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Reviews

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REVIEWS

Hughes, G. E. and Cresswell, M. J., *A Companion to Modal Logic*, London, Methuen, 1984, pp. ix, 203, $19.95 (paper).

Hughes and Cresswell's *Introduction to Modal Logic* (hereafter, *IML*) was first published in 1968. In the subsequent 17 years it has initiated almost as many generations of students into the dark secrets of modal logic. One of the remarkable things about the book is that it has retained its place as *the* standard textbook on the subject, and that in a subject that has been expanding rapidly. (There are other texts around, for example, Chellas' excellent *Modal Logic*; but these tend to have a more specialised orientation, both in the ground they cover and in the target audience.) An important secret of Hughes and Cresswell's success, was their ability to explain, simply and clearly, ideas of a quite technical nature to an audience that could not be relied upon to have great technical sophistication.

But despite (or in virtue of) its longevity, the book now appears rather dated. The advent of the canonical model construction and its implications, at around the same time as the publication of the book, have brought about a deeper perspective of the subject. Model theory has replaced comparative axiomatics as the unifying force; and from this perspective the Lewis systems appear to be an historical accident, not appropriate for the focus of an exposition, as they are in *IML*.

It is for this reason that Hughes and Cresswell's new book, *A Companion to Modal Logic* (hereafter, *CML*), is to be welcomed. *CML* is text book written from the new perspective. Not that the book is a replacement for *IML*. It is more or less self contained, but does not attempt to cover the same ground, and could not really be used as an introductory text on its own. Rather, and as the name suggests, it is to be used in conjunction with *IML* to bring it up to date. Neither does it attempt to be comprehensive. Indeed, modal logic has expanded so far that a text book which does this is now unthinkable. (It does not even cover all the ground covered in Chellas—neighbourhood semantics, for example). It centres on arguably the basic semantic structure of modal logics, Kripke frames (sets of worlds together with a binary relation on the set), and explores important questions about them.

In more detail, the contents are as follows: The first three chapters explain the canonical model construction for modal propositional logics, and introduce the reader to the idea of the characterisation of a logic by a class of structures. Chapters 4 through 6 then concentrate on characterisation by frames. They compare this with characterisation by models, and prove a number completeness and incompleteness results using techniques such as p-morphisms and bulldozing (to use Segerberg's terminology). Chapter 7 is a disquisition on what Hughes and Cresswell call 'subordination frames'. These are frames where the relation is a certain sort of tree; they were the structures used to prove completeness in *IML*, and now appear in a much more general form. Chapter 8 discusses finite models, filtration and decidability. The final chapter is the only one concerned with predicate logic, and gives an account of the canonical model construction for constant-domain semantics. Each chapter save the first contains useful exercises. There is a glossary of technical terms, and a short, but very useful, bibliography which, together with the notes to the text, provides an excellent reference to the recent literature.

The book is, in fact, a very successful distillation of the recent results of van Bentham, Segerberg, Fine and others, which were, until now, largely accessible only as technical papers in journals. But as with *IML*, the distillate is enriched in the production. Moreover, if a knowledge of *IML* leads readers to expect a similar high level of clarity of explanation in *CML*, they will not be disappointed. Only at one point would I have added a few words: in the discussion of decidability and the finite model property (pp. 153-4). (A reader who has met the notion of isomorphism only three chapters before might need a bit of help to see that the set of finite frames (distinct up to isomorphism) can be enumerated; and a similar novice might be puzzled as to why the fact that both a set and its complement are recursively enumerable implies that the set itself is decidable.) However, this exception proves the rule.

The thing which disappointed me most about *CML* was that it contains so little on quantified modal logic. Since *IML* is still the only text to cover the subject, the numerous interesting developments in this area over the last fifteen years could certainly have used Hughes and Cresswell's services. The single chapter at the end of the book seems like a bit of an apology. (Those who want more could consult Garson's very readable article. 'Quantification in Modal Logic', in Vol. II of the *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*. Incidentally, the articles by Segerberg and Bull and by van Benthem in the same volume are also useful follow-ups to *CML*.) Still, this does not detract from the fact that for modal propositional logic *CML* marks well the new perspective of the subject.

There is also another, and perhaps unintended, way that the book is an index of the current state of the subject: it shows the estrangement of modal logic (propositional logic anyway) from its philosophical roots. Modal logic, as a creature of this century, was born of a philosophical dissatisfaction with certain aspects of classical logic. It survived early attempts at infanticide by Quine, and its metaphysical implications came of age with the formulation of possible-world semantics. These semantics, with the technical investigations which they inaugurated, revealed the rich purely mathematical structure that underlies modal logic. Once this was exposed, modal logicians felt free to investigate it for its own sake, without worrying about the philosophical relevance of what they were doing. (Mathematical logic was similarly displaced from the philosophy of mathematics, which begot it, earlier this century.) Thus, current studies in modal propositional logic can pursue their way with no philosophical comment at all. This, *CML*, unlike *IML*, which was always glancing over its philosophical shoulder, does.

The divorce of the mathematical investigations of modal logic from its philosophical roots obviously has its beneficial effects. Like most divorces, however, there are losses as well as gains. One of these is that it allows modal logicians to forget the controversial past of their subject, and so lose sympathy with, if not interest in, areas that have not. In particular, dissatisfaction with the paradoxes of implication is still an important philosophical issue; but this is now pursued not in modal logic, but in relevant logic, about which modal logicians tend to be as suspicious as orthodox logicians were of modal logic in its pre-mature years. (See, for example, the remarks of Segerberg, one of the less unsympathetic modal logicians, on p. 7 of Vol. II of the *Handbook of Philosophical Logic*). In fact, the resemblances between relevant logic now, and modal logic at the publication of *IML* are strong and striking. Both were moved originally by the same thought. Both were surrounded by philosophical controversy. Both appeared first in a purely axiomatic guise but were later furnished with algebraic and, notably, relational semantics. (Binary for modal logic, ternary for relevant logic.) In virtue of these semantics, the early systems of both modal and relevant logic can be seen as but the tip of an iceberg—and not the most fundamental part, at that. Moreover, in 1968 the semantics of modal logics were relatively new. Thus, they were known only to the few who could read technical articles, and their power had not been fully realised or exploited. Exactly the same is now true of relevant logic semantics. Without doubt, *IML*, with its lucid, accessible and sympathetic explanations, played an important role in the domestication of modal logics. What we need now is a text book which can do the same thing for relevant logics. Any takers?

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Routley, Richard, with Meyer, Robert K., Plumwood, Val, and Brady, Ross T.; *Relevant Logics and their Rivals 1*, Atascadero, California, U.S.A., Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1985, pp. xv, 460.

On the front cover a crowd of gowned figures file into a surprisingly deep billabong, while four casually dressed folk tramp safely round it. On the back cover is a projection of the globe with Australia central in bright red. Routley and Meyer have come a long way from the groves of academe as located in Wellington, New Zealand, and Pittsburgh, PA. (We are told that Routley wrote the last third of the book with Meyer, and rewrote the final version of the whole. Beyond that the contributions of the co-authors are not clear, though my impression is that the philosophical discussions of the first two thirds are by the Routleys.)

The book is a big one, for all that it covers only half the prepared material, over 450 large and closely printed pages. Thus it is much the most comprehensive account of relevant logic since the Anderson and Belnap *Entailment* described the subject before the advent of the Routley-Meyer semantics. It is natural to compare the two books, and it soon becomes clear that they differ considerably.

First, the emphasis has largely shifted from the relevance of the antecedent to the consequent, to paraconsistency. Thus more than a third of the book covers entailments between formulas of zero degree, so that the emphasis is on negation, conjunction, disjunction as much as on implication. Here there is much hard-nosed philosophical logic, with detailed defences of the relevant position and criticisms of many alternatives. After this book, no-one can complain that relevant logicians have not spelled out their case at the philosophical level. The story starts with Lewis's derivations of $(A \& {\sim} A) \rightarrow B$, in which the authors see Disjunctive Syllogism $(A \& ({\sim} A \vee B)) \rightarrow B$ as the villain. Throughout the first two chapters the relative merits of this diagnosis and many objections or alternatives are discussed in detail: Lewis himself, Bennett, Smiley, Stalnaker, Parry, Lewy, etc. etc. The Antilogism Rule, that if $(A \& B) \rightarrow {\sim} C$ then $(A \& C) \rightarrow {\sim} B$, is seen as another main bad guy. The basic criterion used against these and other principles is the invalid suppressing of antecedents, and dually the negative suppressing of alternatives in the consequent. Situations which are inconsistent or incomplete can always be used to produce informal counter-examples to such principles which positively or negatively suppress, provided that & and v are interpreted extensionally. (As I say, the ground has shifted considerably from Anderson and Belnap; during a vigorous attack on some logicians' rejection of $(A \& B) \rightarrow A$ I was expecting an own goal on $A \rightarrow (B \rightarrow A)$ at any moment.)

In the same two chapters a start is made on the preferred proof theory and semantics. Here I am more uneasy, for it is tempting to present a technical device as an explanation. I still feel that the operation * on situations, used to evaluate negation, is being presented as a justification for the logical principles that remain after the previous criticisms. But I have heard many people say 'not', few of whom would accept that they meant something about shifting from situation a to situation a^*, as Routley seems to be saying. Further, I think many of them would accept the explanation that some propositions are true, some are false, some are both, some are neither, and that ${\sim} A$ is true when A is false, etc. This provides a perfectly good alternative semantics for zero degree formulas, with four truth values instead of two. And it can be extended to the higher degrees of implication for some systems, especially in the absence of Contraction $(A \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow B)$. As far as I have learned, this kind of semantics began with Nelson's Constructible Falsity, a topic not mentioned at all in this book.

Again, disjunction is normally defined in terms of negation and conjunction in this book. But I am sure that most people would not take this definition for its meaning, and the Intuitionist case alone shows that it cannot be basic. Again, sequents are used here with a very extensional conjunction on the left, which determines the subsequent development. But it is quite feasible to take the lefthand side to represent successive antecedents of implications, with $\ldots, A\&B, \ldots \vdash \Delta$ following from

$\ldots, A, \ldots \vdash \Delta$ or $\ldots, B, \ldots \vdash \Delta$. If Δ must be a single formula then Cut elimination is easily proved but the Distributivity of & and v does not hold. Otherwise Distributivity does hold but Cut elimination cannot hold for a full system. Now this book asserts Distributivity strongly, with no more argument than a reference to another work by Routley, the point being that both the technical devices I have just mentioned commit one to it. But this seems to be a watershed formula for weak logics, with systems lacking it having a much smoother metatheory, as various Japanese and East European logicians have shown. I do not believe that its omission is philosophically justifiable, but I would very much like to see the point argued fully. (Of course quantum logic proves nothing here, for quantum events simply do combine in very odd ways, and the lack of Distributivity is just one aspect of this.) In general I feel that the properties of the positive part of logic should be established independently of negation. For intuitions concerning negation vary wildly, and there seems to be less hope for a common core to these intuitions than for those concerning implication itself.

At a technical level my complaints about the * operation are met in the first sections of Chapter 3. Here there is a full account of the semantics for first degree entailments, beginning with the intensional lattices and 8-valued matrix of Belnap and his co-workers. A wide range of alternatives is examined in detail, including the distinction between having two truth values with the * operation and having four truth values, referred to as the Australian and American Plans.

A second difference from the Anderson and Belnap *Entailment* surfaces in the rest of the long third chapter. Belnap has argued that the correct logics of implication and entailment should be the strongest ones avoiding the fallacies of relevance and necessitation. (A nice game is played with this approach in one section here, which lists a number of extensions of E which still satisfy these criteria.) In this chapter the basic criterion of the avoidance of suppression of antecedents is again employed to criticise a number of theses of E and R philosophically. My own objection to non-relevant logics centres on the Intuitionist view that $A \to (B \to C)$ is equivalent to $(A \& B) \to C$, so I am particularly pleased to see a heavy attack against Exportation, the principle that the latter implies the former. Also attacked, with the reservation that it is Routley's view rather than that of all his fellow authors, are the usual Syllogism axioms. The Syllogism rules and the Conjunctive Syllogism $((A \to B) \& (B \to C)) \to (A \to C)$ are accepted here, but deriving the usual Syllogism axioms such as $(A \to B) \to ((B \to C) \to (A \to C))$ from the Conjunctive Syllogism is a typical example of Exportation. The converse heresy of Importation is also discussed, less vehemently I am afraid, mainly in its consequences such as Contraction. The upshot of this chapter is that while the first degree theory of implication preferred here coincides with that of E and R, the higher degree theory is much weaker.

Another difference from the Anderson and Belnap *Entailment* dominates the last third of this book, the development by Routley and Meyer of their relational semantics. The minimal logic considered is B with no Syllogism principles except the rules, for which a detailed treatment is given. (Note that the superficial argument for the Conjunctive Syllogism on p. 75 is refuted with the ternary relation in its most general form.) An American Plan semantics with two ternary relations is also given. (But the Cut-free proof theory without Distributivity mentioned above can be exploited to give an American Plan semantics in which implication is determined by one binary function. Please hurry up and convince me that Distributivity cannot be dropped! At various points in this review I have tried to indicate that arguing from technical needs to an informal position must be very convincing to succeed at all. For a viable alternative technical position can equally well lead back to a different starting point. I hasten to add that if indeed Routley and Co. have sins under this heading, then they are more venial than those of most of us symbolic logicians.) The extensions of B with many other axioms and rules are considered, including the strong systems of Ackermann and of Anderson and Belnap. The extensions of these logics with further operators are also considered. Some of these are well known, intensional conjunctions such as relative consistency, some less so, such as the intensional disjunction which Lewis first considered in 1912. Note that with these intensional operators one must be careful to avoid the arguments against their extensional counterparts, such as objections to Disjunctive Syllogism and defences of $(A\&B)\rightarrow A$. Some metatheory for relevant logics is developed from these completeness results. However there are as yet no implicational analogues of the rich metatheory for modal logics developed by Fine and Goldblatt. That theory depends upon a contravariant duality between the morphisms of the algebras and the relational structures for modal logics, which carries the wellknown results for algebraic varieties over to classes of relational structures. So far there are no morphisms known for the ternary relation, let alone a duality theory, so that there is not much that one can do with the ternary relation.

A tentative menu of section headings for the second volume is provided, which will be mouth-watering for the gourmet of semantic technicalities. However the present volume is more important for the general than such caviar. Both relevant logicians and their rivals must be grateful that the philosophical underpinnings of the relevant position and the semantics of its basic systems have at last been set out in this detail. And indeed the cumulative detail of this large book is extremely impressive. Whatever the role of the co-authors, one must admire Routley's command of this wealth of both formal and informal analyses.

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Friedman, M., *Foundations of Space-Time Theories*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983, pp. xvi, 385, $95.00.

Michael Friedman's long awaited book is largely devoted to the attempted solution to a single problem: is there a precise mathematical characterisation of the principles of relativity that relates them to the symmetry group of particular space-time structures? Since the general reader is likely to find this an unpalatably obscure formulation I'll attempt a brief summary of the historical background by way of motivation.

In the early days of General Relativity, in fact in the papers that Einstein wrote giving the theory its first formulation, it was claimed that the theory was (as the name suggests) a generalisation of Special Relativity. There was one sense in which this was obviously true: Special Relativity was a theory defined on a *flat* Lorentz-signature manifold and in General Relativity the Lorentz-signature manifolds were allowed to be curved to incorporate the effects of gravitation. But was there also a sense in which General Relativity contained *more relativity of motion* than Special Relativity? Einstein apparently thought there was. The relativity in General Relativity was enshrined in several principles, notably the Principle of General Covariance and the Principle of Equivalence, but from the first they were subject to debate, dissent and incomprehension. Couldn't all theories be formulated covariantly? If a space-time is *really* curved due to the effects of gravitation isn't the equivalence of accelerated observers and those that are free-falling in a gravitational field only apparent? In 1967, J. L. Anderson attempted to formulate precise notions of General Covariance and Equivalence which would vindicate in some measure Einstein's original claims. Michael Friedman then tried in a paper entitled 'Relativity Principles, Absolute Objects and Symmetry Groups' in *Space, Time and Geometry,* ed. P. Suppes, (D. Reidel, 1973) to give a more mathematically perspicuous formulation of Anderson's formulation. There was no attempt there however to deal with the problem of General Covariance at the same time as the putative equivalence of frames.

Which brings me to Friedman's book. This essentially is a very thorough analysis of the same problematic issues, along the lines of his 1973 article but with a greatly increased scope. Chapters 2-5, the heart of the book, articulate Friedman's notion of absolute geometrical objects and apply it to successive space-time theories.

What then is Friedman's solution to the problem of the distinction between absolute and dynamical objects? The intuitive notion of an absolute object as it appears in Anderson's work is that it is a geometric object field that is not affected by the interactions that the theory describes, it is not dynamic and subject to change. The Minkowski metric in Special Relativity, for example, is fixed *ab initio*, it is unresponsive to anything that may be happening in the space-time itself. Clearly this is not the case with the metric of General Relativity. Friedman attempts to capture this notion more formally by, first, extracing from a given theory its set of models consistent with the field equations. These are denoted generically by the ordered $n+1$-tuple $\langle \mathfrak{M},\Phi_1, \ldots \Phi_n\rangle$. The second step is to describe conditions under which any two models can be said to have the i-th geometrical object equivalent. Friedman does this with the following definition: given two models of T, $\langle \mathfrak{M},\Phi_1, \ldots \Phi_n\rangle$ and $\langle \mathfrak{M}, \Psi_1, \ldots \Psi_n\rangle$ then of for each $p \in \mathfrak{M}$ there are neighbourhoods A, B of p and a transformation h: $A \rightarrow B$ such that $\Psi_i = h\Phi_i$ on $A \cap B$, Φ_i and Ψ_i are said to be d-equivalent. If the i-th geometrical objects of all models of T are d-equivalent then the object is absolute (pp. 58-60). Friedman then applies the notions of absolute and dynamical objects to Newtonian theory (with and without gravitation), Special Relativity and General Relativity, arguing that the d-equivalence condition gives the right answers in the four cases and in particular that General Relativity has no absolute objects. Clearly then, the notion of d-equivalence is central to Friedman's book. How plausible is it?

There are some worrying consequences of the d-equivalence conditions. One problem is noted by Friedman in a footnote (p. 59), namely that it turns out that nowhere-vanishing timelike vector fields are absolute objects since any two are d-equivalent. I am puzzled by Friedman's response to this counterexample.

> Fortunately, however, this problem does not arise in the context of any of the space-time theories I discuss. It could arise in the general relativistic theory of 'dust' if we formulate the theory in terms of a quintuple $\langle \mathfrak{M}, D, g, \varrho, \mathfrak{U}\rangle$ where ϱ is the density of the 'dust' and $\mathfrak{U}$ is its velocity field. $\mathfrak{U}$ is non-vanishing and thus would count as an absolute object by my definition. But here it seems more natural to formulate the theory as a quadruple $\langle \mathfrak{M}, D, g, \varrho\mathfrak{U}\rangle$ where $\varrho\mathfrak{U}$ is the momentum field of the 'dust'. Since $\varrho\mathfrak{U}$ does vanish in some models it will not be absolute.

I'm puzzled by this for the following reasons:

(i) Surely if the problem arises with *any* space-time theory then that is enough to do the damage.

(ii) It can't be the case that whether a theory has or does not have absolute objects is dependent upon how a theory is formulated: that would make the existence of symmetry groups a *non-physical* matter — surely even more counter-intuitive than the anomaly Friedman is trying to escape from.

(iii) If nowhere vanishing time-like fields come out absolute on the d-equivalence criterion then surely this will affect all general relativistic space-times, not just the general relativistic theory of 'dust' since almost all space-times admit such fields. (I confess to not being certain as to how strong this criticism is since it is unclear from what Friedman says just what goes into the $n+1$-tuple $\langle \mathfrak{M}, \Phi_1, \ldots \Psi_n\rangle$: is it all geometric objects or only those that appear in some formulation related to the field equations? If the latter then see (ii) above, if the former then the criticism stands.)

(iv) Are general relativistic theories of 'dust' not general relativistic theories *simpliciter* so that they cannot simply be bracketed off?

Still, lest I give the impression that I started out reviewing a book an ended up reviewing a footnote I'll now give a more general criticism of d-equivalence. Consider the following fictitious space-time theory: the theory has two models, in one the manifold is R^4 and in the other the manifold is four dimensional but not simply connected. Both models have a flat metric. Which space-time model obtains depends upon a scalar field which has only two values, 1 or 0, on or off. If you turn the scalar field on you get the non-simply connected flat space-time; if it is off then it is just Minkowski space-time. On the intuitive criterion, the metric looks to be a dynamical object since, globally at least, it is responding to the scalar field; it is not fixed *ab initio*. On the *d*-equivalence condition it turns out to be an absolute object. Indeed the metric turns out to be an absolute object even on the *d*-equivalence condition given in the article in the Suppes volume (mentioned above) where one is looking at maps between space-times.

Whatever the ultimate status of *d*-equivalence, Friedman's arguments and analysis are undoubtedly important and contribute a great deal to our understanding of the area. I've long had a feeling that theories of symmetry groups and the intuitive notion of dynamical geometrical objects cannot easily be made to fit together, so I came to Friedman's book a little sceptical that it can achieve its aim. (This feeling has recently been given a little more substance by Roger Jones' article 'The Special and General Principles of Relativity' in P. Barker and C. G. Stugart (eds.) *After Einstein: Proceedings of the Einstein Centenary Conference*, Memphis, Memphis State University Press, 1981. Jones appears to argue there that there are no plausible equivalence conditions that would give Friedman what he wants. I say 'appears' because Jones does not in fact address himself directly to Friedman's book; so that it is not clear to what extent there is a confluence of concerns.)

One outstanding feature of Friedman's book is the clarity with which he presents the mathematical foundations for the various space-time theories that he considers. In this respect the book comes very close to being a text book for the area. There are many other aspects of this book that recommend it to researchers. The first chapter is a quite brilliant analysis of the interplay between the development of relativity theory and logical positivism. Friedman rightly asserts, I think, that Kant was much more important for the development of Reichenbach's and Carnap's views than is usually thought to be the case. The German positivists were less empiricists (in the English tradition) than neo-Kantians. Friedman's arguments here deserve to be read by a wider audience than the book itself is likely to reach.

The remaining two chapters, six and seven, deal with relationalism and conventionalism respectively. (I won't discuss chapter seven save to recommend it.)

Friedman's analysis of relationalism is, in my view, unsurpassed in the literature. His method is to treat, à la van Fraassen, the space-time theory and its relational counterpart in terms of the model/sub-model distinction. Given that starting point he moves on to make extremely sensible suggestions as to when theoretical structures should, and should not, be deemed necessary for physical theory. Clearly we don't want all theoretical entities to be reified—who, for example, wants to believe that phase space exists in the same way that space-time does—yet neither do we want to 'nominalise the goodness away'. Friedman takes the right stance. The mathematics of relational theories are developed in such a way that their intrinsic weaknesses can clearly be seen *from the point of view of mathematical physics*. I don't think it would now be possible to discuss relationalism without taking into account what Friedman has written.

Friedman's book is, in this reviewer's opinion, the best book by a philosopher on the status and nature of space-time theories to have come out in a very long time. I could not recommend it too highly to all who are interested in contemporary philosophy of physics. In addition, I hope I've given the impression that large parts of the book may well have things to say to a general philosophy of science audience.

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Williamson, Raymond Keith, *Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Religion*. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1984, pp. xii, 388, US$44.50 (cloth), US$14.95 (paper).

In his oration at Hegel's funeral the theologian Philipp Marheineke spoke of Hegel's resurrection not only in religious but also in hermeneutic terms. Free from all earthly attachment Hegel was now 'no longer susceptible to misinterpretation' but, like Christ, 'transfigured in the hearts and spirits of all who recognised his eternal worth'. Marheineke had no doubts that Hegel was a devout Christian and that Hegel's system could only be interpreted as a defence of the Christian faith. It is ironic, then, that Hegel's remarks on religion should have become a hermeneutic problem themselves. For despite Marheineke's graveside pieties there has always been, even during Hegel's lifetime, sharp disagreement regarding the extent to which the Hegelian system is an accommodation of Christianity and the extent to which it is a critique of its most fundamental tenets.

Raymond Williamson's position on this issue is quite clear: while conceding that Hegel's philosophy of religion is characterised by ambiguity he seeks nevertheless to establish that it is broadly Christian in its emphases. More particularly, Williamson addresses himself to what is, without doubt, the central problem of Hegel's philosophy of religion, namely the relation between religion and philosophy. The book falls into three Parts. We begin with brief accounts of Hegel's early 'theological' essays, and here Williamson steadily traces the growth of the notion of dialectic from its beginning in the concepts of love and life to its clearest and richest formulation in the concept of spirit (*Geist*). From this point on there can be no question that Hegel has adopted a vocabulary which, at the very least, allows for a religious interpretation to be put upon it. Williamson, however, goes further, giving credence to the view that Hegel incorporated the vocabulary of Christianity into his system.

In Part Two, therefore, we are offered a reading of Hegel's account of spirit and where better to look, Williamson asks, than in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? Unlike many commentators on Hegel's philosophy of religion, Williamson does not confine himself to the final stages of the dialectic—the relations between art, religion and philosophy—but rather contends that religion must be viewed as the progressive revelation of spirit to itself. According to this reading, religious consciousness develops with the spirit's unfolding of itself, and the penultimate stage of the dialectic—Absolute Manifest Religion—is the emergence of the truth that has been working itself out thoughout religious history. It is on the basis of this reading that Williamson is able to maintain that religion is not superseded by philosophy; rather, philosophy is to be construed as the clearest expression of a truth that is always already manifest in religious consciousness and that is absolutely manifest in Christianity. Hegel is perfectly plain, I think, that religious truths are given at the level of representation (*Vorstellung*) but where he is far from clear is whether they are exactly the same truths as are given at the level of the concept (*Begriff*). If they are the same, Hegel's thought tends to converge with Christian theology; and Williamson argues that this is indeed the case.

Finally, in Part Three, Williamson discusses Hegel's doctrine of God. We are shown the arguments for Hegel as a theist and as an atheist; and, perhaps a little too briefly, the case for Hegel as a pantheist. The view that Williamson finds most persuasive, however, is for Hegel as a panentheist: the position that everything in the universe is part of God but that God is not exhausted by the universe. Now the claim that Hegel was a panentheist is far from new; it has been advanced by Whittemore, and Copleston has argued that while we cannot conclusively assert that Hegel was a panentheist it does seem as though such was Hegel's intention. Williamson's contribution consists more of sanding and polishing than of designing and building; but his remarks upon Hegel's senses of 'transcendence' and 'necessity' do give an impressive finish to the view.

Such, in brief, is Williamson's book. It is, as the title announces, an introductory work, though exactly whom it wishes to introduce to Hegel is less than clear. Very little philosophical or historical knowledge is assumed, and patient exposition is favoured over argument. There is, to be sure, a good deal of talk about 'following Hegel' on certain points and 'noticing his demonstrations', but at no time is any pressure put on Hegel's arguments: Williamson is not concerned whether Hegel was *right* to be a panentheist, only to make out a case that he *was* a panentheist. What we have, then, is a text situated somewhere between the disciplines of Philosophy and the History of Ideas; and, as such, it could serve as a primer for advanced undergraduates in courses in Religious Studies as well as in Philosophy. Williamson's prose is straightforward, though at times rather ponderous and marred by a zeal for splitting infinitives. Cavils regarding style aside, though, let us consider what sort of philosopher Williamson's Hegel turns out to be; for just as each 'Life of Jesus' finds a different subject to venerate so too there are many Hegels.

Williamson's Hegel is the author of the *Phenomenology*, a text he maintains to be representative of the whole of Hegel's philosophy. Now this is certainly a contentious claim: Hegel was adamant from the beginning to the end of his career that this passionate and hastily completed text was an *introduction* to his system. If there is one work that represents Hegel's mature thought it is the *Science of Logic*, a text to which Williamson makes scant reference and one which badly needs the services of a clear-minded commentator. But even if we agree to this choice of text, there are still problems; for Williamson's account of the *Phenomenology* is neither broad nor strong enough to bear the weight of his thesis. While some scholarly reference is made to Alexandre Kojeve and Jean Hyppolite, the two great French commentators on this early text, we mainly see Hegel through Anglo-American eyes. Thus there is a good deal more concern to ascertain Hegel's 'position' on religious language and the doctrine of God than to interpret Hegel's text for contemporary philosophical use; and this emphasis does result in some useful discussion in Part III. It is unfortunate, however, that in reacting against Kojève's and Hyppolite's atheistic readings of Hegel, Williamson renders marginal their characteristic emphases upon the struggle between the Lord and the Bondsman and, in Hegel's fine phrase, 'the patience, and the labour of the negative'.

This swerve away from Kojève and Hyppolite has two unsatisfactory consequences. First, it restricts the range of commentators to whom Williamson makes reference. No mention is made, for example, of those chiefly influenced by the French re-reading of Hegel – Bataille, Levinas and Derrida; similarly, the German re-reading of Hegel by Heidegger, Gadamer and Hamacher, amongst others, is passed over in silence. Second, and more significant for the book's argument, Kojève's and Hyppolite's privileged themes are of paramount importance in accounting for Hegel's philosophy of religion, whether from an atheist or a broadly Christian perspective. The dialectic of the Lord and the Bondsman is essential to an understanding of how Hegel views the passage of religious consciousness from Judaism to Christianity in both doctrinal and hermeneutic terms, and Williamson makes nothing of this. One of Hegel's most piercing criticisms of Schelling's Absolute is precisely that Schelling failed to take sufficient account of the work of the negative; and as the correlative notions of 'negativity' and 'otherness' have been the subject of detailed analysis in recent Hegel scholarship, the lack of sustained attention to them is all the more regrettable. Also treated all too briefly is Hegel's account of the Inverted World (*Verkehrte Welt*) which, in its puzzling elaboration of the relationship between the supersensible and the true worlds, should be a central text in any study of the spirit's progressive revelation of itself.

When Marheineke remarked that, after Hegel's death, the master's thought would be free from misinterpretation he believed himself to be in possession of the one, true interpretation of the Hegelian corpus. Later commentators, such as Hyppolite, have been more circumspect, emphasising the equivocal nature of Hegel's thought while nonetheless recommending their own interpretations. And so, appropriately enough, Williamson concludes his study by admitting that Hegel's position on religion is 'characterised by ambiguity'. This stress upon Hegel's 'position' is characteristic of Williamson; he assumes without question that Hegel does have a consistent position on the Christian religion and that he remains in good faith as regards religion throughout his career. Williamson may tell us that Hegel uses 'Spirit' and 'God' interchangeably, but the question at issue is whether we understand 'Spirit' in terms of 'God' or *vice versa*. And the question is all the more urgent when one considers that 'Spirit' is only one possible way of rendering Hegel's term '*Geist*': the ambivalence of Hegel's text is far less easy to master than Williamson would have it.

Williamson thus reads Hegel's text as a hermeneut of faith, forever faced with a lack of fit between what he takes to be Hegel's *position* and Hegel's *text*. That there is a difference between the two Williamson seems happy enough to accept. After all, he concedes the possibility of viable interpretations other than his own, and his own interpretation rests largely upon his finding support for one aspect of what he admits to be an ambiguous vocabulary on Hegel's part. However, while Williamson tolerates a certain difference between position and text, his hermeneutic forbids him to pose the question, 'How are we to account for this difference?' This is, to be sure, first and foremost a question directed towards Williamson's assumed theory of interpretation. To answer it with all rigour, though, would not only go some way towards offering a more coherent account of why Hegel's text generates irreducible interpretations but would also allow us to trace the labour of the negative as it manifests itself in Hegel's account of spirit's self-revelation.

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Harney, Maurita, *Intentionality, Sense and the Mind*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, pp. x, 203, £21.50.

The two very different trends in modern philosophy of phenomenology and philosophy of language owe much to Husserl and Frege respectively. Though the differences in direction had for a long time covered over the similarities, numerous authors have more recently attempted rapprochements between the two philosophers. Harney's purpose in this book, though indirectly of this kind, is rather to offer solutions to some of the difficulties that beset Frege's notion of sense, on the one hand, and Husserl's account of the intentionality of the mental, on the other.

Frege has been criticised for thinking of sense as a psychological entity. Husserl's account of intentionality was elaborated in response to the charge of psychologism made, notably by Frege, against his early work on arithmetic. The argument of Harney's book has two stages. The first leads to a linguistic reinterpretation of Husserl's account of intentionality by appealing to the intensionality of sentences used to describe mental phenomena. This reinterpretation, which makes use of Frege's notion of sense, is to provide the means for a clearly non-mentalistic characterisation of 'objects of thought'. The second uses this characterisation of intentionality to provide an account of sense that is not mentalistic. The well-known imputation of mentalism to the view that sense is what a speaker grasps when he understands an expression of his language is plausible in the case of Frege, so it is argued, only because Frege never gave a satisfactory theory of the relation between sense and the mental; and Husserl's theory of intentionality can be exploited to make good this lack.

Chapter I discusses Brentano's theory of the intentionality of thought and the problem of the ontological status of intentional objects. Appealing to Chisholm, Harney recasts Brentano's views about mental phenomena in terms of properties of sentences describing them. She redescribes the intentional, which concerns properties of mental phenomena themselves, in terms of the intensional, which concerns reports of mental phenomena. Harney argues, with Chisholm, that we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being intentional in terms of the properties of intensional sentences. However, since causal and modal sentences, being intensional but not reports of intentional phenomena, seem to be a fairly obvious counterexample to this, it is surprising that they are not mentioned.

Frege and Russell on the sense of names are discussed in Chapter II, while Chapter III considers Russell's views on the 'non-existent objects' of mental states or acts. Here Harney sets out some of the difficulties of Russell's attempt to avoid 'assuming the existence of the non-existent' by dispensing with the intentionality of the mental altogether.

Chapter IV is principally a discussion of Anscombe's account of intentional and material objects of perception, with the purpose of addressing the question of how it is possible 'to assert that objects of psychological acts are real, existing objects while at the same time preserving the intentionality of sentences about these acts' (p. 91). Harney brings out the paradoxes of Anscombe's position and locates them in an imported (and unwarranted) 'dualism of the incorrigibly and the corrigibly known, the privately and the publicly accessible and of inner and outer realms' (p. 95). The puzzles surrounding intentionality arise, Harney thinks, 'because intentionality cannot be accommodated into any of these imported dichotomies' (p. 95). The sources of these dichotomies, though ultimately Cartesian, are more directly traceable to distinctions involved in the debate over sense perception between the realism of ordinary language philosophy and theories of sense impressions.

At this point the difficulties that beset any account of intentionality seem to lead either to a rejection of the psychological, i.e. intentional, altogether or to serious problems with maintaining both the reality of objects of intentional states, which implies extensionalism, and the very intentionality of those states themselves, which requires descriptions of those states in intensional language.

It is in Chapter V that a solution to the problem of intentionality is sought in Frege's notion of sense. But in order to do this, Fregean sense must first be dissociated from any view susceptible to the charge brought by Quine of ontological mentalism and from psychologistic theories about the way sense determines reference. Harney makes much of Frege's claim that senses 'are not wholly unactual but their actuality is different from the actuality of things' (p. 131). But since on Frege's view it is possible to refer to senses, it is not clear how exactly this actuality is different from that of things. It seems we do need an account of this, given how redolent this 'not wholly unactual' is of the notion of inexistent objects. Harney argues that the deficiency in Frege's account that makes it subject to the above criticisms is that though Frege says that senses and thoughts *are* objective, he gives no account of how it is that senses or thoughts 'relate to the mind'. She accepts that if the only account of sense available is psychologistic, then it has to be rejected, but claims that an account that does avoid psychologism can be given in terms of an intentional theory of the relationship between meaning and mind. If sense is *intentional* then it *can* be shown that sense is both 'mind-related' and objective (p. 140). It is not altogether clear what is gained by this if 'intentional' is understood in the above-defined manner, where it was glossed in terms of the intensionality of sentences. For it follows that the claim about the intentionality of sense is no more than the claim that sense is intensional; and upon this, at least, everyone is agreed. In any case, this is where Husserl comes in, for it is his account of intentionality, Harney says, that can give use a satisfactory theory of sense. Whereas on Brentano's account the intentional object is immanent to the particular mental 'act' in question, Husserl's intended object is transcendent, that is, fulfills the requirement that the same experienced object (Anscombe's material object) be able to be experienced from a presumably infinite number of 'perspectives' or '*noemata*'. Essential to Husserl's account of intentionality is the idea that every conscious act (or mental state) comprises a *noema* through which the act (or state) is directed to its intended object. Now, Husserl's theory of intentionality is about the mental while Fregean sense is about language, but, Harney argues, if we distinguish between 'personal reference' as concerning what a speaker does in uttering a name, and 'semantic reference' as concerning what a name does, then Husserl's analysis of the noema of such acts can be exploited to provide the required non-psychologistic account of Fregean sense.

One crucial question this raises though, which Harney does not seem to have fully dealt with, is whether on this understanding Fregean sense can be called a feature of language. For, as Dummett points out, it is not enough to show that each speaker attaches a particular sense to a name if he is to associate a reference with it; it must also be shown, if, as Frege claimed, meaning is to be objective and shared by all speakers, that different speakers attach the same sense to any one word. Unless this is also shown, sense cannot be claimed to be a feature of language, and it will be difficult, ultimately, to deny the claim that sense is a psychological feature of the speaker, in the form, e.g., of a psychological mechanism by which he determines the reference of a name.

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Tilghman, B. R., *But is it Art?*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp. xi, 193, £15.

At the end of this book, Tilghman says 'I have not argued that a philosophical theory or definition of art is impossible . . . . What I have been trying to argue is that the very idea of a theory or definition is a confused one' (p. 186). In that case doesn't it *follow* that a theory or definition of art is impossible? Puzzling remarks of this kind rather characterises Tilghman's book. We are told that in disregarding financial value in assessing the aesthetic merits of a work 'There is no theory here, implicit or otherwise; there is only what we do' (p. 66). But doesn't what we do cry out for a theory that explains our intuitive distinctions between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic? When Dickie asks for a classificatory definition of art Tilghman reminds us of 'the oddity in the image of . . . Bernard Berenson . . . pointing to a Giotto panel and repeating that he knows it to be the work of art' (p. 51). Should we dismiss Frege's inquiries into the nature of number on the grounds that Gauss undoubtedly knew that 2 is a number and Julius Caesar isn't? In a long disquisition on aspect-seeing Tilghman says 'it makes no sense to speak of seeing a duck as a duck' (p. 143). It makes perfectly good sense to me.

All this may seem unfair, since I quote the *aperçus* and neglect the arguments. The trouble is that the arguments are hard to come by, though a good deal of forceful denunciation can sound like argument on a first reading. The enemy is anyone looking for a systematic philosophical theory of the arts. Sometimes the target is ill-chosen; few contemporary philosophical illusions will be shattered if Tilghman convinces us that Stephen Pepper's metaphysic of the arts is beyond repair. When the target is worthwhile (Danto, Dickie) Tilghman's aim is wide. For instance, Danto sees an important distinction between art works and 'real things' on the one hand and actions and bodily movements on the other. But, we are told, 'there simply is no ontological question, as that term has been understood in traditional philosophy, about action' (p. 106). Now if Danto is confused about action, much of what he says about art works and physical objects would be unaffected; at least, Tilghman owes us an account of how it would be affected, and we never get one. But in fact the examples Tilghman uses to back up his thesis about actions are inconsequential or perplexing. He says that if a soldier's arm drops from the prescribed position 'any question must concern whether he did it voluntarily or involuntarily. Finding out whether he did is a matter of finding out more about the man himself and not at all a matter of philosophy' (p. 104). Of course, the philosopher does not expect to be called in to pronounce on the case; he or she hopes to tell us something about the difference between action and involuntary behaviour in general. Tilghman doesn't help us find the difference, or see why looking for it is a mistake.

One can't help suspecting that Tilghman simply doesn't understand the ontological problems that he's so hostile to. A plausible and once popular view is that the aesthetic properties of a picture supervene on its visual appearance. Danto and others have constructed plausible counterexamples where two visually identical pictures have different aesthetic properties. He imagines two white canvases, each bisected by a black line, called *Newton's First Law* and *Newton's Third Law*. Tilghman remarks 'Actually it doesn't make any difference whether there are two canvases or only one. We can see it now as a point tracing a path across space or again as two masses impinging on one another' (p. 135). Of course, given Danto's problem, it makes *all* the difference whether we have one canvas or two. Tilghman, who never tires of telling us that we must see questions about art works in their context, can't seem to extend the same courtesy to philosophical theories about art.

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Ricoeur, Paul, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 288, US$25.00.

Paul Ricoeur's latest work, *Time and Narrative*, aims at a new solution to the difficulties of writing a philosophy of time. The last of its three volumes is due to appear at the end of 1985. The English version aims to keep pace with the original. It reads well and clearly, thanks to translators who have brought out many of Ricoeur's recent works.

The title brings together two concepts important in 20th century thought. The theme of time itself recalls earlier studies of the experience of time, such as Bergson's *Matter and Memory* and Heidegger's attempts, in *Being and Time* or the later *Time and Being*, to construct a phenomenology of time. Recent studies, like W. H. Newton-Smith's *The Structure of Time* (1980), or Elliott Jaques' *The Form of Time* (1983), stress structural over existential aspects of the theme. Narrative, familiar from the work of Barthes or of Northrop Frye, was the subject of Ricoeur's collective volume *La Narrativité* of 1980. The two themes work together here to solve a problem of long standing.

Ricoeur puts the problem like this: there is a contrast between the experience of time and time as set out in a plot. As described by Aristotle in the *Poetics*, the construction of plots is essentially a-temporal (or 'a-chronic'). But time as experienced is exemplified, according to Augustine's famous description in Book XI of the *Confessions*, as the 'distention of the soul': unable to put the measure of time into speculative language, Augustine portrays its passage as a 'triple present', the present of the present, of the past and of the future, held together 'experientially' by this distention. If one brings together the still unsolved enigma left us by Augustine, and Aristotle's account of plot-construction, there is no solution on the speculative level, but instead there is a new problem, and on this one can work. It is that all figuring of time, and all efforts to 'think' time, are to be placed within the contrast between the approaches of Augustine and Aristotle. In Ricoeur's words: 'Human time is recounted time'. *Time and Narrative* sets out to analyse human time as time 'recounted' or 'configured'. Vol I studies the figuring of time in historical narrative, and Vol II in fiction. The contrast between historical and fictional time, as well as the implications of the contrast between the effort to describe time as experienced and the configuring of time, are the topic of the final volume.

Ricoeur describes *Time and Narrative* as the companion study to *The Rule of Metaphor* of 1975. Both are concerned with 'the phenomenon of semantic innovation'. In metaphor, he notes, such innovation derives traditionally from 'tropes' or figures of speech, and in narrative from literary genres. But in each case innovation occurs at the level of discourse, of acts of language equal to or greater than the sentence.

As Ricoeur is not known directly in Australia, one can ask what is the best way to situate this linking of time and narrative, within his own work and within 20th century thought.

One way is to start with the kind of expression-barrier which is often said to block understanding between European and English-speaking philosophy. The former is perceived as system-based, metaphorical in expression, contentious. The latter is then seen as analytic and precise—though these terms do not hold for all philosophy written in English. In the introduction to *Freud and Philosophy* (1965) Ricoeur pointed out that many preoccupations of contemporary philosophy have a common point of convergence: the philosophy of language, which he singled out as a fruitful area for research. That he has chosen to situate his own work in this way is clear from the title he gave to the short philosophical autobiography, 'From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language' (in Charles Reagan and David Stewart: *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, 1978). According to the account of his thought offered there the movement of sympathy which took him towards Anglo-Saxon philosophy stemmed less from a sense of alternative approaches than from the search for what he has called a better 'grammar' for dealing with the questions being asked by European philosophers.

Taking this approach further, in the philosophical section of *Main Trends of Research in the Social and Human Sciences* (1979), which he edited for UNESCO, Ricoeur grouped contemporary philosophy under not two but four main generic heads. They are: 1 Systematic representations of reality (the 'Weltanschauung' approach); 2—'represented most notably by English and American analytic philosophy and by its diverse variations in Europe and throughout the world', analytic work aiming to cure philosophy of its ill-founded claim to 'know more and better than science'; 3—reacting against both the ambition of the first approach and the modesty of the second, an effort to work in depth on the themes of experience and subjectivity; 4—beyond all three of these approaches, 'post-philosophy' or metaphilosophy, which 'meditates on the breakdown' of philosophy and is inspired mainly by the influence of Neitzsche and Heidegger.

Such a scheme of multiple preoccupations takes contemporary philosophy beyond simple alternatives. Critique and opposition are in fact seen as producing new possibilities for thought. Ricoeur's own thinking has been viewed in this way. John B. Thompson has described it as 'dualist', while Umberto Eco, in *Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language*, uses the term 'Hegelian' of Ricoeur's reading of Heidegger and Freud. So a second way to situate *Time and Narrative* could be as the work of a philosopher who is best seen against the achievements of European tradition: Hegel, or more accurately, Husserl read in the light of Hegel. However, this could lead to a distorted understanding of Ricoeur's specific contribution to contemporary philosophy. A third way of approach is to place it within the field of world thought to which he himself refers. Eco provides a useful frame for this in his discussion of postmodernism in *Reflections on the Name of the Rose*. The avant-garde, or modern, he observed there, has to deface the past, it destroys form, figure and the flow of discourse. (*Les Demoiselles d'Avignon* is an example of the 'modern' in art.) Ultimately, the avant-garde arrives at the abstract, the 'white page', or the silences of Cage. Its 'metalanguage' speaks of 'impossible texts'. The postmodern reply

> consists of recognizing that the past, since it cannot really be destroyed, because its destruction leads to silence, must be revisited: but with irony not innocently.

'Irony' does not mean sarcasm, for to negate merely repeats destruction. Rather, it means to speak at a remove. Eco's analogy moves the phenomenon out of the aesthetics of 'high art' into the realm of speech.

> I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a very cultivated woman and knows he cannot say to her, 'I love you madly', because he knows that she knows (and that she knows that he knows) that these words have already been written by Barbara Cartland. Still, there is a solution. He can say, 'As Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly'. At this point, having avoided false innocence, having said clearly that it is no longer possible to speak innocently, he

> will nevertheless have said what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves her, but he loves her in an age of lost innocence.

The success of irony, of being able to speak 'after' language has been destroyed, is that in the second mode

> both will have accepted the challenge of the past, of the already said, which cannot be eliminated; . . . but both will have succeeded, once again, in speaking . . . (pp. 67, 68)

This third aspect emphasises the challenge offered to thought—to express what can no longer be said naively. (One can recall Husserl's effort to go beyong the 'natural attitude'.) The fourth philosophical approach noted by Ricoeur—that of the 'end of philosophy'—implies the postmodern task. This appears in two examples of his work from the 1960's.

In the conclusion of *The Symbolism of Evil* (1961) he seeks a 'postcritical' reading of symbols. Asking whether we could 'go back to a primitive naiveté' linking symbolic language and rationality, he states 'in every way something has been lost, irretrievably lost'. The challenge for philosophy is that

> we can, we modern men, aim at a second naiveté in and through criticism.

Interpretation deriving from such a criticism will be not only 'reductive' but 'restorative'.

> The time of restoration is not a different time from that of criticism; we are in every way children of criticism, but we seek to go beyond criticism by means of criticism . . .

The second example is from *Freud and Philosophy* (1965). Ricoeur notes there that the 'masters of suspicion', Freud, Marx and Nietzsche, have exposed philosophy to more radical doubt than did Descartes. Where Cartesian doubt questioned the contents of consciousness, doubt now turns on 'consciousness itself'. But beyond the reductive work of demystifying, a hermeneutic of 'restoration'—of reconstruction, or 'retrieval', as Charles Taylor puts it—seeks for fresh meanings.

Ricoeur's work in the 1970's shows concern with the problems raised for philosophy not only by language but by science. Two essays articulate the problems which converge in *The Rule of Metaphor* and *Time and Narrative.*

The first, 'Explanation and Understanding', sets out to question the problem Max Weber posed with regard to facts and values, and its corollary, the 'epistemological discontinuity between the natural and social sciences'. It shows how the debate extends, from 'a simple analysis of our way of thinking and talking about things', to 'the things themselves on which our concepts bear'. At stake in the 'ontological dimension' is

> (philosophy's) capacity to subordinate the very idea of method to a more fundamental concept of the relation of truth to things.

The second essay, 'Creativity in Language', exposes the polarity between two kinds of language: 'scientific'—artificial because it is formulated in order to eliminate ambiguity—, and 'ordinary'—the source of metaphor and change. The solution lies in recognising with Roman Jakobson that

> both mathematical and ordinary languages are required, and that each of them has to be considered as the metalanguage required for the structural analysis of the other.

The twinned studies, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-disciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language* and *Time and Narrative*, unite these themes of ontology and language in a sustained inquiry. The first takes Aristotle's *Poetics* as the basis for interrelating other approaches and develops from it the theory of 'split reference' as the key to metaphor. Eco underlines well what Ricoeur has brought out in Aristotle: that if the essence of metaphor 'is *mimesis*, it cannot be an empty, gratuitous game' but must involve 'knowledge of the dynamics of the real'. *Time and Narrative* extends *mimesis* to include Augustine's 'triple time'. Bringing together the three times of action, recounting and reading, it makes of the initial dilemma—the discrepancy between time as experienced and as configured—the ontological centre of the study.

The centre, as such, appears by its absence when Ricoeur sets out the 'aporias of the experience of time':

> . . . it must be admitted that in Augustine there is no pure phenomenology of time. Perhaps there never will be one. (p. 6)

Augustine's effort to measure time connected 'two basic themes', the triple present tried to resolve the enigma 'of a being that lacks being', and the distention of the mind to resolve the enigma of 'the extension of a thing that has no extension'. Phenomenology—the work of 'Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty'—followed in the path opened by this initial exposition of the problem. Ricoeur situates it thus:

> What remains . . . is to conceive of the threefold present *as* distention and distension *as* the distension of the threefold present. (p. 16)

In this first volume, devoted to the narration of time as history, Ricoeur recognises that the relation between phenomenology, poetics or literary theory and historiography is a 'dialectic' difficult to keep in equilibrium. In this 'three-way conversation', Heideggerian phenomenology's ambition

> is not just to owe nothing to an epistemology of the physical and the human sciences, but to serve as their *foundation*. (p. 86)

For this reason, the interest as well as the intellectual challenge of *Time and Narrative* Vol I is its integration of the central viewpoint of phenomenology with an attentive and sophisticated analysis of theories of history and historical epistemology. This volume is dedicated to the memory of the historian Henri Marrou, for whom the demands of 'historical knowledge' were both technical and philosophical.

The third aspect of the three-way discussion links 'historiography to contemporary narratology' (p. 86). *Mimesis* operates, in the 'writing' of history, as the construction of plots, defined as 'followable' narratives. However, one of the book's most interesting arguments, which can be mentioned only briefly in this review, is the discussion of a form of contemporary French historiography in terms of narrative theory.

Some historians coming from the *Annales* school—historians of the 'long time-span' and of geohistory—do not centre history on 'events'. Do they invalidate the concept of emplotment as the key to historical narrative? Ricoeur's proposing of 'quasi-events', and even quasi-characters and quasi-plots, to bring out the temporal character of the thematically centred work of Braudel, Le Goff, and historians of mentalities, challenges both our suppositions about narrative, and our reading of these historians.

The second-last chapter, 'Historical Intentionality'—a rereading of Husserl's 'question-back' in his *Krisis*—focuses the analysis:

> Through what mediations does historical knowledge succeed in transposing into its own order the twofold constitution of the configuring operation of narrative? (p. 180)

The questioning which Husserl directed at 'galilean and newtonian science' is turned towards social science, so as to reach a 'reconstruction' of our knowledge of time. (*Ibid.*) Such knowledge will acquire a further dimension in the study of creative literature which follows.

Time and Narrative Vol I is a powerful and coherent study. Its propositions on historical theory will be challenged, as, surely, those to follow on literature. But it is postcritical philosophy which is able to 'speak again', cogently, of the relation between 'things' and our understanding of them.

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Shoemaker, Sydney, *Identity, Cause and Mind*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. x, 365, $71.50 (hardback), $23.50 (paper).

The major work of many distinguished contemporary philosophers is to be found in papers rather than books. This can make it difficult to survey their thought. In recent years the situation has improved, with collections of the papers of individual philosophers appearing while they are still philosophically active. This collection of papers by Sydney Shoemaker is a welcome addition to such volumes. (The Australian price of the hard-back copy is less welcome.)

Greatest space is devoted to the philosophy of mind. Shoemaker started as a Wittgensteinian, but in these papers we see him moving over to a Causal or Functionalist account of the mental. Shoemaker is an Analytical or Conceptual Functionalist. That is to say, he holds that there is a *conceptual* connection holding between the notion of a mental state (state type) and (some) of the causal connections that the state has with other sorts of mental states, with stimuli, and with behaviour. He argues in essay 12, successfully in my prejudiced view, for this relatively unfashionable version of the fashionable doctrine of Functionalism.

It is generally agreed that the two main difficulties faced by a purely Functionalist theory of mind are, first, accounting for the *intentionality* of mental states, and, second, giving an account of our experience of *quality*. Shoemaker discusses the second problem at length. He takes up in particular the problem of the inverted spectrum. It seems that my colour spectrum might be systematically inverted relative to yours. (Shoemaker traces the suggestion back to Locke.) Our colour experiences would then be different. But the difference might be causally, functionally, undetectable. This is a *prima facie* difficulty for Functionalism.

It can be doubted whether the inverted spectrum is really a possibility. First, it is not clear whether the logical space of colour has the requisite symmetry to permit a genuinely systematic transposition. That, however, is a philosophically uninteresting doubt. Prescinding from this objection, Shoemaker argues that it is certainly possible that an individual should experience colour reversal. But if this is possible, why should not an individual's spectrum be reversed relative to another individual? This is a strong argument. Shoemaker adds that if fusion of persons is possible, as envisaged in many contemporary discussions of personal identity, it should be possible for the fused individual to determine by memory that the individuals who were fused had reversed spectra relative to each other.

So how is the Functionalist to analyse interpersonal reversal? Shoemaker makes heavy weather of this. In an Appendix to his final essay (15) he finds himself reluctantly forced back to the view that colour reversal is well defined only for the intrasubjective case.

I believe that Shoemaker's difficulties are due to attempting to give a functional/causal account of the sensible qualities, such as colour. At the same time, I do not think that this impugns a purely functional/causal account of the mentality of mental states. For the experience of being appeared to redly does not, I believe, involve the instantiation of the quality of redness. Experience is qualityless. It is physical surfaces, *etc.*, that have the sensible quality of redness. The experience of being appeared to redly involves the quality *intentionally* only.

A physicalist will go on to identify the sensible qualities, secondary as well as primary, with physics-respectable properties of physical objects. But the identity involved is not a functional/causal one. Rather, it is an identity of constitution.

What of colour reversal, then? Well, if red things started to stimulate my green-selectors, and *vice-versa*, then presumably, for a while at least, red things would look green to me and green things would look red. This point can then be used to make sense of the interpersonal case. If the sort of processes in my brain (or soul) which play the functional role of red-selectors play the role of green-selectors in your brain (soul), and *vice-versa*, can we not say that our colour experiences are reversed relative to each other?

But for me the most interesting papers in the collection are 11 and 12: 'Causality and Properties' and 'Identity, Properties and Causality'. Here various themes in Shoemaker's thought converge and a systematic metaphysical position begins to appear. *First*, consideration of the grue problem, discussed in Essay 4, leads to a distinction between genuine properties (which Shoemaker takes to be universals), and what Geach calls 'mere Cambridge properties'. *Second*, in Essay 2 Shoemaker develops a Causal theory of personal identity. (He tells us that here he was influenced by Martin and Deutscher's article 'Remembering' which persuaded him that memory is a causal affair.) This broadens out to a Causal theory of identity through time generally. A continuing thing is a certain sort of causal chain. *Third*, properties (genuine properties) and causality are brought together by the conception that the identity-conditions for properties are given by the causal powers which they bestow. (No doubt the less general idea that mental states can be defined in terms of their causal role was an important stimulus here.)

Setting up such identity-conditions for properties might appear to lead to a vicious regress. A property is what it is because, in conjunction with other co-instantiated properties, it can, *e.g.*, bring about certain sorts of effect in certain sorts of thing. But reference to sorts here must surely be cashed in terms of properties. What are the identity-conditions of these further properties?

A similar difficulty appears in connection with the Causal theory of identity through time. How are we to distinguish the immanent causality involved when earlier temporal parts of a thing at least contribute to bringing later parts into existence, and the transeunt causality where one thing acts upon something else? Perhaps all we can say, in apparent hopeless circularity, is that in immanent causality what is brought to be is always a later stage (later temporal part) of the thing that brings it to be.

Shoemaker's answer to these difficulties is that the concepts of property, causality, and continuing thing are fundamental, and distinct, notions, but that they are ones which can be introduced together, or not at all. They constitute a package-deal, like the concepts of husband and wife, soldier and army. The notion of such interdependent concepts is familiar from Functional/Causal analyses of the mental concepts. No doubt the mental case was again an influence on Shoemaker's thinking here.

Shoemaker's view has what he describes as a very strong consequence, a doctrine that he never expected to find himself upholding, the view that causal necessity is a species of logical necessity. For if the causal powers associated with a property are essential to it, then they attach to the property in every possible world. Shoemaker says at one point that Kripke 'has complicated our lives by showing that propositions whose truth or falsity is logically necessary can have the epistemological status of being a posteriori' (p. 305). But without Kripke, Shoemaker's view of causal necessity would be very implausible. For causal necessities are surely discovered a posteriori.

For myself, while accepting Shoemaker's distinction between genuine and 'mere Cambridge' properties, and also accepting a Causal theory of identity through time, I shrink from his doctrine of causal necessity. (If a Combinatorial theory of possibility is correct, as I have recently come to think, then it seems that causal laws come out contingent.) Shoemaker says that his reasons for holding his theory of properties are, 'broadly speaking, epistemological' (p. 214). And it seems true that, broadly speaking, we recognise properties through their effects. But does this mean that we should take the connection between sameness of properties and sameness of their effects, and difference of properties and difference of their effects, to be a necessary one? Perhaps, instead, what we have here is some sort of inductive inference, perhaps an inference to the best explanation. That, at any rate, is where I should wish to swerve aside from Shoemaker's more thoroughgoing conclusions.

The book has an index of names, but the inclusion of subjects would have been useful.

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Schick, Frederic, *Having Reasons, An Essay on Rationality and Sociality*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 158, US$29.50, US$10.50, (paper).

Schick addresses an issue concerned with the explanation of action which he characterises as a choice between 'rationalism' and 'sociality' (he would have termed it 'socialism' had the name not been long previously appropriated elsewhere (p. 101)!). 'Rationalism' offers explanations on the premise that agents act always in accordance with their own perceived interests; while the proponent of 'sociality' allows that people sometimes perform genuinely other-regarding actions. Part of Schick's essay is a run through rational-decision theory. With some variations, a Ramsey-based theory is offered (Chapters 2 & 3), and familiar problems encountered: when it comes to Newcomb's problem, for example, Schick is a convinced 'two-boxer', and takes this intuition to require a causal decision theory, in which what matters is not the probability of an outcome given a certain option, but the probability that the option will have the outcome as its *causal* sequel. (Evidently, the essay went to press before recent work in this area could be taken into account, such as David Lewis', 'Causal Decision Theory', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 59 (1981) pp. 5-30.)

With a rhetorically deft transition from Newcomb's problem to the Prisoners' Dilemma, Schick explores (Chapter 4) the extent to which his 'rationalist' can explain cooperation, and shows how a self-regarding Adam and a self-regarding Eve may still accommodate each other, either because each believes that this pays in the long run, or because their interests become mutually responsive.

But the big question, taken up in Chapter 5, is whether 'rationalism' can provide explanations for *all* cooperative and apparently other-regarding action. Now, this use of 'rationalism' is quite idiosyncratic—indeed, Schick would have done well to exercise the same caution in labelling his opposition as he did in rejecting 'socialism' to denote his own view. His incautious usage creates certain distortions, as, for example, when Davidsonian arguments about what must be presupposed concerning agents whose behaviour is interpreted as intentional are dismissed as establishing the presumption, not of rationality, but of 'a kind of coherence' (p. 64). (One is tempted to ask, *what* kind of coherence, if not rational?) The truth is that Schick's target is not rationalism about what is presupposed in action-explanations, but, rather, psychological egoism. While I have seen more extensive discussions of this thesis in some ethics textbooks, Schick does say enough on the subject to convince me (again) that it requires great strain to make it come out true that all actions are motivated by their agents' desire to further their own interests. (This significant falsehood is, of course, not to be confused with the trivial truth that agents act intentionally always in order (as they believe) to further their own *ends*.)

Schick introduces 'new formal concepts' of 'social choice functions' and 'bonding patterns' (p. 102f), and provides useful, if bland, advice for the rationalist who rejects psychological egoism (here 'rationalist' simply means the constructer of action-explanations based on rationality assumptions). But some interesting questions do get raised. Things brighten up, for example, when Schick considers the objection that the explanations provided by his theory of sociality will not be genuinely explanatory because the generalisations they use merely summarise the data to be explained. But the solution proposed, with its dependence on the relativised notion of a generalisation's being 'proper' for a given inquirer, is most unsatisfactory (see p. 114). Another really interesting question received a bit more debate: granted that people *do* act from purely other-regarding motives, can any defence be offered of the entrenched moral intuition that they *ought* so to act? Schick argues that the question, 'Why should a person act socially?' no more needs an answer than the question, 'Why should a person act rationally?'. And the latter, he claims, needs no answer: 'we never have reasons for being moved by our reasons, whether social or rational or whatever' (p. 117). This claim is backed with some dubious argument about the impossibility of second-order causation, whose relevance (even if true) is hard to grasp, since it is surely clear that, in many cases, it is under an agent's control whether to be swayed by what he or she recognises as a good (even 'the best') reason for acting. And, while there is an air of paradox about requesting reasons for doing what reason requires, some philosophers, anyway, have proposed to dispel it. (See Max Black, 'Why Should I Be Rational?', *Dialectica*, 36 (1982) pp. 148-168. Kai Nielsen has recently redefended the meaningfulness of the 'why should I be moral?' question, which is presumably a close relative of the 'why should I act socially?' question which Schick wishes to reject. ('Why Should I Be Moral? Revisited', *American Philosophical Quarterly* 21 (1984) pp. 81-91).) A final chapter (Chapter 6) offers miscellaneous meta-ethical remarks, each suggested by some aspects of Schick's theory of sociality.

Is this essay primarily concerned to advance a formal theory of action-explanation, or to canvass and examine a range of philosophical issues about rational action? It aims to do both—but I, for one, would have preferred the two tasks to have been more clearly separated. Others may find, however, with Edward F. McClennen, that Schick does indeed realise 'an almost impossible balance between mathematical formulations, philosophical and conceptual issues, and notes on everyday life' (quoted from back flap). I found that the author never quite resolves his view of his intended audience: while he gives only the briefest exposition of 'the Ramseyan theory' (p. 20), he finds it necessary later to remind the reader that the consequent of a conditional is 'its *then* part' (p. 108). And in general Schick displays a certain hesitancy towards his whole project, nowhere more apparent than at the conclusion, when, having explained that his theory of sociality is meant to be added to all that the 'rationalist' can achieve, he concludes with a string of rhetorical questions:

> Do the matters this (*sc*: inclusion of 'social motives') lets us consider warrant designing a whole new theory? Are they worth all the trouble? This question I leave to the reader. But if he (*sic*) doesn't think they are worth it, why has he read thus far? (p. 148)

I suspect that it is the reader of mathematical bent who will be most readily sustained on the journey through the book. There is certainly good material for the formal decision theorist to ponder. The philosophers, however, may emerge frustrated. But, then, perhaps that's just par for the course.

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Glover, J., *What Sort of People Should There Be?*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984, pp. 190, $6.95 (paper).

In his introduction, Glover expresses concern about the future of mankind in light of recent technological advances in genetic engineering, neurobiology, psychology and artificial intelligence. He intends *What Sort of People Should There Be?* to contribute to the discussion of how these technologies may be used, setting out the questions which he feels must be raised and the values considered, so that the full implications of their use may be understood.

The book is divided into three parts. The first deals with value questions arising out of possible uses of genetic engineering. The central issue is to decide how willing we should be to allow humans to make decisions which will determine human nature. Various methods of genetic engineering are discussed, ranging from environmental change, through pregnancy screening programmes where there is a risk of genetic defect, to the use of enzymes to alter genetic structure. It is the last of these which Glover sees as most problematic if used, not to eliminate gross genetic defects, but to create persons with specific genetic make-up. The familiar issues of who makes decisions about the genetic structure of future generations, what sort of safeguards should be implemented to guarantee that no monster will be born, as well as concern for the autonomy of genetically engineered persons and protection of a diverse gene pool are raised and discussed, without drawing any surprising conclusions. To put it briefly, Glover would like to see genetic engineering used to eliminate the gross defects which now occur, but is not in favour of persons making decisions which may alter the present random diversity of human nature.

Part Two consists of six sets of thought experiments which bring out issues surrounding advances in neurobiology, psychology and artificial intelligence. If technologies develop which allow people's experiences to be altered and their motives and behaviour to be controlled, should those technologies be used? The examples illustrating these thought experiments show quite a bit of imagination, but the issues touched on and conclusions drawn are, once again, rather familiar. Of central importance for Glover is protection of personal autonomy and consciousness. If people lead lives in which none (or very few) of the decisions they make affect the 'real' world (although their decisions affect the 'dreamworld' in which they live), they must be missing out on something necessary for a worthwhile life. The problem of what is necessary for a worthwhile life is brought up again when Glover considers a world in which all productive activity is taken over by intelligent machines. This section is interesting because it shows how the issues considered in the book do not fall exclusively into the domain of changing human nature directly.

Part Three examines values appealed to in Parts One and Two to see whether they are appropriate to the task. Glover thinks, correctly, I think, that human values are in some way connected with human nature and that if human nature is changed, so might human values be. Glover views impartiality between our values and the values of those who would exist through the use of the various technologies as valuable, but only insofar as we can in some way put ourselves in their position. This task is easier for Glover than it is for those who are less certain about what the future should hold because Glover seeks to protect human nature as it is, while only eradicating the worst defects. If Glover's conservatism is followed, then there is no great need to worry that the values of future generations will be wildly different from our own, as they will be very much like us.

Glover's worries in this book are not new, so the weakness of his replies are rather dissatisfying. He does not attempt to clarify what sort of features would be required to make any programme of 'positive' genetic engineering or mind or behaviour control acceptable, he simply indicates areas of concern (autonomy, diversity, an open-ended future, risk avoidance) and then pleads for human nature as it is. Surely the case for human nature as it is, with its many flaws, can be argued for more strongly than by showing extreme possibilities and then backing away in horror. If Glover had been willing to also look at more moderate possibilities in the use of the technologies he considers, he might have found some clear guides which could be used to answer the question 'What sort of people should there be?'.

Glover acknowledges the problem of distinguishing between 'negative' and 'positive' uses of genetic engineering (the former is aimed at eliminating defects and the latter improves human nature (p. 31)), but does not examine the problem deeply enough, as he assumes that the eradication of genetic defects is a non-controversial good. However, once defects such as Down's syndrome, spina bifida and haemophilia have been eliminated, would 'negative' genetic engineering not be legitimately available to eliminate the defects of short-sightedness, baldness and left handedness? Surely, if we are to be impartial between our own values and those which would be held by those who may exist in the future, we must appreciate that what is now seen merely as an inconvenience could be seen as a defect once all other defects have been eliminated.

The book is enthusiastic and well written, showing a great deal of imagination and creativity. The passages cited at the beginning of each chapter nicely set the stage for what is to come in the chapter. It is unfortunate that this enthusiasm is not carried over into a strong fight with the issues at hand. Because Glover is uneasy with what the future could hold, he can only offer the reader some fantastic examples of the problem, not a thorough discussion of the problem itself.

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White, Alan R., *Rights*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. viii, 186, $31.00 (cloth).
Paul, Ellen Frankel, Miller, Jr., Fred D., and Paul, Jeffrey (editors, *Human Rights*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984, pp. 175, $16.95 (paper).

Richard Tuck (*Natural Rights Theories, 1979*) claims that while the language of rights has become increasingly important in normal political debate during the last thirty years, academic political philosophers have mostly found it elusive and unnecessary. Tuck remarks that, Nozick excepted, no major theorist in the Anglo-Saxon world for almost a century has based his work on the concept of a right. This may strictly be true. Nevertheless, an abundant literature on rights attests to many notable academic philosophers continuing to take rights discourse very seriously indeed.

Alan White takes the language of rights so seriously that he devotes an entire book to an examination of how it is to be understood. By implication, White can be said to regard appeals to rights as essential to important issues in moral and political philosophy. But his book is silent on this, as on other vexed substantial questions about rights. At the outset we are told that conceptual questions exhaust the scope of White's book, and that nothing will be said about what rights people actually have or ought to have. White does address the issue of who can possess rights, but he takes his answer obviously to follow from the implications of the ordinary use of 'a right' as signifying something which one can exercise, waive, assert, and so on. Only persons can logically have a right because only a person can be the subject of such predicates. This seems to identify beings with certain characteristics as right holders, but White rejects any criterion couched in terms of substantial characteristics said to be either necessary or sufficient for the possible possession of rights. He maintains instead that it follows from the language of rights only that persons (content unspecified) can sensibly be said to possess rights.

Thus, one side of White's contribution on this issue amounts merely to a claim about appropriate terminology. 'Person' is the correct label for the claimed bearer of a right, whoever or whatever he, she, or it might be. White's interest does not extend to exploring what beings can sensibly be said to be persons, despite the other side of his claim, which is that a possible possessor of a right is whatever can intelligibly, whether truly or falsely, be spoken of in the full language of rights. He unquestioningly takes everyday use as his guide. In denying that 'person' excludes infants, children, the feeble-minded, the comatose, the dead and generations yet unborn, White claims that 'so long as we speak of them as persons', they are 'the logically possible subjects of rights to whom the full language of rights can significantly, however falsely, be used'. Moreover, 'it is a misfortune, not a tautology, that these persons cannot exercise or enjoy, claim or waive, their rights or do their duty or fulfil their obligations'.

I doubt that we consistently use 'person' in the full-blown sense necessary to establish that whatever we refer to as a person is a subject about which it makes sense to use the full language of rights, duties and obligations. And if we do, then we call some entities persons when it makes no sense to do so.

White accepts and stresses that something can only have a right to do what it can do; and it is essential to his argument for persons as bearers of rights that they alone can intelligibly be said to exercise, assert, claim, waive, etc. rights. This seems precisely the reason why other philosophers sympathetic to this link have thought it necessary to establish a conceptual connection between the possession of rights and personhood in terms of those substantial characteristics which allow the subject to assert, exercise and claim. Such accounts must then explain, e.g. how artificial persons can be said to have rights, and how entities which themselves lack the relevant capacities can be said to have rights which others can claim for them. White avoids these issues only because his account is so thin.

White's other positive thesis is equally meagre. It is that a right is an entitlement. This is the product of the book's central concern—the understanding of the notion of a right, via an examination of the circumstances in which 'a right' is used, and the relationship of a right to other notions with which it is commonly associated.

A very close examination of the notions of duty, obligation, ought, and of something's being right, occupies much of the first half of the book. Here, at least, ordinary use is not inflated and then taken as a guide to what it is proper to say, for the very good reason that notions such as duty and obligation are commonly assimilated, some philosophers and jurisprudents also being guilty on this score. Etymology bears some of the burden of White's analysis, together with what he states to be the central feature of each concept when it is used with sufficient care. Much of what he says seems unexceptionable (e.g. his distinctions between being obliged and having a duty, between obligation and ought); but then clarification can seem straightforward only after someone has painstakingly set us right. Because conceptual imprecision has marred some otherwise careful philosophical discussions which make use of these notions—some examples of which White explicitly exposes (e.g. the view that an obligatory act is necessarily something one would avoid if one could)—these chapters are useful in their own right. Nevertheless, readers who share White's central concern are likely to feel short-changed when told that the laborious analysis of these and other related concepts (e.g. need, claim, choice) can tell us no more than what the dictionary and many philosophers and jurists have often said—that a right is an entitlement.

I am not unsympathetic to this conclusion. But others have arrived at it less tediously and more convincingly. White's contention is that the notion of a right is unequivocal across the various fields in which we speak of rights. His distinctive argument for this relies on our accepting a very wide range of rights, most of them familiar and the crucial ones amongst them surprising. According to White, a root cause of many of the common mistakes made about what it is to have a right (e.g. that it implies a claim or a duty) is a 'one sided diet of examples' which are confined to rights to do so and so or to have such and such done. We see that to have a right is always simply to be entitled once we recognise that we also have rights to assume *p*; to feel proud of *x*; and to feel hard done by, or indignant. Given the work done by these latter examples, it is a serious flaw that insufficient consideration is given to whether the notion of a right is stretched in all or any of them—as White concedes it can be in other contexts. When Trollope talks of a house with certain gradiose features as having 'the right' to be called a castle, White advises us to ask what job, if any, is being done by the notion of 'a right' as contrasted with 'right'. How do his own 'whetstone' examples fare on this type of test? 'Justified' does seem to me exchangeable without qualification for both 'a right' and 'entitled' in each of them, and yet, significantly, not for either in cases where we say we have rights to do and to have done.

In the remainder of the book White rejects familiar analyses of rights as claims, liberties, and privileges. None of these notions provides a satisfactory analysis in all the contexts in which we use 'a right'; but some important contributions to the literature on rights will not be embarrassed by this. Joel Feinberg ('Duties, Rights, and Claims', 1966) has connected rights and claims. He does not argue that claims are important to the analysis of a right, but to an understanding of what rights are. Feinberg clearly has in mind rights to do and to have done, his concern being to express certain facts about these rights in order to show why some of them are so vitally important.

Other minor points of interpretation are irritating. For example, Peter Singer ('All Animals are Equal', 1976) consistently argues his own case for animals by appeal to the principle of equality, and not, as White's representation suggests, in terms of rights.

This book is recommended only for those with a very serious interest in the concept of a right, and a strong stomach for lengthy linguistic analysis.

Human Rights is identical in content to Volume 1 Issue 2 of a new journal, *Social Philosophy and Policy*, which appeared in the same year. So far, each issue has had a theme, and most of the papers in this collection were presented at the Conference on Human Rights held at the Social Philosophy and Policy Center at Bowling Green, Ohio, in October 1982. At present the journal's policy is to publish solicited papers only, and the list of contributors to this and other issues is impressive. I imagine that one of the risks which accompany such a policy is the re-statement of some material already published elsewhere. Nevertheless, one does not expect to find journal articles which are mainly condensed versions of parts of books. That order of presentation is the wrong way around. Equally surprising is the inclusion of such material in a collection, in the 'hope that it will prove to be a valuable addition to the contemporary discussion on human rights'.

The lead, and by far the longest paper in the collection is a piece by Alan Gewirth entitled 'The Epistemology of Rights'. This forms part of a group of papers, together with a reply by Arthur Danto, a reply to Danto by Gewirth, and a substantial paper by Loren Lomasky, 'Personal Projects as the Foundation for Basic Rights'. Gewirth and Lomasky share a bold enterprise. Frequently, philosophers assume a fundamental value in arguing for the necessity of rights. Feinberg ('The Nature and Value of Rights', 1970), for example, takes recognition of rights as indispensable for minimal self respect. Even where such argument succeeds, others may reject the importance of such values in favour of other, conflicting ones. Gewirth and Lomasky believe that basic rights can be grounded on something which we cannot deny. For Gewirth, the bare facts of human agency provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the generation of rights. Lomasky accepts the soundness of Gewirth's 'basic insight'—that action as such possesses a normative structure—but believes that this must be fleshed-out before it will generate recognition of rights.

Gewirth's paper provides a succinct introduction to his intriguing argument, the steps of which are too difficult briefly to re-state here. But those familiar with his *Reason and Morality (1978)*, and subsequent vigorous criticisms of it, can probably safely skip a large portion of the initial trilogy of papers. I believe that R. M. Hare, in a contribution to a recent critical volume, shows exactly why Gewirth's derivation of moral rights from agency fails (Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism, 1984). In the context of the *Human Rights* paper, Gewirth's egalitarian conclusion—'since all humans are actual, prospective, or potential agents the rights in question belong equally to all humans'—is a *non sequitur*.

Loren Lomasky's argument that a properly sensitive moral theory must allow a place for rights which provide the individual with an area for autonomous development, is based on the claim that it is a 'deep fact' about human beings that they are 'project pursuers'. Lomasky's worthwhile paper is an important challenge both to those who argue for what Lomasky calls 'an impersonal standard of value', and for those who maintain that utilitarianism can incorporate respect for individual rights.

The criteria of project pursuit are troublesome. Much of the time it is fairly certain that most human beings will qualify,for 'the absence of projects is a state of extreme psychosis', reducible to isolated episodes of experience. Now and then, my own status seems dubious, project pursuit requiring persistent attachment to one's own ends, and motivational patterns that persist over long periods of time, so that to comment " 'She is an ardent Zionist'; 'He is a Cicero Scholar', is to begin to explain a life"! More troublesome is Lomasky's early admission that due to the connection of rights and interests, it makes sense to ascribe rights to very young children, to wastrels, and lunatics. This strongly suggests interests as an obvious foundation; but this is not taken up, nor even acknowledged.

The other obvious trilogy of papers centres on the question of whether there can be a Utilitarian basis for rights. John Gray's exploratory 'Indirect Utilitarianism and Fundamental Rights' is scholarly and insightful, and his sketch of Mill as an indirect utilitarian complements part of J. L. Mackie's 'Can There Be a Right-Based Moral Theory?' (1978). The case for rights is found not in Mill's fallibilistic arguments, but in his emphasis on individuality and autonomy as limiting the area of social control. Gray, sensitive to the problems of indirect utilitarianism, argues that this is genuinely distinct from sophisticated act utilitarianism, and draws attention to criticisms of the distinction between the critical and practical levels of moral thinking.

Alan Gibbard ('Utilitarianism and Human Rights') also argues that Utilitarians should accept certain principles of individual human rights. His paper, which lacks the subtlety of Gray's, is followed by a reply by James Fishkin. The final papers in the collection—'Moderating Rights' by Richard E. Flathman, and a reply by Charles R. Beitz—also discuss the place of rights in moral theory.

Other papers, dispersed between those mentioned so far, are by H. A. Bedau ('Why Do We Have the Rights We Do?'), David Kelley ('Life, Liberty and Property'), Martin Golding ('The Primacy of Welfare Rights'), and Alan Donagan ('The Right Not to Incriminate Oneself'). Both Bedau and Golding criticise Gewirth's derivation of rights; and Golding's discussion, which is concerned with the significance of rights language, differs greatly from the type of analysis we find in White's book. Golding argues that rights language exists as a device for making claims and demands against others. He is critical of Gewirth's reference to an 'intellectual right' (e.g. the right to draw some inference), commenting, rightly in my view, that this is unnecessary, and parasitic on the idea of what is right.

Human Rights is not an introductory volume, but a collection of sophisticated papers most of which assume a background in rights theory. Each of the papers discusses one of the two crucial questions we must answer if we are to take human rights seriously: on what basis are they to be derived? and what is their proper place in a more general moral theory?

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