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### Reviews

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## REVIEWS

Tooley, Michael, *Causation: A Realist Approach*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp.xiii, 360, \$88.

This book is centred on the all-important question of whether laws of nature and singular causation conform to the so-called thesis of Humean supervenience. This thesis, which lies at the heart of traditional empiricist approaches, states that the truth values of nomological statements and statements of singular causation are logically determined by the truth values of non-nomological, non-causal statements about particulars. Tooley argues forcefully that laws of nature and singular causation do not, in fact, conform to the thesis of Humean supervenience. If his arguments are correct, all the usual empiricist renderings of these notions are radically flawed. In place of the usual empiricist renderings, Tooley advances a view of laws of nature and of singular causation as theoretical relations, construed in a staunchly realist fashion.

In the first half of the book, Tooley, discusses these issues as they touch on the subject of laws of nature, amplifying his earlier treatment of them in his well-known article 'The Nature of Laws'. He effectively criticises several versions of the regularity account and then develops his own conception of the simplest kinds of laws as relations of nomological necessitation between universals. As mentioned above, he thinks of these relations of nomological necessitation as theoretical entities and adopts a thorough-going realism about them. He appeals to David Lewis's proposal in 'How to Define Theoretical Terms' for analysing terms referring to theoretical entities. Applying Lewis's treatment to non-probabilistic laws first, Tooley proposes that "the relation of nomic necessitation is identical with the unique contingent, genuine relation, *K*, among universals, which satisfies the following open formula: 'its being the case that the property universals *P* and *Q* stand in relation *R* logically entails that for all *x*, if *x* has property *P*, then *x* has property *Q*.'" (p. 80) As it stands, the analysis covers only the simplest kind of law. However, Tooley generalises it to include nomological relations involving more than two universals and nomological relations corresponding to probabilistic laws. The various similarities with, and differences from, D.M. Armstrong's closely related theory of laws are traced out in an illuminating way.

Tooley claims a number of advantages for his theory over orthodox regularity theories (pp. 137-141). While some of the claimed advantages are genuine, two strike me as questionable. The first is Tooley's surprising claim that he has given a purely extensional analysis of an intensional notion. Early on in the book (p. 27-8), he argues that nomological statements are intensional in the sense that the exchange of coextensive predicates in a nomological statement does not preserve truth value. But later (p. 140) in arguing that statements of relations of nomological necessitation are extensional, he invokes a different definition of extensionality: they are extensional, he says, in the sense that the exchange of predicates referring to the same universal preserves truth value. However, without the slide from one definition of extensionality to another, Tooley's argument for his surprising claim does not go through. Applying the first definition of extensionality uniformly, we can see that statements of relations

of nomological necessitation are just as intensional as the nomological statements they purport to analyse, since in both cases the exchange of coextensive predicates does not preserve truth value. This point is not just a trifling one. For Tooley places great emphasis throughout the book on the requirement that adequate truth conditions for nomological statements must be extensional. By appealing to this misconceived requirement, he dismisses what seem to me promising non-regularity accounts of laws in terms of dispositions and propensities. (pp. 69–70 and pp. 146–7)

A second dubious advantage Tooley claims for his account of laws is that it overcomes the problem of confirmation facing accounts which identify nomological statements with universally quantified statements. Referring to Carnap's discussion of the matter, Tooley claims (p. 135) that a generalisation, quantified over an infinite domain, will have a probability of zero, given evidence concerning only a finite number of instances. In contrast, his account represents a nomological statement as being made true by a relation among universals, that is an atomic state of affairs; and so, Tooley claims, it is justifiable, given standard principles of confirmation theory, to assign a non-zero probability to this fact's obtaining. Unfortunately, Tooley's neat argument works does not succeed. He holds that a nomological statement entails the corresponding generalisation about particulars, and so it follows by a standard principle of probability theory that the probability of the nomological statement, given a body of evidence, can be no greater than the probability of the universal generalisation, given the same body of evidence. If, as Tooley claims, the latter has a zero probability, so must the former. If Carnap's result raises a problem for orthodox construals of laws, it does so for Tooley's construal as well.

The theory of laws as nomological relations among universals is a bold metaphysical hypothesis. Tooley does a good job in presenting, and responding to, various objections to this hypothesis. But he does not completely dispell my doubts. A serious objection concerns how so-called vacuous or uninstantiated laws are to be handled by the theory. If one adopts, as Armstrong does, an Aristotelian conception of universals, which does not allow them to exist uninstantiated, one has to say that vacuous laws are admissible only in so far as they can be derived from other non-vacuous laws. But Tooley makes out a good case for there being basic or underived vacuous laws. (pp. 47–50) Consequently, Tooley argues that vacuous laws are to be accomodated within his scheme by accepting a Platonic conception of universals which allows for uninstantiated universals. To many philosophers a view of laws of nature which relies upon a Platonic theory of universals will appear too metaphysically extravagant.

Why is this? Why does Tooley's realism about universals, and indeed about nomological relations, seem too extreme? Tooley may well adopt the standard defence of realism about scientific entities, arguing that it is reasonable to believe in the existence of the entities he postulates because they provide the best explanation of the relevant range of phenomena. But there is an important difference between Tooley's metaphysical theoretical entities and the theoretical entities of physics. The difference is that the theoretical entities of physics about which a realist view is more justified are ones which are known to enter into many causal relations. Realism about electrons, quarks, and some distant astronomical bodies is justified because we have a detailed story about their causal powers and indeed in some of these cases we know how to experimentally manipulate them to produce certain effects. But this cannot be said of Tooley's Platonic universals, nor of his nomological relations among universals, for they do not appear to possess any causal powers. There are some grounds, then, for rejecting Tooley's extreme realism about uninstantiated universals and nomological relations among universals in favour of a more moderate realism encompassing only the theoretical entities of science.

Tooley's discussion of singular causation occupies the second half of the book. He begins his discussion by challenging the widely accepted assumption that singular causation conforms to a thesis of Humean supervenience, to wit the thesis that the

truth values of all singular causal statements are logically determined by the truth values of statements of causal laws, together with the truth values of non-causal statements about particulars. Tooley advances a number of ingenious arguments against this thesis. The following is a sample of his general style of argumentation. (pp. 199–202) Suppose that there are two indeterministic laws governing a certain kind of phenomenon: for any  $x$ ,  $x$ 's having property  $P$  will give rise either to  $x$ 's having property  $Q$  or to  $x$ 's having property  $R$ ; and for any  $x$ ,  $x$ 's having property  $S$  will give rise either to  $x$ 's having property  $Q$ , or to  $x$ 's having property  $R$ . Now imagine that a particular  $a$  has both properties  $P$  and  $S$  and both properties  $Q$  and  $R$ . Is  $a$ 's having  $Q$  caused by  $a$ 's having  $P$  or by  $a$ 's having  $S$ ? In such cases, Tooley claims we cannot appeal to the possibility of an intervening causal process to sort out the ontological situation. Nonetheless, we suppose that it is ontologically determinate which state of affairs caused  $a$  to have the property  $Q$ . Indeed, we can imagine two possible worlds agreeing on the relevant causal laws and on the particular matters of fact, but differing in that one makes  $a$ 's having  $P$  the cause while the other makes  $a$ 's having  $S$  the cause.

Tooley's important arguments require more discussion than is permitted here. The significant point is that Tooley regards these arguments as demonstrating the need for a *realist* conception of causation, by which he means, in part, a conception of causation which does not conform to the thesis of Humean supervenience. Tooley canvasses two such realist theories. One is a singularist conception which takes causation to be a non-Humean relation between particular states of affairs. On this conception, if a causal relation holds between two states of affairs, it does so by virtue of the intrinsic nature of the non-Humean relation holding between them and not because the states of affairs fall under any kind of law. The other realist conception Tooley canvasses is slightly different in that it states that the existence of a causal relation between two states of affairs requires not only that a non-Humean relation holds between them, but also that they fall under a causal law. Although Tooley acknowledges that the singularist conception is simpler and more intuitively appealing than the second realist conception, he adopts the latter view, mainly because it proves to be possible to marry it, but not the singularist conception, with another view which he thinks is essential to the analysis of causation.

This other view is that causation is a theoretical relation which can be specified only indirectly. This view is neutral, he says, on the issue of Humean supervenience: it can be developed in the context of an account of causation which conforms to the thesis of Humean supervenience or in the context of an account which does not. The central idea of this view is that causation is that theoretical relation which determines the direction of logical transmission of probabilities. Tooley attempts to spell out this idea, initially in the context of a supervenience conception of causation, by way of a number of postulates stating how a given hypothesis about a causal law may affect the logical probabilities of various states of affairs. For example, one important postulate states that the probability of  $Pa$  conditional on the hypothesis of the causal law  $P \rightarrow Q$  is the same as the unconditional probability of  $Pa$ . Another states that the probability of  $Qa$  conditional on the hypothesis of the causal law  $P \rightarrow Q$  is equal to a certain sum of probabilities which is at least as great as the unconditional probability of  $Pa$ . These postulates are supposed to capture the idea that a cause transmits its probability to its effect in a way that an effect does not transmit its probability to its cause.

The intuitive idea motivating the postulates is nicely brought out by examples of irreversible processes which run from an antecedently reasonably probable event—say, a pebble dropping into the centre of a pond—to an antecedently extremely improbable event—a concentric pattern of waves radiating from the centre of the pond. The postulates, Tooley claims (p. 302), explain why we take the direction of causation to run from the reasonably probable event to the extremely improbable one. If the antecedently improbable event were causally prior, then by the first postulate

mentioned above, that event would remain just a grand accident. But if the antecedently improbable event is causally posterior, then by virtue of the second postulate mentioned, it ceases to be highly improbable, since its probability must be at least as great as that of the other more probable event.

After demonstrating that causal laws which satisfy his postulates have their customary formal properties, Tooley goes on to consider whether it is possible to frame an account of causation as a theoretical relation in the context of a singularist conception which accords primacy to singular causal relations rather than to causal laws. He concludes that it is not possible to do so because there is no way of expressing, within the singularist conception, a postulate corresponding to the first postulate mentioned above. It does no good to postulate that the probability of  $Pa$  conditional on the hypothesis that  $Pa$  caused  $Qa$  is equal to the unconditional probability of  $Pa$ : since the hypothesis that  $Pa$  caused  $Qa$  entails that  $Pa$  and  $Qa$  obtain, the conditional probability must always equal one, while the unconditional probability may differ from one. Tooley argues that we have more success with the other realist conception which says that states of affairs are causally related only if a non-Humean relation holds between them and they fall under a causal law. There is no difficulty, he says, in expressing the view that causation is linked with the transmission of probability in the context of this conception: one can simply retain the postulates presented in the context of the supervenience view, adding an extra postulate stating how the posited non-Humean relations connect up with the covering causal laws. Tooley proposes the resulting set of postulates as his analysis of singular causation.

Tooley develops his proposed analysis with great technical sophistication to which the summary above does not do justice. Nonetheless, there are several points of obscurity in his discussion which are not resolved by his technical apparatus. One point of obscurity concerns the requirement of the analysis that a non-Humean relation, which Tooley calls the  $C$  relation, hold between causally related states of affairs. Clearly, it is this requirement which gives the analysis its distinctive realist character. But exactly how are we to understand the non-Humean  $C$  relation? One might expect that the postulates of the analysis would say something about this relation. But, in actual fact, all but one of the postulates are concerned with the way in which hypotheses about causal laws determine the direction of the transmission of probabilities. The only postulate concerning the  $C$  relation raises more puzzles than it solves. It states (p. 271) that if the causal law  $P \rightarrow Q$  holds, then it is a law that, for all  $x$ , if  $Px$  obtains, then  $Qx$  obtains and a  $C$  relation holds between  $Px$  and  $Qx$ . But this does not shed much light on the  $C$  relation. If anything, it raises suspicions about its alleged non-Humean character, since the postulate implies that, on some occasions at least, facts about laws and non-causal facts about particulars determine whether a  $C$  relation holds. Tooley does not provide enough in the way of informal philosophical characterisation to explain the non-Humean  $C$  relation, which will appear a mystery to many conventional empiricists.

This point highlights a general weakness, which is that Tooley develops his theory of causation at such a level of technical abstraction that not all the philosophically controversial points are sufficiently well motivated. Often the argument seems to be driven more by the demands of the theory than by pretheoretically plausible intuitions. A few illustrative examples, taken from science or everyday life, would have done much light on the  $C$  relation. If anything, it raises suspicions about its alleged non-Humean character, since the postulate implies that, on some occasions at least, facts about laws and non-causal facts about particulars determine whether a  $C$  relation holds. Tooley does not provide enough in the way of informal philosophical characterisation to explain the non-Humean  $C$  relation, which will appear a mystery to many conventional empiricists.

Still, the book's strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. There is much to be learnt from its critiques of regularity accounts of laws, of the thesis of Humean supervenience, and of orthodox treatments of the asymmetry of causation. Moreover, I am full of admiration for the rigorous but imaginative argumentation of the book. The book is likely to stand for some time as a classic exploration of the possibilities of a realist metaphysics of causation.

Papineau, David *Reality and Representation*; Oxford, Blackwell, 1987 pp. xix, 243, \$87.50.

This book is an important contribution to a very central philosophical issue: how it is possible for humans to have mental representations of an objective reality. In the course of exploring this issue a quite extraordinary range of important topics in recent philosophical works are considered. The author argues for a realist ontology and a naturalistic stance on epistemology and philosophy of mind. Throughout the argument is clear without oversimplifying issues.

David Papineau takes an original and interesting perspective on realism. He sees instrumentalism in science and phenomenalism as presupposing 'The myth of the given', so once this myth is rejected any challenge these theses pose to realism vanishes. (p. 6) He is concerned with a different issue. His point of departure is that if there is an independent reality, then however a belief has been arrived at there must be a possibility of error. So he defines realism as the thesis that human belief is susceptible to substantial error. (p. 7) The first part of the book defends realism so conceived from a number of challenges to it which he identifies in recent philosophy.

In the preface he announces the two central ideas of the book as 'the teleological theory of representation, and the idea that we can avoid error by reflecting on our belief-forming processes and adjusting them in pursuit of reliability'. (p. xv) The latter is the concern of the second part of the book and the former is developed in reconciling a functionalist account of the mental with realism. A central theme is that 'realism requires that beliefs should be caused by the facts they are about'. (p. xiv) However for error of belief to be possible it is essential that what a belief is about is not simply what causes it. Biological function (call it 'teleology' to avoid confusion with the functionalist theory of the mental) is invoked to do this job.

Donald Davidson's appeal to truth conditions certainly has a realist air, but Papineau sees it as challenging realism. He argues that this account of meaning can easily be developed in a way which excludes erroneous belief in any serious sense. In 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' Davidson explicitly rejects conceptual divergence, and by assuming that charity should normally be maximised in the determination of meaning he leaves little room for divergence in opinion. (pp. 18ff, 35n and 105-6) However there is an alternative to charity. We often have good reasons for thinking that aliens have false beliefs; and when we do we should take this into account in considering the meaning of their words. This strategy (which he calls 'humanity') acknowledges the kinds of human error that are all too evident. We must note that this requires the notion of 'belief' to be prior to that of 'meaning'; as in Grice's theory of meaning.

Davidson's account of meaning involves a distinctive view of judgements: their identity is determined extrinsically by relations to truth conditions. It is then natural to analyse belief in terms of meaning. But the extrinsic theory of judgement, which effectively rules out conceptual divergence, is not inevitable. It is possible to see judgements identified intrinsically, in terms of their properties as representers. (p. 22) Indeed once we switch from charity to humanity, Papineau claims, it is hard to avoid an intrinsic notion of belief. He considers whether functionalism can provide such an account. It seems promising, since according to it a mental state is identified largely by its causal relations to other internal states. However he insists that an account of the representational power of belief is still necessary; and causal connections with external entities are not, on their own, sufficient for realism. So teleology is invoked. The notion is that being normally caused constitutes a belief's being truth. Such a belief will have been brought about by the kind of circumstance which 'it is biologically supposed to respond to'. (p. 65)

Speaking of 'what is biologically supposed to happen' will strike many as very dubious; it smacks of irreducible teleology. While Papineau favours a selectionist

account of teleology, he sees an objection to analysing the notion in this way. Consider the case of a replica, precise in all aspects, of a particular person brought into being a few seconds ago. (p. 72) Since such a being has not evolved, none of its processes, cognitive or otherwise, has any function in the Darwinian sense. Are we to say that it therefore can have no beliefs? He considers the case for modifying (what he accepts as) our intuitions and insisting that such an immediately created being could not have beliefs. However he ends up reminding anti-selectionists that the teleological theory is not committed to natural selection. It is biological function, not its explanation which is important to the account. This implies that the former notion is meaningful in its own right. It seems the theory is committed to an undefined, fuzzy notion of 'purpose', and this is taken as prior to truth.

Papineau gives an ingenious account of how the complex structuring of belief can be accounted for by this theory. What he does not consider is the possibility of mechanisms of belief formation arising by natural selection which, in their normal course, lead to beliefs which are false by ordinary standards. The mere possibility of such cases should be a difficulty; but it seems to me that there are, in fact, such cases. Consider the human tendency to stereotypic thinking, and the kind of beliefs it leads to about people in other cultures. It seems very plausible that the formation of such beliefs contributed to Darwinian fitness in the context of early human society, where hostile attitudes were sustained by the beliefs. Such beliefs should be true according to the theory, yet by ordinary standards they are false.

A weaker kind of anti-realism consists of what Papineau calls 'methodism': the thesis that there is no possibility of disagreement about standards of belief-evaluation. In Ch. 6 he considers some general difficulties with this thesis. The arguments of Hilary Putnam and Michael Dummett, who he identifies as supporting methodism, are dealt with later in the book. Given that it is possible for people to differ in the way they evaluate beliefs, we must consider how appropriate standards can be chosen. Papineau accepts reliabilism, and argues that it provides a normative epistemology. (p. 134) He considers an apparent paradox. Granted that it is a fact that a belief has been formed in a reliable way, the concerned believer need not know this. From his point of view he needs to draw on what he believes. Maybe he has a belief about the reliability of the way he formed the first belief, but what about *this* belief? Has he grounds for confidence in it? We are led to regress without end.

The answer offered is that this problem only arises when we adopt a cartesian stance, and assume that what the concerned believer needs are inferences. However naturalism denies this. Instead it recommends that people who are concerned about their beliefs 'should simply aim to be reliable belief-formers'. One should do 'what has to be done to bring this about', and to this end should 'investigate what belief-forming processes' they embody. But Papineau does not tell us how this is to be done without inference. He tells us a good deal about the way reliability can be relevant to the appraisal of beliefs, but passes over the need for an intellectual agent to arrive at beliefs about what is reliable. Until this point is met, the paradox stands.

We are offered a consideration relating to reliabilism which an agent can apply: we should seek an overall method which leads to the belief that the method is reliable. If this coherence between method and beliefs is lacking, we should adjust our method. (pp. 149-150) Undoubtedly this provides a necessary condition for a satisfactory method, the question is whether it is sufficient. Induction meets this criterion, as Van Cleve points out (pp. 192ff); however this is not enough. It gives no guarantee that induction is reliable, but we must agree with Papineau that to take this as an objection would be to raise an impossible standard of justification. (pp. 218ff) There is a different problem. The coherence criterion does not distinguish induction from any number of anti-inductive procedures. Certainly, accepting induction leads to the conclusion that induction is reliable. However, consider some anti-inductive method (which can readily be made as powerful as induction by being



put in the from 'Accept induction except—'. cf p. 205) ). It will predict one or more mutations in nature in the future, radical changes from the patterns which now occur. Accepting these predictions will tell us that that method will be more reliable than induction. (It is such specific alternatives to induction, rather than the general sceptical thesis (cf p. 228) which are self-vindicating in a way which damages naturalism.)

So there must be some criterion beyond reliabilist coherence by which induction is to be preferred. Actually Papineau identifies simplicity as such a criterion. He invokes it to exclude irrational self-vindicating methods, and in giving an answer, that differs from Putnam's, to the ultimate sceptical challenge: that we might be subject to systematic perceptual illusion. The hypothesis that this is so, while possible, is needlessly complex (p. 227) What he has to say about the justification of simplicity comes earlier. In discussing induction he recognises that Goodman's paradox points to the need to identify natural kind so as to get it going, and invokes simplicity to break a regress which would otherwise be unending. But the status of the simplicity criterion is not satisfactorily resolved. Again coherence is invoked: if the world is indeed simple, using the simplicity criterion will be reliable. (pp. 197–8; cf. 231) But again we may note that a complex method would be more reliable if the world included the mutations predicted by that method.

A simplicity criterion is acknowledged as a key component in ampliative reasoning, but it can not be grounded on reliabilism. The propriety of this criterion is evident when we recognise the intellectual incoherence of allowing oneself to adopt some belief which is more complex than is needed to fit what we already accept. Papineau touches on this point, but only in parenthesis (p. 198), and does not develop it. To do so would allow that there must be some very basic principle(s) of reasoning which have a non-naturalistic justification, in order to get a system of self-vindicating naturalistic belief going.

I have indicated some, but far from all, of the interwoven themes explored in this richly stimulating work.

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Jackson, Frank, *Conditionals*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. viii, 148, \$45.00.

The nature of the conditional, 'if . . . then . . .', has been a hotly debated issue in logic—ancient, medieval and modern. A recurrent, but by no means general view is that the conditional is material implication,  $\supset$ ; and this has been the view that predominated amongst logicians in the earlier parts of this century. Indeed, when I was a student in the late 1960's the idea that the conditional was material was a firmly entrenched orthodoxy amongst logicians (though philosophers may have been more skeptical). One might have to 'regiment' natural language a little . . . But few logicians were not prepared to grit their teeth and get on with it.

The situation has changed in a remarkably short space of time. Under the onslaught of possible-world conditionals, relevance logic and so on, the material conditional has been dislodged from its favoured place. It may be true that there is no longer any logical orthodoxy about the conditional at all, different accounts pressing their various claims; but it is equally true that the material conditional is now fighting a rearguard action even to hold its place as an account of the so called indicative conditional.

This short book occupies a place of distinction in the rearguard action. It provides the most systematic and thorough defence of the claim that the indicative conditional is material to date. Moreover, it does so with the tightness, clarity and ingenuity that we have come to expect from Jackson.

After an introductory chapter, the book states and defends its theory of the indicative

conditional. It then fills in a number of details of the account, in particular the relationship between the indicative and subjunctive/counterfactual conditional, and the central notion of conventional implicature. The two final chapters, which concern begging the question and the surprise examination paradox, are only loosely connected with the main theme of the book. Much of the material has been published before in various places, but the book, I take it, provides the definitive statement of Jackson's position.

The book contains arguments and insights that must be taken into account by anyone with a view on conditionals. Its discussion of conventional implicature and begging the question are also notable contributions to those subjects. However, in the rest of this review I will address only Jackson's position on conditionals, summarising it and pointing out some of its problems. The central theses are as follows:

- a) It is possible to divide the English conditional into two kinds: indicative and subjunctive/counterfactual.
- b) To specify the meaning of a sentence one must specify both its truth conditions and its assertibility conditions.
- c) For the subjunctive/counterfactual conditional: truth conditions are of the possible world variety, as given by Lewis and Stalnaker; and such a conditional is assertible iff its probability is high.
- d) For the indicative conditional: truth conditions are those of the material conditional; and such a conditional is assertible iff it is both probable, and robust (i.e. probable) with respect to its antecedent (provided that this has non-zero probability).

The claim a) is not so much argued for as rather nonchalantly assumed. This is a pity since it is highly moot. (It is not simply a matter of there being borderline cases, p. 2.) For starters, many 'subjunctive/counterfactual' conditionals are neither subjunctive nor counterfactual. (If the robber had come in this window he would have left footprints here. Ah! I see that there are . . .) As the work of Vic Dudman (see his 'Indicative and Subjunctive', *Analysis* 48 (1988) and the references cited there) shows, the primary grammatical distinction in the genus *conditional* would appear to be that between those whose antecedents are prime (i.e., those whose antecedents can stand alone with the same sense) and those whose antecedents are not. The former are always indicative; the latter may be indicative or 'subjunctive/counterfactual'. Moreover, in the major variety of the latter species, mood seems to play no logical role at all, but merely conveys certain temporal information. If there is an important semantic distinction to be made, therefore, it is not at all obvious that this will coincide with Jackson's primary distinction. (See Tim Smiley 'Hunter on Conditionals', *Proc. Arist. Soc.* 84, (1983–4).)

Traditionally, logicians have ridden rough-shod over grammar in this area, rewriting tense and mood *ad lib*, and using schematic letters indiscriminately—and Jackson is no exception to this. For example, they are prepared to count the following inference as *modus ponens*,  $A, A \rightarrow B/B$ : {It will rain tomorrow; if it rains tomorrow the match will be canceled. Hence the match will be canceled.} The justification for this (when justification is offered) is that it is merely a quirk of English grammar that at the surface level it transforms a future tense in the antecedent of conditionals of this kind into a present tense. This, however, is false. Not only do many languages other than English do it; but such conditionals can have future tense antecedents where a present tense means something quite different. Compare 'If you will be at home tomorrow I'll arrange for the technician to call then' and 'If you are at home tomorrow I'll arrange for the technician to call then'. And this is just the tip of the ice-berg. (See Vic Dudman, 'Antecedents and Consequents', *Theoria* 52 (1986).) If such a cavalier attitude to tense and mood is legitimate, it certainly needs careful justification.

The case of b) is a standard one. ('A but B' and 'A and B', for example, have the same truth conditions, but are assertible under different conditions.) But its consequences are worth noting. We cannot claim to have given an account of the meaning of 'if' until we have given an account of the assertibility condition of every sentence in which it occurs. d) above gives the assertibility conditions only of sentences of the form 'if A then B'. We therefore need to give, in addition, the assertibility conditions of every (meaningful) sentence of which such a formula is a subformula. One cannot say that non-principle 'if's make no contribution to assertibility conditions—at least if an objection of Appiah is to be avoided (pp. 127 ff). How, then, is this to be done? Jackson makes a partial attempt at this in an appendix to the book. But it is seriously incomplete since it concerns only some truth functional contexts. There is no suggestion made as to how to handle quantifiers, modality and other non-truth—functional operators etc. Nor is it clear that Jackson's strategy succeeds even for his limited cases. For example, it is claimed that conditionals with conditionals as antecedents have no clear sense (unless they can be interpreted in some other way). This is false: consider 'If you want to go only if I do, then I don't want you to go'.

Since the concerns of the book are mainly with the indicative conditional, c) is more or less lifted straight from Lewis/Stalnaker, and little argument is given for it. It is not at all unproblematic, however. First, there are inferences of the form  $A, B/A \Box \rightarrow B$ : {You said the magic words; It rained. Hence if you had said the magic words it would have rained.}—which always strike one as odd. More tellingly, such semantics cannot distinguish between counter-logical conditionals: if paraconsistent logic were correct disjunctive syllogism would fail (true); if paraconsistent logic were correct double negation would fail (false); if I were to square the circle tomorrow I would become famous (true); if I were to square the circle tomorrow there would be a communist revolution in Australia (false).

Moving to d) we find the really distinctive features Jackson's account. Jackson calls the following statement '(Adams)': 'If A then B' is assertible if  $pr(B/A)$  is high (for  $pr(A) \neq 0$ ). He notes that (Adams) is very plausible, and is entailed by d) but by no extant rival theory of conditionals. This provides his main argument for d). Unfortunately, the argument faces a serious problem since (Adams), though true normally, may be false. Suppose that we are given that all people under the age of 10 live with their parents, and that all the inhabitants of Ageville are OAP's. Suppose, also that we know of a certain Fred that his parents live in Ageville. We then wish to know whether Fred is under 10, and reason as follows: {If Fred is under 10, he lives with his parents. But then he lives in Ageville, in which case he is an OAP. Hence (\*) if Fred is under 10 he is an OAP; whence Fred is not under 10.} The conditional (\*) is highly assertible at the appropriate stage in our deliberations; but the probability of the conditional, given the antecedent, is 0. (One might try to avoid the conclusion by rejecting Transitivity, but this option is not open to Jackson.)

One of the principle functions of the assertibility conditions in d) is to protect the truth conditions from standard counter-examples. How they are supposed to do this is best seen with an example. Consider the inference: {The sun will rise tomorrow. Hence if the sun does not rise tomorrow we will go and play cricket.} The inference, according to the material truth conditions, is valid, but it strikes us as invalid. The explanation, according to Jackson, is that the conclusion is highly unassertible (it is not very probable that we will go and play cricket given that the sun does not rise tomorrow), and we mistake this for falsity.

It is not clear that this defence will work, for two reasons. First, because moving from assertible premises to a non-assertible conclusion is neither necessary nor sufficient for a valid inference to strike us as invalid. It is not sufficient; witness the inference: {I will not throw a five or six on the first throw; I will not throw a five or six on the second throw; I will not throw a five or six on the third throw.

Hence I will not throw a five or six on any of the first three throws.} (The conclusion has probability of less than 0.3.) It is not necessary; witness the inference: {It is not the case that if I wear blue socks the sun will not rise tomorrow. Hence the sun will rise tomorrow.} (The premise is certainly assertible according to Jackson, see his discussion of denials of conditionals, pp. 33 ff.)

The second reason is that there are a number of unacceptable inferences which would be valid if the conditional were material, and which cannot be defused *à la* Jackson. (I take these from Richard Routley *et al*, *Relevant Logics and their Rivals*, pp. 6–7.) Consider the inference: {If  $F$  (a two dimensional rectilinear figure) is equiangular and equilateral it is a square. Hence if  $F$  is equiangular and not equilateral it is a square, or if  $F$  is equilateral but not equiangular it is a square.} Since the premise is true, so is the conclusion. But both disjuncts are false (and unassertible to boot). Or consider: {It is not the case that if there is a good god the prayers of evil people will be answered. Hence there is a good god.} The premise is true (and assertible). Who cares whether the conclusion is assertible or not? Since the inference is valid it is true. So there is a god!

As we see, Jackson's account faces a number of problems (as do all extant accounts). Whether suitable replies can be found, time will tell. But I am doubtful that it will stem the recent tide running against the material conditional.

(I am grateful to Vic Dudman, Ian Hinckfuss and Frank Jackson for comments on an earlier draft of this review.)

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Hamblin, C. L., *Imperatives*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. ix, 262, \$55.00.

This book supplies a readable commentary—sometimes thoughtful and sometimes superficial—on much of the linguistic and philosophical literature on imperatives since (especially) the 1950's, together with some novel proposals of the author's own. It is easy to forget the many published discussion notes that have contributed to this literature and this bibliographical information is the most useful feature of Hamblin's book. His own proposals are mostly scattered points which, while being potential ingredients for a theory of imperatives, cannot be regarded as having here been assembled into such a theory. (There is no reason to think Hamblin would have disagreed with this.)

One chapter (the fourth) is devoted to setting up some elaborate machinery reminiscent of the branching-time trees often found in discussions of tense logic; this is apparently to provide a way of visualising full compliance with an imperative as possession of a (perhaps partial) strategy for the selection of possible continuations from any given node reached. (Actually, it is something called a 'deed' that is selected.) The chapter's title is 'Action-State Semantics' but it is not clear that such a modelling of compliance has any place in a *semantics* for imperative language, whatever its interest for general praxiology might be—in particular as part of a general account of goal directed behaviour. For example, it is not deployed in appraising the validity of imperative inference, which is something that Hamblin apparently doesn't believe in anyway. (p. 89) Some use of the apparatus is made in the discussion of the consistency of sets of imperatives—the topic of Chapter 5. Here stress is placed on the distinction between *quandaries*, as when you are told to park your car somewhere and also told to park it not to park it there, and *antagonisms*, as when you and someone else are both told to park your cars in a certain (single) parking space. In neither case can both imperatives be obeyed, though only in the former are you in any

doubt as to how to set about achieving compliance on your own part. But is the distinction importantly imperatival, or is it just a direct analogue of the parallel distinction between the corresponding predictive assertions ('you are going to park. . . etc.)? A more interesting distinction is that Hamblin draws attention to between terms functioning as vocatives and terms picking out the subject of the imperative (pp. 51-54): the distinction between who is being directly addressed and who it is that is being commanded (requested, or whatever). The valuable discussion here will be ignored by subsequent theorists at their cost.

An irritating feature of the book is Hamblin's intermittent neglect of the distinction between the illocutionary force of commanding/requesting/ advising etc. and the imperative mood itself, along with a similarly force/mood distinction- blurring use of the term 'indicative'. For example, we have a discussion (p. 99) of 'Russell's proposal to reduce all indicatives to imperatives of the form *Know that . . .*'; a check of the course will reveal that Russell spoke of statements (= assertions), not of *indicatives* at all. The proposal as represented by Hamblin would be open to the immediate objection that what fills the '*. . .*' will itself be indicative in mood. Similarly, on p. 131 we are told that Austin held performatives to be 'different in kind from indicatives'; the argument in Chapter 3 against a view associated with Lewis and Cresswell to the effect that imperatives have truth-conditions is also undermined by making this distinction. Relatedly, of words like 'and' and 'or' when connecting imperatives, Hamblin complains (p. 72) that "logicians have only thought that 'truth-functional' was a good descriptive term because they were wearing indicative blinkers", a cheap remark requiring more by way of substantiation than is to be found in the surrounding text. While we're on this subject—mixed imperative-indicative disjunctions are taken, Hamblin interestingly notes (p. 75), as giving in the non-imperative disjunct the consequences of not complying with the imperative disjunct: 'Hurry or you'll be late', for example. (*Question*: is this Griceanly explicable? This is the sort of question Hamblin does *not* ask since, as the complaint at the beginning of this paragraph illustrates, he is not sensitive to the distinction between semantic and pragmatic considerations.) The mixed cases with conjunction border—except in certain special idioms—on the ungrammatical, says Hamblin (p. 72), as with: 'It's one o'clock and come and have lunch', though for what it is worth let me point out that conjoining with 'but' leads to no such difficulties: 'Sylvia's out, but come on in anyway'. (*Cf.* also the use of 'though' in the preceding sentence itself.)

The inside cover of Hamblin's book declares it to offer 'the first sustained treatment' of its topic. I don't know what to make of this. The little book by Rescher was perhaps too short and Chellas' book perhaps too formally specialised to constitute counterexamples; but what of Moutafakis' *Imperatives and their Logic* (Sterling Publishers, 1975)? It is true that this was written in something short of the best English, and that it was printed in India, but it surveys at least as many positions on imperatives as Hamblin's book, and frequently overlaps with it in content. These are not good reasons for suppressing any mention of it. To further tone down the praise, above, of his ability (or willingness) to access the literature, let me cite the curious comment on p. 124 deontic logic 'as it is usually studied' differs from suggested logics of imperatives in not singling out an agent as the one responsible for seeing to it that an action of the type deemed obligatory actually gets performed. This completely ignores the extensive work on agent-relativised deontic logic done by Potts, Kordig, Hilpinen, Castañeda and others in the 1970's. In fact in the case of Castañeda, in a well known paper not cited in Hamblin's bibliography, an argument is given for basing deontic logic on the logic of imperatives *for precisely this reason!* This, incidentally, is not the only place at which the significance of some of Castañeda's work on imperatives seems to have been lost on Hamblin, though for reasons of space I cannot illustrate this further here.

*Imperatives* abounds with misprints, missing page numbers, and so on, though these

seldom hamper understanding. The printing of such set-theoretic notation as Hamblin deploys is annoyingly bargain-basement, with underlined capital 'C's for inclusion signs, inverted capital 'U's (serifs and all) for intersection, and a systematic misuse—presumably Hamblin's own fault here—of braces '{, }' (e.g., p. 159, second inset formula). I have not checked the bibliography carefully, though did notice that the work of the philosopher P. B. Downing appears under the entry for a certain linguist, Bruce T. Downing, and his name (P.B.'s, that is) similarly disappears from the index, with the relevant page references appearing under B.T.'s index entry.

In conclusion, I cannot recommend the reading of Hamblin's book as a substitute for working through the seminal papers of Hare, Castañeda, and others, though it may prove a useful supplement to that activity. Useful for examples, and invaluable for bibliographical references, the method of Case Law (as Hamblin calls it) does not completely satisfy. When it ventures into general theory, Hamblin's discussion loses credibility. The philosophy of action in *Imperatives* is jejune and the philosophy of language virtually non-existent. A telling reflection of both weaknesses is the absence of any reference to Davidson in the book.

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Solomon, Robert C., *Continental Philosophy since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. viii, 214, \$57.50.

Roberts, Julian, *German Philosophy: An Introduction*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1988, pp. viii, 296, \$29.95 (paper).

Robert Solomon's smallish volume is the second contribution to appear so far in the eight-part series entitled 'A History of Western Philosophy'. The project has been undertaken by Oxford University Press; judging by early impressions it will have quite a lot in common with OUP's other serial projects, namely, selection of competent authors, readable rather than detailed scholarship, appeal to philosophical audiences at both staff and student level.

Continental Philosophy being a wide and rich area, Solomon restricts himself to the theme of 'the rise and fall of the self'. The choice is wise, for in the given context this is indeed a highly prominent if not the central theme. While the British Empiricists and their followers showed an almost exclusive preoccupation with cognition (and Hume could not discover a self), on the Continent attention was paid to the self in its social, ethical, emotional aspects as well. In modest formulations this became the question of 'human nature', but there were also larger claims. Kant, for one, introduced the transcendental self as something timeless, universal, the same around the globe and throughout history. More extravagantly, there was also the self as part of the World Soul or of God. As Solomon puts it, 'by about 1805 the self was no longer the mere individual human being, standing with others against a hostile world, but had become all-encompassing. The status of the world and even of God became, if not problematic, no more than aspects of human existence' (p. 4).

For the grander versions of the self Solomon coins the term 'the transcendental pretence'. This, for him, has two central elements. First, there is the remarkable inner richness and expanse of the self, to the point of being in some sense everything. Secondly, there is the tendency, conceived as a right, to project from the introspection of one's own mind to the nature of humanity as such. But how did such pretensions originate? Certainly not with the transparent ego of Descartes, though he too theorised on the Continent. For Solomon, the key figure is Rousseau, 'a sociopath, free and alone with his self-aggrandizement, but one who inspired some of the most spectacular

and successful philosophy that the world has ever known'. (p. 2)

Solomon's reproduction of the 'dramatic story of the European self-image'—conditioned by the relative smallness of the volume—is an extended sketch rather than a detailed treatment. But he packs a great deal into the survey, to the extent that the reader is offered not only a multitude of illuminating brushstrokes but is given compact yet readable and competent presentations of the crucial philosophical positions involved. There is first of all the contrast between the introspectively passive approach typical of the British Empiricists and the 'expressive', dynamic self of Rousseau. Then Rousseau's self turns into Kant's cognitively forming self which at the same time, through the possession of the Categorical Imperative, is nothing less than the absolute moral authority. Hegel's attacks on the everyday notion of the self as essentially individual result in a self which deep down is of the very opposite nature: social, anonymously cultural, 'infinite'. But after the amazing rise comes the fall. Though later the transcendental pretence was revived by Husserl (p. 138), in the meantime the deluge of sceptical, ironical, empirical, logical objections brought about the self's decline. This is, of course, the work of Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, Wittgenstein et al. Solomon closes his account with Lévi-Strauss, Foucault and Derrida, rejecting further prognostications as pointless.

It should be added that Solomon is not satisfied with the 'philosophical dimension' alone. For him, theory and practice are intertwined; in particular, 'the transcendental pretence is no innocent philosophical thesis but a political weapon of enormous power'. (p. 6) But where so much is undertaken, there must be shortcomings. The reader, depending on expertise, is likely to quarrel with various details, though it is doubtful whether any substantial faults can be found in the structure as such. To the present reviewer one desideratum does stand out. Solomon cannot help mentioning 'constitution' (of object by subject), and it is here that the book could have been enhanced by a more detailed account of the relation between 'externality' and 'internality'. Today's philosophical generation seems to be at a loss how to understand the otherwise so interesting Classical Idealists. Did they really reduce externality to internality? But if so, why did they dismiss Berkeley? What does Hegel say about cognition in the technical sense? When Hegel rejected the Kantian noumenon, did he really reject the 'outside world'? It seems that Solomon could have dispelled the fog by, e.g., commenting more on Hegel's Introduction to his *Phenomenology*, in particular on his characterisation of appearance as double-faced. In philosophy, almost anything said at any time is relevant at some other time, and the problem of 'constitution', in its logical structure, is just as relevant in our age, when so much interest is being shown in the relation between *language* and reality.

While Solomon's volume sometimes must rely on outlines and pregnant directions (but can be powerfully supported by his more extensive works such as *From Hegel to Existentialism* and *In the Spirit of Hegel*), Julian Roberts offers much fuller individual accounts of ten philosophers prominent in the German or German-related sphere: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Lukács, Heidegger, Adorno. Roberts, too, is interested in a theme, namely, reactions to the problem of freedom as posed and handled by Kant, but it gradually drops out of focus. In fact, in the conclusion Roberts speaks rather of different reactions to Hegel. The reader can, without any loss, treat the book's chapters as self-contained.

Roberts' book is more 'personal' than Solomon's. It is a fusion of illuminating insights (which, as centralising perspectives, can protect the reader from wasteful intellectual expenditure) and less felicitous formulations. Frequently he attempts to paraphrase, to explicate the thinkers in a foreign tradition by providing analogies from a more homely environment, but the result is not always a happy one. And occasionally one begins to wonder whether the faults lie in the transformations or in the author's own grasp.

One of the book's defects appears early, in the first chapter devoted to Kant. Whatever one may say about the ultimate truth and logical coherence of Kant's work, the fact is that he did argue and he did analyse with a considerable measure of rigour. For example, Kant's argument for the subjectivity of the categories displays a definite logical structure which to him was irrefutable (briefly: Induction does not furnish necessity. If, however, we do possess necessary propositions, they are not a result of induction. Therefore, necessary propositions are not empirical and have their origin elsewhere, e.g., in the mind.). But of Kant's logical argumentations there is little in Roberts' presentation; one can be left with the impression that Kant simply said this and that and so on. Admittedly, by the end of the chapter (and discounting infelicitous phrasings) the reader does get an overall picture of Kant's position, but the available space could have been put to better use.

Roberts' approach works better with those philosophers who, unlike Kant, were more interested in an ethical position, or a certain world-view, for in such cases logical solidity tends to be subordinated to a sequentially describable personal statement. Unfortunately, a peculiar injustice is done to Nietzsche. Roberts discusses (to follow his section headings) what Nietzsche says about the *principium individuationis*, ecstasy, symbolism, history and redemption but, strangely enough, practically ignores what many would take to be Nietzsche's central concern: his positive ethic (as expressed, e.g., in his distinction between Master and Slave Morality or, more concretely, in his observation that psychological strength, 'abundance', 'overflow' preclude such bad emotions as hate, revenge, resentment, etc.). If Nietzsche's constructive endeavours are omitted, what was so powerful, and inspiring, about his thought, at least on the Continent?

Certainly, there are lots of valuable reminders in Roberts' book. When he writes that "the Kantian 'I' . . . is a way describing the cohesiveness of reality in general, not an aspect of any existing person" (p. 285), he brings out neatly one of Kant's major points. Again, when Roberts starts his chapter on Hegel by saying that Hegel's underlying metaphysical problem was that of continuity (p. 70ff), he is already cutting through some of Hegel's mysteriousness. (By the same token, the chapter on Schelling is quite useful, for these days Schelling is dismissed as either unintelligible or wilfully bizarre or both). But on the whole, quality is not even; sometimes it is not sustained within a single paragraph. A philosopher will require more; perhaps the book was intended for the 'educated reader' or for academics in the humanities generally.

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Derrida, Jacques. *Glas*. English translation by John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986, pp. 262, US \$50.

Leavey, John P. Jr. *Glassary*. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1986, pp. 320, US \$50.

Two of Jacques Derrida's texts have already achieved an exemplary status. At once scholarly and speculative, *Of Grammatology* has come to inspire a highly serious way of re-reading the canon of western thought, while *Glas* is taken to illustrate something altogether more elusive and playful: a new way in which to write, one that unsettles the canon or extends it in an unforeseen direction. Thus drawn, the distinction is too sharp to be of much help in understanding Derrida's development; after all, a good deal of *Glas* offers a searching reading of Hegel, and *Of Grammatology* has its ludic moments. But the distinction is drawn, repeatedly so, and its effects are everywhere apparent in discussions of contemporary European philosophy. It is a pity, since the distinction often occludes some of Derrida's best work: *Speech and Phenomena*, 'Plato's Pharmacy' and 'White Mythology', for example, have never



been as central to debate about deconstruction as they deserve to be. But *Of Grammatology* seems well on the way to being regarded as a pivotal text of our period; and now that *Glas* has finally been translated into English, in a very stylish edition, along with an equally attractive companion volume, it seems likely that these two texts will continue to regulate our image of Derrida.

The first thing to say about *Glas*, I suppose, is that it resists the idea of translation from beginning to end. It consists of two columns: the left-hand one dealing with Hegel—the philosopher of law and the State, the staunch apologist of Christianity—while the right hand one addresses Jean Genet, the homosexual novelist, poet, playwright and thief. One of the text's main themes is that philosophy and literature are at once irreducible and inextricably entangled: just as the Hegelian dialectic always relies, at some level, on rhetorical moves, so too there are invariably philosophical motifs at work in Genet's writings. Attempts to translate everything into a philosophical discourse (such as one finds, famously, in Hegel) turn out to be as delusive as those brave ventures to rid one's discourse entirely of metaphysics. Nor is it an easy matter, Derrida insists, to translate from one philosophical discourse into another: there will always be a supplement of signification that escapes formalisation. The point is easily conceded; more troubling, though, for those who know *Glas* in French is the very idea of translating it into English.

The text poses formidable problems for the English translator. One or two examples from the first page should make the point. In the French text a note inserted into the left-hand column tells us: 'Sa sera désormais le sigle du savoir absolu. Et l'IC . . . de l'Immaculée Conception'. This is rendered, clearly enough, as 'Sa from now on will be the siglum of *savoir absolu*. And IC . . . the Immaculate Conception' (p. 1a). *Sa* must remain untranslated, since a good deal of Derrida's strategy relies on the reader realising that it fits into a series of phonemes—*ça* (Saussure's signifier), *Ça* (Freud's id) and *sa* (her)—which, as he will demonstrate, are systematically linked. *IC* for Immaculate Conception may seem to escape this difficulty, but as is evident in the French text, Derrida is punning on *ici*. Why the pun? First of all, to recall Hegel's argument in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* against sense certainty providing immediate knowledge. (That is, in pointing out a Here one is involved in a process of gaining knowledge rather than having an immaculate conception of a particular item of knowledge.) Second, to illustrate how a word can be 'unconsciously' cited by another: lifted from its original context and so become subject to a different signifying pattern.

So *Glas* is concerned to show as well as say, and the translators have succeeded as well as one might decently ask in capturing both aspects of the text. The benefit of intelligibility is balanced, though, by a certain cost: the English text sometimes appears rather laboured, straining to make points that are lightly evoked in the French. Thus 'Sa signature, comme la pensée du reste, enveloppera ce corpus' becomes, inevitably enough, 'Its/His [*Sa*] signature, as thought of the remain(s), will envelop this corpus' (p.1a). As this one sentence suggests, *Glas* offers few concessions to those mythical beings 'the plain man' and 'the common reader'; but too much can be made of its difficulty. The frequent complaint amongst analytic philosophers that Derrida cannot be understood comes down, all too often, to a simple lack of knowledge of European philosophy. One cannot argue about what one does not know.

Certainly one could not make much sense of *Glas* without a close familiarity with Hegel and Genet. The left-hand column is a striking reading of what Derrida calls 'the law of the family: of Hegel's family, of the family in Hegel, of the concept family according to Hegel' (p. 4a). It would be easy enough to detail the concept of the family in the *Encyclopedia* and the *Philosophy of Right*; yet, as Derrida patiently shows, the notion of the family at once organises and troubles Hegel's project in all its various forms. The following passage is characteristic, in style as well as its argumentative moves:

Economy: the law of the family, of the family home, of possession. The economic

act makes familiar, proper, one's own, intimate, private. The sense of property, of propriety, in general is collected in the *oikeios*. Whatever the exportation or the generalizing expropriation of the concept economy, that concept never breaks the umbilical cord attaching it to the family. Or rather yes, it always breaks the cord, but this rupture is the *deduction* of the family, belongs to the family process as that process includes a cutting [*coupante*] instance. The *Aufhebung*, the economic law of absolute reappropriation of the absolute loss, is a family concept. (p. 133a)

One of Derrida's main tasks, then, is to study the sequence 'proper', 'property', 'propriety', 'appropriation' and 'expropriation' as it occurs in Hegel. And that means, in short, to find the economy in which these concepts operate, to describe its laws, and then to analyse those elements that the economy relegates to its margins in order to work efficiently. What Derrida shows, by the end of *Glas*, is that those marginal elements actually underwrite the entire economy and provide the means whereby it can be displaced. As Derrida suggests, his way of reading Hegel follows a 'bastard course'. (p. 6a)

One way in which Derrida approaches the questions of property, propriety and appropriation is by an examination of the structure of certain signatures: Hegel's, Genet's, and his own. The basic argument is familiar to Derrida's readers. In normal circumstances, a signature represents its author—it functions in the absence of the individual. Yet if this possibility *can* occur while the individual is absent from the scene of writing, it can *always* occur: the possibility of being cited outside of its original context is a structural trait of the signature. What interests Derrida in *Glas* is that the signature functions in the general absence of the author, that is, when he or she is dead. The possibility of one's death is therefore inscribed in the act of signing one's name.

In *Glas* one comes across this argument, in a more compressed form, in the middle of a discussion of Genet's poetry:

(to) read the *déjà* [already] as a siglum. When I sign I am already dead. I hardly have the time to sign than I am already dead, that I am already dead. I have to abridge the writing, hence the siglum, because the structure of the 'signature' event carries my death in that event. For which it is not an 'event' and perhaps signifies nothing, writes out of a past that has never been present and out of a death that has never been alive. (p. 19b)

One problem here, I think, is that one needs to know Derrida's argument about the signature (from *Speech and Phenomena* or 'Limited Inc', for instance) before one can make much sense of passages like this, let alone see how they help us to read Genet and Hegel. So *Glas* is a long way from being an ideal introduction to Derrida's work; along with *Signéponge* and *Parages*, it should be left until one already knows Derrida's arguments about metaphysics and the sign.

*Glossary* provides some welcome assistance to the reader of *Glas*. John P. Leavey, Jr. supplies a thorough set of translation notes and a glossary, both of which are of enormous help to the advanced student of the text, whether in French or English. Derrida offers an introductory essay, "Proverb: 'He that would pun . . .'", on the various theoretical problems attending a translation of *Glas*; while John P. Leavey, Jr. and Gregory L. Ulmer contribute essays which are designed to guide the reader through the text. Ulmer's essay, 'Sounding the Unconscious', is perhaps the best account of Derrida's interest in psychoanalysis that has yet been written: all of the psychoanalytic themes sounded in *Glas*—the name of the Father, castration, fetish, psychosis, and so on—are discussed in a clear, informative manner. The same cannot be said for Leavey's own essay, 'This (then) will not have been a book . . .', which seeks to discuss Derrida's views on the relations between literature and philosophy. Like most weak readers of Derrida, Leavey feels obliged to imitate the master's

style; and that is a recipe for disaster. *Glas* is a difficult and demanding text as it is, and the last thing one needs is an introduction that makes Derrida seem a more opaque writer than he really is.

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Novitz, David, *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination*, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1987, pp. xiii, 262, US\$34.95.

David Novitz suggests 'three distinct but related ways' (p. 232) of considering his most recent book. As 'a study in the philosophy of literature' it seeks 'to show that fictional literature, relying as it does on the fanciful imagination, can and does impart knowledge'. (p. 232) This demonstration rests on the argument—the core of his 'study in the imagination and its powers'—that the fanciful imagination is essential to 'the acquisition and growth of empirical knowledge' (p. 21), a position definitive of what he calls 'romantic epistemology'. (p. 19) His 'study in romantic theory' contends that historically romantic epistemology has slid into 'the romantic abyss' (pp. 71–72), or, in other words, into 'idealism, textualism and pragmatism'. (p. 7) He argues that this slide is not inevitable, and that we can and should embrace romantic epistemology without the abyss. At the risk of exaggerating their distinctness, I shall allow these three approaches to structure my response to *Knowledge, Fiction and Imagination*.

*A Study in Romantic Theory*. Novitz argues that the romantic notion that the fanciful imagination is essential to the acquisition of knowledge is in opposition to 'the traditional view' (p. 22)—espoused most notably by Kant and Hume—that 'fancy' is superfluous to human knowledge. Now given that Hume and Kant both contrast fancy (or 'phantasy' in Kant's case) to types of the imagination—the constructive in Hume's case, the transcendental in Kant's case—which are essential to knowledge, Novitz needs to explain why 'fancy' rather than the other kinds of imagination coincides with the imagination celebrated by the romantics. Why, for instance, should we identify Coleridge's 'primary imagination'—'the living Power and prime agent of all human Perception'—with Kant's 'phantasy' rather than with Kant's 'transcendental imagination', which Novitz describes as 'a condition of all empirical knowledge'? (p. 26) After all, Coleridge also distinguished the imagination (which is essential to perception) from the fancy (which isn't). Novitz's own characterisation of the fanciful imagination—our 'ability . . . to fabricate or invent by combining ideas, images, beliefs, words, or physical objects howsoever [we] choose' (p. 27)—is of no help. For according to Coleridge, the primary imagination is not subject to the will, and even if we see it as inseparable from the secondary imagination, there remains the problem that for Coleridge the 'empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE', pertains to neither type of imagination but to fancy. Novitz probably identifies the fancy of Hume and Kant with the imagination of the romantics and his own fanciful imagination, because they are all productive of art and metaphor. Yet he invokes the fanciful imagination and romantic epistemology in order to shed light on the nature of art and metaphor. If we must know what art is before we can talk about the imagination, then instead of an aesthetic theory being situated within the context of epistemology, epistemology is rendered dependent on aesthetics. Moreover, apart from its logical incoherence, Novitz's position licenses gross insensitivity to what the romantics had to say about the imagination—his stunning inattention to Coleridge is a case in point. This insensitivity renders all the more grotesque his unargued attack (p. 20) on Geoffrey Hartman and Paul de Man, two of the most perceptive writers on romanticism.

Novitz's critique of those who would push romantic epistemology into the romantic abyss is aimed mostly at Derrida, who, we are told, is a romantic idealist in so

far as he both emphasises 'the voluntaristic side of human nature—the freedom of the mind to construe as it wills' (p. 5) and denies that language and thought can relate to nonlinguistic entities. (p. 42) This is absurd. From his earliest works onwards, Derrida has sought to deconstruct the attempt to characterise the essential operations of mind as free, active, spontaneous and creative—his writings on Husserl, Hegel and Kant are ample evidence of this. Novitz thinks that Derrida's denial of a 'transcendental signified' is a denial of extra-linguistic objects. But a transcendental signified is not an empirical referent of language but a meaning, an ideality, which exists prior to empirical signifiers—Novitz, I suspect, confuses 'transcendental' with 'transcendent'. This error is connected to his startling belief that idealism escapes what Derrida calls 'logocentrism' and 'the metaphysics of presence'. (p. 58) Altogether typical of Novitz's treatment of Derrida is his claim that Derrida describes his own arguments as 'an adventure of vision' (p. 152)—a description which Derrida applies to structuralism in the context of a critique of structuralism. Novitz's denial that we should take Derrida seriously (p. 55) cannot justify such misrepresentation, for the force of this denial depends on a minimal fidelity to Derrida's text, a fidelity which Novitz does not attain.

*A Study in the Imagination and Its Powers.* Novitz argues that to make sense of our world we must bring the fanciful imagination into play. In order to individuate the objects of our environment, we must 'place imaginative constructions on the flurry of untamed sensation' (p. 31), constructions which are 'pre-verbal and pre-conceptual' (p. 33), and which are fanciful 'in that they involve the arrangement and rearrangement of sensations at will' (p. 32). If they prove useful, however, these constructions will eventually 'become part of a network of everyday beliefs which we have about our world'. (p. 33) Novitz does not explain how a 'preverbal and pre-conceptual' construction can become part of a network of beliefs. In his example of an imaginative construction becoming a belief—the case in which a person's fanciful construal of 'death as a gateway to a better life' comes 'to be regarded as literally descriptive' (pp. 27–28)—the imaginative construction is no less verbal and conceptual than the belief. Novitz would probably justify the lumping together of verbal and non-verbal imaginative constructions on the ground that both are subject to the will. Yet what the will amounts to here is far from clear. Does 'the new born infant'—of whom Novitz speaks (p. 30)—choose to 'place imaginative constructions on the flurry of untamed sensation' in the way that an adult might choose to imagine death as a gateway to a better life? Surely its behaviour is instinctive in a way that the adult's is not.

Even if Novitz's argument had been intelligible, then all it would have shown is that the process of acquiring knowledge—not knowledge itself—requires the exercise of the imagination: 'Description', he says, 'does not require the exercise of the fanciful imagination'. (p. 95) Given that it is the possession of knowledge which is what in the final analysis he values, he implies that the imagination and its products should ideally be transcended. It is doubtful that he can be regarded as a romantic at all.

Novitz's account of the imagination is not only muddled and crude; it also fails to acknowledge almost all the valuable literature on the subject—the efforts of, for instance, Husserl, Sartre, and Wittgenstein are ignored. Nor does he attempt to relate his own account to other accounts in analytical aesthetics, which are often more impressive than his own. He seems bent on creating the impression—altogether misleading—that he is alone in situating an aesthetic theory within the context of a theory of the imagination.

*A Study in the Philosophy of Literature.* Contrary to what he would have us believe, Novitz's study in the imagination is irrelevant to his account of the role of literary fiction—a product of the imagination—in the growth of knowledge. For he never implies that fictional discourse contributes to knowledge by coming to be regarded as factual. His account of how it does contribute is banal and for the most part

applies equally to non-fictional discourse. To specify something peculiar to fiction which makes it valuable, he argues that it yields moral insights 'with minimal cost to ourselves', 'without [our] having to live in the situations which occasion them'—'our vicarious concern for a favorite heroine, the moral judgments we make about her and the moral decisions we take on her behalf . . . can . . . occur without the anguish and painful consequences that are often attendant in the actual world'. (p. 141) He does not explain why a biography or autobiography may not be similarly cost-efficient.

A related problem emerges in his account of metaphor. He argues that 'juxtapository metaphors'—which, unlike sentential metaphors, 'involve the stark and incongruous verbal juxtaposition of two or more subjects and their associated ideas without any explicit predicative relationship between them' (p. 192)—are characteristic of fiction as opposed to non-fiction. (p. 205) Only artificial 'ordinary discourse' can sustain such metaphors. (p. 253) Yet the juxtapository metaphor which he sees in the description (in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*) of the unjust beating Stephen suffers—the metaphor which 'aligns soutane and pandybat in a way which invites the reader to think of those who wear soutanes in terms of the violence and pain of the descending pandybat' (pp. 192–93)—could have existed had the passage been part of an autobiography. Are we supposed to believe that the metaphor is somehow natural in the fiction but not in the case of the imaginary non-fiction? The inadequacy of Novitz's discussion at this point becomes all the more glaring if we turn to Paul de Man's treatment of the autobiography/fiction relation.

Novitz takes pride in the fact that he does not write 'as a literary theorist', that he is outside 'the polemical tradition of contemporary literary theory': 'I have every hope . . . that my arguments will stand without the help of such trappings'. (p. 20) It is certainly true that had he read the work of the major literary theorists instead of merely abusing it, his 'arguments' would not have been what they are. In view of the arguments which he does produce, the abuse is not at all surprising.

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Brown, Robert, *Analyzing Love*, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. viii, 133, \$39.95.

Robert Brown has provided us here with a rich collection of insights into the nature of love. He has assembled them first by considering how love may be contrasted with other states, such as liking, benevolence, infatuation and sexual desire; second, by considering what it means to be in love with someone; third, by considering whether love is an emotion and/or an attitude; and fourth, by considering whether there are reasons for loving. His remarks are often provoked by statements by other authors, with which he disagrees, notably by W. Newton-Smith, Alan Goldman, J.F.M. Hunter, Leila Tov-Ruach, Roger Scruton, William Lyons and George Pitcher. The book is rather like a personal conversation about these topics and in response to these authors. Brown is revealed as a sensitive, perceptive, critical and caring person. He has produced many interesting observations about the nature of love, but not a systematic, comprehensive account of the subject.

Brown's view of the nature of love is to be gleaned from the many short discussions which constitute this book. To love someone or something is to cherish them, to hold them dear, which is more than just liking them, taking pleasure in them. (pp. 17–24) Love also 'implies wishing to benefit' the one who is loved, but need not involve a desire to be loved in return. (p. 30) More precisely, it requires a tender care for the well-being of the beloved, not just a disinterested or dutiful concern for them. (pp. 26–33) In this it can also be contrasted with sexual desire, which aims chiefly at one's own sexual pleasure. (p. 57)

All this is fairly familiar. Of greater interest are Brown's further remarks, that 'to love a particular person is often to commit oneself to an open-ended relationship' with them, to share one's life with them and to care for them into the uncertain future. (pp. 106-7) This characteristic of love is introduced to explain how we can love people as unique particulars, and not just for some general characteristics which they might have. One unique feature about those we love is their previous relationship with us, a relationship which we value in coming to love them. (pp. 107-8) Another unique feature about them is the 'particular complex of instantiated properties' which they embody, actually or potentially, some of which we value. (p. 106) Brown suggests that we first love people in themselves, and only later come to identify the qualities about them which we admire. (p. 45)

This account of love is agreeable enough as far as it goes, but it leaves some important questions unanswered. First, what is meant by caring for a person's well-being? Does it mean assisting them to develop their personality, as *Tov-Ruach* though? (p. 66) Brown objects that it should not mean this, first because some people's personalities are infantile and neurotic, such as the personalities of homosexuals, and should not be encouraged; and second, because personality traits are often very hard to identify, and so difficult to promote. (pp. 68-70) Unfortunately Brown takes the question no further. Do true lovers act on their own ideas of the beloved's well-being, or serve the wishes of the beloved, or do whatever is needed to preserve the relationship of mutual admiration and care? Brown leaves the notion of loving care rather obscure.

Next, although Brown repeatedly contrasts loving a person and loving their attributes, by describing a person as a unique collection of attributes, it is never clear that in loving a person one is *not* merely loving their attributes, albeit a unique collection of them. But we often think people have value as persons, not merely for their attributes, where to be a person means to be capable of knowing, feeling, desiring and acting. To love a person as a person may, then, mean wanting them to know what is true, feel free from anxiety, desire what is good and act efficiently. Brown's analysis of loving people for themselves never really gets off the ground.

Finally, the most interesting and difficult question of all concerns the nature of the personal union which loving couples create, a union which is often tragically shattered when one dies or departs. Brown talks warmly of the relationship, or set of relationships, which exist between lovers, but does not appear to recognise the joint identity which lovers develop over time.

Brown's characterisation of the state of being in love, in chapter three, is admirable. Hunter had described it as a willingness to share one's life with another, and Brown argues that it also involves certain emotions, such as delight in the presence of the beloved, and an intense desire to be inseparable from him or her. (pp. 71-77)

Rather less satisfactory is Brown's chapter on whether love is an emotion or an attitude. Having criticised Scruton's interpretation of these terms, Brown argues that all emotions, both dispositional and occurrent, are attitudes towards their objects. (p. 98) He appears to be inconsistent here, however, for since he adopts the O.E.D.'s account of attitudes as 'settled behaviour or manner of acting, as representative of feeling or opinion', it is surely wrong to think that all cases of occurrent emotion display an attitude. They may be quite uncharacteristic responses, made under unusual stress, and not representative of a 'settled' pattern of reaction at all.

The last section of Brown's book is the least satisfactory, raising issues which need much more discussion. Brown generally endorses Pitcher's assertion that love involves an evaluation of the beloved's 'inherent worth', but disagrees with his further claim that such evaluations are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. (p. 115 ff.) Certain personal qualities are generally thought to be inherently worthwhile: for example loyalty, trustworthiness and sympathy. (p. 112) Presumably Brown thinks that those we love are judged to possess at least some of these qualities. He says we cannot love what we judge to be wholly bad. (p. 120) But don't mothers love

sons whom they judge to lack any of the virtues on Brown's list, caring nevertheless about what they suffer and do? The conditional love Brown advocates is no doubt defended in divorce courts, but unconditional love exists and deserves to be recognised.

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Perrett, Roy, W. *Death and Immortality*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, pp. vii, 202, US\$38.50.

Leman-Stefanovic, Ingrid, *The Event of Death: A Phenomenological Enquiry*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, pp. xvi, 345, US\$47.95.

These two works represent quite different perspectives on death. Perrett's volume is narrower in scope and in the Anglo-American analytic tradition with no significant reference to European philosophy; Leman-Stefanovic's, by contrast, centres on Heidegger and thereby the widest perspective on the phenomenon of death, though she is keen to stress that she is careful to keep her discussion at the level of the concrete reality of death as it appears to human consciousness. We will take each work in turn, before passing to some comparative observations.

The first volume commences with the concept of death, in particular its definitions in law and medicine. These definitions are critically examined to arrive at the author's concept of death as 'the destruction of a functioning biological organism', a concept that does 'not imply the destruction of a person' (p. 14). Death is thus neutral to all deaths; the death of any living organism is covered, from oysters to trees, to other animals, the human animal. This particular conception takes on significance as one proceeds through the volume, and especially in Part Two which discusses immortality, disembodied existence, resurrection and rebirth. That is, while the author claims that his conception of death is neutral also in relation to these last issues, nonetheless a conception that allows the person to exist beyond the end of the functioning of the biological organism would appear well suited to the possibility of immortality, resurrection and so forth.

In this opening discussion Perrett distinguishes death from dying, in that the former is an *event*; dying, by contrast is a *process*, being dead a *state*. The contrary arguments (death as process, death as state) are reviewed and criticised to defend the view of death as 'an event (the disintegration of a living organism as a whole) that marks the transition from the state of being alive to a state of being dead' (p. 18). This opening discussion concludes with some observations concerning the epistemological status of our knowledge of death, again drawn from the definition of death initially established. We can have knowledge of the deaths of others, drawn from simple observation of the disintegration of their biological organisms. But can we have knowledge of our own death in a similar way? Here the issue of 'the person' returns. That is, if destruction of the biological organism does involve the destruction of the person, then I cannot have knowledge of my own death (the author says 'perhaps' cannot); if destruction of the organism does not involve destruction of the person, and his definition is neutral on this, then I will be able to have such knowledge (he says 'presumably'). In either case, knowledge of the death of another person where death is defined rather as the destruction of the person, is impossible.

These considerations lead to the question of the significance of *my death*. That is, given that I can 'know' my own death in the same way as I know the deaths of others (on his definition) the meaning or significance of my own death might be different to that of the death of another. Thus to the second chapter *My Death* wherein the general issue and status of 'subjectivity' is considered. Here Perrett commences with the common beliefs found, for example, in Freud and Sartre respectively, that I cannot imagine my own death, and that when I attempt so to

do I experience fear and anxiety. Again the discussion turns upon the conception of death originally proposed and from this conception it is possible to allow that I can conceive of my own death, and that rather than there being some significant subjective element in my attitude to my own death this attitude is really like any other attitude; it differs not at all from my attitude to being a 'father' for example. Here Heidegger's position is succinctly stated as 'there is a first-person, subjective perspective on death that cannot be adequately captured by a third-person, objective perspective'. In other words, that the significance *for me* of the expression 'I will die' cannot be analysed exhaustively into a purely third-person reading of 'This body will cease to function and will decay'. (p. 28) Thus follows a track through arguments concerning the separation of subjective and objective domains. Perrett argues that there is no rigid demarcation here and that what is ultimately at issue is the rational adjudication between competing philosophical systems. This takes him into a consideration of objectivity and a support for the view that there are 'no conclusive arguments against the traditional belief in objective values'. (p. 38) The status of 'traditional belief' is presumably higher than that of 'intuition', as earlier he had insisted that we should not in our philosophical deliberations be restricted by a need to remain faithful to what intuition might tell us. Nonetheless, a typology of values is considered wherein he finds no support for a case *against* objective values (Is this a curious way of arguing? Does it avoid a question of *onus*?). From this, 'my death' is amenable to objective analysis and the subjective element has no special status.

The fear of death is thus raised for consideration and this moves through the Epicurean position that death is not to be feared (curiously, Socrates is not mentioned in this respect, nor the *Apology*), that the dead can be harmed, that the dead can have interests, to the reasonableness of fear of death and observations on when a reasonable becomes an unreasonable fear of death. A reasonable fear is grounded on the 'thwarting of interests' that death brings, an unreasonable fear that which is self-defeating of those interests: 'if an agent allows a reasonable fear of death to defeat the purpose he or she presumably wishes to be alive to pursue, then such a fear itself harms the agent's interests and becomes unreasonable'. (p. 65) This sounds a trifle arbitrary in a work otherwise notable for its precise distinctions. That point aside, however, the idea is closer to Sartre's position that death remained a 'background factor' that had to be accepted, yet not allowed to subvert the process of choice, in which it could not figure—death could not be a *project*. However, Perrett has eschewed the European insights. Finally, Death and the Meaning of Life, arises from the previous discussion which has placed death in the context of how to live rationally in the face of death. Here there is an extended critical discussion of Tolstoy and a defence of life as having meaning, and an objective meaning at that.

Part Two, Immortality, considers this general issue of eternal life, together with disembodied existence, resurrection and rebirth. The general context of the first consideration is the question of whether immortality is a necessary or sufficient condition for life to have value. Perrett argues that it is not a sufficient condition. Various scenarios are suggested where eternal life would in fact be far from valuable: the transposition onto an eternal scale of the typical pattern of growth, decay and senility would leave us enduring forever those disabilities that are life's legacies and from which death releases us; less dramatically, there is the scene of simple boredom in an unending life. Yet, in the idea of a series of lives, as in the idea of a cycle of birth, death, and rebirth, there is a difficulty of satisfying at least one, and likely both, of the two conditions of any worthwhile form of immortality: it is *me* who survives forever, and my eternal life is adequately related to my past life and my present aims and values. These conditions are the identity and adequacy conditions, respectively. A useful summing up finds none of the scenarios satisfactory; they are either unattractive (a life of endless pain and suffering, or of boredom, or of ignorance of past lives), or fail to satisfy the identity or adequacy conditions.



Related to the issue of immortality that organises this Part are the problems of disembodied existence, resurrection and rebirth. The logical necessity of mind-body dualism to a belief in disembodied existence is noted (though not the reverse, dualism does not imply disembodied existence) but the problems of dualism are passed over quickly to consider specific questions concerning first the notion of disembodied existence. Two such questions are central: is a disembodied mind a *person*?, and is this person the *same* person as the ante-mortem person? Behind these are two other questions: that of the intelligibility of, and that of the value of, immortality. The first is Perrett's main concern, but the second is found to arise chiefly in religions, where immortality is accorded significant value and notions of resurrection and rebirth have currency. He is able to discuss critically various problems with the idea of disembodied existence, problems that might be resolved in a Vedantic position—though at a cost to Western views on the mind-body question and the concept of a person. Thus he is led to analyse concepts of resurrection and rebirth. A conception of resurrection as 'a divine reconstitution of the bodily person' (p. 148) is defended as having metaphysical coherence, though this is acknowledged to leave open a host of other philosophical questions; questions like the epistemic status of claims of actual resurrection, and value issues that return us to the point of eternal pain or boredom noted above. The most coherent account of rebirth is found in the Indian tradition, which tradition had been of value at various places in the analysis.

This volume represents a comprehensive canvassing of a range of conceptual issues pertinent to the phenomena of death. Each concept is generally taken with precise argument that draws in relevant philosophical work in other domains, such as that of the mind-body issue and attendant questions, philosophy of religion and axiology. There are useful summary statements of Indian positions and an indication of the implications of their acceptance for traditional Western positions; an acceptance that is sometimes required to make a particular concept coherent. There is in this some interesting discussion for those who would stress the unity of knowledge, and perhaps there is no better phenomenon than death to address in this regard.

The second work is written for two different audiences somewhere between the two of which falls the present reviewer: those well-familiar with Heidegger, and those new to him. For the first audience the work begins with Part Two, for the second, Part One succinctly and clearly summarises and reviews Heidegger's essential objective. This objective was to raise our awareness of the question of Being, done here through a consideration of three central themes in Heidegger: individuation, transcendence, and temporality.

What this volume is attempting to do is something quite significant. It is attempting to avoid a tendency to see particularity as essentially distracting of our attention from the question of Being. Rather, concrete events, particular experiences, have to be explored—carefully, and so as to avoid our being lost in them—for the glimpses of Being they provide. Particularity, that is, cannot be prematurely set aside. The volume addresses the questions of the meaning 'of the relationship between ontology and the concrete, determinate ontic event, as much more than simply an inauthentic covering up of Being, but rather, as a revelation of Being itself'. (p. xvi) The particular experiences chosen for this inquiry are the experiences of terminal illness and bereavement.

The intention, then, is to show how the experience of one's impending death, or the loss of a loved one—the particular, personal, concrete experience—provides also a more general ontological insight (potentially at least).

The closeness of these particular experiences to the Heideggerian enterprise is both advantage and disadvantage, however. It is valuable because Heidegger makes the conscious awareness of personal mortality central to our grasp of both our individuality and the 'wholeness' of our life; consciousness of our own death is supposed to bestow these things. Yet it is difficult or a disadvantage that another concrete experience, one that does not favourably prejudice the Heideggerian position, was

not also considered. Such an experience as love (which serves for Hegel a similar function as death does for Heidegger) or perhaps humour or a sense of play (laughing and crying have been described as the 'limits of behaviour'). That is, by choosing that *particular* experience that is death, there is something of a favouring of a Heideggerian position; there is a confounding of the intention to determine whether any particular event provides glimpses of Being, or whether death is somehow special. Thus Lemen-Stefenovic's observation that one of the most startling revelations was how very fundamental the description of 'the ontic moment can be for an understanding of the ontological' (p. xvi), must be read as the ontic moment concerning death; which gives a special status to death that is already part of the Heideggerian position.

These last observations aside, this is a thoughtful, well developed work. Part One provides a detailed account of Heidegger's position in relation to death, its unity and range. The significance of death, or at least of temporality, is emphasised as central in Heidegger, not just as a basic 'fact of life' (as in Sartre, for example) but as something which 'permeates my very Being, and all my ways of Being'. (p. 53) This outline is clear, and aside from one or two German expressions, intelligible to the second audience noted above. The material is, however, relatively uncritical, and the stress that death was not mere 'fact of life' reminds one of Sartre's objections to Heidegger which are not discussed. Nor are other critiques of Heidegger's position acknowledged or met in this Part when perhaps they might have been (Paul Edwards' *Heidegger on Death: A Critique* in particular, along with Sartre's observations in his *Being and Nothingness*; possibly Roger Waterhouse's *A Heidegger Critique*). Still, these may be reasonably taken as beyond the purpose of the volume, and there is something of critical perspective in a refusal to rest with Heidegger, in her 'project beyond Heidegger' that is the final observation in this Part. This project is that noted at the outset, that of questioning whether Heidegger had 'done justice to the description of the meaning of the *ontic* possibilities revealed by the phenomenon of death'. (p. 13)

Thus to Part Two, which draws on a variety of sources to illustrate the possibility and possibilities of reflecting on one's own death. The writings of psychologists and psychoanalysts are noted and added to examples of one's own critical ontic moments (in situations of great shock or of great personal danger) to illustrate the manner in which one's being is *concentrated* in a particular event: 'primordial temporality . . . is seen to be 'molded' . . . by specific, genuine ontic e-events, which reveal Being through a concrete congealing in a full temporal presence'. (p. 162) A similar, but different, experience to the critical ontic moment is that of learning that you have a short time to live. Here the work of Elisabeth Kübler—Ross is drawn on and her five stages of reaction to one's pending death discussed in their deepest level of meaning for the individual (a deeper level than might be appreciated by so-called helping professionals). Thus, again: 'the emotions described by the psychologists are hardly incidental; from the stages of denial, anger, fear, isolation, to depression, bargaining and final acceptance (if that stage is reached), these emotions but reflect the struggle of man to come to terms with Being'. (p. 192) A similar conclusion is drawn from the experience of the loss of a loved one, and from one's own reflection on the prospect of one's own or another's immortality. In addition, the death of and the possibility of immortality of the other, raise wider issues of Heidegger's general social theory and of the type of social relations he would envisage.

Part Three draws all of these issues together. It does so by posing a question. This is that if death is an ontic event (a particular experience, close as in the case of my own death, more mysteriously relevant in the case of another's death) that can reveal *ontological* significance, then what does this do to Heideggerian ontology? In that ontology, particulars—at least a lostness in the particulars of life—supposedly distort our vision of the universal. This very last rendering of Heidegger is in fact the one that Lemen-Stefanovic directly seeks to counter. This final part stresses the concreteness of ontology and evaluates Heidegger's ontology on this criterion

of concreteness. It is argued here that the dimension of particularity is not merely a dimension of the inauthentic, but rather something vital to a grasp of Being. The rethinking of the meaning of Being is a rethinking of the simple instrumentalism of particulars (that is especially encouraged by life in advanced technological society) and finding a new way of handling them. (The contrast between Plato and Aristotle on the Forms transcending or being imminent in particulars was difficult to put out of mind when reading her discussion here).

This is a well developed volume that in fact addresses two themes: The first is that of death, where a very clear phenomenological perspective is outlined from the thinker who makes death most significant. The second is the use of death, of self and other, as a vehicle for demonstrating the concreteness of Heidegger's ontology. While some of the critics of Heidegger, specifically on this phenomenon of death, might have been reviewed, and while some conceptual issues might have been more directly addressed (death versus dying, for example), both these themes are well covered.

The two volumes probably stand as far apart as two could. Yet this reflects the complexity of the phenomenon under consideration. There has been something of a 'growth spurt' in works on death in the past decade yet one can wonder if we have advanced very far despite thousands of articles and books. Indeed, some writers have asked whether the topic has been 'beaten' or 'worked to death'! Certainly these two volumes contribute to a more precise and a deeper level of reflection on the topic. One wonders how each might respond to the other, and whether each would have written differently having reflected on the other?

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Lloyd Thomas, D. A., *In Defence of Liberalism*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp. ix, 133, \$68.50.

The liberalism Lloyd Thomas defends is essentially, he tells us, a concern for freedom: freedom of thought and expression, and particularly freedom to frame the plans of our lives to suit our own characters. The liberal believes that everyone ought to have these freedoms. Such a view, Lloyd Thomas suggests, might well be founded on a theory of natural rights. 'The most plausible set of rights to propose is', he adds, 'rights of self-ownership. These are understood as the rights of each person to control his or her own thoughts, talents, capacities, actions and body. Your rights of control are limited in that they do not permit you to act in such a way as to violate the similar rights of control of another person'. (p. 8)

How can such rights be justified? Not, Lloyd Thomas argues, as a means to the maximisation of any supreme good, whatever supreme good you happen to fancy. For if every individual is given the right to make certain kinds of decision for himself, it is inevitable that sometimes he will make a decision which does not maximise the supreme good. This is true even if the maximand is taken to be the power of persons to choose for themselves. 'For example, a simple operation using standard procedures is necessary to save a young adult's life. There is a high probability of success, but the patient refuses consent. The restriction on the patient's right to choose would be much more than compensated for by preserving the patient's power to choose for the rest of his life.' (p. 24)

Maximisation, then, is out. But, Lloyd Thomas argues, it is possible to justify a right on the ground that it is a condition for the existence of something believed to be intrinsically good. And one intrinsically good thing is knowledge of what ways of life are most valuable. The liberal rights, then, may be 'conditions for having

more reasonable views about what activities are worth while'. (p. 38) If people are free, as Mill suggested, to experiment with different styles of life, we have more chance of gaining this knowledge, just as we have more chance of discovering whether an opinion is true if we are free to consider it alongside the contrary opinion.

The liberalism that emerges from this defence will not involve unrestricted *laissez-faire* capitalism. Self-ownership, Lloyd Thomas says, does require some ownership of material things and so some property rights. However 'there is a *prima facie* case for any initial distribution being equal, on the assumption that there is no reason for supposing in advance that any one person's views about which activities are valuable are better than any other's.' (pp. 68–9) And it would be self-defeating if this relative equality were to be destroyed as the result of market activities. This points to some qualification of private property rights. Moreover, workers often spend time on activities which not they but their employers think worth while. 'Why', Lloyd Thomas asks, 'should those who happen to be in a stronger position in the market be likely to make better judgements about what activities are valuable or worth while?' (p. 71)

It follows, Lloyd Thomas says, that the liberal society will judge any system of property rights by this criterion: To what extent will it 'have a long-run tendency to relieve people of 'economic necessity': to relieve them of engaging in activities they consider to be wholly of instrumental value, and to provide them with adequate resources for the pursuit of what they consider to be worth while in itself?' (p. 72) This is, of course a use of 'economic necessity' which differs from the standard one, and it leads to another non-standard definition: of 'economic efficiency'. For Lloyd Thomas, one economic system is more efficient than another if 'less labour (regarded by those who perform the labour as wholly of instrumental value) is necessary to produce the same result'. (p. 74) The most efficient society is the one in which people have most leisure to do the things they think worth doing for their own sake (which need not exclude some gainful employment).

Would the reduction of 'economic necessity' and the pursuit of 'economic efficiency' be consistent with capitalism? Lloyd Thomas leaves this an open question, though he notes that, although capitalism has a tendency to increase productivity, which might help to reduce 'economic necessity', it also has a tendency to encourage production indiscriminately, regardless of its instrumental or non-instrumental desirability, and to adopt production methods that, from the point of view of the workers, have only instrumental value. Both tendencies work against 'economic efficiency'. Capitalism is also likely to bring about inequality of incomes, and so unequal opportunities for doing things thought to have intrinsic value.

In arguing that the liberal rights are desirable because they help us to discover what things have intrinsic value, Lloyd Thomas makes it clear that he takes an objectivist view of intrinsic value. In his final chapter he defends this view, telling us that 'a belief that something is of intrinsic value is to be understood as a belief that something possesses a certain non-subject-dependent property' which cannot be directly observed, but which should be 'regarded as analogous to a primary quality'. This would seem to be practically identical with Moore's 'non-natural quality' of goodness.

This chapter has its own value, as a contribution to the controversy between objectivists and subjectivists. One wonders, however, whether an objectivist view of value is really essential to Lloyd Thomas's argument. There are people who claim that the belief that (for example) one ought not to torture children for fun depends on a prior belief that the universe is controlled by a God whose commandments should be obeyed. This is odd, since the second statement seems much more disputable than the first. Isn't it odd, in exactly the same way, to suggest that a social system which enables every individual to spend most of his time doing the things he thinks most worth doing is justified only if one's ontology includes esoteric non-empirical qualities?

However that question is answered, the main thesis of this book will be unaffected. Lloyd Thomas argues his case carefully and scrupulously, considering every objection fairly and conceding any point which he cannot conclusively rule out. Reading this book may well be one of the things that is worth doing for its own sake.

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Code, Lorraine, *Epistemic Responsibility*, University Press of New England, Hanover and London, 1987, pp. xiv, 232, US \$33.50

In the preface and introduction to her book *Epistemic Responsibility* Lorraine Code states what she is trying to establish as follows:

'I attempt to develop an alternative way of approaching epistemological questions through shifting the emphasis of the investigation and evaluation of cognitive claims. My central contention is that the knower, or would be knower, bears as much of the onus of credibility as does the known.' (p. x)  
and:

'In fact, I shall outline an approach to theory of knowledge that turns questions about, and conditions for, *epistemic responsibility* into focal points of explication and analysis. Central to this approach will be the view that knowing well is a matter of considerable moral significance; hence, moral issues and questions of 'character' are often integral aspects of epistemic evaluation. I shall maintain that one is frequently in a better position to understand how, or what, a person knows, and to understand the implications of that presumed knowledge, when it can be placed in the context of the putative knower's character.' (p. 3)

If I understand it correctly, the main idea seems to be this. In Code's view epistemologists have traditionally focused on the following pair of questions. What relations must a belief stand in to other beliefs in order to be justifiably believed? What conditions must be satisfied in order to have knowledge? Code regards emphasis on these questions as unfortunate because the individual believer or knower tends to drop out of the picture. Suppose I am trying to find out whether some individual *J*'s belief that *p* is true. I may investigate the relationship between the belief that *p* and my own beliefs. For example, I may investigate whether the belief that *p* coheres in a suitable fashion with my own beliefs. However, in deciding whether to accept *J*'s belief that *p* it is just as likely that I will be concerned to assess *J*'s epistemic trustworthiness. Moreover, determining whether *J* is epistemically virtuous in this sense requires determining whether she forms her beliefs in an epistemically responsible manner. So, in deciding whether to believe someone I may have to decide whether that person has the epistemic counterpart of such moral virtues as integrity, a sense of responsibility, and a capacity for self criticism.

What is it to be epistemically responsible? Code takes epistemic responsibility to include the following. First, an epistemically responsible individual is epistemically reliable. Second, an epistemically responsible individual will endorse what Code calls normative realism. Finally, an epistemically responsible individual will adopt a responsible attitude towards other member of her epistemic community.

Insofar as it is distinguishable from the other components of epistemic responsibility, the notion of epistemic reliability is a familiar one. Roughly an individual is epistemically reliable provided that her beliefs are generated by mechanisms that predominantly generate true beliefs. What of the normative realist and communitarian aspects of epistemic responsibility? I looked forward to Code's discussion of normative realism in chapter 6. Recently, a number of philosophically substantive theses have

been defended under the heading of realism. I anticipated that in chapter 6 Code would attempt to relate a belief in a philosophically interesting version of realism to normative features of justification. For example, it would be interesting to ask whether we ought to believe in at least one substantive version of realism given the procedures of justification we ought to endorse. However, according to Code's account of it, normative realism amounts to a very tame position. One is a normative realist if one has a concern to get things right, and believes that one ought to avoid being biased in surveying evidence, overly swayed by emotion in forming opinions, having a propensity to ignore relevant evidence, or being too wedded to cherished beliefs. As Code puts it one is a normative realist if:

'One is guided in cognitive enterprises by an aim to understand how things really are, however difficult it may be to achieve such understanding. One should not rest content with partial, simplified, or distorted accounts when, with greater effort, more accurate ones can be achieved.' (p. 136)

I would be very surprised if anyone were to reject normative realism so construed.

To be fair to Code she adds the following to the passage quoted immediately above:

'This idea may be neither startling nor new in epistemological thinking: indeed, most epistemologists would endorse it.' (p. 136) So, why air platitudes under the title of 'normative realism'? Her reason for doing so is this:

'It (normative realism) is not often explicitly articulated nor discussed in a specifically normative context where its connections to intellectual virtue are emphasised.' (p. 136) I must confess that the only connection I could discern between normative realism and intellectual virtue is this: An intellectually virtuous person will be a normative realist. True enough, but you would have to have a grotesquely implausible conception of intellectual virtue to suppose otherwise.

As with her discussion of normative realism Code's discussion of the communitarian aspect of knowledge and justification in chapter 7 veers towards the platitudinous. One of Code's main aims in chapter 7 is to elaborate and defend the claim that there is a great deal of knowledge that it is not practically possible to acquire unless one trusts the pronouncements of other members of one's community. As she says:

'In adult life it would be absurd to refuse to take knowledge claims seriously unless they are based upon experiences at first hand: that is, unless the person has tasted the substances declared poisonous for herself, located the North Pole, been present at the battle of Waterloo, redone the chemical or psychological tests upon which the next stage of his research is based. In principle, the individualistic tradition demands such first hand experience of people who want to claim knowledge rather than simply to state opinion. Yet these experiences are the kinds of things people learn about from others. In many such cases, learning from others . . . is the only way one *can* ever know; and I use the word 'can' with its strongest force. Although it could be argued that it is logically possible to know most of these things on one's own, I am concerned here with practical possibilities.' (p. 169)

Some pretty bizzare views have been held by philosophers. Nevertheless, I cannot imagine anyone claiming that it would be practically possible for a normal individual to acquire in isolation the body of knowledge she could be expected to have as a literate member of a technologically advanced society.

It may seem unfair for me to focus on a few passages where Code presents innocuous theses as if they were newsworthy. I do so because the passages in question are illustrative of a pervasive tendency to inflate the uninteresting.

I think it is fair to say that Code takes her book to represent a departure from traditional epistemology. What is unclear is whether she intends her work to address at all the familiar issues in epistemology that have prompted the formulation of coherentist and foundationalist theories of justification. Some passages in her book

gave me the impression that she does not take herself to be offering an account of justification and knowledge that would rival foundationalism or coherentism. Other passages gave me the opposite impression. One difficulty is that Code sometimes writes as if coherentists and foundationalists are offering competing descriptions of the processes of justification that actually lead to belief formation. For example, Code has this to say about the nineteenth century biologist Philip Gosse opting for creationism:

'Although it would be difficult to decide how justified Gosse's ultimate stance is by appealing to foundationalist and/or coherentist criteria alone, certain initial steps can be suggested. A foundationalist might examine each of the rival positions to ascertain which, if either, is more firmly grounded. Tracing both sets of beliefs back to their origins in sensory experience would not be easy, however, since they purport to offer rival explanations of what the senses observe (fossils for example), and neither the evolutionary process, nor God, is amenable to observations.' (p. 24)

Of course, foundationalists and coherentists are not (or ought not to be) purporting to describe how we actually set about justifying our beliefs.

Whether or not she intends it to Code's book does not engage with standard issues in epistemology. For example, if I am wondering whether I am justified in believing in the existence of an external world it is no help for me to reflect that forming my beliefs in an epistemically virtuous manner makes it more likely that I will come to hold true beliefs.

My main criticisms of Code's book are that much of it is unclear, and much of it consists in dressing up the unexciting as if it were exciting. In addition, there is a less major criticism I would make. Code has the irritating habit of making an innocuous claim, and then proceeding to deny that it has some outrageous implication that only a mental defective would take it to have. Here is a representative example. Writing about education she says:

'One of the most difficult steps in learning who can be trusted is realising that authority cannot create truth' (p. 248) and adds:

'I do not mean that one should accept nothing upon authority nor that the more responsible course would be to disband educational institutions and send everyone off, from earliest infancy, upon a solitary cognitive journey.' (p. 248)

Code's book is not all bad. In chapter 4 she very clearly draws the distinction between moral and epistemic obligations. In chapter 8 she makes some sensitive comments about our capacity to acquire knowledge through reading literature. In addition, she writes in a very readable style.

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