offers an analogy to help us understand holistic realism. Suppose that a picture is blurred. In that case it will be indeterminate which elements of the picture correspond to which elements of reality. But it can still be the case that one such picture is a better representation of reality than the other (pp. 132-3). Two points can be made here. Return for a moment to the idea of the perfectly true theory and ask what it corresponds to in terms of the analogy. The answer is, surely, a picture without any blurs. If a picture is blurred we can always imagine that there is a better, less blurred, picture. If the perfect theory is a picture without blurs it will be possible to say what elements in the picture correspond to what elements in reality. So the analogy seems to break down at an important point. My second objection is this. Suppose that we are comparing two blurred pictures of a face. Can we say that the one is a better likeness than the other if we cannot isolate elements in the picture and pair them off with elements of the actual face? We cannot take mathematical points and lines for the purposes of comparison, but perhaps this shows only that it is not points and lines that are the relevant constituents of the picture. We must surely be able to isolate, if only roughly, certain areas of the picture and pair them with areas of the face. If we could not do that there just would not be any sense in which the picture was a picture of that face rather than of something else. There must be corresponding parts (suitably chosen parts, that is) if there is to be a correspondence of the wholes. But it is this, I take it, which holistic realism denies with respect to theories.

Holistic realism is a programmatic notion. Such ideas often deserve a breathing space during which they may develop and overcome their difficulties. Perhaps the problems which I have raised here can be overcome.

The author has a number of things to say about the notion of a scientific research programme. Lakatos's theory of research programmes gives a central role to progressive theory change; changes which bring about novel, and sometimes successful, predictions. But successful prediction involves some notion of reliable observational report: 'if observations are overturnable then what becomes of the requirement that programmes proceed progressively — progressive with respect to what?' (p. 98). The author's suggestion is that we take the same attitude towards the overturning of observation reports as we do to theoretical change. We can legitimately question an observation report if in doing so we make some novel prediction about the causal process which relates observation to utterance (p. 99). Now demanding simply that someone who questions an observation report do so by putting forward an hypothesis which has novel empirical consequences will not successfully legislate against unwanted *ad hoc* manouvers. The move from 'this is a reliable observer' to 'this observer is reliable except on Sundays' predicts that the observer's reports will clash with accepted observation reports next Sunday. The important question must be: can the person who questions an observation report do so by putting forward an hypothesis which has *successful* new empirical consequences? But if we put it in this way the author's proposal seems to involve a regress; the advocate of the modified hypothesis about the condition of the observer may simply disagree with us about whether that hypothesis is independently corroborated. At some level we will simply have to insist that a certain observation statement be accepted, without being able to justify that insistence in terms of the objective properties of rival theories. (On. p. 101 the author deals with an objection based on an infinite regress but if I understand it correctly this regress is somewhat different from the one I have considered.)

According to the author the methodology of research programmes goes with a holistic account of meaning; in order to know the language of a theory one must know 'nothing more nor less than that theory itself' (p. 117). Meaning is thus highly dependent on theory. We cannot simply decide what a theoretical postulate means and then decide whether or not to accept it. But then 'how can we understand decisions on generalizations as being informed by an understanding of what determines the constituent predicates' extensions, if what that is depends upon what such generalizations are accepted?' (p. 184). The author's answer is that the acceptance of

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theoretical statements and the fixing of predicate extensions 'proceed side by side'. I do not think that we can be content with this. We need some notion of *degree of semantic disturbance* here. Changing certain assumptions is likely to have a greater effect on the extension of a predicate than is changing certain others. The fact that we are quite often successful in our attempts to replace one theoretical assumption by another in a progressive way indicates that the extensions of scientific terms are only minimally disturbed by changes in the surrounding theoretical structure. Perhaps it could be argued that the function of the distinction between the hard core of a programme and its auxiliary assumptions is that it encourages us to make theory changes in a semantically conservative way by making certain assumptions constitutive of the programme and thereby more difficult to replace.

The author wants to modify the idea of the 'hard core' of a programme in such a way as to take account of the differing commitments of individual scientists. These commitments will be represented in a tree structure; a path from the trunk to an outermost branch representing the totality of a scientist's theory, from the assumptions he shares with all workers in his field to 'his least central and most individual views' (p. 106). The author's way of putting his point seems to indicate that an assumption being more idiosyncratic is identified with it being less central. This conflicts with the idea that the existence and identity of a research programme is in no way bound up with the degree to which the community is committed to the idea. There was a time, for instance, when Young was almost the sole advocate of the wave theory of light, yet the assumption that light is propogated in the form of waves through a medium was surely his most central assumption. It is unclear whether the notion of a tree structure can adequately replace that of a hard core without doing violence to the notion of a research programme.

In addition to making a number of positive suggestions such as the ones discussed above, the book contains, as I have indicated in the summary at the beginning, a good deal of exposition and criticism. The exposition is on the whole lucid and the criticism cogent.

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Van Inwagen, Peter (ed.): *Time and Cause: Essays presented to Richard Taylor.* Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1980., pp. x, 313.

The sixteen essays in this book are grouped under three headings: Time; Causation; Other Topics. Part I gives us J. J. C. Smart on Time and Becoming; Roderick Chisholm's 'Beginnings and Endings'; Irving Thalberg's 'Fatalism Towards Past and Future'; Margery Bedford Naylor's 'Fatalism and Timeless Truth' and D. M. Armstrong's 'Identity Through Time'. Part II consists of Hector-Neri Castañeda's 'Causes, Energy and Constant Conjunctions'; Sydney Shoemaker's 'Causality and Properties'; Myles Brand's 'Simultaneous Causation'; Marshall Swain's 'Causation and Distinct Events'; Carl Ginet's 'The Conditional Analysis of Freedom'; Keith Lehrer's 'Preferences, Conditionals and Freedom'; Timothy Duggan's 'Habit'; Raymond Martin's 'Explanatory Controversy in Historical Studies'. The Other Topics are: R. M. Martin's 'Fact, Feeling, Faith and Form'; Joel Feinberg's 'Absurd Self-Fulfillment' and the editor's 'Philosophers and the Words "Human Body"'. There are no comments on the essays by Taylor himself.

The book is much what you would expect it to be: a collection of competent, professional, more or less interesting essays on themes in Taylor's work. I will discuss only some parts of some essays.

The most novel and ambitious essay in the book is Castaneda's. The advances in it what he calls a Leibnizian theory of cause. However, much of it consists of a reappraisal

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of Hume and especially of a close scrutiny of Hume's treatment, in the *Abstract,* of the collision of billiard balls. Hume describes the collision then analyses his description so as to find in it the necessary and sufficient conditions for cause. Castañeda claims that the analysis is less rich than the description is and he manages to lend the claim some plausibility. In the description, Hume notes of the impact that it *produces* the motion of the second ball and that, in it, the one ball *communicates* its motion to the other. This element of the situation does not appear in Hume's analysis yet, without it, the description would not seem to portray a causal process. The element which is missing, more explicitly, is that something is always *transferred* from cause to effect. Castañeda gives this something a name: causity. It is a quantity and, arguably, is obedient to certain principles of conservation. Much of the paper explicates this concept of causity. It is, perhaps, the same thing as energy but, if it is, this identity is contingent not necessary. It looks to me (no great expert in the field) to be a quite new contribution to a major problem in philosophy.

Three of the papers in the section on cause are rather alike in style and aim. Shoemaker advances a theory of properties in which sets of properties give rise to sets of powers to produce effects. The paper attempts to chart the relations between properties and powers and reflects on some consequences of the attempt; for example, that causal laws are logically necessary. Brand defends the view that, strictly considered, causes are always simultaneous with their effects. This is made plausible in the light of a close examination of what entities are strictly causally related. Swain's paper addresses the problem of what count as distinct events for the purposes of the maxim that cause always relates distinct events. Each paper identifies an interesting problem within an established area of research, deals with it in a usefully precise and insightful way and advances our understanding of the area somewhat.

Much the same may be said of Keith Lehrer's account of Freedom given largely in terms of orders of preference — what one prefers to prefer. In my case, Lehrer was preaching to a long standing, hardened convert to soft determinism so that the flaw I think I see in his account may seem to others a thing of no great significance. Lehrer requires that a free individual have a preferential hierarchy with respect to actions he or she contemplates. If S is hierarchical and has a first order preference for A then he has a second order attitude of preference, aversion or indifference toward A. For each order, i, he also has an $i + 1$th attitude if he has an ith attitude. This looks awfully strong. It looks as if it requires free people to be infinitely complex causal structures, for I take it that an $i + 1$th preference has to be a causal structure in S distinct form his ith preference. Moreover, when Lehrer gets round to justifying the realism of postulating hierarchical people he seems to ask for significantly less: 'I can go on *as long as anyone might care to enquire*' (p. 193, my italics). 'This may seem rather a cavil, but its wider point is to emphasise a contract between papers which open a new front in the attack on some problem and those which are refinements on established general forms of response. Castañeda's paper is speculative whereas work of the latter kind advances towards the more meticulous.'

Three of the essays on time go naturally enough together: Smart's, Thalberg's and Naylor's. Smart discusses the problem of the flow of time, or becoming. In particular, he looks at Storrs McCall's attempt to underpin it with some argumentative structure. He rejects the structure for reasons that strike me as well taken and makes the point that the source of the persistent idea of flow must arise, in the first instance, not from language but from experience. I could hardly agree more warmly than I do with this sentiment. But, as Smart makes clear, much work remains to be done on which facts about experience do sustain the illusion that time flows and make it so hard to escape.

For this reason, I am dissatisfied with the essays of Thalberg and Naylor on the closely associated problems of fatalism. Each essay is careful and ingenious but each puts the diagnostic finger on linguistic facts which underlie fatalism. But I guess Taylor might want to say (as Smart would) that the way we talk rests on deeper illformed beliefs which spring from our experience of time rather than the other way round.

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Finally, I recommend Joel Feinberg's 'Absurd Self-Fulfillment' as a graceful and penetrating look at the not very commonly treated question whether human life is inescapably absurd. He looks at the views of Camus, Thomas Nagel and, of course, Taylor himself before concluding that an appropriate-and-saving-response to our predicament is to view it with irony.

Graham Nerlich *University of Adelaide*

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Murphy, Jeffrie G. *Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. Essays in the Philosophy of Law,* Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1979, pp. xx, 255.

'One might legitimately ask what reasons other than vanity could prompt an author to issue a collection of previously published essays', open the preface (p. xi). Indeed one might, and the fact that the author feels the need to respond with several (in the circumstances) uncompelling reasons strongly suggests that he was somewhat troubled by his own question. Be that as it may, Jeffrie Murphy is a clear and lively writer, and I am not sorry to see a collection of his papers. Though they contain little by way of original argument, they would make a stimulating text for an undergraduate philosophy of law or social philosophy course.

Fifteen papers, published over a ten-year period, are included. The standpoint is consistently (and somewhat repetitiously) Kantian with more than a touch of Rawls. The cover blurb states that the essays have been 'extensively rewritten' but this is an exaggeration, and there is a noticeable tension between some of the earlier and the later papers. The papers are grouped into four parts.

The four papers in Part I, 'Rights, Justice and the Social Contract' are intended to detail and illustrate Murphy's general moral position. Beginning with the Kantian conception of Man as a rational chooser, it is argued that the notions of rights, justice and respect for persons must constitute our basic moral coinage. Rawls is assumed to have put the final nail into the utilitarian coffin. 'The Killing of Innocents' (1973) raises some of the moral problems in war, particularly the morality of killing 'non-combatants'. The argument contains a curious incoherence. Babies are taken as the paradigm of those whom it is wrong to kill, but the rationale adduced for this (respect for rational choosers) excludes them from its protection, and there is a last minute and none-too-convincing effort made to secure them (p. 18). Matters are much improved in the second (and later) paper, 'Rights and Borderline Cases' (1977), where a distinction is drawn between Autonomy Rights (acquired by virtue of one's status as a rational chooser) and Social Contract Rights (guarantees arising out of the Rawlsian original position). The latter, it is claimed, would not only attach to children and the retarded, but would also provide a basis for positive welfare rights. 'Violence and the Socratic Theory of Legal Fidelity' (1974) has little to say about violence. It tries (reasonably successfully, I think) to make sense out of Socrates' refusal to flee Athens in the face of his conviction. 'Hume and Kant on the Social Contract' (1978) is more or less what it says. There is a brief attempt to defend the Kantian position against the Humean critique. Although Murphy claims that the essays included in this Section articulate the general moral background for his views on a variety of social questions, they do not really confront some of the deeper problems facing social contract theory, and which have surfaced in the discussions of Rawls.

Some hint of these problems is contained in the Second Part, 'Punishment and Responsibility'. There is a good deal of repetition here, and 'Three Mistakes About Retributivism' is almost wholly reproduced in other papers (in particular 'Kant's Theory of Criminal Punishment', (1972) and 'Marxism and Retribution' (1973)). The latter paper is the most interesting by far. It is argued that Marx supports retributivism as the only acceptable theory of punishment, but denies that it has application in

bourgeois society, where crime must be understood in terms of class conflict. The textual evidence for this attribution to Marx is more qualified than Murphy notices. When Marx says: 'From the point of view of abstract right, there is only one theory of punishment which recognizes human dignity in the abstract, and that is the theory of Kant, especially in the more rigid formula given to it by Hegel', it must not be assumed that this was a point of view he himself adopted. It is most unlikely that he did: as his essay *On the Jewish Question* makes abundantly clear, the language of rights had little appeal for Marx.

Nevertheless, this essay contains a more searching examination of the presuppositions of contractualism than anything else in the collection. In particular, its underlying model of rational choice is called (albeit briefly) into question. It is a pity that no other paper attempts this at greater length, for it is of fundamental importance to Murphy's whole enterprise. Two other papers, 'Involuntary Acts and Criminal Liability' (1971) and 'Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy' (1972) complete this Section. The former defends Austin against Hart on voluntariness. Davidson's essay on reasons as causes provides the linch-pin. In the latter, it is argued that psychopaths (suitably defined) are better seen as animals than as subjects of rights (Autonomy Rights, presumably — one wonders how this might go in the light of his later category of Social Contract Rights. An added footnote (p. 143) suggests that psychopaths and animals might both qualify). No practical consequences are allowed to flow from this, however — the difficulties of diagnosis and the temptations of Big Brother are too great.

Four papers comprise Part III, 'Therapeutic Intervention'. 'Criminal Punishment and Psychiatric Fallacies' (1969) and 'Preventive Detention and Psychiatry' (1970), are early and somewhat unimaginative critiques of psychiatrists and others who, in the name of science, want to eliminate considerations of responsibility, guilt and justice in favour of social dangerousness. Karl Menninger is the whipping post. His arguments are so bad that one is left feeling that there must be (as indeed there are) more impressive representatives. The remaining two papers are better. 'Incompetence and Paternalism' (1974) delimits the notion of incompetence, and argues, on Rawlsian grounds, that it provides a necessary, though not a sufficient reason, for paternalism. The fact that Rawls seems to countenance a somewhat more extensive paternalism (*A Theory of Justice*, p. 249) is overlooked. 'Total Institutions and the Possibility of Consent to Organic Therapies' (1975) is a valuable discussion of *Kaimowitz v Department of Mental Health,* in which it was argued that involuntarily institutionalised patients were not able to give informed, voluntary and competent consent to organic therapies such as psychosurgery. Once again, Murphy argues vigorously for a particular conclusion, only to claim that we should not implement it: institutionalised patients *are* capable of giving informed, voluntary and competent consent to psychosurgery, but diagnostic techniques and the risks are such that the probability of abuse is too high.

The final Part, 'Death and the Supreme Court', contains two unconnected papers. 'Rationality and the Fear of Death' (1976) argues that a certain kind of fear death is irrational. It is not denied that fears can be rational, and that there is even a rational fear of death (where one is thereby provoked into diligent attention to one's projects). But where the fear of death serves no purpose connected 'with the successful and satisfying integration and functioning of our person' (p. 216) it is irrational. 'Cruel and Unusual Punishments' (1979, not previously published) focuses on the relation of capital punishment to the Eighth Amendment (U.S. Constitution). It is argued that the rubric 'cruel and unusual' applies to punishments which fail to acknowledge what Kant spoke of as *Würde* (dignity), and further, but less confidently, that there is no reason why capital punishment should not pass this test. Nevertheless, it should be outlawed, since past practice and its 'incompensability' render its use a violation of 'the right not to be dealt with negligently by one's government' (p. 238). The argument is sketchy but suggestive.

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The collection contains a very incomplete index and far too many printing errors (I noticed upwards of sixty).

John Kleinig *Macquarie University and ANU.*

Edwards, Rem B., *Pleasures and Pains: A Theory of Qualitative Hedonism,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1979, pp. 164, US$9.95.

Sometimes a problem will seem insoluble, until it is finally solved, and then the solution will seem obvious. Rem Edwards has made sense of J. S. Mill's claim that a consistent Hedonist can hold that some pleasures are qualitatively superior to others, a claim that has been widely thought to be outrageous nonsense, and in a way so simple as barely to justify the short book that he devotes to its exposition. Unfortunately, the book is rambling, repetitive, and often inconclusive, yet it shows, as the author claims, that the text books in moral philosophy will have to be rewritten.

Edwards' main thesis is that pleasure is not some one kind of sensation, phenomenally the same in all its occurrences, and neither is pain. 'The class of pleasures is the class of feelings we like and ordinarily desire to sustain and cultivate . . . Pain is the class of all those multifarious feelings that we dislike and ordinarily desire to eliminate or avoid . . .' (p. 86) Since pleasures can differ from each other in quality, we may prefer some pleasures to others because of their quality. Similarly some pains may be disliked more than others. Because pleasures differ in quality, one pleasure may be qualitatively superior to another, and to believe this to be so does not require one to accept any criterion of value other than pleasantness. He agrees with Mill that the better of two pleasures is that one which a person acquainted with both would choose.

Can he define pleasures as those feelings we like and pains as those feelings we don't like? He points out that some of these feelings are localised, for instance toothache and feelings of warmth, and some are not, for instance, feeling lonely, or feeling interested. Given this, it is plausible to classify pleasant and painful states as feelings. Moreover, he is right that pleasures and pains vary. Toothache and loneliness do feel different; so do enjoying a Bach cantata and enjoying a quiet snooze. These positions are presented persuasively. And what more can be done, beyond appealing to the reader's experience in the matter?

His claim about ranking pleasures is less persuasive. Why should we accept the view that the pleasures that a majority of competent judges prefer are the best? Why does the fact of its being the majority taste make the majority's taste better than the minority's?

He believes that this view that pleasure encompasses all agreeable state enables him to explain hedonistically values usually thought incompatible with Hedonism, for instance, freedom. He points out that being free to do as we wish is pleasant, and restriction is painful. But what about honour, and truth, and virtue?

He says that a Qualitative Hedonist can accept virtue as an intrinsic good, because, he claims, virtue is something inherently enjoyable. Supposing him to be right, does that explain the regard in which virtue has traditionally been held? Something he does not mention is the admiration that is felt for moral heroes, and admiration is an agreeable feeling. Perhaps, given that virtuous activity is pleasant both to agents and beholders, the Qualitative Hedonist can allow a kind of intrinsic goodness to virtue.

But what about truth? Surely what is enjoyable here is the feeling that one knows or understands the truth, but since this feeling can be enjoyed in the absence of truth, its agreeableness surely has no bearing on the value of truth itself? It would seem that at least one traditional value must be given up by a consistent Qualitative Hedonist.

Edwards is reluctant to accept this conclusion. He rejects what he calls 'The Replaceability Thesis', that "since all so-called pluralistic goods are merely of instrumental value, and since 'pleasure is pleasure' no matter what its source, then each

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pluralistic good could in principle be replaced by an equally efficient or more efficient source of agreeable feeling without any loss of intrinsic worth." (p. 50). He takes this thesis to be an implication of Quantitative Hedonism.

He claims that the 'higher pleasures' cannot be replaced *in practice* by electronic pleasure machines. Given our current state of technology, the real world is a better source of pleasure. Nevertheless, he insists, if an efficient pleasure machine were available that could reproduce the pleasures to be obtained in the real world, without the pain, we would have no grounds for preferring to obtain our pleasures from the real world.

The real world is preferable just because it delivers the goods. There is . . . 'a greater *variety* of qualities of agreeable feeling in (it). . . . some of these varieties have a worth or dignity which makes their value . . . incommensurable . . . For their loss there would be no adequate compensation.' (p. 72) This sounds like a defence of the intrinsic value of love and truth and friendship but it is not. He is saying that these sources of pleasure are irreplaceable in that we have not got the technical know-how to replace them. So is he not accepting the Replaceability Thesis?

The issue is not clear. He finally produces a logical reason for rejecting replaceability. 'The pleasures of contemplation are not replaceable by equally prolonged and intense pleasures of copulation. The two kinds of pleasure are not even adequately identified if their objects are eliminated from thought and experience. . . . Qualitative hedonism now has a linguistic or logical foundation, for pleasure is always logically inextricable from other qualities of experience and thought. If we are to have those distinctive pleasures, we must also have their distinctive intended objects — no substitution allowed.' (p. 89) But what does this show? There need be no phenomenal difference between the joys of contemplation where one contemplates a truth, and where one contemplates a falsehood one believes to be a truth. There need be no phenomenal difference between a waking experience of copulation and a dream of copulation. Perhaps we cannot have a pleasure without its *intensional* object, but that does not show the real objects to be essential to the production of the associated pleasures. He recognises this point. He says (p. 92) that 'It would have been a poor defence of qualitative hedonism to have argued that the real world is to be preferred to an electronically stimulated universe of experience because intensional pleasures are not available to us except through their normal *sources,* for the most that can be claimed . . . is that they are not available except through their intensional *objects* . . .' But if this is so then the replaceability thesis is true. Love, truth, and freedom have not even the dignity of being irreplaceable.

He has shown that Mill was not hopelessly confused in saying that the higher pleasures might be preferred on account of their quality. He has shown that Qualitative Hedonism can account for the value we ascribe to things other than agreeable states. He has certainly not shown that the intrinsically good is the inherently enjoyable.

Finally he comes to the defence of Utilitarianism. He argues that Mill should have used the device of the competent judge, for deciding issues of distribution. This device was introduced to give sense to the notion that the superiority of one pleasure over another is not a matter of quantity but of preference. The point holds for pleasures and pains but can it be applied so easily to moral issues? Is the best distribution of goods really the one which a majority would prefer? Edwards has his doubts on this point and thinks that perhaps in the last resort, we should agree to differ. His defence of utilitarianism therefore amounts to saying that it is one possible position amongst others.

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Bambrough, Renford, *Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge,* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. x, 166, £5.50.

'We know that this child, who is about to undergo painful surgery, should be given an anaesthetic before the operation. Therefore we know at least one moral proposition to be true.'

We find this direct proof for the objectivity of morals in Bambrough. — Simple, isn't it?

In this way, anti-objectivism, as Bambrough calls it — (also known as nihilism, non-cognitivism, emotivism, subjectivism, or implied by theories so called) seems once and for all refuted.

The 'proof' is of course inspired by Moore's 'proof' of an external world. Bambrough makes this clear; what he makes less clear is the degree of his own commitment to it. He uses it chiefly to refute those who reject *this* appeal to common sense and yet accept the appeal to common sense in Moore's proof, accusing them of inconsistency. This refutation seems convincing.

Although Bambrough seems to find this quite an important point, he does himself state that the refutation affects only 'some contemporary British philosophers'. In this context, it may be noted that of the 34 authors mentioned in the bibliography, only two (Kant and Sartre) did not write in English. This hint of philosophical parochialism, together with the sometimes tedious preciosities on the nature of philosophical activity, suggest some influence from a certain academic coterie.

These minor features should not be allowed to overshadow the genuine merits of this book. All those who incline in favour of non-cognitivism may not be impressed by the 'proof' above, but the sustained discussion and criticism of various arguments commonly advanced in favour of non-cognitivism will be found very impressive and instructive. Bambrough distinguishes, to begin with, six of them and argues systematically and lucidly that none of them succeeds: they purport to show a difference between morality and other realms of discourse, but can in fact be applied equally to claims to moral and non-moral knowledge. He also makes the valid point that it is no defence to argue from a *general* non-cognitivism or scepticism to the *moral* variety, since the point of the whole exercise is precisely to exhibit something which morality does not have in common with other realms of discourse.

Many of these points are sound indeed, though not all of them new: names such as e.g. Monro, Gewirth, Kövesi, spring to mind. But Bambrough's statement is certainly a very lucid and useful one.

Another merit in this book is that it is clearly indicated how non-cognitivism can be seen as a rejection of — according to Bambrough an over-reaction against — heteronomy and authoritarianism. I find his view that a moral commitment against these both inspires and contradicts non-cognitivism implausible. More plausible is the argument that there is no more connection between objectivism and authoritarianism in morals than there is in science.

That Bambrough has seen correctly in taking this to be a key issue is in a sense confirmed by the fact that the first statement in our century of an unequivocally non-cognitivist view, Hägerström's 'On the Truth of Moral Ideas' (1911) (in his *Philosophy and Religion,* tr. R. Sandin, London 1964) presents heteronomy and objectivism as closely linked, and so does Popper, eloquently, in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* — (1945). Bambrough mentions neither. What they and others were driving at was of course that no objective facts like the demands of custom or of a god, nor the direction of biological or historical development, etc., can determine what is right or what is good from a moral point of view.

I believe that Bambrough agrees with this, but that he rejects the view that it would justify an anti-objectivist stance. His reply, if I have understood him correctly, is essentially that non-cognitivists have too narrow a conception of objectivity. Objectivity does not require an object. Logic and mathematics are objective enough without

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objects: why not ethics? The idea of objectivity applies whenever an appeal to consistency is in order, whenever there is scope for rational argument: so it applies to morality. Moral disputes do involve constant appeals to consistency and other principles of rationality, involve constant recourse to empirical evidence, etc.

That Bambrough is raising a key objection is again confirmed, in a sense, by the fact that it is present already in the first reaction of measured criticism (most early reactions were either positive or outright abusive) of Hägerström's article, *viz.* the one by Hans Larsson, professor in philosophy in Lund at the time in his *Filosofien och Politiken,* Stockholm, 1915: differences in moral opinion can be *wide* without being *radical,* as long as this is so, a rational method for settling the dispute is in principle available, and it is hard to envisage a really irreconcilable difference of opinion. In Bambrough, this point, which he develops, is stated in the following words:

> I do deny that there are any moral questions which are not also questions of fact or questions of logic or mixtures of questions of fact and questions of logic. (p. 72)

> Hume thought not only that it was abstractly possible but also that it frequently happened that two men were in dispute about a moral question when no question of fact or of logic was at issue between them, and in this too he has been followed by his modern disciples. But neither Hume nor any of his disciples has ever produced an example of a moral dispute in which nothing divides the parties except a difference of feeling that persists after all the relevant facts are in and all the relevant points of logic are settled. I do not believe that it is even theoretically possible that such an instance should occur . . . (p. 73).

This is a serious challenge to non-cognitivism. According to it, rationally irreconcilable conflicts are possible. And yet, as Bambrough points out, it seems extremely difficult to understand how a moral dispute can be conducted unless there is some common ground between the disputing parties; in principle, a moral dispute must be rationally reconcilable.

But this challenge can, I think, be met. We should distinguish between *conflicts* and *disputes.*

Indeed, Hägerström's example is that of a wolf and a lamb. He also mentions Cesare Borgia, who is seen as a psychopath, detached from common morality. It would be futile for the lamb to try to convince the wolf that it is wrong to bite so inconsiderately. The lamb and the wolf are in conflict: it cannot be rationally resolved.

There are radical moral differences of the wolf-lamb variety. Suppose that a tribe settles on a tract of land in order to secure its survival and prosperity. The land may have to be cleared first, for purposes of grazing and agriculture. Wild animals which might interfere may have to be chased away, killed or captured. If there are other people in the area, they will similarly be expelled, killed or enslaved, in the same manner and for the same reasons. These are not reasons designed to persuade them rationally to accept their fate. There is, then, a conflict in this situation, but no dispute.

Another case in point would be conflicts between the aristocratic and the vulgar kinds of people, as defined in Nietzsche's writings.

Racism offers less clear-cut examples. Sometimes a racist provides arguments in support or defence of his racism. They purport to show that his racism is actually compatible with universalistic moral principles which his critics are supposed to share. But in this case, there is no radical moral difference: at least lip-service is paid to the same principles.

Universalism — the equality and fraternity of all human beings — is of fairly recent origin as a moral view. And even its most sincere adherents tend to practise it very imperfectly.

In this way, it seems that Bambrough's challenge can be met: there may not be any disputes that are rationally irreconcilable, but there may be conflicts that are rationally irreconcilable.

To rejoin that such conflicts are not *moral* conflicts is of course to beg the question. A

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certain substantive content is illicitly imported into the formal notion of morality. To assume that moral reasons are reasons that anyone who is rational enough will find acceptable, is to assume moral universalism. This seems, incidentally, to be Hare's standpoint (whereby Hare ends up in agreement with Bambrough, contrary to the innocent reader's expectation): Hare's view is, according to a recent comment by H. M. Robinson (in *Analysis* 41 (1981)):

> ... whereas emotivists had conceded that once agreement on factual matters was reached there remained the possibility of sincere divergence of moral attitude, on Hare's position this is not possible ... Hare argues that being fully informed eliminates all subjectivity from prescriptivism. (p. 56)

On the whole, there is much to suggest that it is the variety of concepts of morality that explains, partly at least, why contradictory opinions in moral philosophy each can seem so plausible. The writers whom Bambrough attacks have in mind primarily a concept of morality influenced by stoic and biblical traditions, whilst his own is more Aristotelian. In the former, ideals of justice and fraternity are central, but there are problems in finding a place for objectivity. In the latter, the ideals — well, suffice to say that many find them uninspiring, or worse — fit easily into schemes of rational, prudential, reasoning.

In conclusion, Bambrough seems to me to have given one of the best cases for anti-anti-objectivism to appear for a long time; it should be of interest even to those who end up in disagreement with the author.

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Reagan, Charles E., (ed.), *Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.* Ohio: Ohio University Press. 1979 pp. xvi, 194. U.S. $12.00, Sturrock, John, (ed.), *Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to Derrida.* Oxford: Oxford University Press (OPUS paperback). 1979 pp. 190 $9.95.

The hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, on the one hand, and the structuralist and post-structuralist movement, on the other, represent two important but very different currents in contemporary French thought. The first of these movements is the subject of the essays collected in *Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur,* edited by Charles E. Reagan. The diverse thought of five French intellectuals commonly labelled 'structuralist' or 'post-structuralist' is the subject-matter of a second anthology of essays, *Structuralism and Since: From Levi-Strauss to Derrida,* edited by John Sturrock. This volume contains essays on each of the five writers, Claude Levi-Strauss, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. Each of these books brings together a number of scholarly essays which deal comprehensively with, and (in different ways) serve to illuminate, the particular movement or school of thought under consideration. Sturrock's book is designed to introduce readers to the central concerns, methodology and ideas of those writers popularly associated with the structuralist movement in France. It presupposes no previous acquaintance with that movement — apart from that to be gained from Sturrock's own excellent introduction to the book. Reagan's book, however, presupposes considerable familiarity with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and with the phenomenological tradition to which it belongs.

It is not possible to say very much about these works which would be comprehensible to the general reader unless some background knowledge situating Ricoeur's hermeneutic philosophy and the structuralist movement within a broader philosophical context is provided. Both schools of thought belong to the French philosophical tradition — a tradition grounded in the philosophy of Descartes and signposted by the influential movements of phenomenology and existentialism. Both Ricoeur's philosophy and the ideas of the structuralists have emerged in response to particular

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developments within that broader tradition — specifically, in response to what might be called a 'crisis of subjectivity'.

Until the last decade or so, subjectivity has been the dominant characteristic of the French philosophical tradition and the methodological starting-point for the human sciences which are inseparable from that tradition in France. The primacy of the conscious subject, enshrined in the Cartesian 'cogito', was re-affirmed in Husserl's phenomenology which provided the theoretical underpinnings of French existentialist and humanist philosophy. Phenomenology accorded central place to the conscious subject in the sphere of meaning, generally; existential phenomenology safeguarded the privileged and authoritative status of the conscious subject in the sphere of meaningful activity — the sphere of human behaviour which is the domain of the human sciences. Inquiries into the meaning of human behaviour, at the individual or at the social level, reached their terminus in the authorship of those actions, at the level of subjective conscious intentions.

The 'crisis of subjectivity' effected by Freud and Marx consisted in the de-centring of the conscious subject as the locus of meaning in the human sciences. For Freud, the meaning of individual human behaviour was often to be sought at the level of the *un*conscious, the conscious subject or ego being a possible source of illusion or disguise. For Marx, the meaning of social practices and institutions — those 'external' embodiments or expressions of social consciousness — was often to be sought in the economic bases or infrastructure of a particular society: Consciousness was, all too often, a *false* consciousness. Both Freud and Marx succeeded in showing that human behaviour, as studied by the human sciences, is 'meaningful' (thereby forstalling any resort to crude behaviourism), but that its meaning is, in many instances, 'split off' from subjective conscious intentions. Both were able to show convincingly that there is more to the meaning of behaviour than meets the (conscious) mind. The 'cogito', now exposed as a possible source of illusion and false consciousness, was divested of its authority in the study of the meaning of human behaviour and displaced from its privileged position at the centre of the human sciences.

The hermeneutic philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, on the one hand, and the intellectual movement loosely labelled 'structuralism' on the other, represent two different ways in which contemporary French philosophers have responded to this 'crisis of subjectivity'. Ricoeur's hermeneutic philosophy represents an attempt to salvage subjectivity in the form of what is basically a humanistic philosophy (Ricoeur calls it a 'philosophical anthropology') — one in which meaning is ultimately grounded in subjective lived experience. Ricoeur uses the expression, "'cogito' blesse" ('wounded ego') to describe the blow dealt by Freud to those philosophies premissed on Descartes' 'cogito'. His hermeneutic philosophy is an attempt to rehabilitate the wounded ego. Structuralism and post-structuralist thought represent an abandonment of subjectivity: meaning is ultimately a function of a closed system or structure from which considerations relating to subjective authorship or authority have been eliminated. With the advent of structuralism we see what Foucault has called 'the disappearance of man'. Ricoeur has called the structuralism of Levi-Strauss a 'Kantianism without a subject'; Sartre has dismissed it as a 'positivisme des signes'. In the post-structuralist writings of thinkers like Barthes, Lacan and Derrida, subjectivity undergoes its final destruction. In place of the Cartesian conception of the self or ego as sovereign, autonomous, a unity, there appears a conception of the self as a fragmentation, a disintegration, a 'dispersal'. The ego, already wounded, is quite dramatically shot to pieces.

For both the hermeneutic and the structuralist approaches to human behaviour, however, it is language which supplies the model for understanding or explaining that behaviour. Specifically, it is 'the text' which is most often taken as a paradigm. A text is a fragment of discourse which enjoys what Ricoeur calls 'semantic autonomy'. The text is meaningful in its own right, independently of any private, subjective meanings or intentions in which it may have originated. The text — like the phenomena studied by the human sciences — is a kind of 'externalisation' of subjective individual or social

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consciousness, but its meaning is not reducible to the author's (or authors') subjective conscious intentions. The meaning of a text is 'split off' from subjective consciousness. For this reason, the text provides a suitable paradigm for an approach to the study of human behaviour as perceived through post-Freudian or post-Marxist eyes.

For Ricoeur, as for most structuralists, the phenomenon investigated by the human sciences is subject to interpretation of the kind that we bring to a text. For the structuralists, however, the text has been 'set free' from subjective consciousness in a quite radical way. For the structuralist, the text carries no reference to an extra-linguistic world. From the structuralist point of view, meaning is a function solely of the relationships between the signs which together comprise the text. To interpret a text is to disclose the structures and relationships within this closed system. For Ricoeur, on the other hand, a text necessarily has a reference. The text refers to a world, and this world is a possible world for self-understanding. To interpret a text is to re-appropriate this world and, thereby, to 're-appropriate' the self — to restore subjectivity — in an act of interpretative understanding. The task of interpreting a text includes within its aim the goal of self-understanding. 'Hermeneutics' (which means, literally, rules or procedures governing the interpretation of texts, its initial application in the nineteenth century being confined to literary and religious texts) is the name given to Ricoeur's philosophical method for this interpretative understanding of texts. When meaningful action is construed on the model of the text, the word 'hermeneutics' designates a methodological principle for the task of understanding that action.

Ricoeur, like the later Husserl, sees the goal of philosophy as that of self-understanding, self-knowledge. Ricoeur himself sees hermeneutic philosophy as a development or extension of the phenomenological method, rather than as an alternative to it. It is a development which for Ricoeur is necessitated by his own view of language and of human experience, generally, as being symbolic in its structure. Ricoeur's early studies of the concrete symbolism of evil in Judaeo-Christian theology yielded to a study of the nature and structure of symbolic thought generally. Hermeneutics is the name given to the act of interpretative understanding which is demanded by symbols in virtue of their semantic structure. Symbols are 'double-meaning' expressions. A symbol has a primary, literal meaning through which it intends or points to a secondary, latent meaning. The meaning of a symbol is, therefore, not something transparently given. It is something grasped through an interpretative act. The semantic structure of the symbol — its 'double-meaning' structure — demands an act of interpretative understanding. Such understanding cannot be effected by phenomenological reflection, for the latter cannot accommodate self-knowledge or understanding which is mediated by symbols. Symbols call for a hermeneutics.

An important phase in the movement of Ricoeur's philosophy is marked by his recognition that all language is symbolic. The scope of hermeneutics is thereby broadened to include the task of interpreting language as it is inscribed in texts. During this phase, we see Ricoeur confronting the claims and methodology of the structuralists, specifically those of Levi-Strauss, and his attempts to combine structuralist principles with his own hermeneutics of the text in the form of a dialectic — a dialectic which must be repudiated by the 'pure' structuralist for whom the subject has been eliminated. The most recent phase in the development of Ricoeur's philosophy sees the hermeneutic field extended to the human sciences generally. Meaningful human action, construed on the model of the text, exhibits a symbolic structure and therefore demands, for its understanding, the hermeneutic method.

'Hermeneutics' and 'structuralism' at one level designate two conflicting methodologies for interpreting human behaviour where that behaviour is construed on a linguistic model. The difference at this level is sometimes expressed as the difference between 'understanding' as opposed to 'explaining' human behaviour. The difference at the methodological level does, however, point to a difference at a deeper level concerning substantive issues such as the concepts of selfhood, identity and meaning. In the case of the structuralist movement, these substantive questions emerge as an

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identifiable 'ideology' in the post-structuralist thought of writers like Barthes, Foucault, Lacan and Derrida. Structuralism began as a method of inquiry initiated by Levi-Strauss in his analyses of anthropological phenomena — myths, rituals, kinship systems, etc. It was a method derived from de Saussure's theory of structural linguistics. In the hands of the structuralists, de Saussure's linguistic techniques for uncovering the depth-structures (the 'meaning' structures) of human behaviour in all of its cultural manifestations. The structuralism of Levi-Strauss sees the beginnings of an anti-individualistic philosophy, one preferring universal structures of human thought as against individual, subjective meanings; it sees the subversion of claims to authority in questions of meaning by sanctioning a plurality of admissible interpretations none of which is a competitor for the claim to authority; in short, it bears witness to the disappearance of 'the subject' as traditionally conceived in egocentric philosophies such as phenomenology and existentialism.

What characterises the thought of the post-structuralists is the exploitation of the structuralist method to denounce this traditional conception of the subject as a unified and autonomous 'self' or 'ego' which exists 'behind' the text and invests that text with meaning. The 'self' conceived of in this way is exposed as a false construct. Language which, paradoxically, helps to construct the myth of 'the self', plays a crucial role in the post-structuralists' dissolution of that myth. For these thinkers, language is neither the transparent medium of thought — i.e., the subject's or author's — nor is it a mirror of 'the order of things' — i.e., 'reality'. Implicit here is the rejection of two common preconceptions concerning language: first, the idea that for all texts or all discourse, there is a subject or author which in some way transcends that text or discourse; second, the presumption that the coherence of the text is a reflection of a unity in nature, be it a unified subject or a unified 'reality'. A structuralist approach to language seeks to undercut such preconceptions by attending to the interplay of 'signifiers' — the material form of the signs which make up the text — rather than to the 'signified' — an immaterial content 'behind' the text. The focus is upon 'the how' of discourse rather than upon 'the what'. The text is not the medium of the inquiry but, rather, the object of inquiry.

Roland Barthes, in his structuralist analyses of literary texts and cultural phenomena generally, seeks to demonstrate an essentialist prejudice in those who would postulate a subject as the source of the text or of 'reality' as its extra-linguistic referent. Lacan, in his structuralist approach to the texts of psychoanalysis, shows that the self or ego construed as a unity is an illusion. His study of the language of the unconscious reveals the self as a fragmentation, a dispersal. Derrida's dissolution of the notions of 'selfhood' and authorship is a consequence of his 'de-construction' of texts — his demonstration that writings of a philosophical or literary nature show a consistency or a coherence which is, in fact, an illusion. In many of these writers there is a distinct ideological tone: the conception of the self as autonomous, authoritative and a unity is seen to be a construct of bourgeois ideology; language which, in some sense, serves to create this conception and to re-affirm it, is a potential instrument of political domination. The relation between language and power is dealt with explicitly in Foucault's later works, but it is a theme continuous with his earlier renunciations of the subject as a false transcendence.

Both the methodological and the substantive aspects of Ricouer's hermeneutic philosophy, on the one hand, and of structuralist and post-structuralist thought, on the other, receive due prominence in the two books under review here. The impression created by Reagan's collection is that the essays contained within it are all contributions to an ongoing project. This view is confirmed by Ricoeur himself in his preface to the work. Many of the essays trace the development of particular themes through Ricoeur's writings, revealing a unity within that corpus and extending some of its main ideas. Mary Schaldenbrand explores the role of imagination as a theme in Ricoeur's work. She shows how for Ricoeur, the role of imagination as 'mediating function' is anticipated in Ricoeur's early work on symbolism and confirmed in his most recent

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studies of metaphor. The notion of the text, which is one of the most important unifying themes in Ricoeur's philosophy, receives careful examination in three of the essays: Patrick Bourgeois discusses the different stages in the development of this theme, showing how each of these phases emerged in response to quite specific problems at a previous stage of Ricoeur's philosophy of language; David Pellauer's essay provides a natural sequel to this by showing the progressive broadening of scope and of significance of the notion of the text in Ricoeur's hermeneutical theory; Charles Regan shows how Ricoeur's notion of the text can provide a suitable model for approaching the 'mixed discourse' of Freudian psychoanalysis — an ambivalent discourse which seems to demand *both* a scientific *and* an intentional model for the understanding of human behaviour.

Other essays in this book offer a critical review of Ricoeur's place within the tradition of phenomenology and existentialism. Although both Ricoeur and Sartre might accurately be termed 'existential phenomenologists', they are what Robert Solomon calls 'an uncomfortable duo'. Solomon discusses Ricoeur's view of passion and the emotions, comparing it with that of Sartre. He shows the limitations of Ricoeur's account of emotion and suggests the direction that an adequate theory might take. David Stewart also draws some illuminating comparisons between Sartre and Ricoeur, arguing that Ricoeur's humanism is a genuine alternative to the atheistic humanism advocated by Sartre. Richard Zaner raises some important questions concerning the status of Ricoeur's inquiry, arguing that *statements about* the hermeneutical task cannot be assimilated to the level of *the practice of* hermeneutics. Ricoeur, in his preface, responds in some detail to Zaner's objections by justifying his departure from the 'pure' phenomenology of the early Husserl — a departure which Ricoeur argues is necessitated by the fact that the object of reflection at the meta-level is itself reflection, specifically the understanding of the self through symbols and texts.

Many of these essays will be of interest to scholars of 'theological' hermeneutics. Biblical exegesis and religious symbolism are for Ricoeur, fundamentally important dimensions of the hermeneutic field, and these dimensions receive due prominence in most of the essays here. The two bibliographies included in this work provide an invaluable resource for the Rocoeur scholar. Frans D. Vansina has contributed a chronological survey of Ricoeur's main published works; Francois H. Lapointe's bibliographical essay lists secondary sources including one section classifying articles by language. Reagan's book will be welcomed for its informative and stimulating reading by specialists in Ricoeur's philosophy and by those interested in the theological aspects of hermeneutics.

John Sturrock's collection of essays, on the other hand, addresses a much wider audience. The ideas of the five thinkers discussed in this collection are, generally speaking, unfamiliar and strange to the uninitiated and are, in many cases, quite deliberately rendered obscure or difficult by the style of writing. An important merit of Sturrock's collection is the success of each contributor in making those ideas accessible. Perhaps an even greater merit of this book is the attention given by each writer to explaining why the difficulty in style is deliberately calculated by these thinkers. Because of the difficulty of the 'primary sources' in the case of each of the thinkers represented here, Sturrock's book could provide a useful prelude to the task of approaching the original works. These essays are, however, not mere expositions. Key terms and concepts are submitted to critical scrutiny, ideas and methodologies are compared and evaluated, important criticisms are raised or suggested. Contributors to this volume include theorists of literature, language, history and anthropology. Sturrock, himself, is Deputy Editor of the *Times Literary Supplement*.

One major difficulty in compiling an anthology of essays on the structuralist movement and its successors is surely that of identifying any unified set of ideas or of subject-matter which can be designated by the word 'structuralist' or 'post-structuralist'. Most writers who have been associated with that movement have repudiated the title 'structuralist' and have disclaimed allegiance to any common programme. Thus

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Sturrock has prudently called his book *Structuralism and Since*. The collection, taken as a whole, seeks to emphasise the individuality of each of the writers discussed and the diversity of thought within this 'movement'.

In the first of these essays, Dan Sperber discusses the work of Levi-Strauss, analysing some of the key concepts and methodological principles of the structuralist approach and evaluating Levi-Strauss' own work in the light of subsequent developments in structuralism. John Sturrock examines Roland Barthes' structuralist approach to literary texts, placing that approach within its philosophical and polemical context. He argues that Barthes is to be regarded as a moralist rather than as a scientist. Hayden White's analysis of the work and ideas of Michael Foucault incorporates a critical review of the status of Foucault's own writings. He suggests that Foucault's work to date lacks a philosophy of language which, he argues, is needed to provide a theoretical basis for that work. Malcolm Bowie reviews Jacques Lacan's work on linguistics and psychoanalysis showing Lacan's view of the relationship between language and the unconscious — a theme which appears in a somewhat different guise in the writings of Foucault. Finally, Jonathan Culler discusses Derrida's structuralist approach to literary and philosophical texts. He compares and contrasts Derrida's ideas and methodology with those of the other thinkers already discussed in this book. What connects these diverse and highly individual ideas is, in the first instance, an acceptance of the methodological principles of de Saussure's structural linguistics. At a different level, however, it is clear that these writers (with the exception, perhaps, of Levi-Strauss) are in some sense united in their shared opposition to humanistic and ego-centric philosophies.

Sturrock's collection is an impressive and significant contribution to the literature dealing with contemporary European thought. It succeeds in showing a degree of contiguity and perhaps continuity (if not a unity) in the thought of these leading French intellectuals. It achieves this while at the same time preserving the lively diversity, originality and inventiveness of each of the writers discussed.

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Cooper, David E., *Illusions of Equality*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. x, 178.

This book deserves to be read, pondered and argued about. It is not a book simply to scan. It is well, clearly and closely argued, and presents in a refreshingly competent manner a systematic treatment of one of the central issues in the philosophy of education. Those who, particularly on ideological grounds, oppose David Cooper's views will no doubt react with some violence to what he has to say, but if any of them puts forward an equally clear, sustained and argued case for the egalitarian position which Cooper attacks, a great step will have been made in this area of the philosophy of education. Many indeed will wait with interest to see if there is an egalitarian able and bold enough to take up the gauntlet.

In brief outline Cooper proceeds as follows. He begins by trying to explain why it is that so many people (mistakenly) think of themselves as egalitarians, or get drawn into speaking in egalitarian terms; and having done this he attempts to clear up some of the muddles involved, by providing us with at least a working understanding of what the doctrine of egalitarianism amounts to. He suggests that the egalitarian is one who demands more equalities in *x*, *y* or *z*, where the equalities concerned are of a *levelling* sort and where, in fulfilment of a necessary condition, the demand in question is not based on a consideration of the needs of those supposedly to benefit from the equalities, but on a consideration of what *others* receive or possess. In other words, it is suggested that the egalitarian centrally claims that John Smith ought to receive more (or less) of *x*,

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not because he needs more (or less) of x, but because *others* receive more (or less) of x. Having set down this 'definition' of egalitarianism, Cooper examines the various grounds (utility, rationality, justice and the Rawlsian principle of difference) which have been or might with some plausibility be appealed to in support of the doctrine. He finds them all inadequate.

Cooper's positive position is one which favours certain inequalities in education. In particular he favours a system in which some schools are allocated the more able pupils, and provide them with better teachers, better facilities and in general a better education than is given to the rest. His way of arguing for this is to work in part with an imaginary simple society, named Scholesia, in which there are only two schools, North and South (North being the one where the better education takes place). In Scholesia people value educational goods for their own sake, and for the most part educational standards are not tied to socio-economic levels (e.g., there is no connection between attendance at North or South and subsequent income or status). With his eye steadily on this model, Cooper argues that on purely educational grounds a system of selective schooling is fully justified, and he treats quite separately the objections to such a selective system in the real world: the objections, for example, that it is élitist, is carried out in the interests of some at the expense of others, is based on luck rather than merit, fosters social divisions and ensures the 'circle of inequality'.

The essence of Cooper's positive case for selective education comes to this. In a world in which abilities are varied and resources limited, a selective system alone will make possible the pursuit of educational *excellence* (excellence in knowledge, understanding, critical appreciation and so on), and it is precisely and simply this which constitutes its justification. Most human beings are concerned at a very fundamental level with the attainment of excellence in this or that area, and in that sense are 'enthusiastic' about the latter, and to say this is to say that they are concerned with the reaching of ever higher standards, the breaking of barriers, the scaling of new heights and the rest. Anyone who is not concerned with such things in a given pursuit (music, athletics, education or whatever) cannot with seriousness claim to be an enthusiast at all. Similarly, where there is a conflict between attending to excellence and attending to an evenly spread average improvement, there is rarely any hesitation in the mind of the enthusiast over which should be preferred. One who does hesitate, or one who chooses the even average improvement, is just not an enthusiast. (The assumption behind all this, I take it, is that no-one — not even the egalitarian — concerned about education, knowledge and the rest would wish to be thought of as anything but enthusiastic about them.)

Cooper's case against the coherence of the doctrine of educational egalitarianism is very strong, and while many egalitarians will doubtless complain that his way of defining their position is too narrow or too wide or too something else, they will not find it easy to meet his attack. On the other hand, Cooper's own case appears to have a number of weaknesses. First, even those of us who are totally committed to the value of excellence in knowledge, understanding and the rest ought surely to allow that the right of that excellence to be pursued is no more than a *prima facie* right and consequently may be overridden by others. This point may be brought out by considering the contrast between the aims of, say, a university and those of a school. It is very plausible to maintain that a university should have as its chief, if not only, aim the single-minded pursuit of intellectual enquiry and excellence. A school by contrast has many central aims, including such diverse things as imparting basic skills; developing and training intellectual and critical abilities; providing students with hobbies and interests; helping them to find their place in society; preparing them for jobs; educating them for moral, personal and physical well-being; helping them to understand the world they live in; helping them to become responsible members of a democratic society. And because it is difficult, if not impossible, to single out some of these aims and activities as being of greater importance than others, a case for selective education cannot fairly be based on considerations of intellectual or kindred excellence alone. It needs to be argued in

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addition (a pretty formidable task) that a selective system based on the pursuit of intellectual excellence would not run counter to the many other central aims of a school. Second, under the umbrella of education lie not only diverse but often competing excellences. Many teachers, parents and others, for example, set excellence in character, moral and practical living well above excellence in knowledge, understanding and critical appreciation, and when in turn they go on to argue (as often they do) in favour of selective education, the sorts of pupils they have in mind for selection are not the same as those that Cooper has in mind. Cooper therefore needs to demonstrate that the kind of selection he favours should take precedence over theirs. Third, there are many kinds of justifiable enthusiasms, and it *is* possible for a teacher to be genuinely enthusiastic about the unending progress, breaking of barriers, scaling of heights and so on of his average students *relative to their earlier performances.* Of course it may be pointed out that this sort of enthusiasm is not enthusiasm for this or that subject or area of understanding. That is true. But if it comes to a clash (it may not, but that is a different issue), there is nothing irrational about a teacher's preferring enthusiasm for the progress of his average pupils, or for the progress of the main body of his pupils, to that of any given subject or subjects *in abstracto.* Fourth, in what concerns the real world as opposed to Scholesia, Cooper seems to favour something like a system of English grammar schools (side by side with 'public' schools) in more or less the form in which they have existed until now — that is, as places of *general* education. But the logic of his arguments would seem to lead rather in the direction of the sorts of special schools now existing in Russia, for children gifted in ballet, music or mathematics. That kind of selective schooling, if any, would seem more likely to ensure the future scaling of heights than more general-purpose schools. I say 'if any', because it may well be that the scaling of academic heights in the real world can safely be left to universities and their students anyway.

I do not wish to suggest that Cooper cannot provide answers to these and other points that might be made against him. What I do wish to suggest is that he needs to develop his case a good deal further.

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Diamond, Cora, and Teichman, Jenny (eds.). *Intentions and Intentionality. Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe,* Sussex, The Harvester Press, 1979, pp. xix, 265, $16.95.

This collection of essays dedicated to G. E. M. Anscombe on the occasion of her sixtieth birthday is one that aims to do justice both to the depth of her philosophical insights and to the breadth of their reverberations. The result is a very diverse collection — one ranging over topics in philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, semantics, metaphysics and philosophy of logic. It is a collection which demands a formidable range of philosophical interests and expertise for its full appreciation. The depth and diversity which make this book a fitting tribute to Anscombe's philosophical talents may well turn out to be a shortcoming where that book's accessibility and readership are concerned.

The seventeen essays which comprise this *Festschrift* fall into four sections headed 'The First Person', 'Action and Intention', 'Sense and Nonsense', 'Time, Truth and Necessity'. The thread which connects this diverse assortment of topics is said to be the themes of intention and intentionality.

The essays in the first of these sections are all directly addressed to the questions concerning self and self-consciousness associated with the use of the pronoun 'I' which Anscombe raises in her paper, 'The First Person'. In Anscombe's paper the problematic nature of the *I,* which can be both subject and object, derives ultimately from Cartesian

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considerations. For this reason, A. Kenny ('The First Person') and N. Malcolm ("Whether 'I' is a Referring Expression") suggest that the problems surrounding the first person can be dissolved by invoking those Wittgensteinian arguments against privacy which, as we all know, deal an effective death-blow to Cartesian dualism and its attendant evils. In dealing such a blow, however, Kenny and Malcolm show a certain insensitivity to some of the more interesting aspects of Anscombe's treatment concerning, for example, questions of sense and reference and questions of personal identity. (One might add that they also show a degree of eclecticism which understates Wittgenstein's own concern with the problem of self as both subject and object in *The Blue Book*.) A more fruitful response to the problems raised by Anscombe is to be found in J. E. J. Altham's neo-Davidsonian account of the indirect reflexive ('Indirect Reflexives and Indirect Speech') and in H. Noonan's discussion of the problem of identity associated with uses of 'I' ('Identity and the First Person'). Both accept Anscombe's recommendation that the indirect reflexive ('himself'/'herself') be explicated in terms of the first-person pronoun ('I'). This recommendation is challenged by R. Chisholm ('The Indirect Reflexive') who attempts a reconstruction of the problem of the first person in terms of intentional attitudes, requiring an explication of 'I' in terms of the indirect reflexive. Chisholm's difficult and penetrating analysis of the indirect reflexive involves an attempt to capture the notion of acquaintance (which characterises self-consciousness) by appeal to a special property rather than by relying on presuppositions of an epistemological kind.

Papers grouped under the heading of 'Action and Intention' include criticisms of what are often held to be the more dubious moral stances adopted by Anscombe vis-a-vis the particular issues of contraception and war. Jenny Teichman, in a masterly piece of analysis and criticism, 'Intention and Sex', explores the basis of Anscombe's version of a 'natural law' thesis concerning the immorality of certain forms of contraception. Teichman examines the conceptual distinction which Anscombe draws within the class of intentional acts relating to contraceptive sex and questions the legitimacy of Anscombe's move in drawing specific conclusions of an ethical nature on the basis of that distinction. Lucy Brown ('Intentions in the Conduct of a Just War') traces the development of Anscombe's thought concerning war and killing, and exposes some of the weaknesses in the principle of double effect which is a consistent underlying principle in this development. Another of Anscombe's distinctions — that between chance and 'mere hap' (which she has drawn in an unpublished paper) — is accepted without criticism by R. Hambourger ('The Argument from Design') who attempts a non-analogical version of the argument from design making use of that distinction. Other papers in this section include A. Muller's discussion of practical reasoning ('How Theoretical is Practical Reasoning?') and C. Taylor's version of an expression theory of desire ('Action as Expression').

In the remaining two sections of the book, Anscombe's writings cease to be a focal point. These two sections serve rather to open up domains of discourse — most notably those of formal semantics and modal logic — which are seen to provide a fertile context for the development of some of her main preoccupations. The contributors to the section, 'Sense and Nonsense', share Anscombe's lively concern with the writings of Frege and Wittgenstein. Prominent in this section is Deirdre Wilson's illuminating discussion of the problem of intensional isomorphism ('Intensional Isomorphism and Natural Language Sentences') — a problem which clearly has an important bearing on Fregean-inspired debates concerning meaning, synonymy and the semantic structure of natural languages. Linguistic theory and formal semantics are the tools for Wilson's contruction of the problem and her proposed solution to it. But they are tools which, in this instance are put to a non-technical use. By contrast, B. Wolneiwicz's exploration of the possibilities of a Wittgensteinian semantics is highly technical in its approach and subject-matter ('A Wittgensteinian Semantics for Propositions'). Frege and Wittgenstein come together in Cora Diamond's essay, 'Frege and Nonsense'. Here, an examination of Frege's account of 'nonsense' allows us to see more clearly

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Wittgenstein's indebtedness to Frege where the relation of meaning to the linguistic role of expressions is concerned.

The final section, 'Time, Truth and Necessity', is devoted to questions in metaphysics and modal logic, most of which arise from the ninth chapter of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. P. Geach ('Kinds of Statement') argues that there are no logically insulated kinds of truth; G. H. von Wright ('Time, Truth and Necessity') discusses the problem of 'future truth' and in doing so, takes issue with some aspects of Anscombe's interpretation of Aristotle; R. C. Jeffrey ('Coming True') and B. Chellis ('Modalities in Normal Systems Containing the S5 Axiom') explore some of the implications of this same problem in terms of systems of modal logic.

If the themes of intention and intentionality form the thread which connects the various topics in this collection, then it seems at times to be a very tenuous one. The relation between intention (which derives from the philosophy of mind) and intentionality (a feature of language) is an irrepressible question throughout Anscombe's own writings. This much is undeniable. But, despite the editors' claim to the contrary, it is hardly a question which has been elucidated let alone put to rest by Anscombe herself. The failure to meet an important, if implicit challenge in Anscombe's writing — that of confronting the question of the relation of intention and intentionality — is an unfortunate omission in this particular work. The relation in question remains as elusive as it does in Anscombe's own writings.

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