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Reviews

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REVIEWS

Holmes, Helen Bequaert (ed.), *Issues in Reproductive Technology* (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1992); Holmes, Helen Bequaert and Purdy, Laura M. (eds), *Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1992) pp.320, US$39.95 (cloth), US$14.95 (paper); Sherwin, Susan, *No Longer Patient* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1992) pp.286, US$39.95 (cloth).

This review heralds the release of three excellent new books in the field of feminist ethics and bioethics in 1992.

Individually, each makes an important contribution; taken together they come close to staking out a new research paradigm. There are cross-links of authorship, in that Laura Purdy is a contributor to 'Issues in Reproductive Technology', edited by Helen Bequaert Holmes, as well as being co-editor of 'Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics', to which Susan Sherwin is a contributor, while Mary Anne Warren is represented in both 'Issues in Reproductive Technology' (on 'Abortion: New Complexities') and 'Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics' (on 'The Moral Significance of Birth'). The important connections are forged at a deeper level, producing a common feminist perspective that integrates the disciplinary frameworks of genetics (Holmes) and philosophy (Purdy and Sherwin) in a fruitful and coherent way, that models interdisciplinarity.

'Issues in Reproductive Technology' addresses the moral, ethical, psychological, and social aspects of recent developments in human reproductive technology. It tackles this challenging task in an admirably broad-based way, with contributors from Australia, Canada, Denmark, UK and the Netherlands adding their perspectives to a variety of American contributors — from academics and health activists to researchers and government consultants.

The collection's starting point is the uncontroversial recognition that as human reproduction slowly becomes medicalised and technologised, careful assessment is required. The effect of the development of technology and its use in reproduction is far from neutral. The fundamental question around which the book pivots is: When technology is brought into play, does it enhance a woman's ability to liberate herself from the expectations and demands placed on women by society, for example by exploitation, restricted role expectations, marginalisation, and maleness as norm? In this sense, this is a feminist anthology. Five areas are explored in depth: new contraceptives, new facets to the abortion debate, cryopreservation of human embryos, psycho-social dimensions to the search for fertility through I.V.F., and new perspectives on contract pregnancy (Laura Purdy's recommended usage in place of 'surrogacy', a recommendation I endorse). Each section is preceded by a thematic linking essay.

Part Two addresses the very timely issue of new complexities in abortion, with its legal status growing more perilous between the 1989 case of Webster v Reproductive Health Services and the appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas, and with new reproductive technologies generating new ethical issues.

As Mary Anne Warren points out, in America,

> *Many states now have laws requiring parental consent or notification for teenagers seeking abortion, spousal consent for married women, medically unnecessary tests for signs of foetal viability, or laws prohibiting abortion — or any mention of abortion — in facilities receiving government funding.* (p.113)

Issues addressed include the selective abortion of genetically or developmentally abnormal foetuses; sex-selective abortions (usually female foetuses); selective termination (in a multiple pregnancy); IVF as a treatment for infertility; experimental uses of IVF embryos; experimental or therapeutic uses of tissues from aborted foetuses, e.g. in the treatment of Parkinson's Disease; court-ordered caesareans, and other cases involving so-called maternal-foetal conflict; the possible introduction of RU486.

Part Three tackles the cryopreservation of embryos. Helen Bequaert Holmes, in a challenging introductory essay, points out that cryopreservation has so far only worked with tiny embryos — entities arguably neither persons nor property. Mira Alikani describes how technical problems have

been partially solved for freezing, then thawing, early embryos; Howard W Jones Jr, the US pioneer of IVF, proposes some policy recommendations for the non-medical problems that arise and uses the term 'pre- embryo'. As Holmes points out, the coining of this term was a political, not a biological move, by the Voluntary Licensing Authority in the UK in 1986, after the Warnock Report (1985) to the British government produced no immediate action. Nevertheless, it has not softened political, social and moral objections to research on early embryos.

Thomas Shevory's contribution to this section is a case study analysis of the fate of 7 Junior and Mary Davis embryos in a Tennessee freezer, while Junior and Mary Davis were embroiled in a custody dispute. Shevory also discusses earlier cases, such as the 1978 Del Zio v Presbyterian Hospital, where a New York specialist undertook the first IVF procedure in the US. A second case involved a Los Angeles couple, the Rios, who undertook IVF at the Queen Victoria Medical Centre in Melbourne in 1981. Three eggs from Mrs Rios were fertilised by an anonymous donor; one was implanted unsuccessfully in Mrs Rios, and the other two were frozen. In 1983 the wealthy Rios died in a plane crash. This was the background to the 1984 Waller Committee 'Report on the Disposition of Embryos Produced by IVF', which made 60 recommendations, including that untransferred embryos not possess rights or claims to inheritance, and that clear agreement about the disposition of embryos be reached before they are frozen — a lesson not learnt in the Davis case. Shevory warns that the discourse generated by the new reproductive technologies will tend to reduce women's control, and that ethics committee guidelines were drawn up to support the work of fertility clinicians and researchers, rather than the reproductive rights of women. Reliance on reproductive rights in courts of law is hence likely to prove disappointing.

Part Five probes new perspectives on contract pregnancy. Hilde Lindemann Nelson's overview also discusses troubling cases (as did Shevory), but in the context where the social mother's legal status can be questioned. The Moschetta case involves a 3-way custody battle between Robert and Cynthia Moschetta, and Elvira Jordan, a Latina, who contracted for a baby with Robert Moschetta, and refused to release the baby for adoption when Moschetta filed for divorce. What seems certain is that Cynthia Moschetta will not win custody, as the Orange County Superior Court judge ruled she cannot be the baby's mother because she has 'no biological or blood relationship to the child' (p.298).

In the second California case, Anne Johnson, a black single mother, was hired by the Calverts to gestate an embryo grown from their egg and sperm, and sought to remain involved in rearing the child. In extraordinary language, the judge ruled that she was only 'the foster parent providing care, protection, and nurture during the period of the time that the natural mother, Crispina Calvert, was unable to care for the child' (p.298). The racial and socio-economic position of Elvira Jordan and Anna Johnson is patently relevant, and the 'best interests' of the child are presumed to lie with the more affluent father and his wife.

The troubling question is how should we think about this form of assisted reproduction in the context of a liberal, democratic nation-state? What it means to separate the gestational from the genetic or social strands of motherhood is a complex question indeed, and we are still in the throes of discovering the implications of our technologically-induced actions in this area.

The book concludes with a useful annotated bibliography on contract pregnancy, by Helen Bequaert Holmes.

Contract pregnancy is one of the five areas also examined in 'Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics', a welcome re-issue of 2 'Hypatia' special issues, on Feminist Ethics and Medicine, and Ethics and Reproduction, extended by the addition of 'Sex Selection through Prenatal Diagnosis' and 'Women, Foetuses, Medicine and the Law', as well as an article discussing Sara Fry's 'The Role of Caring in a Theory of Nursing Ethics'.

It is an excellent and indispensable text, well arranged, with elements of dialogue. In the contract pregnancy section, for example, Sara Ann Ketchum's 'Selling Babies and Selling Bodies' is juxtaposed with H.M. Malm's 'Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum'. In section three, Women and Clinical Experiments, there is 'Re-visioning Clinical Research: Gender and the Ethics of Experimental Design', by Sue V. Rosser, and 'An Ethical Problem Concerning Recent Therapeutic Research on Breast Cancer', by Don Marquis. Helen Bequaert Holmes comments on both. My teaching experience with this material has shown this to be an excellent format.

Section four, Women and New Reproductive 'Choices', contains articles on ectogenesis, informed consent in labour, sex selection through pre-natal diagnosis, and what were for me the highlights: Judith Lorber on 'Choice, Gift or Patriarchal Bargain? Women's Consent to IVF in Male Infertility' and Mary Anne Warren on 'The Moral Significance of Birth'. They are both excellent, clear, challenging, student-friendly articles.

Section one, The Medical Ethics Community: Female Views, contains two pioneering essays by

Susan Sherwin and Virginia Warren, two articles by Nora Kizer Bell — 'Women and AIDS: Too Little, Too Late?' and 'If Age Becomes a Standard for Rationing Health Care' — as well as 'Toward a Feminist Theory of Disability', by Susan Wendell. All of these should be required reading for anyone interested in this field. The first Bell article contains the alarming claim (sourced 1987) that AIDS is now the leading cause of death among women aged 25 to 29 in New York City. This claim was updated in the direction of being even more disturbing by Professor Carol Nadelson, in the keynote address at a conference at the Royal Brisbane Hospital in April 1992: AIDS is now the leading cause of death among women aged 25 to 40 in the United States. This is surely not widely known in general debate in Australia. As well as drawing attention to the racism, classism and homophobia involved in AIDS policy in the US, Bell warns of the shocking prevalence of, and long resistance to acknowledging, paediatric AIDS — how could this be when AIDS was stereotyped as a gay disease? She also castigates the heavy reliance on condom use as effective against aids transmission, pointing out that the rate of the condom's failure to protect against pregnancy was measured in a monthly cycle during which most women were fertile only a few days: AIDS by contrast can be transmitted every day of the month. Given the heavy focus of Australian AIDS policy on 'If It's Not On, It's Not On' stickers and posters, these are challenging arguments to consider.

The parameters of the force and breadth of this collection are well articulated from the outset in the two opening essays by the editors: 'A Call to Heal Medicine', by Helen Bequaert Holmes, and 'A Call to Heal Ethics', by Laura M. Purdy. Their dual perspective is well spelt out and sustained in the rationale for the book and in the selection of topics. Holmes raises 5 key questions which the book addresses:

1. Why hasn't the new field of medical ethics, concerned as it is with the rights and wrongs of medical practice, already healed medicine?
2. If we heal medicine so it better fulfils its mission of healing, can we do so without setting up health and the perfectly functioning body as virtues?
3. What precise role should 'caring' play in a feminist prescription for the healing of medicine?
4. If modern medicine is based on science, but science is infected, must we first cure science?
5. How have recent developments in reproductive medicine transformed and complicated women's reproductive freedom?

The focus is, as I have shown, broader than reproductive issues, and the inadequacy of mainstream medical ethics is convincingly demonstrated, for, as Virginia Wolf argued about science, medicine is not sexless, and feminist perspectives have a great deal to contribute.

Susan Sherwin's 'No Longer Patient' also takes a broad focus, and is the most philosophically rigorous and best theoretically grounded of the three books. A contributor to 'Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics', Sherwin (Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at Dalhousie University) here lays out an extended three-part analysis: Theoretical Beginnings, Traditional Problems in Health Care, and Feminist Expansions of the Bioethics Landscape. Part one comprises chapters on Understanding Feminism; Ethics, 'Feminine' Ethics, and Feminist Ethics; Feminism and Moral Relativism; and Towards a Feminist Ethics of Health Care. It is an excellent introduction to the field. Part two deals with Abortion; New Reproductive Technologies; Paternalism; and Research. Part three tackles Ascription of Illness; Medical Constructions of Sexuality; and Gender, Race and Class in the Delivery of Health Care.

Like Robyn Rowland in 'Living Laboratories', Sherwin stresses the importance of feminists' seeing the broad social implications of developments in reproductive technologies, and of not treating them as single issues. She warns too against the growing tendency in feminist theory to reject the very notion of a general analysis. It is just such a general analysis that Sherwin sets out to provide, in a way that avoids the 'moral geometry' of general foundational principles. Sherwin argues that neither Kantian nor utilitarian theory satisfies the requirement of particularity in feminist and medical ethics, and that concrete differences arise from adopting an explicitly feminist understanding of contextual analysis. Most non-feminist writers examine particular medical practices in isolation from their historical and political contexts. It is necessary, for example, to add an analysis of the political role of health care, to develop a feminist ethic of health care, which seeks to foster agency and self-help.

As we know, there is currently no universal health insurance in the US, and the Hyde amendment denies the use of public money for abortion and abortion counselling. The changing political climate in the US with the advent of the Clinton presidency makes these issues particularly timely in America. They are not unproblematic in Australia, however: abortion remains on the criminal code in Queensland, and rival conceptions of health insurance were clearly at stake in the recent federal

election.

The relevance of these three books is unquestionable worldwide. It is to be hoped that they will be emulated elsewhere, and stimulate further additions to the rich stream of work they represent, in a growing area. In fact, 'No Longer Patient' and 'Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics' are two suggested texts for the emerging international Network on Feminist Approaches to Ethics, convened by Anne Donchin and Helen Bequaert Holmes, which had its inaugural meeting in Amsterdam in October 1992.

The three books complement each other; each is of value on its own. Their near simultaneous publication augurs well for continuing development in this important field.

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Cresswell, M.J.: *Entities and Indices* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990) pp. xi, 274, Dfl.130.00 (cloth).

The work of Richard Montague in the 1960s inaugurated a whole new research area: the application of the techniques of logical semantics to natural language. The research has proceeded apace since Montague's untimely death, and the result has been a vast array of results that have fundamental implications for both linguistics and the philosophy of language. One of the most notable researchers in this movement has been Max Cresswell. The present book is his fifth in a series of monographs dealing with aspects of the subject, and demonstrates further the clarity, deftness and insight the first four volumes have taught us to expect.

The present volume concerns itself with the ontological commitment of natural language. When we talk, we do so, *prima facie*, about numerous kinds of entities: numbers, people, places, times, possibilities, etc. For various reasons, many philosophers have had metaphysical aversions to some of these; they have argued that in those cases the commitment is only *prima facie*, and that a proper understanding of what we say — or at least, its metaphysically kosher part — disposes of this. For reasons that we need not go into here, times and possibilities (that is, possible situations), in particular, have had a bad press. Cresswell employs his talents in their defence.

The question of ontological commitment is naturally associated with Quine's famous dictum: to be is to be the value of a bound variable. Cresswell subscribes to the dictum. He does not follow Quine in identifying being with existence, however: we can quantify over things that do not exist. Only some things exist (in this world), and what exists will vary from world to world.

Assuming the modified Quinean view, it ought to be easy enough to show that natural language is committed to times and possible situations, for we say such things as 'There was a time when you could buy a beer for 5c' and 'There is a possibility that you will get on this flight'. But many (e.g. Prior in the temporal case) have argued that a language with temporal and world quantifiers should be eschewed in favour of language with tense and modal operators such as the familiar P, F and $\Diamond$, $\Box$ of temporal and modal logics. It is widely recognised that it is not possible to express everything we wish to say in terms of such operators. We need (at least), in addition, indexical operators such as 'it is now [actually] the case that' and 'at that time [situation] it is the case that'. In a language with such operators, sentences are true or false with respect to a sequence of indices, which determine the referents of the indexicals in question.

Chapter 4 is the heart of part one of Cresswell's book; and in it, drawing on the work of Steven Kuhn and others, he provides a translation from a (formal) language with explicit temporal or world quantifiers into a (formal) language with indexical notions of the kind I have just mentioned; he then demonstrates that any formula of the quantified language is equivalent, in a precisely defined sense, to its translation. Cresswell concludes that the languages have equivalent ontological commitments, and hence that indexical languages are, equally, committed to there being times and worlds.

Part two of the book takes up a number of philosophical issues raised by Cresswell's ontological thesis. It discusses, amongst other things, the nature of existence, of fictional objects, substitutional quantification, the differences between worlds and times, and counterpart theory. Much of the discussion comprises duels with the views of David Lewis. This part of the book is much less technical than the rest, and philosophers of language will find the discussions interesting independently of their bearing on the main thesis at issue.

The third and final part of the book is the most elaborate technically. The first part of the book

showed that a quantifier of a certain kind is logically equivalent (in a certain sense) to an (operator + indexical) construction. The final part of the book shows the same to be true of generalised quantifiers in the spirit of Montague, and argues, by considering a number of linguistic constructions, that the surface structure of English can be seen in the latter way at least as plausibly as in the former. The relevance of this to the central thesis of the book is important. As has been known for a long time, ordinary quantifiers can be eliminated by the use of combinators. (Cresswell's own construction can be seen as a generalisation of this, as he, himself, points out.) But in that case, their eliminability could be seen as showing that the ontological commitment of quantified sentences is only *prima facie*. (This is pointed out by Sue Haack, *Philosophy of Logics* (1974), p.48.) Cresswell wishes to answer the objection that the eliminability of temporal and world quantifiers that he has provided in the first part of the book just shows that their ontological commitment is only *prima facie*, in a similar way. His reply (p.197) is that if quantifier-elimination served this function, then the elimination of general quantifiers would show that no claims have ontological commitment.

Cresswell takes this to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the objection. It is not totally clear that this is so; certain kinds of philosopher might be very pleased to hear that nothing they say commits them to any ontological position. Yet in the end, we must, surely, have some notion of what it is our language talks about, and this must be applicable to languages with operators and indexicals just as much as to languages with quantifiers. What we witness here is, in fact, the demolition of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. What has happened to the entities to which we are supposedly committed by a quantifier, once it is eliminated? As the details of the construction show, they have become the objects in the sequence which determine the referents of the indexicals concerned. And it seems patently obvious that to invoke an object in the understanding of an indexical is just as much to countenance its being as to quantify over it.

So what does constitute ontological commitment? We could say, I suppose, that any mechanism that is at least as powerful as quantification delivers commitment. But this seems wrong: Cresswell's eliminability result requires the indexical language to have a whole family of indexical operators; fewer would not suffice. Are we therefore to say that a language with less than the full family does not deliver commitment, even when our understanding of how each member of the family functions is unchanged? This seems absurd. It would seem, then, that language must have at least two mechanisms for constituting ontological commitment, quantification and indexicality. And if two, then why not more, e.g., naming. We might even knock out quantification altogether on the ground that it can be eliminated using Cresswell's construction! At any rate, Quine's dictum is history (though this does not undercut Cresswell's own position).

There is much in Cresswell's book, especially in the second part, that can be discussed only at another time — or in another world; but I heartily recommend it to any philosopher of language interested in the issues. Non-logicians may find the material of parts one and three somewhat tough going, but philosophers need not worry about the details of the proofs, and one who is prepared to put a bit of effort into understanding the apparatus of chapter 4, and use a bit of imagination, can skip over much of the subsequent technical material and still appreciate the philosophical discussions. Logicians, of course, will want to savour the whole thing.

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Buckle, Stephen, *Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) pp. xv, 324, A$110.00 (cloth).

This study explores some central themes in early modern political thought, moving from Grotius and Pufendorf through Locke to Hutcheson and Hume. Its concern is to demonstrate continuities in the development of that thought in relation to the theory of property and to accounts of the foundations of social order and moral action on which it relies. Buckle argues that these continuities are of such a kind as would allow us to classify Hume's theory of the origins of social order as a natural law theory.

Buckle accepts Hume's claim that his theory of property was much the same as that offered by Grotius. Accordingly, Buckle argues that Hume's doctrine of the artificiality of justice, which modern readings often see as a rejection of natural law, is better construed as an attempt 'to solve a problem created by grafting the moral sense account of the psychology of action on to the natural law account of the origins of justice and social order'. Hume's project is thus viewed not as a rejec-

tion but as a completion of natural law, through the use of the resources of new experimental philosophy.

In a sense, Buckle's reading of the intellectual heritage of Grotius is constructed from the vantage point of Hume. I do not mean however to accuse Buckle of anachronistic readings of Hume's predecessors. Buckle establishes continuities in that heritage through the exploration of incompleteness or tension in the work of Hume's predecessors. That is, the connections between Hume and his predecessors are established in exploring how each writer in turn augmented the tradition of natural law through broaching weak points in the work of an earlier writer. It then becomes possible to rule out certain modern misunderstandings of the writers at issue on the grounds that they themselves neither held nor were thought to hold such positions as are often now attributed to them. This is a significant achievement of Buckle's study: to indicate that the antidote to anachronistic readings is not piling up more historical context, but simply close and careful reading of texts on their own, philosophical, terms.

Such careful reading leads to valuable insights in two main areas. First, Buckle is at pains to stress that natural law theories are not necessarily at odds with appeals to utility. The appearance of considerations of expediency in an account of natural law should not lead us to conclude that the account is therefore *founded* on expediency. Moreover, that a place is given in a theory to considerations of utility does not in itself herald the arrival of a new more calculative rationality.

Grotius, for example, argued that expediency formed a reinforcement to natural law rather than an alternative to it. For Grotius, natural law is founded on the natural 'sociableness' of humans, albeit a limited sociability which underlies a distinction between perfect and imperfect moral qualities, the former of which are legal rights and the latter non-enforceable aptitudes. Again, Pufendorf saw no insoluble conflict between the demands of sociability and of rational utility (as distinguished from apparent utility). Pufendorf's distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic obligations parallels that between formal and material elements of obligation. That is, the general duties of humanity necessary for social peace are distinct from those duties that enrich social life but which are not absolutely necessary for social harmony, the former being the subject of perfect obligations, the latter of imperfect obligations.

Locke's very emphasis on such a distinction between material and formal elements in natural law makes it possible for Hutcheson in turn to develop a 'secular' variant of natural law, on the basis that we cannot become the property of another. Hutcheson develops the notion of moral sense as the foundation of human sociability on which the law of nature rests, but the 'cost' of his 'solution' is to value the private judgment of benevolent individuals such as to render social rules too fragile for the maintenance of social order. Hume then seeks to deal with this problem by searching for something firmer than moral sense as a foundation for the sense of duty on which depends steady rule-following. That is, Hume tries to establish the sense of duty independent of a conception of nature and the law of nature.

Buckle's account in this area illustrates that changes in the theory of natural law arise not as the result of the arrival of some new world-view. Such changes arise more from tensions within natural law theory itself, here concerned with the way in which the requirements of sociability and self-preservation are negotiated. Natural law accounts of sociability are not intrinsically non-individualistic, nor is the sociability that is invoked at odds with our separateness as individuals.

Buckle's reading of Grotius' heritage yields important insights, secondly, in the area of property. In line with his exploration of sociability and expediency, Buckle notes that natural law itself gives considerable scope to individualistic forms of property. But this property is not defined in terms of the power of absolute control. Its character only becomes clear if we see notions of property as arising out of and grounded in accounts of social order and moral action. That is, unless property is placed within the context of discussions of the laws of nature, we run the modernist danger of construing such arguments as arguments for the conception of property as a cluster of exclusive rights. Property in natural law is better understood as a power to use things without injustice. For example, the Lockeian notion of property in one's person is seen as equivalent to the natural law notion of the *suum*, and hence there is no decisive break between natural law notions and the work of Locke. Buckle argues that Locke, like Grotius and Pufendorf, presents a natural history of property rather than a conceptual analysis of it.

On one hand, Buckle's discussion of property effectively counters the characterisation of Lockeian property in terms of 'possessive individualism'. While such criticism of Macpherson is not new, Buckle also takes to task those defenders of Locke, such as James Tully, who argue that Locke does not have a theory of private property but only of individual use-rights arising out of an original positive community. Buckle argues that Locke does not mean common property by 'property'. In his account of Grotius, Buckle shows that Grotius' original community of possession dif-

fers greatly from modern notions of common ownership, being more like negative community. Again, for Grotius, private property is a late stage in extensions to the *suum* by adaptation of the original use-rights in commons. Insofar as Locke follows Grotius, then, Buckle argues that Locke does indeed have a theory of property, but that the property at issue is rather different from the modern sense of exclusive possession.

While Buckle's work is mainly devoted to the exploration of continuities between Grotius and Hume, one of the more interesting themes in the book concerns the transformation of the problem of the right of necessity in relation to property. Natural law systems of property typically recognise a right arising out of necessity to take from the property of others what is required for one's own preservation. As property is designed to further the more effective preservation of humans, it includes within itself the commitment not to frustrate the use-rights of the needy. But in the process of setting limits to what the right of necessity requires from the industrious, Grotius maintained the naturalness of slavery, and Pufendorf came close to it, in justifying a law-governed servitude for the lazy and incompetent. An interesting theme in Buckle's study is the transformation of the problem of necessity, in economic terms, through increasing emphasis on the high productivity made possible by private property, which keeps instances of necessity rare. The resulting tenderness towards avarice is balanced by recognition of charity as a 'safety net' for hard-luck cases. This economic solution in turn allowed Locke to treat slavery as more of a political problem, and to see property rights of individuals as a bulwark against arbitrary royal power.

The elegance and coherence of Buckle's story of natural law is to some extent, however, bought at the cost of not dealing with Hobbes. Given Buckle's focus, there are certainly good reasons to leave Hobbes to one side, but one suspects that the story as a whole reads as well as it does partly because Hobbes has no place in it. But this suspicion is more than assuaged by the compelling reading of Locke in particular.

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Riggs, Peter J., *Whys and Ways of Science: Introducing Philosophical and Sociological Theories of Science* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1992) pp. xi, 235, A$19.95 (paper).

In *Whys and Ways of Science*, Peter Riggs introduces the reader to some of the prolific but rather confused literature of the last thirty years on the philosophy and sociology of scientific method. There are seven chapters. The first, 'Science and its Philosophy' is an introduction to the problems to be addressed in the later chapters. Chapter 2 is devoted to Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions. Chapter 3 concerns Imre Lakatos's developments of Kuhn's and Popper's ideas about scientific method in the form of his theory of 'scientific research programs'. Chapter 4 concerns the work of Larry Laudan in developing the ideas of Kuhn and Lakatos into his theory of evolving 'research traditions'. Chapter 5 concerns the views of Robert Merton, Norman Storer, Bernard Barber and Michael Mulkay concerning the sociology of science. This is not to be confused, according to Riggs, with the sociology of scientific knowledge, which is the subject of chapter 6. The views of this chapter are those of 'relativists' Kuhn, Feyerabend, Bloor and Latour, with occasional criticisms from Slesak and Laudan. A 'relativist', here, is one who does not believe that there is a correct scientific methodology. Bloor's 'knowledge', by the way, is 'whatever men (sic) take to be knowledge' (quoted on p.141). With such a definition it is hard to see how knowledge could be distinguished from mere belief or even superstition. 'Rationalism' is said to be the view that relativism is false. In chapter 7, Riggs enters into the debate in order 'to shed light on questions relating to the success of science and to scientific rationality'. Scientific realism, 'the view that scientific theories are true (or nearly true)' is rejected on two grounds: firstly, because it is possible that a theory which gives successful predictions is false, and secondly because 'there is good inductive evidence from the history of science which indicates that most scientific theories are false' (pp.172-173). Paradoxically, one might wonder, in that case, whether one should reject the theory that most scientific theories are false. This chapter ends with an attempt to characterise the acceptance and rejection of generally accepted explanations by individuals.

Riggs concludes that the rationality of science, contrary to the claims of some sociologists, is alive and well. What one indeed learns from Riggs, is that if scientists are sometimes irrational in the pursuit of their disciplines, they do not compare in that regard to some of the philosophers and sociologists of science whose views are discussed in this book.

If the book were used as a text in a course in the philosophy of science, it might require supplementation. Only six sentences are devoted to logical empiricism, which is equated with logical positivism and the 'verifiability principle'. That would be too dismissive for a philosophy which, rightly or wrongly, has been so influential in the methodology of physics and psychology in this century, with ramifications for linguistics and for philosophy itself.

Again, the influential work of Karl Popper receives little more attention. Popper is said to have argued against the verifiability principle, but those arguments or any other arguments against the principle are not given, let alone critically examined.

Although six pages are given to Bacon and his 'scientific induction', the problem of induction is treated as if it were merely a matter of the fallibility of induction. But any method is fallible. David Hume, who is not mentioned in the book, saw the problem as a matter of circularity in justifying the inductive principle. A reference to Brian Skyrms' excellent discussion in *Choice and Chance* would have been useful for the beginner to this topic, but although Skyrms' book is mentioned in the (very extensive) bibliography, it receives no mention in the text. Goodman's grue-bleen paradox is missing from both, though there is a useful section on the underdetermination of theory by data. Carl Hempel gets into the bibliography, but his raven paradox does not make the text.

Humans and other animals, though fallible, are very good at predicting the future, or more generally, extrapolating from given data. If we were not, we would not survive for very long. Two questions arise. Firstly: how do we do it? Secondly: why is that method so successful? The literature that Riggs surveys does little to address these questions. They are questions which can be raised without mentioning the science industry. A further question therefore arises: does the science industry add anything to the basic epistemological methods used by ordinary animals in their day to day existence? If not, is there really such a thing as a peculiarly scientific method that is anything more than the methods commonly in use? To answer 'No' to this question would not be to adopt the 'Relativism' of Kuhn and Feyerabend. It would be simply to reduce the epistemological methods of science to those of common sense.

There are other deficiencies in much modern philosophy of science that are reflected in Riggs' account. Here are four examples of such deficiencies in the explicitness of that terminology and the equivocations that arise from that.

1. On p.2, where some of the questions asked by philosophers of science are listed, one could readily understand science to be the process of attempting to discover something about the world. If so, science, like farming and candle-stick making, may or may not be conducted as a communal enterprise. If that is so, the sociology of those who engage in scientific endeavour may not be of any great relevance to the study of science per se. Compare: one can learn to make candle-sticks without studying the sociology of candle-stick makers. Nevertheless, since the appearance of Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, science has been treated by many philosophers as necessarily communal or societal. To what extent has failure to distinguish between these two quite different concepts of science led to some of the more seemingly outrageous claims of relativist philosophers of science?

2. If research is the business of trying to discover something about the world, what is scientific research? What is it for research to be unscientific? Is 'scientific' here a redundancy, or is the label 'scientific' an honorific indicating that it is reasonable to believe that the research is likely to achieve its epistemic ends? Or is it supposed to indicate that the research is being carried out as part of a communal endeavour? The answer to Riggs's question, 'Is scientific research conducted in a rational manner?' (p.2) seems clearly 'Yes', if the honorific is intended, and 'Sometimes, sometimes not' otherwise. There seems to be a similar equivocation with the use of 'scientific' with 'scientific knowledge' and 'scientific theory'.

3. Theories, it appears, can be true or false, can be accepted or abandoned by scientists (pp.2-4) and can be underdetermined by data. (p.12) All that makes theories look like propositions. But theories can also be modified (p.34) to yield 'different versions of the theory' (p.37), which makes them look like sets of propositions. But theories can contain terms which are 'not capable of being translated from one theory to the other' (p.46), which makes a theory look like a language. Finally, theories can be reinterpreted, (p.67) which makes them look like sentences. The taxonomic problems of palaeontology fade in comparison to the taxonomic horrors of the philosophy and sociology of science.

4. Some of the beliefs resulting immediately from observation (Riggs calls these 'facts') are a function of beliefs we already hold. That is uncontroversial. Riggs quotes Turnbull's example of this on p.17: a forest pygmy thinking that distant cattle were insects. Are all such 'facts' a function of previous beliefs? Examples like Turnbull's do not prove the point. Nor do they prove something entirely different, namely that 'there cannot be a clear-cut distinction between fact and theory'. The

so called 'theory-ladenness of observation' is a term that seems to be used equivocally by Riggs and the writers he discusses to label all three of these propositions at least.

One can always complain about omissions. There is always more to discuss. Though much of the argumentation is overly abbreviated, *Whys and Ways of Science* is a useful summary of recent work in the philosophy and sociology of science.

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Swanton, Christine, *Freedom: A Coherence Theory* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1992) pp. x, 200, US$29.50 (cloth).

This is an impressive book. In it Swanton argues for a unified theory of freedom. Taking it that freedom is the absence of breakdowns and flaws of various kinds which beset our practical activity, she offers the hypothesis, (which she calls the background theory) that the unifying factor lies in the perceived value of their absence.

> The perceived value of freedom lies in the value of realizing the various aspects of individual human potential in agency, for the actualization of potential in this area contributes to individual flourishing. (p.38)

She starts from what she calls the *endoxa*, or common conceptions. Initially, these conceptions may seem confused, even contradictory, but her aim is to use the background theory to eliminate contradictions and irrationalities so that 'the endoxa can be recast in such a way that they do not contradict each other, and in a way that preserves their point' (p.25).

This is worked out in intricate detail, and the book abounds in resolutions of perennial disputes. One very fine discussion concerns threats and offers, where she attacks the idea of distinguishing between them by their effects (p.106). The effects will depend on the situation, so that for instance a threat to his life could be very welcome to a suicidal person. She says that it is better to treat threats and offers as illocutionary acts, - thus an offer, as opposed to a threat, is a locution designed to be seen as offering a benefit (p.107). Threats are designed to limit options and offers are designed to expand them, and according to the background theory, 'freedom is affected only where the influence is seen as a *limitation*' (p.111).

Another illuminating discussion concerns weakness of will. She sees this as a weakness of character that too often allows a person to act against his own evaluation of the sort of person he wants to be, and in that way detracts from his potentiality in action. She denies that akrasia is the overwhelming of rationality by desire, since the akratic acts for a reason. She also denies that it consists in acting against second order desires, because this fails to do justice to the idea that akrasia involves acting against a perceived requirement. For example, an anorexic's second order wish not to eat may be recognized as neurotic and in that case acting against it is not akratic. On the other hand, akrasia does not consist in acting against an all-things-considered judgement, because there are situations where an akratic's choice will be as well supported by reasons as the alternative. She identifies the will with a second order volition based on an evaluative second order desire, which she calls a strong evaluation (p.148-149). Strong evaluations concern the sort of person one wishes to be. Rational behaviour involves following rules with loosely specified escape clauses, so a rational agent will act on the rule that he should act in accordance with the relevant strong evaluation unless there is an 'emergency'. Weakness of will is not action against one's strong evaluation *simpliciter* for there may indeed be an emergency. 'Weakness of will occurs when the emergency occurs *all too readily*' (p.152).

This view of an escape clause being used all too readily fits the phenomena but surely not all akratic action is against a second order judgement. Suppose I decide to have another drink, telling myself this is a special occasion, or 'emergency'. My act will be akratic if I have previously decided to avoid such indulgences because they cause headaches, and have not revoked my decision. Now such a decision is based on a first order preference, so that here my akratic choice is not against a strong evaluation at all. Moreover, my too readily accepting that this occasion is an emergency or special case, is a piece of self deception that is typical of the lying excuses that an akratic accepts on his own behalf. Swanton is surely right that weakness of will is a character defect but isn't it honesty which is lacking here, not courage as she suggests?

The detailed discussions are very fine, and constitute the real riches of the book. But what about the background theory? Does the unity of the concept of freedom, lie, as Swanton says, in the way

the absence of the various limitations on action contributes to individual flourishing? She says

> Individual human potential in agency has several aspects, some of which are more normative than others . . . In the richest sense . . . that potential is not just one component or aspect of flourishing *qua* agent; it is synonymous with that flourishing. (p.39-40)

She goes on to identify flourishing with self-realization (p.40). She suggests that individual flourishing 'is constituted by the satisfaction and development of those needs and capacities which, under good conditions human beings characteristically desire to satisfy and develop' (p.42).

I am not convinced of the connection between the ideals of freedom and flourishing. Martin Seligman claims that the idea of self realization depends on the quite recent development of the 'maximal self', although the self has been 'expanding' since the Renaissance. (*Learned Optimism*, 1991, ch.15, and see end notes.) I do not see the concern with freedom as limited to this individualistic ideology. She does say that in some cultures there is comparative hostility towards freedom, and that these are cultures which value individual potential less than supra- individual goods and ideals (p.40). However, this does not mean that only individualistic societies can have a concern for freedom: the independence movements in colonial countries were not dependent on the development of individualism. The background theory, with its emphasis on individual potential, seems to ignore this, and yet the book is supposed to be about social and political freedom (p.vii). Surprisingly, there are no political *endoxa*.

'Flourishing' is a normative term and so cannot be defined by neutral psychological states like contentment, because we might be content in evil societies like Nazi Germany.

> Contentment in Nazi Germany would be regarded as culpable complacency, requiring such dispositions as . . . insensitivity to the sufferings of others . . . . The conditions of Nazi Germany would not be regarded as good conditions for the development of capacities and states that human beings typically desire and enjoy. (p.45)

But doesn't this *assume* that moral virtue is what people typically want? Contentment would have been unlikely in the turmoil of Nazi Germany, but there are other situations we might not approve of that could provide ideal conditions for the development of capacities and states that human beings typically enjoy- like life in a rich colonial power for example. Moreover, good conditions may not be conducive to the development of dispositions like sensitivity. Affluence seems to produces selfishness and complacency. Aristotle presents flourishing (*eudaimonia*) as something that we all want, but on Swanton's conception flourishing does not seem to be such a widespread and important human goal that it can be used to ground the value of freedom.

Swanton treats freedom as being of largely instrumental value, and of intrinsic value only where equivalent to flourishing. I would prefer to treat freedom as an intrinsic good- as something desired for its own sake. People, and animals, do not like to be confirmed, restricted, or forced to do things. This is why deprivation of liberty is thought to be a punishment in itself. Some manipulation is very subtle, and we don't like that either, once we see it for what it is. This is not to say that freedom is of overwhelming value: only that it has its value in itself and not merely instrumentally.

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Hetherington, Stephen Cade, *Epistemology's Paradox* (Savage, MA: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992) pp. x, 234, US$46.75 (cloth).

Could the sceptical claim that knowledge is impossible be known to be true or at least reasonably believed to be so? This admirable book dramatically deepens the issues dimly hinted at in this familiar question. The paradox of the book's title infects, it is argued, not merely sceptical theses but any attempt to evaluate epistemological claims or theories whether sceptical or otherwise.

Hetherington locates the paradox in the inconsistency in the demands made on the *standpoint* of anyone seeking to evaluate epistemological claims. 'Epistemological preoccupation' and 'epistemological detachedness' must *both* characterise the standpoint of anyone who would propose to assess claims concerning when someone knows or justifiably believes (or is in any other epistemic state) but these requirements are inconsistent. Their specification undergoes various refinements, but they run roughly along the following lines. The requirement of epistemic preoccupation holds

that any theorist who purports to establish (or refute or otherwise evaluate) any epistemic criteria must be able to show that s/he is appropriately related to those criteria. Thus, if someone claims that avoiding Gettier type cases is essential for knowledge, that theorist must show that in making this claim he or she avoids Gettier-type cases. The second requirement, Hetherington aptly terms it 'epistemic detachedness', which maintains that for someone (E) to know (or be otherwise epistemically related to) the epistemic status of some person [S], E must presume his/her distinctness from S. Very roughly, the theorist needs to be epistemologically superior in certain ways to his or her subject. Thus, to take Gettier again, to know someone has fallen victim to Gettier problems, is to know some fact hidden from that person about (in the familiar example) who will get a certain job. This is only possible if the theorist and his subject are epistemically distinct. Thus in rather crude form, doing little justice to the author's subtlety, we have the paradoxical result that our theorist must, by the preoccupation constraint, treat him or herself as subject yet, by the detachedness constraint, be precluded from doing so. This requirement that the theorist be both included in and excluded from his or her epistemological study, Hetherington compares to Russell's set paradox.

Much of the strength and interest of Hetherington's argument resides in his deployment of these ideas. In chapters one to four he examines the operation of the conditions with respect to epistemological denials — Descartes' demon, Nozick's vat brains, Hume's inductive scepticism, and Gettier's counter-examples to the justified true belief-thesis. Chapters five and six look at epistemological affirmations centring on a near relative of the internalism/externalism dispute which Hetherington calls reflectivism/non-reflectivism. Chapter seven presents the thesis in full generality and relates it to other issues — the most significant being the realism/anti-realism conflict.

This book impresses in many ways. It is lucid and closely argued, and its central theme is an important one. It ranges in a sure-footed way over many issues. All epistemologists should read and reflect on Hetherington's argument and the wide-ranging yet cohesive discussion it offers would make it a useful text for an advanced undergraduate course.

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Teichmann, Roger, *Abstract Entities* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992) pp, xi, 177, Stg35.00 (cloth).

Abstract Entities is a thorough and sophisticated case for what I would describe as a moderate nominalism about abstract entities, which here include not merely universals but also events. Terms or expressions which prima facie would be taken to refer to such entities are treated as *contextually eliminable.* The author goes to some trouble to explain what contextual eliminability amounts to, but, simplifying matters, his claim is that all *prima facie* reference to abstract entities, especially universals and events, could, and should, be avoided by careful paraphrase. We might expect the author to conclude that there are no abstract entities, but his is a *moderate* nominalism, in that he considers true such assertions as 'There is a property shared by A and B'. That is because the author paraphrases even such explicit commitments to abstract entities. Another way in which the author is moderate in his nominalism is his reliance on higher-order quantification, and on higher-order analogs of identity, in order to provide the appropriate paraphrases.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part is concerned with the general problem of abstract singular terms. The first chapter is a discussion of existential assertions and logical categories; the second a presentation of his thesis that all abstract singular terms are contextually eliminable. The second part of the book is a detailed consideration of universals and of events. In the chapter on universals the author defends his nominalism against the arguments derived from Wiggins, Strawson, and Armstrong. He classifies varieties of realism depending on whether the abstract singular term (e.g. 'redness') or the predicable ('is red') or both or neither refer to /specify universals. And he provides a case against the first three varieties, which are those he considers to be commonly held. In the chapter on events, there is a similar classification of realist positions, depending on whether event-terms or event-statements or both or neither refer to /specify events. The author provides criticisms of the first three positions before concentrating on Davidson, who is interpreted as holding the fourth position. The discussion of events flows over into the last chapter which is to do with identity and its higher-order analogues. The author's main concern here is to avoid realistic construals of identity claims for events. But the discussion of identity is of independent interest and has applications to Mind/Brain identity, Thomson's puzzle about the time of a killing, and to Ethical Naturalism.

The author's case for a moderate nominalism is a carefully developed one, but does it succeed in

the end? I leave it to realists about events to find fault with his case against Davidson. I shall, however, briefly discuss the author's case for nominalism about universals. One criticism of nominalists is that, as Bigelow and Pargetter have recently pointed out *(Science and Necessity* p.13), the mere ability to paraphrase away *prima facie* commitments is not automatically a reason for embracing nominalism. Is the author vulnerable to this criticism? His case for nominalism rests largely on the claim that abstract singular terms, such as 'redness' do not share their 'logico-syntactic category with genuinely referential expressions'. (p.44). In support of this he argues that genuinely referential expressions must be ineliminable by paraphrase, a condition satisfied only by names. The author's argument for nominalism, then, is that eliminability marks a significant syntactic difference between abstract terms such as 'redness' and names, and that because of this difference we should not take abstract terms as referring.

That is certainly an important argument, which is not obviously vulnerable to the Bigelow/Pargetter criticism. It does, however, leave open the position which the author considers chiefly for events rather than universals (Position D, p.108). For universals this amounts to saying that neither 'redness' nor the the predicate 'is red' refers to a universal. Such realism would not be a matter of claiming to be able to refer to universals, but rather for the truth of non-paraphrased assertions about them. The author rejects this (p.108) on the grounds that it requires us to deny the principle that there must be only one redness. If the author is right, then he might well have provided a strong case against realism about universals, but only by drawing our attention to realism about abstract particulars (as defended in *Abstract Particulars* by Keith Campbell). However it is not at all clear that there cannot be many different universals of redness. In a footnote, the author considers the possibility that crimson, scarlet etc might be different rednesses, only to dismiss it as not conforming to the two ways we can think of determinates of determinables. I dc not find the footnote persuasive: as Armstrong submits, the predicable 'is red' could be true of an object, not because there is a universal redness, but rather because some universal which belongs to the object is a 'member of the class of determinate shades of red' (D.M. Armstrong, *A Theory of Universals,* p.117). A rather quaint way of stating this position would indeed be to say that there is not one redness but rather many rednesses .

My other doubt about the strength of the author's case is that he takes the chief argument for realism about universals to be from the supposed ineliminability of abstract singular expressions such as 'redness'. Hence he does not pay much attention to the argument, used by Bigelow and Pargetter (*Science and Necessity* p.344) that universals should be accepted into our ontology because of their explanatory power. In response to Armstrong's somewhat different thesis that *which* universals we countenance should be decided by considering our overall explanatory theory, the author's position is that unless we rely on 'logico-linguistic' arguments, then considerations of explanatory power will give us no way of deciding between nominalism and realism (p.84). But that is precisely what Bigelow and Pargetter would deny. It is surely reasonable to ask: 'Why should not universals (or events, or abstract particulars, if that's where your fancy lies) be treated as theoretical entities just like quarks?' Perhaps the author's response should be that traditionally realists — even empirical ones such as Armstrong — have in fact tended to rely on logico-linguistic arguments and that he is entitled to restrict his discussion to that tradition, since not everything can be discussed at once.

Even if the author's case for nominalism fails, he has at very least provided a strong case against the common realist views that 'redness' and/or 'is red' refer to universals. Furthermore, there is a wealth of independently interesting detail concerning the relevant logical and linguistic points. And I should add that *Abstract Entities* is remarkably readable for a short book in which so many technical issues are discussed.

I only noticed two typographical errors, one was an irritating triple question mark (p.6), the other was the word 'function' in place of 'functor' (p.27).

I commend Teichmann's book as an interesting case for a moderate nominalism about universals, events, and other abstract entities.

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Lipman, Matthew: *Thinking in Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) pp. ix, 280,

Lipman's most recent book is timely given the growing significance of philosophy being taught at

school level, right down to kindergarten. There are currently 26 countries, including Australia, using the curriculum from the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State University in New Jersey, of which Lipman is the founder and director. *Thinking in Education* is a welcome addition to the literature for its serious examination of how philosophy contributes to the development of thinking in school education, and this of course has implications for the tertiary teaching of philosophy. The book will be of interest to philosophers involved in teaching reasoning and thinking skills, but importantly it covers both critical and creative thinking.

This book of Lipman's, however, is not particularly informative about the practice of philosophy for children for those not already familiar with it. Earlier writings such as Matthew Lipman, Ann Sharp and Frederick Oscanyan, *Philosophy in the Classroom*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2nd edition 1980), remain the best source for an introduction to this. But *Thinking in Education* is valuable in enlarging on and developing notions which are central to philosophy for children.

In the current book Lipman opens in Parts I and II by reviewing and positioning himself in contemporary debates in educational theory as to the nature of higher order thinking. He takes the very existence of philosophy as a normative discipline to be a refutation of McPeck's claim that all thinking is discipline-specific (p.112). For his own part in treating of thinking, Lipman emphasizes reasonableness and the development of judgment. He argues (p.116) that critical thinking is 'thinking that (1) facilitates judgment because it (2) relies on criteria, (3) is self-correcting, and (4) is sensitive to context'. He has much to say that is interesting on the variety and scope of judgments we make, offering a model of the wheel of judgment with primary judgments, such as those of identity and difference at the rim, mediating judgments, of various kinds as the spokes, and culminating judgments, such as ethical, social, aesthetic or scientific judgments in the centre. He uses this model to develop his concern with the practical question of how judgment can be strengthened.

In part III the concept of creative thinking is examined in detail and explored for its role in the classroom. This connects with an underlying justification for the use of stories as the stimulus material for the philosophy classroom through the way in which narrative is open to the imagination. Thinking as a classroom process is approached in part IV where Lipman gives a more sustained analysis of the notion of a community of inquiry which is employed in doing philosophy for children. In brief he claims that a philosophical community of inquiry is distinguished by having a dialogue structured by its logic. Whilst it is crucial to tackle the question of what distinguishes philosophical discussion in the community of inquiry from any other old discussion which might happen to occur in class, I think that Lipman construes it too narrowly by insisting on the logic of the dialogue. Factors other than logical ones can be relevant and productive in philosophy, and dialogue puts too much onto the purely verbal. Much appropriate communication in classroom philosophical discussion is overlooked in this account.

The burden of the book is to sustain his claim that philosophy is a better approach for bringing about higher order thinking in education than other approaches. This claim has to be understood with the crucial proviso that it is philosophy as Lipman puts it 'when properly reconstructed and properly taught' (p.3). By 'reconstructed' I take it he means the way in which philosophy can be appropriately offered at school level e.g. through the technique of using 'novels' which stimulate philosophical discussion without explicit reference to standard philosophical texts and without technical terms. By 'properly taught' he means the pedagogy of the community of inquiry. There is an intimate connection between the philosophy which is introduced and the classroom pedagogy of the community of inquiry. They come together, and reinforce each other, in that the 'novels' stimulate questions which set the agenda for inquiry, and inquiry fosters the development of thinking skills which feed back into and generate further questions. But the questions are those the kids ask in their own terms, and the inquiry is their inquiry together.

Philosophers probably need little convincing of the merit of Lipman's claim for the value of philosophy in teaching thinking, but they may take issue with the form in which it is presented here. Throughout the book Lipman's case for philosophy emphasizes the skills of philosophical inquiry with little mention of the substantive issues in philosophy which are addressed in a school curriculum. This suggests that philosophy is characterised more by its methodology than by its content. It may tend to give the unfortunate impression that the usefulness of philosophy in education is merely instrumental as an aid to the development of thinking. Yet nothing could be more evident from the practice of philosophy for children than the importance of the content of philosophy. Philosophical discussion in the community of inquiry is driven by kids' curiosity about a whole range of typical philosophical issues such as who we are, what the world is like, what we should do, how language functions, what makes things beautiful. The motivation for inquiry arises from a natural interest stimulated by the curriculum materials. Once engaged in, or as Lipman would say, 'enticed into',

the process of inquiry, kids can be encouraged to develop their skills in thinking. The substance of the questions is integral to the whole process.

The issues about doing philosophy at school are not only those which arise from the practice of the philosophy for children program. 1994 is expected to be the year for the introduction of a Distinction Course in Philosophy at the Higher School Certificate in New South Wales. This should draw the attention of academic philosophers to issues of teaching philosophy at all levels and the kind of contribution philosophy can make to education. Lipman's book is neither a light nor an easy read, and although he speaks mainly out of the American experience, his views and arguments on this matter are well worth consideration.

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Kleinig, John, *Valuing Life* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991) pp.284, Stg35.00 (cloth), Stg18.95 (paper).

John Kleinig tells us that the material for this book first began to see the light of day in a doctoral seminar that he conducted on 'Respect for Persons and the Value of Life'. The subsequent book, *Valuing Life*, has a wider focus and should be recommended background reading for teachers and students of practical ethics. In addition to the direct relevance of its content to issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and the preservation of wildernesses and species, Kleinig's discussion is mostly rigorous and readable. His appraisal (chs 3-6) of a range of views concerning the value of organismic, plant, animal and human life is hard-nosed but sympathetic and concerned to draw out what might be important in the views he criticises. Kleinig is realistic and explicit about some of the issues and the deeper, theoretical concerns which his book leaves unresolved, and also about the limits of what his critical, more positive (ch.7), and more applied (ch.8) discussions establish. Some philosophers who write on issues of practical ethics could also benefit from a suitably open-minded, careful reading of this book. I have in mind especially those whose writing ignores some very important substantive distinctions which Kleinig's chapters 1-2 and 7-8 bring sharply into focus, as well as those who seem to regard practical ethics as simply a matter of applying particular moral assumptions uncritically to practical moral problems.

'What kind of value is life claimed to have, and what kind of life is claimed to have value?' Kleinig's first two chapters are concerned to show how 'appeals to the "value of life" may take a variety of forms with a diversity of reference', and he articulates 'some of the understandings of "value" and "life" that might and do figure in appeals to the value of life'. The 'valuational terminology' most commonly used in debates about life's value reveals a range of distinguishable terms: life is said to have *value*, *worth*, *sanctity*, *dignity*; some speak of *reverence* and *respect* for life; the *right* to life and the *inviolability* of life are invoked. Although interrelated, Kleinig argues, these terms are wrongly and confusedly used interchangeably, because what is being claimed for life by these different terms can bear on choice in different ways. These value terms can be distinguished by reference to the ways in which, when properly used, they function as primarily choice-relevant (worth, sanctity), choice-constraining (rights, reverence) and choice-determining (right, wrong). Applying this, the claim that organismic life has value appeals to a choice-relevant consideration; appeal to a person's right to life invokes a choice-constraining one. We need to be sensitive to, and to draw upon, the different emphases and nuances of the 'language of value' in reasoning about life's value. Given the various levels, forms and dimensions of *life* (distinguished in ch.2, and pursued in chs 3-6), some value terms will be appropriately used in connection with some grounds on which life is said to have value, while other terms can be inappropriate. For instance, Kleinig maintains that rights-possession is grounded in interests (ch.5), whereas possession of a *telos* is a source of affirmative value for livingness (ch.7). Thus, if a being cannot properly be said to possess rights it may nevertheless possess intrinsic value (which need not be slight). Similarly, if we hold that something does not have rights in virtue of its potentiality, the thing in question can have value in virtue of its potentiality (ch.9). The claim that something does not have a right to life is not equivalent to the claim that it is right, or at least not wrong, to kill it. And so on. Each of these particular points has been made elsewhere. Kleinig's systematic discussion is particularly welcome because the sort of ambiguous or confused valuational reasoning about life which he aims to help rectify persists both inside and outside professional philosophy. At one or two points Kleinig himself seems to succumb to it, for instance, in his discussion of rights as grounded in having interests of a particular kind (p.110). Kleinig may think that something's having particular welfare interests is

also sufficient for its possessing (some) rights. But it does not follow from the fact that I have a particular welfare interest that I possess a particular corresponding right. (It might be strongly in my interests to have your kidney; this does not give me any right to it. It might be strongly in my interests to engage in conduct dangerous to others; it does not follow that I have any positive right to act in this way.) Kleinig points out that rights can conflict and that rights are not necessarily absolute claims. But his discussion also needs explicitly to recognise that the possession of even very important rights, such as the right to life, can be conditional, and that, where possessed, the scope of such rights is limited in various ways.

A general sticking point for some readers will occur early in chapter 1, when Kleinig lays down a view about the nature of value which is important to his subsequent discussion (pp.7-9). He isolates the notion of 'affirmative value' as what is commonly intended when life is said to have value. Affirmative value is a matter of *attributing* value to something, *investing* it with value. Talk of something's *having* or *possessing* affirmative value only makes sense against a background in which valuers/attributers of value are conceived of as choosers; ascribing affirmative value to something is, *inter alia*, to characterize it as choiceworthy in some respect, such ascription making reference to the interests of the chooser. Kleinig says that this particular conceptual link between affirmative value and choice helps to account for the bifurcation that sometimes occurs between something's 'being valued' and its 'having value'; he also thinks that affirmative value is neutral between intrinsic and instrumental value. We, as choosers, can *attribute* intrinsic or instrumental value to things: something *has* intrinsic value when it is *affirmatively valued* for its own sake; something *has* instrumental value when it is a material precondition for other things that are *affirmatively valued*. Kleinig explicitly rejects the notion of inherent value, where this ascribes value-in-itself as a property which exists independently of the existence of valuers.

In chapter 4 Kleinig rightly insists (as have others) that all value is not rendered instrumental if attribution of value must refer to the standpoint of a valuer. All the same, some of Kleinig's later statements about what is, or can be, involved in valuing life intrinsically (for its own sake) have a decidedly instrumental tone. Consider, for instance, his claim that animal and human life, 'by providing us with increasing opportunities for rich and fulfilling experience, may be accorded greater intrinsic value than plants' (p.179). Compare the emphasis of that last statement of 'intrinsic' value with Kleinig's idea that in valuing organismic life *intrinsically* we may be identifying with and admiring the independence it manifests, 'the way in which, like ourselves, particularly in our embodiment, the various life forms engage and succeed in their struggle for existence' (p.181).

Kleinig's analysis in chapters 1 and 2 of the 'language of value' and what it implies is important to careful thinking about a range of issues of practical ethics. But I'm not sure that its detail is sufficiently utilised in his own discussion prior to chapter 7 to warrant the first two chapters of the book being so highly conceptual. Granted, placement of such material is difficult; but it doesn't make for an engaging start. It would be a pity if the book's appeal is confined for this reason to those whose concerns are primarily academic.

Chapters 3-6 provide a very useful and reasonably complex overview, and perceptive critical discussions of a number of debates about value and the various forms and dimensions of life. Kleinig's critique employs the techniques of analytical philosophy; the views discussed extend beyond those of mainstream analytical philosophy. Kleinig himself maintains (ch.7) that as reflective choosers we will both attribute intrinsic and instrumental value to living things and appeal to a hierarchy of value in our appraisal of the various and diverse forms of life. In the final chapter Kleinig's concern is to show 'how the broad issue of life's value manifests itself in a number of applied contexts, and in determining the weight that it should be given'. His brief critical discussions of vegetarianism, fetal life, and comatose life are quite illuminating in this respect, the discussions of capital punishment and genetic engineering less so.

There is a good deal that is of value in *Valuing Life*, but to my mind much of the discussion does not come alive. Chapters 1-6 contain a sound, very useful analysis of the language in which we speak of value and life, followed by an appropriately sympathetic critique of fruitful themes concerning the value of various forms of life. Important positive aspects of problematic lines of argument are revisited and utilized in Kleinig's more creative discussion of chapter 7, and also in his more applied discussions of chapter 8. But as a book, *Valuing Life* reads (to use Kleinig's own description) as a project, rather than as a philosophical work which is animated by a point of view for which the author is arguing.

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Carruthers, Peter, *Human Knowledge and Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. viii, 199, A$24.95 (paper).

This book updates classical empiricism. Concentrating on recent work on the sources of knowledge, Carruthers seeks to reconcile the empiricism of Locke and Hume with recent support for various claims to innate knowledge. He argues that their deepest philosophical motivations for rejecting innateness nonetheless permit modern empiricists, in the light of evolutionary and other naturalistic explanatory advances since the eighteenth century, to embrace it. We ought not, however, tolerate claims to 'substantive knowledge of the world gained *a priori*'. What is still denied, then, is that any *a priori* knowledge, and so any innate knowledge, is substantive, that is, 'either contingent . . . or which concerns entities which exist independently of the human mind' (p.10).

One task, then, is to explain our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Carruthers urges as against platonism a reduction of universals to internal relations between (mental) concepts, indeed to 'noncontingent features of the human mind' (p.33). Logic and conceptual analysis have to do with internal relations between concepts understood as classificatory rules governed by the semantic intentions of their users (pp.33-34), and thus their truths are analytic. We avoid the necessary existence of universals by quantifying over ways of thinking rather than over worlds. Mathematics will deal with abstract objects, but we may insist on their supervenience upon the rules whereby we count, add, subtract. (No detailed account of such a theory is here defended.) Now how are mathematics and logic to apply to worlds empty of rule users? In terms of one-to-one correlations between instances of our concept in agentless worlds and the relevant number in the actual world.

Transcendent platonic universals could not be known, since they lack causal powers. The number 7 cannot have been other than prime, and so its being so is fit to cause nothing. Crucially, it cannot be the cause of our belief that 7 is prime. It's best then, and particularly congenial to the programme of reviving empiricism, to construe knowledge of mathematics naturalistically.

Classical empiricism understandably but mistakenly repudiated innate knowledge. Carruthers, citing recent research, favours innate knowledge of the 'locally triggered' variety. Some truths make their appearance in belief sets subsequent upon experiences of the relevant kind, but could not have been learnt (by 'memory, [generalizing?] induction, and inference to the best explanation') (p.52). Such knowledge is not, of course, a matter of propositions stored in us prior to birth.

But what is knowledge? Carruthers supports the reliabilist conception: in brief, knowledge is true belief caused by a reliable process, where a reliable belief-forming process yields beliefs which are likely to be true. However, where I am not justified in some claim which I know, I may not claim to know it, for a first person claim to know is a claim not to first-order but to second-order knowledge. Second-order knowledge is the proper domain of epistemology, whose leading question is 'What do we know that we know?' One can only support claims to second-order knowledge, and thus reject scepticism, by reasoning, i.e. by the production of a rational justification, for that is the only kind of reliable process available. Locke and Hume could, consistently with their texts as we have them, have accepted reliabilism.

Reliabilism can accommodate innate knowledge. To support second-order claims that we know that we possess innate knowledge requires empirical support that some of our first-order true beliefs were formed by a reliable process and are innate. So we need to show that the 'powers of the mind' include belief forming processes which are guaranteed by their origin to be reliable. Abstractly, evolutionary selection and divine design may underwrite such a guarantee. The latter is anathema to empiricists, who are above all naturalists (of which more later). If evolutionary selection, then, can be shown to be likely to give rise to reliable belief-forming processes, then we may infer that cognitive processes which are its products are reliable in just the right way.

Chapter 6-8 contains a broad empirically based defence of nativism. In the case of information-bearing linguistic structures, what is innate is not propositional knowledge but something more like a practical ability than a set of beliefs (pp.87-91). There is also much evidence of the innate constituent structure of vision and other perceptual abilities, required in order to begin to learn from experience. Thus sense data foundationalism, phenomenalism and other red herrings can safely be eliminated from the empiricist programme. Similarly, 'our basic repertoire of discriminatory-capacity concepts' is innate. But what of conscious concepts, which require beliefs and desires accessible to the subject's reflective thought and which figure in explanations of behaviour which fit the practical-reasoning model? 'Plato's Problem' favours innateness for these just as it does for knowledge of linguistic rules: we cannot have acquired a mountain of such concepts by learning alone, given the paucity of data, with little explicit training in their use.

Empiricists need only object to the innateness of concepts which seem to carry information about the mind-independent world. So they can welcome Carruthers' able defence of the innateness

of our knowledge of folk psychology, in chapter 8. They can also welcome his defence of the claim that inference to the best explanation (hereafter IBE), of which generalizing induction is a special case (p.109), is probably innate.

Now evolution enters the picture. We can explain how IBE came to be innate if it is a generally reliable method of belief formation, for then it aids survival by revealing underlying natural processes. And it is hard to see why it should aid survival unless normally yielding true and (relevantly) nearly true beliefs. Organisms get by only if they normally get it right. So if evolution has given rise to any innate beliefs, they will by and large be innately known.

We might ask here, why then not suppose that all survival-enhancing cognitive capacities are innate? And isn't this style of reasoning really just a fanciful Panglossian adaptationism? Countless truths don't matter much to survival. So why suppose that evolutionary selection guarantees a certain ratio of true to false beliefs arising from all the uses of our inherited cognitive equipment? We might also anticipate design compromises between truth and the various other ends of cognition. As to the first of these questions, much survival-enhancing knowledge concerns mind-independent reality. But Carruthers has not motivated his claim that claims to *a priori* knowledge are acceptable to modern empiricists only when they concern mental states and processes.

Chapter 9 is crucial to the project of recasting empiricism. The question is, what motivated classical empiricism's attack both on nativism and on substantive *a priori* knowledge? Carruthers' 'historical hypothesis' (p.129) is that the core of empiricism consists in the claim that epistemology is constrained by science, and in particular that claims of knowledge should be granted only if 'they can be rendered consistent with our best theory of the powers of the human mind' (p.130). Classical empiricism had no naturalistic theories of the powers of the mind, and so innateness in all its forms had to be rejected. So did substantive *a priori* knowledge. There was no prospect of how it might have come to be that the structure of reason 'accurately mapped' the structure of any mind-independent realm (p.132) so as to yield reliably engendered true mathematical and logical beliefs.

Carruthers takes that motive to represent a perfectly legitimate demand upon epistemology. There may be first-order knowledge for which current science can provide no explanation. But in that case we are in no position to claim it: reliability of origin for the relevant powers of mind cannot be established.

Should Locke and Hume have been sceptical about the deliverances of sight and touch, given the then current ignorance of their origins? Ought we? The claim that prescience is a source of knowledge is declared bogus for failing to meet the present test (pp.137-140). But if prescience were as successful as sight is at enabling hosts of successful predictions of further fruitful contact with one's environment, it might well seem dogmatically scientistic to persist in that claim. What matters is success at prediction. It is experience which teaches us that sight is, within statable limits, reliable.

The book contains a good deal else. The treatment of evolutionary platonism is among the best things in it. His hopes outstrip his reasonings, however, when Carruthers turns his evolutionary naturalism upon classical rationalist claims that innate powers of the mind enable knowledge of God, freedom and the soul. His objection is to 'the survival value of a faculty of reason' (p.155) which would contain such powers. The evolutionary explanation of the innateness of such a power must be in terms of benefits related to the truth of the belief in question, otherwise selection of the power to form such beliefs does not yield a reliable method of acquiring true beliefs. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the architecture and powers of a brain fit for immediate human survival until mating and rearing may well enable much reasoning, imagining, and theorizing which is surplus to (such) needs. Having something with that much excess capacity is what it takes. The same applies to innate knowledge: the innate powers required for survival may likewise enable extensive reliable although redundant *a priori* reasonings.

We would not expect, nor should we tolerate, innate faculties whose typical outputs jeopardize survival prospects. Proofs of God are one thing, proofs of the desirability of universal celibacy quite another. But the motivational impact of metaphysics tends to be rather slight, for most of us, in any case.

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Attfield , Robin and Wilkins, Barry (eds), *International Justice and the Third World* (London: Routledge 1992) pp. x, 207, A$32.95 (paper).

That the people and nations of the world are economically interdependent has become a common-

place observation. Yet there has been too little philosophical attention paid to a system of global relationships which results in wealth for a few and poverty and oppression for many. This collection of essays is, therefore, especially timely and welcome.

One of the main purposes of the book, as the editors state it, is to clarify and defend the notion of international justice. Some of the contributors think that existing notions of justice can, without too much difficulty, be applied to everyone in the world. Global justice says Kai Nielsen, is 'a plain extension of domestic justice' (p.28). It requires, above all, that we treat each other as equals and treat others as we would reasonably wish to be treated ourselves. Andrew Belsey insists that reciprocal relations between people of the world, whether contractual or not, mean that a more equal distribution of resources has become a requirement of justice.

Onora O'Neill and Andrew Collier are less confident that existing ideas about justice are an adequate basis for a theory of international justice. In a particularly interesting contribution O'Neill wrestles with problems which most theories of justice ignore. She points out that theories of justice are generally meant to govern the relationships between independent actors in a public sphere. Even Rawls conceives of individuals who choose principles of justice in the Original Position as being heads of families. Family and kinship relationships, and their effects on individuals, especially on women and children, are outside the purview of such theories — an unacceptable omission in a world where women and children bear the brunt of poverty and oppression. O'Neill searches for an approach to international justice that is abstract enough to avoid endorsing traditional conceptions of women's roles, but at the same time capable of being sensitive to the situation of vulnerable and dependent people. One of the requirements of justice, she concludes, is that people be in a position to refuse or renegotiate their relationships. How this can be assured remains an unanswered question.

Collier is the only contributor to take seriously the Marxist and communitarian idea that obligations arise out of our social relationships rather than from an abstract conception of human entitlements or human needs (though O'Neill and others allow that demands of justice presuppose the existence of interrelations). But if there is 'no account of obligations outside the context of common interests in a collective' (pp.77-78), then how is international justice possible? Collier attempts to deal with this problem in the Marxist framework by looking for interests that can unite the proletariat of both wealthy and poor parts of the world. Economic interdepedence and environmental problems, he suggests, are making the different worlds of these workers into one world of common interests and struggles. There are a number of problems with this thesis. For one thing, national or ethnic differences seem to be of much more importance, as far as definition of common interests is concerned, than class differences. Nevertheless, the issue Collier is concerned with is a crucial one. Even those who reject Marxism and prefer a liberal approach to justice ought to be concerned with how people come to recognise and act on global obligations.

The remaining essays in the collection are concerned with problems faced by people in the Third World: what kind of development is possible, whether it can be combined with environmental sustainability, and what ought to be done about the problem of debt. Nigel Dower makes some sensible comments about whether people have a 'right to development'. To answer the question of whether development and environmental protection are compatible, Geoffrey Hunt embarks on a Cook's tour of models of development, liberal and Marxist, and comes to the predictable conclusion that a Marxist model which allows participatory-democratic control of production is most compatible with environmental sustainability.

Robin Attfield undertakes the heroic task of showing that those concerned with alleviating Third World poverty ought also to be environmentalists and that environmentalists ought to be concerned to alleviate poverty and injustice. Misanthropy, he convincingly argues, is not a satisfactory environmentalist position, and those who are concerned about the welfare of human beings ought to be concerned about animals who are also the victims of poverty and exploitation. Nevertheless (as Attfield would probably admit), there remains a large potential for conflict between those concerned with justice and environmentalists, especially deep ecologists: conflicts between demands for human well-being and the desire to preserve species, between those who want to exploit wilderness for the human good, and those who want it left strictly alone.

Barry Wilkins argues that Third World debt ought to be cancelled and that indebted Third World countries are justified in not servicing their debts. Though his case is a good one, more should be said about who exactly is likely to suffer if these debts are not paid — wealthy capitalists and governments who bear the responsibility for exploiting countries desperate for funds, or not-so-wealthy, and relatively innocent, shareholders and taxpayers? Is it just that they bear the burden of others' greed?

As this brief survey indicates, *Justice and the Third World* raises important issues which could

use more discussion and debate. This collection is one of the best available on the topic of international justice. It is well organised around important themes, and the standard of the contributions is high. There are some inevitable shortcomings. The predominance of liberal and Marxist approaches means that communitarian and post-modern objections to cosmopolitan ideas of justice are not sufficiently considered. Some problems that are obviously central to a philosophical discussion of international affairs are hardly mentioned at all: e.g., the legitimacy of nationalism and demands for national independence; the rights of states and the limitations of sovereignty. However, the editors can be forgiven for not trying to cover all of the issues related to international justice. What can't be so easily forgiven are gross typographical errors which in some places make the text unreadable.

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Malachowski, Alan (ed.), *Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' (and Beyond)* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) pp. xiv, 384, A$39.95 (cloth).

In recent years there have been a number of 'readers' consecrated to important figures in the philosophical and literary worlds. Most have been devoted to people working in and around the hermeneutic, phenomenological and semiotic traditions. These readers come in two kinds: edited anthologies of pieces by the thinkers themselves (*A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, The Lévinas Reader, The Kristeva Reader* and soon, I hear, *The Blanchot Reader*); and collections of critical essays on the chosen writer (*Heidegger: A Critical Reader, Derrida: A Critical Reader, Re-reading Lévinas*, and so forth). This book, *Reading Rorty*, is of the second kind.

Given the title and this immediate context, one might think that the anthology affirms a style of criticism, drawn from Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, that stresses close reading as a way of solving or dissolving philosophical problems. So we have a title like *Reading Heidegger*, the contents of which are guided by an impulse which the editor, John Sallis, specifies as elucidating Heidegger's texts 'in such a way as to let them resound in the questionableness of their element'. The point, it seems, is to approach the thinker of Todtnauberg in a way that is faithful to his hermeneutical style. The issue of reading is accented even more heavily in *Reading de Man Reading*, a collection of essays in which people work with Paul de Man's notion that 'reading' is a rhetorical figure and apply his style of analysis — with modifications, to be sure — to his own essays. Although Rorty has sympathies with some philosophers and literary critics who have learned from Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, he is not a 'slow reader' as they are. (Sometimes the burden of these essays is to point out that he has not attended to Locke or Quine as closely as he should.) Nor are any of the contributors greatly concerned to examine Rorty's rhetoric at all exactly or minutely.

The title *Reading Rorty,* then, makes no big investment in 'reading'. It is more like *Reading Rawls* in that its emphasis is, in the usual way of analytic philosophy, on validity and truth. And since Rorty maintains that good arguments are not as persuasive as strong descriptions, this means that the essays tend to go against the grain. *Nil admirari* is one dictum that philosophers learn early on. That said, it is striking how often the contributors to this anthology disagree sharply, even fundamentally, with the man whose work they are discussing. The editor, Alan R. Malachowski, is an interesting case in point. When introducing the collection he suggests that now is indeed the time for a reflective look at Rorty, since an 'earlier collection would perhaps have elicited too many defensive "reflex reactions" to do justice to the far-sightedness and integrity of Rorty's views' (p.1). These views amount to 'a comprehensive and provocative reappraisal of the cultural role of philosophy'. When Malachowski changes from editor to critic, it is hard to see why he wishes to devote quite so much time and energy to his chosen subject. He maintains that Rorty needs to show at least the following:

(1) it is unwise to crave for a *theory* of knowledge and
(2) it is unwise to think of knowledge as something which has (or needs) *foundations*
(3) to make his own favoured pragmatic/hermeneutic conception of philosophy more attractive, to make *that* something we can have confidence in (albeit, confidence of a different order).

After demurring to Rorty's admirable sense of the history of epistemology, Malachowski lays his cards on the table: 'I will argue three things: (a) that Rorty tends to conflate (1) and (2); (b) that he fails to establish either (1) or (2); and (c) that Rorty's anti-epistemological contentions generally do

nothing for his picture of what philosophy should really be like (so he does not deserve to achieve (3))' (p.141).

Malachowski goes on, pointing out that 'Rorty's position rapidly becomes unstable' and that it 'has too many potential weak spots' to serve 'as the kind of springboard many will require to make the leap forward into post-epistemological philosophy' (p.144). Introducing his paper along with all the others, Malachowski describes its argument as being that 'Rorty's announcement of [the demise of epistemology] is somewhat undermotivated' (p.3). After reading the essay, this sounds like a grand understatement. In intent, let alone in effect, his criticisms are far more damaging. So why edit *Reading Rorty*? It seems that the author of *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* has earned the right to a thick anthology of essays because of his contribution to the culture of philosophy rather than to philosophy as such. His far-sightedness is directed more surely toward the past than toward the future. Or, in slightly different terms, he is a splendid diagnostician, a clumsy surgeon and a hopeless physiotherapist.

One of the strange things about this collection is that people tend to argue about Rorty's leap without referring to the traditional literature on the leap out of philosophy. Neither Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* nor Heidegger's *The Principle of Reason* is mentioned, and the allusions to Hegel and Derrida are sketchy. This raises a couple of other worries about the collection. Several of the essays gesture toward the breadth of Rorty's historical understanding, but only one or two show any deep interest in the history of philosophy themselves. Descartes, Kant and Hegel make numerous guest appearances; but their names could just as well refer to arguments and ideas as to men who have lived and thought at a particular time and in a particular place. By the same token, there is very little sense, for a book of nearly four hundred pages, of the intellectual, social and institutional pressures that have helped to shape Richard Rorty. A bibliography of his publications is appended, but nowhere are we ever given his year of birth or any details about his intellectual and social formation. If he is as culturally important a figure as is suggested, all this would be useful and important material.

In fact breadth is precisely what this anthology lacks. Most of the essays are satisfactory in their own terms, while those by Bernard Williams, Donald Davidson and Charles Taylor are very impressive indeed. But as a whole the essays tend to be good in the same way. Except for Michael Fischer, who offers a sharp critique of Rorty's redefinition of philosophy as literature, the contributors are all philosophers — by and large, of the Anglo-American analytic school. Since Rorty is making a case for a *post*-philosophical culture, and that Harold Bloom, a literary critic who explicitly defines himself against philosophy, has been chosen to endorse the book on its back cover, this is more than a little odd. The collection would have been diversified and enriched by an essay by, say, an American literary pragmatist like Richard Poirier or a literary anti-pragmatist like Christopher Norris. Even if the collection were restricted to philosophers, it could have been broadened by one or two essays that addressed the question of pragmatism. There are a few scattered references to Dewey, but James is mentioned only three times, Pierce twice and Emerson just the once. Turning away from America, an essay comparing Rorty's pragmatism with Heidegger's (taking its cue, no doubt, from Mark Okrent's suggestive *Heidegger's Pragmatism*) would have been illuminating. And is there no theologian who could have been asked to discuss Rorty's project of 'dedivinizing culture'?

Etienne Gilson's *bon mot* 'Philosophy always buries its own undertakers' is quoted in the preface, and the editor glosses it by observing, rightly, that 'the best attacks on philosophy always stimulate its recuperative powers' (p.xii). What needs to be added, though, is that the nature and direction of philosophy are changed by its best attacks, that there is a crucial gap in Gilson's observation between 'philosophy' and 'its'. It is a shame that so much of *Reading Rorty* does not take account of that gap and so does not question the scope and status of the possessive.

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