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‘What is it like to be a philosopher? Interview with Graham Priest’, http://www.whatisitliketobeaphilosopher.com.Download PDF
‘What If: the Exploration of an Idea’, Australasian Journal of Logic 14, https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4028/3574.Download PDF
‘Speaking of the Ineffable, East and West’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (2015), pp. 6-21. [Note: despite the date of the volume, this issue actually appeared in 2017.]Download PDF
‘Three Questions to Graham Priest’, Paraconsistent Logic Newsletter, Spring, 1017.
‘Stop Making Sense’, Philosophical Topics 43 (2015), pp. 285-99. [Note that this appeared in 2017, notwithstanding the journal date.]Download PDF
‘Where Laws Conflict: an Application of Chunk and Permeate’, ch. 8 of H. P. Glenn and L. D. Smith (eds.), Law and the New Logics, Cambridge University Press, 2017.Download PDF
‘Nasz Świat Nie Jest Najlepszym z Możliwych’ (‘Our World is not the Best Possible’), Filosofuj 2016 #6 (12), 26-27.Download PDF
‘Logical Disputes and the a Priori’, Logique et Analyse 236 (2016), pp. 347-66.Download PDF
‘Answers to Five Questions’, pp. 153-160 of T. Adajian and T. Lupher (eds.), Philosophy of Logic: Five Questions, Automatic Press, 2016.Download PDF
‘Foreword: Edward Conze and the Law of Non-Contradiction’, pp. vii-x of E. Conze, The Principle of Contradiction: On the Theory of Dialectical Materialism (tr. Holger Heine), Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016.Download PDF
‘The Strange Case of the Missing Object’, OUP Blog, September 2016, http://blog.oup.com/2016/09/non-existent-objects-philosophy/.
‘Thinking the Impossible’, Philosophical Studies, 173 (2016), pp. 2649–266.Download PDF
‘It is and it Isn’t’ (with Damon Young), Aeon (2016), https://aeon.co/essays/how-can-duchamp-s-fountain-be-both-art-and-not-art.Download PDF
‘Old Wine in (Slightly Leaky) New Bottles: Some Comments on Beall’, Australasian Journal of Logic 13(5), Article 1, https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/3934/3544.Download PDF
‘The Enduring Evolution of Logic’, with Thomas Ferguson, OUP Blog, July 2016.
‘A Dictionary of Logic‘ (with Thomas Ferguson), Oxford University Press.
‘Logical Disputes and the a Priori’, Principios: Rivista de Filosofia 23 (2016), pp. 29-57.Download PDF
‘Is Moonshadows lunacy? The Cowherds Respond’, (as one of the Cowherds) Philosophy East and West 66 (2016), pp. 617-21.Download PDF
‘Comment on Restall’, Thought 5 (2016), p. 125.Download PDF
‘Torn by Reason: Lukasiewicz on the Principle of Non-Contradiction’, ch. 18 of S. Costreie (ed.), Early Analytic Philosophy: Some New Perspectives on the Tradition, Springer, 2016.Download PDF
‘Paradoxical Truth’, pp. 166-71 of P. Catapano and S. Critchley (eds.), The Stone Reader: Modern Philosophy in 133 Arguments, Liveright Publishing Corporation, New York, 2016.Download PDF
‘None of the Above: The Catuskoti in Indian Buddhist Logic’, ch. 24 of J.-Y. Beziau, M. Chakraborty, and S. Dutta (eds.), New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic, Springer, 2015.
‘Introduction: Why ask About Madhyamaka and Ethics?’ (with Jay Garfield), pp. 1-6 of the Cowherds (eds.), Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness, Oxford University Press, 2015.Download PDF
‘The Santideva Passage: Bodhicaryvatara VIII 90-103’ (with Stephen Jenkins and Jay Garfield), pp. 55-76 of the Cowherds (eds.), Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness, Oxford University Press, 2015.Download PDF
‘Compassion and the Net of Indra’, pp. 221-39 of the Cowherds (eds.), Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness, Oxford University Press, 2015.Download PDF
‘The Answer to the Question of Being’, pp. 249-58 of J. Bell, A. Cutrofello, and P. Livingston (eds.), Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century, London: Routledge, 2015.Download PDF
‘Graham Priest on Philosophy and Buddhism’, Philosophy Bites, October 2015.
‘What I’m Reading’, Meanjin 74 (2015).
‘External Curries’ (with Heinrich Wansing), Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44 (2015), pp.453-471.Download PDF
‘Nineteenth Century German Logic’, ch. 20 of M. Forster and K. Gjesdal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press 2015.Download PDF
‘Alethic Values’, Newsletter of the APA, Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies, 14(2), (2015), pp. 2-4.Download PDF
‘Philosophie Sans Frontières’, OUP Blog, May 23, 2015.
‘Introduction’ (with K. Tanaka et al), pp. xi-xvi of The Moon Points Back, Oxford University Press, 2015, eds. K. Tanaka, Y. Deguchi, J. Garfield, and G. Priest.Download PDF
‘Kripke’s Thought Paradoxes and the 5th Antinomy’ ch. 24 of T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Fernandez, and K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, Springer, 2015.Download PDF
‘Is the Ternary R Depraved?’, ch. 4 of C. Caret and O. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence, Oxford University Press, 2015.Download PDF
‘Modal Meinongianism and Characterization. Reply to Kroon’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (2014), pp. 183-200.Download PDF
‘The Net of Indra’, pp. 113-127 of K. Tanaka, et al, The Moon Points Back, Oxford University Press, 2015.Download PDF
‘Fusion and Confusion’, Topoi 34 (2015), 55–61.Download PDF
‘Chunk and Permeate II: Bohr’s Hydrogen Atom’ (with Bryson Brown), European Journal for the Philosophy of Science, DOI 10.1007/s13194-014-0104-7.Download PDF
‘Reflections on Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance’, International Journal of Motorcycle Studies, 10 (2014).Download PDF
‘Tolerating Gluts’ (with Z. Weber, D. Ripley, D. Hyde, and M. Colyvan), Mind 123 (2014), 813-28.Download PDF
‘Sein Language’, Monist 97 (2014), 430-42.Download PDF
‘Much Ado About Nothing’, Australasian Journal of Logic 11:2 (2014); article 4.Download PDF
‘Revising Logic’, ch. 12 of P. Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics of Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.Download PDF
‘The Martial Arts and Buddhist Philosophy’, ch. 11 of Philosophy and the Martial Arts: Engagement, ed. G. Priest and D. Young, Routledge, 2014.Download PDF
‘Buddhism, Logic, and All That’, Scientia Salon, September 8, 2014.
‘Speaking of Nothing…’, ch. 7 of Nothingness in Asian Philosophy, eds. J. Lee and D. Berger, Routledge, 2014.Download PDF
‘Contradictory Concepts’ (short version), ch. 1 of Contradictions: Logic, History, and Actuality, ed. E. Ficara, De Gruyter, 2012.Download PDF
‘Contradictory Concepts’, ch. 10 of Logic, Reasoning and Rationality, eds. E. Weber, D. Wouters, and J. Meheus, Springer, 2014.Download PDF
‘Chunk and Permeate III: the Dirac Delta Function’ (with R. Benham and C. Mortensen), Synthese 191 (2014), pp. 3057-62.Download PDF
‘Beyond True and False’, Aeon, 5 May 2014.
‘Lost Platonic Dialogue Found’, pp. 105-23 of Four Lives: a Celebration of Raymond Smullyan, ed. J. Rosenhouse, Dover Publications, 2014.Download PDF
‘Philosophy and its History, Oxford University Press VSI Blog, 2014.
‘Plurivalent Logic’, Australasian Journal of Logic 11:1 (2014); article 1.Download PDF
‘Logical Pluralism: Another Application of Chunk and Permeate’, Erkenntnis 29 (2014), 331-8.Download PDF
‘Entravista – Graham Priest’, Polemos 2 (2013), 167-194.Download PDF
‘Foreword’, Kereknyomok 2013/7, p. 6.Download PDF
‘Indefinite Extensibility – Dialetheic Style’, Studia Logica 101 (2013), pp. 1263-1275.Download PDF
‘Logic and Buddhist Metaphysics’, Oxford University Press VSI Blog, 2013.
‘The Prime Minister’ (‘When Tony Abbot met Socrates’), The Conversation, Nov 27, 2013.
‘A Mountain by any Other Name: a Response to Koji Tanaka’ (with Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi), Philosophy East & West, 63 (2013), pp. 335-43.Download PDF
Two Plus Two Equals One: a Response to Brook Ziporyn’ (with Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi), Philosophy East & West, 63 (2013), pp. 353-58.Download PDF
‘The Contradictons are True – and it’s not Out of This World!: a Response to Takashi Yagisawa’ (with Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi), Philosophy East & West, 63 (2013), 370-72.Download PDF
‘Does a Table Have Buddha Nature? A Moment of Yes and No. Answer! But not in Words of Signs: a Response to Mark Siderits’, (with Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi), Philosophy East & West, 63 (2013), pp. 387-98.Download PDF
’Those Concepts Proliferate Everywhere: a Response to Constance Kassor’, (with Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi), Philosophy East & West, 63 (2013), pp. 411-16.Download PDF
‘How We Think Madhyamikas Think: a Response to Tom TIllemans’ (with Jay Garfield and Yasuo Deguchi), Philosophy East & West, 63 (2013), pp. 462-35.Download PDF
‘The Parmenides: a Dialetheic Interpretation’, in Plato: the Journal of the International Plato Society 12 (2012). Appeared August, 2013.Download PDF
‘The Martial Arts and Buddhist Philosophy’, pp. 17-28, Royal Institute of Philosophy, Supp. Volume, 73, 2013.Download PDF
‘Philosophy Sans Frontieres: Analytic and Continental Philosophy – a View from the East’, ch. 8 of B. Mou and R. Tiezen (eds.), Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches to Philosophy, Brill, 2013.Download PDF
‘Between the Horns of Idealism and Realism: The Middle Way of Madhyamaka’, pp. 214-222 of S. M. Emmanuel (ed.), A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.Download PDF
Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyakamakārikā. Topoi, 2013, 32 (1) 129–134.
The article reviews the book “Mulamadhyakamakarika,” by Nagarjuna.Download PDF
Mathematical Pluralism. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 2013, 21 (1) 4–13.
There is a plurality of mathematical investigations. These cannot all be reduced to proofs within the framework of Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, if only because some of them use non-classical logic (such as the various branches of intuitionist mathematics). How is one to understand this situation? In this article, I suggest that one should see this plurality as analogous to the plurality of games, any of which may be played. Various objections are considered and rejected, including the charge that the picture engenders a pernicious relativism.Download PDF
Lost in Translation: a Reply to Woodward. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2013, 86 (1) 194–199.
The article offers the author’s insights regarding Richard Woodward’s concept of intentionality based on noneism. According to the author, noneist holds an idea that some object does not exist. The author cites that the noneist notion does not really mean that an object is non-existent rather the subject is not a concrete object.Download PDF
‘Three Heresies in Logic and Metaphysics’, Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (2013), 9-20. [Appeared in 2015.]Download PDF
`Replies’, Polish Journal of Philosophy 7 (2013), 93-108. [Appeared in 2015.]Download PDF
‘In the Same Way that This is: a Reply to Dotson’, Comparative Philosophy 3 (2012), 3-9.Download PDF
The Sun May Not, Indeed, Rise Tomorrow: A Reply to Beall. Analysis, 2012, 72 (4) 739–741.
A well-known feature of standard paraconsistent logics, such as LP, is that they are weak in a certain sense. Thus, they do no validate the Disjunctive Syllogism, even though there are clearly cases where we would want to use it. I have argued that a way around this apparent problem is to employ a non-monotonic extension of LP, LPm, which is stronger. LPm can be applied to any situation, and in that sense it is a universal logic: it gives classical reasoning in consistent situations and an inference engine at least as generous as LP in inconsistent situations.Download PDF
A Note on the Axiom of Countability. Al-Mukhatabat, 2012, (1) 23–32.
The note discusses some considerations which speak to the plausibility of the axiom that all sets are countable. It then shows that there are contradictory but non-trivial theories of ZF set theory plus this Axiom.Download PDF
A Brief Remembrance of Michael Dummett. The Opinionator, New York Times, 2012, 4th January.
A Prolegomenon to any Planning for the Future. Ormond Papers, 2012, (29) 136–143.Download PDF
Definition Inclosed: A Reply to Zhong. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2012 90 4, 789-795.
In ‘Definability and the Structure of Logical Paradoxes’ (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, this issue) Haixia Zhong takes issue with an account of the paradoxes of self-reference to be found in Beyond the Limits of Thought [Priest 1995. The point of this note is to explain why the critique does not succeed. The criterion for distinguishing between the set-theoretic and the semantic paradoxes offered does not get the division right; the semantic paradoxes are not given a uniform solution; no reason is provided as to why the naïve denotation relation is ‘indefinite’ (other than that its definiteness leads to contradiction); and the account of the denotation relation given clearly misses the mark, even by consistent standards.Download PDF
Czech translation of Garfield and Priest (2003). Pp. 305-330 of Jiri Holba (ed. and trans.), Nagardzuna: Filosofie Stredni Cesty, Oikoymenh, 2012.Download PDF
On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality. With JC Beall, R. Brady, J. Dunn, A.P. Hazen, E. Mares, R. Meyer, G. Restall, D. Ripley, J. Slaney and R. Sylvan. Journal of Philosophical Logic 2012 (41) 3 595-612.
One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions.Download PDF
The Axiom of Countability. Philosophy, Mathematics, Linguistics: Aspects of Interaction Euler International Mathematical Institute, St Petersburg, 2012, 164–169.Download PDF
An Interview with Graham Priest. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (eds.) The Antipodean Philosopher, Vol. 2: Interviews with Australian and New Zealand Philosophers. Lexington Books, 2012, 183-198.Download PDF
Realism, Antirealism, and Paraconsistency. In S. Rahman, G. Primeiero and M. Marion (eds.) The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics, Springer, 2012, 181–190.Download PDF
Jaina Logic: a Contemporary Perspective. Pp. 142-161 of M. N. Mitra, M. K. Chakraborty, and S. Sarukkai (eds.), Studies in Logic: a Dialogue between East and West, Sanctum Books, 2012.Download PDF
Read on Bradwardine on the the Liar. Pp. 155-61 of C. Dutilh Novaes and O. Hjortland (eds.), Insolubiles and Consequences: Essays in Honour of Stephen Read, College Publications, 2012.Download PDF
Vague Inclosures. Ch. 20 (pp. 367-77) of K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. Mares, and F. Paoli (eds.), Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, Springer Verlag, 2012.Download PDF
Logically Speaking, Interview with 3AM Magazine. Graham Priest and Richard Marshall, 2012. Saturday, March 17th, 2012.
Foreword to the Japanese Translation of Towards Non-Being. (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2011).Download PDF
First-Order da Costa Logic, Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 2011 97(1) 183–198.
Priest (2009) formulates a propositional logic which, by employing the worldsemantics for intuitionist logic, has the same positive part but dualises the negation, to produce a paraconsistent logic which it calls ‘Da Costa Logic’. This paper extends matters to the first-order case. The paper establishes various connections between first order da Costa logic, da Costa’s own C, and classical logic. Tableau and natural deductions systems are provided and proved sound and complete.)Download PDF
Against Against Nonbeing, Review of Symbolic Logic 5, 2011, 4(2) 237–253.
Towards Non-Being (Priest ) develops an account of the semantics of intentional predicates and operators. The account appeals to objects, both existent and non-existent, and worlds, both possible and impossible. This paper formulates replies to a number of the more interesting objections to the semantics that have been proposed since the book was published.Download PDF
Can u do that? With JC Beall and Zach Weber. Analysis 2011, 71(2) 280–285.
In his ‘On t and u and what they can do’, Greg Restall (2010) presents an apparent problem for a handful of well-known non-classical solutions to paradoxes like the liar. In this article, we argue that there is a problem only if classical logic – or classical-enough logic – is presupposed.Download PDF
Four Corners – East and West. In M. Banerjee and A. Seth (eds.) Logic and Its Applications, Springer, 2011, 12–18.Download PDF
Why Asian Philosophy? In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (eds.) The Antipodean Philosopher. Lexington Books, 2011.Download PDF
Paraconsistent Set Theory. In D. DeVidi, M. Hallett and P. Clarke (eds.) Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy: Vintage Enthusiasms. Essays in Honour of John L. Bell. Springer, 2011.Download PDF
Creating Non-Existents. In F. Lihoreau (ed.) Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag, 2011, 107–118.
Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2010, 88 (2) 359-366.
Badici  criticizes views of Priest  concerning the Inclosure Schema and the paradoxes of self-reference. This article explains why his criticisms are to be rejected.Download PDF
Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2010, 51 (1) 69-84.
In this paper, I start by showing that sorites paradoxes are inclosure paradoxes. That is, they fit the Inclosure Scheme which characterizes the paradoxes of self-reference. Given that sorites and self-referential paradoxes are of the same kind, they should have the same kind of solution. The rest of the paper investigates what a dialetheic solution to sorites paradoxes is like, connections with a dialetheic solution to the self-referential paradoxes, and related issues-especially so called “higher order” vagueness.Download PDF
Paradoxical Truth, New York Times, 2010, 28 NovemberDownload PDF
The Logic of the Catuskoti. Comparative Philosophy, 2010 (1) 2, 24–54.
In early Buddhist logic, it was standard to assume that for any state of aﬀairs there were four possibilities: that it held, that it did not, both, or neither. This is the catuskoti (or tetralemma). Classical logicians have had a hard time making sense of this, but it makes perfectly good sense in the semantics of various paraconsistent logics, such as First Degree Entailment. Matters are more complicated for later Buddhist thinkers, such as Nagarjuna, who appear to suggest that none of these options , or more than one, may hold. The point of this paper is to examine the matter, including the formal logical machinery that may be appropriate.Download PDF
Hopes Fade For Saving Truth. Philosophy, 2010 (85) 109-140.
A literary criticism of the book “Saving Truth From Paradox,” by Hartry Field is presented. It examines the semantic paradoxes used by the author and comments that the book is the most significant publication on consistent solutions to the liar paradox. It investigates the irony of the first sentence of the preface which says opinionated. An overview of the story is offered.Download PDF
The (Two) Truths about Truth. With T. Tillemans and M. Siderits. Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy: The Cowherds. Oxford University Press, 2010, 131-150.
The Buddhist doctrine of satyadvaya can be understood both as the claim that there are two realities (ontological) and as the claim that there are two truths (semantic). This chapter concerns the question of what notions of truth are at issue in the second sense, according to which statements or cognitions may be true in either of two ways, conventionally or ultimately. It starts by reviewing various Western theories of truth and then discusses which of these are appropriate, in particular, Abhidharma and Madhyamaka. Of central concern is the T-schema and how it functions in the two truths.Download PDF
The Australasian Association of Philosophy. With E. Goddard. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (eds.) A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand, Monash University Publishing, 2010.Download PDF
An Interview with Bodhidharma. In D. Young and G. Priest (eds.) Beating and Nothingness: Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Open Court, 2010.Download PDF
Quine: Naturalism Unravelled. In M. Dumitru and C. Stoenescu Cuvinte (eds.) Teorii si lucruri: Quine in perspectiva, Pelican (Bucharest) 2010.Download PDF
Contradiction and the Structure of Unity. In J. Yi (ed.) Analytic Philosophy in China, 2010, 35-42.Download PDF
Foreword On the Plenitude of Truth: a Defense of Trivialism (P. Kabay). LAP-LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2010.Download PDF
Non-Transitive Identity. In R. Dietz and S. Moruzzi (eds) Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press, 2010.Download PDF
A Case of Mistaken Identity. In J. Lear and A. Oliver (eds.) The Force of Argument, Routledge, 2010, 205-222.Download PDF
Two Truths: Two Models. Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy: The Cowherds. Oxford University Press, 2010, 213-220.
Madhyamaka-influenced schools of Buddhism are committed to the view that there are two realities (the doctrine of “two truths”). This chapter provides two ways in which the idea may be (and has been) understood. According to one of these, the two realities are two (subjective) perspectives on one and the same thing. According to the other, the relation between the two is that between something and its (objective) manifestation.Download PDF
Neighborhood Semantics For Intentional Operators. Review of Symbolic Logic 5, 2009 (2) 2 360–373.
Towards NonBeing (Priest, 2005) gives a noneist account of the semantics of intentional operators and predicates. The semantics for intentional operators are modelled on those for the ◻ in normal modal logics. In this paper an alternative semantics, modelled on neighborhood semantics for ◻, is given and assessed.Download PDF
Obituary for Leonard Goddard. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2009, 87 (4) 693–694.Download PDF
Dualising Intuitionistic Negation. Principia 2009 13 2 165–189.
One of Da Costa’s motives when he constructed the paraconsistent logic Cw was to dualise the negation of intuitionistic logic. In this paper I explore a different way of going about this task. A logic is defined by taking the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic, and dualising the truth conditions for negation. Various properties of the logic are established, including its relation to Cw. Tableau and natural deduction systems for the logic are produced, as are appropriate algebraic structures. The paper then investigates dualising the intuitionistic conditional in the same way. This establishes various connections between the logic, and a logic called in the literature ‘Brouwerian logic’ or ‘closed-set logic’.Download PDF
The Structure of Emptiness. Philosophy East and West, 2009 59 (4) 467-480.
The view that everything is empty (śūnya) is a central metaphysical plank of Mahāyāna Buddhism. It has often been the focus of objections. Perhaps the most important of these is that it in effect entails a nihilism: nothing exists. This objection, in turn, is denied by Mahāyāna theorists, such as Nāgārjuna. One of the things that makes the debate difficult is that the precise import of the view that everything is empty is unclear. The object of this essay is to put the debate in a new light. It does so by proposing a mathematical characterization of Emptiness—that is, the totality of empty things—showing that, whatever it is, it has a definite structure and is not, therefore, to be identified with nothingness.Download PDF
Mountains are Just Mountains. In J. Garfield and M. D’Amato (eds.). Pointing at the Moon: Buddhism. Logic and Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2009, 71-82.Download PDF
Conditionals: a Debate with Jackson. In I. Ravenscroft (eds.). Minds, Worlds and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press, 2009.Download PDF
What does the Ternary R Mean? Philosophy, Mathematics, Linguistics: Aspects of Interaction. Euler International Mathematical Institute, St Petersburg, 2009, 19–24.Download PDF
Not to Be, ch. 23 of R.L. Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal and R. Cameron. (eds.) The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge, 2009.Download PDF
Translation of ‘Objects of Thought’ into Japanese. Human Ontology 15, 2009, 1-12. (Translator, S. Yamaguchi.)Download PDF
Beyond the Limits of Knowledge. In J. Salerno (ed.) New Essays on the Knowability Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2009, 93-104.Download PDF
Graham Priest and Diderik Batens interview each other. With D. Batens. The Reasoner, 2008 (2) 82-4.Download PDF
Replies to Nolan and Kroon. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008, 76 (1) 208-214.
A response to the previously published letter to the editor relating to the book “Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality,” by Graham Priest is presented.Download PDF
The Closing Of The Mind: How The Particular Quantifier Became Existentially Loaded Behind Our Backs. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 2008, 1 (1) 42–55.
The paper argues that the view that the particular quantifier is ‘existentially loaded’ is a relatively new one historically and that it has become entrenched in modern philosophical logic for less than happy reasons.Download PDF
Precis of Towards Non-Being. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008, 76 (1) 185-190.Download PDF
Jaina Logic: A Contemporary Perspective. History and Philosophy of Logic, 2008, 29 (3) 263-278.
Jaina philosophy provides a very distinctive account of logic, based on the theory of ‘sevenfold predication’. This paper provides a modern formalisation of the logic, using the techniques of many-valued and modal logic. The formalisation is applied, in turn, to some of the more problematic aspects of Jaina philosophy, especially its relativism.Download PDF
Many-Valued Modal Logics: A Simple Approach. Review of Symbolic Logic, 2008 (1) 190-203.
In standard modal logics, the worlds are 2-valued in the following sense: there are 2 values (true and false) that a sentence may take at a world. Technically, however, there is no reason why this has to be the case. The worlds could be many-valued. This paper presents one simple approach to a major family of many-valued modal logics, together with an illustration of why this family is philosophically interesting.Download PDF
Creating Non-Existents: Some Initial Thoughts. Studies in Logic, 2008 1 (1) 18
The paper assumes that some objects (like Sherlock Holmes) do not exist. Should one be a realist or an anti-realist about such objects? Specifically, does the presence of such objects in the domain of quantification/reference (at a world) depend on the properties of the objects that do exist (there)—notably the behaviour of sentient creatures, who tell stories, etc.? In Towards Non-Being (Oxford University Press, 2005), I gave a semantics for intentional language in which the non-existent objects were treated realistically. In this paper I give a non-realistic semantics, and explore its properties.Download PDF
Logical Pluralism Hollandaise. Australasian Journal of Logic, 2008 (6) 210–214.Download PDF
The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism. With Y. Deguchi, J.L. Garfield. Philosophy East and West, 2008 58 (3) 395–402.Download PDF
Envelopes and Indifference. With G. Restall. In C. Dégremont, L. Keiff and H. Rückert. Dialogues, Logics and Other Strange Things: Essays in Honour of Shahid Rahman, College Publications, 2008, 283–290.Download PDF
60% Proof: Lakatos, Proof, and Paraconsistency. With N. Thomason. Australasian Journal of Logic, 2007 (5) 89-100.Download PDF
How the Particular Quantifier became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs. Soochow Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2007 (16) 197–213.Download PDF
Logic. Φ News, 2007 (10) 5–8.
Reprinted with minor amendments in The Dictionary, ed. Giandomenico Sica, PolymetricaDownload PDF
Not so deep inconsistency: a reply to Eklund. With JC Beall. Australasian Journal of Logic, 2007, 574-84.Download PDF
Revenge, Field, and ZF, in JC Beall. Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2007, 225–233.Download PDF
Foreword to the Romanian translation of the second edition of Beyond the Limits of Thought. Dincolo de Limitele Gândirri Paralela 45, 2007, 23-25.Download PDF
Reply to Slater, in J.-Y. Beziau, W. Carnielli and D. Gabbay. Handbook of Paraconsistency, College Publications, 2007, 467–474.Download PDF
La Logique du Paradoxe (translation of ‘Logic of Paradox’, with an Introduction by François Rivenc) Philosophie 94, 2007, 72-94.Download PDF
Paraconsistent Logic: Dialethic Variations, in D. Gabbay and J. Woods. The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic, North Holland, 2007, 129–204.Download PDF
A Hundred Flowers, Topoi, 2006 (25) 1-2, 91–95.
The paper discusses where philosophy is going at the moment. Various current trends are singled out for comment. It then moves to the question of where it ought to be going. After a brief discussion of what this question means, it concludes that no guidance can be given except that each philosopher should pursue what they think to be important.Download PDF
What Is Philosophy? Philosophy, 2006, 81 (316) 189-207.
The article discusses the views of philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida regarding the nature of philosophy. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems arise from words taken out in language game wherein some words are literally meaningless. Derrida points out that words do not latch on anything non-linguistic.Download PDF
Relevant Restricted Quantification, J. Beall, R.T. Brady, A.P. Hazen, G. Restall. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2006, 35 (6) 587–598.
The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.Download PDF
Motion. Pp. 409-11, Vol. 6, of D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 2006.Download PDF
Logic, Relevant (Relevance). Pp. 358-9, Vol. 8, of D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 2006.
Logic, Paraconsistent. Pp. 105-6, Vol. 7, of D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 2006.Download PDF
Foreword Teorie dell’assurdo. I rivali del Principio di Non-Contraddizione, Carocci (F. Berto) 2006.Download PDF
The Limits of Knowledge. The Logica Yearbook, 2005, Filosofia, 2006, 165-176.Download PDF
The Proliferation of Non-Classical Logics. Pp. 482-4, Vol. 4, of D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 2006.Download PDF
Logic, Non-Classical. Pp. 485-93, Vol. 5, of D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 2006.Download PDF
Logic, Many-Valued. Pp. 688-95, Vol. 5, of D. Borchert (ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 2006.Download PDF
The Paradoxes of Denotation. With T. Bolander, V.F. Hendricks and S.A. Pedersen. Self-Reference, Stanford University, 2006.Download PDF
‘Zen and the Art of Harley Riding’, pp. 2-12 of B. E. Rollin, C. M. Gray, K. Mommer, and C. Pineo (eds.), Harley Davidson and Philosophy (Popular Culture and Philosophy, Vol. 18), Open Court, 2006.Download PDF
Problems with the Argument from Fine Tuning. With M. Colyvan, J.L. Garfield, Synthese 2005, 145 (3) 325-338.
The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe is improbable, thus no explanation of the fine tuning, theistic or otherwise, is required.Download PDF
Analysing of the Iraqi Adventure, Ormond Papers, 2005 (22) 147–150.Download PDF
Analetheism: A Pyrrhic Victory, B. Armour-Garb. Analysis 2005, 65 (2) 167–173.
The article focuses on analetheism, which is described as the a position concerning the paradoxes of self-reference. Analetheist achieves whatever expressive virtues that the dialetheist achieves; and she also partakes of the same sort of expressive vices as the dialetheist. Analetheism adopts exactly the same logic, but interprets the middle value as neither true nor false. What distinguishes analetheism from more simple-minded truth-value gap theories is precisely that it takes the middle value to be designated.Download PDF
The Limits of Language, pp. 156–159 of K. Brown (ed.). Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Elsevier, 2005.Download PDF
Spiking the Field Artillery, J. Beall and B. Armour-Garb. Truth and Deflationism, Oxford University Press, 2005.Download PDF
Intentionality: Meinongianism and the Medievals, S. Read. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2004, 82 (3) 421–442.
Intentional verbs create three different problems: problems of non-existence, of indeterminacy, and of failure of substitutivity. Meinongians tackle the first problem by recognizing non-existent objects; so too did many medieval logicians. Meinongians and the medievals approach the problem of indeterminacy differently, the former diagnosing an ellipsis for a propositional complement, the latter applying their theory directly to non-propositional complements. The evidence seems to favour the Meinongian approach. Faced with the third problem, Ockham argued bluntly substitutivity when the intentional complement is non-propositional; Buridan developed a novel way of resisting substitutivity. Ockham’s approach is closer to the Meinongian analysis of these cases; Buridan’s seems to raise difficulties for a referential semantics. The comparison between Meinongian and medieval approaches helps to bring out merits and potential pitfalls of each.Download PDF
Chunk and Permeate, a Paraconsistent Inference Strategy. Part I: The Infinitesimal Calculus, B. Brown. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2004, 33 (4) 379–388.
In this paper we introduce a paraconsistent reasoning strategy, Chunk and Permeate. In this, information is broken up into chunks, and a limited amount of information is allowed to flow between chunks. We start by giving an abstract characterisation of the strategy. It is then applied to model the reasoning employed in the original infinitesimal calculus. The paper next establishes some results concerning the legitimacy of reasoning of this kind – specifically concerning the preservation of the consistency of each chunk and concludes with some other possible applications and technical questions.Download PDF
Introduction (to a special issue of the AJP on David Lewis) with F. Jackson, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2004, 82 (1) 1-2.Download PDF
Foreword (Cuivant Inainte), I. Lucica. Ex Falso Quodlibet: Studii de Logica Paraconsistenta, Editura Technica, 2004.Download PDF
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Goedel’s Theorem, M. Kölbel and B. Weiss. Wittgenstein’s Lasting Significance, Routledge, 2004.Download PDF
Consistency, Paraconsistency and the Logical Limitative Theorems, W. Hogrebe and J. Bromand. Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen (XIX Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie), Akademie Verlag, 2004.Download PDF
Inconsistent Arithmetic: Issues Technical and Philosophical, pp. 273-99 of V. F. Hendricks and J. Malinowski (eds.) Trends in Logic: 50 Years of Studia Logica (Studia Logica Library, Vol. 212), Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003Download PDF
Meinongianism and the Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophia Mathematica, 2003, 11 (1) 3-15.
This paper articulates Sylvan’s theory of mathematical objects as non-existent, by improving (arguably) his treatment of the Characterisation Postulate. It then defends the theory against a number of natural objections, including one according to which the account is just platonism in disguise.Download PDF
Where Is Philosophy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2003, 103 85-99.
This paper sketches an analysis of the development of 20th-century philosophy. Starting with the foundational work of Frege and Husserl, the paper traces two parallel strands of philosophy developing from their work. It diagnoses three phases of development: the optimistic phase, the pessimistic phase, and finally the phase of fragmentation. The paper ends with some speculations as to where philosophy will go this century.Download PDF
On Alternative Geometries, Arithmetics, and Logics; A Tribute to Łukasiewicz. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 2003, 74 (3) 441-468.
The paper discusses the similarity between geometry, arithmetic, and logic, specifically with respect to the question of whether applied theories of each may be revised. It argues that they can – even when the revised logic is a paraconsistent one, or the revised arithmetic is an inconsistent one. Indeed, in the case of logic, it argues that logic is not only revisable, but, during its history, it has been revised. The paper also discusses Quine’s well known argument against the possibility of “logical deviancy”.Download PDF
Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought, J.L. Garfield. Philosophy East and West 2003, 53 (1) 1-21.
Reprinted as ch. 5 of J. Garfield, Empty Words, Oxford University Press, 2002.Download PDF
Geometries and Arithmetics, 65-78. Alternative Logics: Do Sciences Need Them? Springer-Verlag, 2003.Download PDF
A Site for Sorites, J. Beall, 9–23. Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2003.
The Hooded Man, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2002, 31 (5) 445-467.
The Hooded Man Paradox of Eubulides concerns the apparent failure of the substitutivity of identicals in epistemic (and other intentional) contexts. This paper formulates a number of different versions of the paradox and shows how these may be solved using semantics for quantified epistemic logic. In particular, two semantics are given which invalidate substitution, even when rigid designators are involved.Download PDF
Rational Dilemmas, Analysis 2002, 62 (1) 11-16.
Focuses on rational dilemmas. Description of dilemmas; Effect of reflection on dilemmas; Guidance of rationality in dilemmas.Download PDF
Fuzzy Relevant Logic, W. Carnielli and et. al.. Paraconsistency: the Logical Way to the Inconsistent, Marcel Dekker, 2002.Download PDF
Logicians Setting Together Contradictories. A Perspective on Relevance, Paraconsistency, and Dialetheism, ch. 14 of D. Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell, 2002, 651-664.Download PDF
Inconsistency and the Empirical Sciences. In J. Meheus. Inconsistency in Science, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.Download PDF
Paraconsistent Logic, D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, 287–393. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
Paraconsistent Belief Revision, Theoria 2001, 67 (3) 214.Download PDF
Heidegger and the Grammar of Being, R. Gaskin. Grammar in Early 20th Century Philosophy, Routledge, 2001.Download PDF
Why it’s Irrational to Believe in Consistency, B. Brogaard and B. Smith. Rationality and Irrationality; Proc. 23 rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2001, 284–293.Download PDF
Logic: One or Many, J. Woods and B. Brown. Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Proceedings of the 1999 Conference of the Society of Exact Philosophy, Stanmore: Hermes, 2001, 22–28.Download PDF
Vasil’év and Imaginary Logic, History and Philosophy of Logic, 2000, 21 (2) 135-146.
This paper is about the ‘Imaginary Logic’ developed by the Russian logician Nicholas Vasil’év between about 1910 and 1913, a logic that is often claimed to be a forerunner of different sorts of modern nonclassical logics. The paper describes the content of that logic (not by trying to interpret it in modern logic, as some commentators have done, but by describing it in its own terms). It then looks at the philosophical underpinnings of the logic. Finally, in the light of the preceding, it discusses Vasil’év’s place in the history of logic.Download PDF
Objects of Thought, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 78 (4) 494–502.Download PDF
Could Everything Be True? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2000, 78 (2) 189-195.Download PDF
On the Principle of Uniform Solution: A Reply to Smith, Mind, 2000, 109 (433) 123–126.Download PDF
Truth and Contradiction, The Philosophical Quarterly, 2000, 50 (200) 305–319.Download PDF
Worlds Apart. Mind, 2000 (109) 25-31A, supplement to Mind (109) 2000.
Presents the short story `Worlds Apart.’Download PDF
Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic. Part II: The General Case, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 2000, 65 (4) 1519–1529.
The paper establishes the general structure of the inconsistent models of arithmetic. It is shown that such models are constituted by a sequence of nuclei. The nuclei fall into three segments: the first contains improper nuclei; the second contains proper nuclei with linear chromosomes; the third contains proper nuclei with cyclical chromosomes. The nuclei have periods which are inherited up the ordering. It is also shown that the improper nuclei can have the order type of any ordinal, of the rationals, or of any other order type that can be embedded in the rationals in a certain way.Download PDF
The Logic of Backwards Inductions, Economics and Philosophy 9, 2000, 16, 267–285.
Backwards induction is an intriguing form of argument. It is used in a number of different contexts. One of these is the surprise exam paradox. Another is game theory. But its use is problematic, at least sometimes. The purpose of this paper is to determine what, exactly, backwards induction is, and hence to evaluate it. Let us start by rehearsing informally some of its problematic applications.Download PDF
Motivations for Paraconsistency: the Slippery Slope from Classical Logic to Dialetheism, D. Batens et. al. Frontiers of Paraconsistent Logic, Research Studies Press, 2000
Negation as Cancellation, and Connexive Logic, Topoi, 1999, 18 (2) 141–148.
Of the various accounts of negation that have been offered by logicians in the history of Western logic, that of negation as cancellation is a very distinctive one, quite different from the explosive accounts of modern “classical” and intuitionist logics, and from the accounts offered in standard relevant and paraconsistent logics. Despite its ancient origin, however, a precise understanding of the notion is still wanting. The first half of this paper offers one. Both conceptually and historically, the account of negation as cancellation is intimately connected with connexivist principles such as ¬(α → ¬α). Despite this, standard connexivist logics incorporate quite different accounts of negation. The second half of the paper shows how the cancellation account of negation of the first part gives rise to a semantics for a simple connexivist logic.Download PDF
Perceiving Contradictions, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1999, 77 (4) 439–446.
Semantic Closure, Descriptions and Non-Triviality, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1999, 28 (6) 549–558.
It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the nontriviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator.Download PDF
On a Version of One of Zeno’s Paradoxes, Analysis, 1999, 59 (1) 1-2.
Discusses a version of Zeno’s paradoxes. Features of motion; Characterization of the condition about barriers.Download PDF
Validity, A. Varzi, 183–206. The Nature of Logic, CSLI Publications, 1999.Download PDF
What not? A Defence of Dialetheic Account of Negation. In D. Gabbay and H. Wansing, What is Negation? Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999.
The Trivial Object and the Non-Triviality of a Semantically Closed Theory with Descriptions, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 1998, 8 (1-2) 171.
After indicating why this is needed, the paper proves a non-triviality result for a paraconsistent theory containing arithmetic, naive truth and denotation predicates, and descriptions. The result is obtained by dualising a construction of Kroon. Its most notable feature is that there is a trivial object—one that has every property.Download PDF
To Be and Not To Be – That is the Answer. On Aristotle on the Law of Non-Contradiction, Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, 1998 (1) 91–130.Download PDF
Fuzzy Identity and Local Validity, The Monist, 1998 (81) 331-342.
Opinion. Studies two forms of sorites paradoxes, focusing on local validity and fuzzy identity. Identification of the two forms of sorites paradoxes; Suggestions as to how the standard sorites paradoxes should be solved; Examination of local validity and fuzzy identity.Download PDF
The Import of Inclosure: Some Comments on Grattan-Guinness, Mind, 1998, 107 (428) 835-840.
Comments on an article written by Grattan-Guinness on the paradoxes of set theory, highlighting the structure underlying the standard paradoxes of self-reference, which is Inclosure Schema. Arguments of Grattan-Guinness, who stated that satisfying the Schema is neither necessary nor sufficient for a paradox of self-reference; Information on the Inclosure Schema.Download PDF
What is so Bad about Contradictions? The Journal of Philosophy, 1998, 95 (8) 410–426.
Opinion. Questions what is wrong with believing some contradictions. Difference between believing some and all contradictions; Information on the law of noncontradiction; Indication that contradictions cannot be believed rationally.Download PDF
Dialetheism (later editions with F. Berto). E.N. Zalta. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
Number. In E. Craig (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge, 1998, 47–54.Download PDF
On an Error in Grove’s Proof, K. Tanaka. Logique et Analyse, 1997 (158) 215–217.Download PDF
Sexual Perversion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1997 75 (3) 360–372.
Translated into Croatian, ch. 9 of I. Primoratz (ed.), Suvremena filozofija seksualnosti, Zagreb: KruZak, 2003.Download PDF
The Linguistic Construction of Reality. Exordium, 1997, 6 1–7.Download PDF
Sylvan’s Box: a Short Story and Ten Morals. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1997, 38 (4) 573-582.
The paper contains a short story which is inconsistent, essentially so, but perfectly intelligible. The existence of such a story is used to establish various views about truth in fiction and impossible worlds.Download PDF
Editor’s Introduction to ‘Special Issue on Impossible Worlds; Guest Editor: Graham Priest.’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1997, 38 (4) 481-487.Download PDF
Yablo’s Paradox. Analysis, 1997, 57 (4) 236-242.Download PDF
Inconsistent Models of Arithmetic Part I: Finite Models. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1997, 26 (2) 223–235.
The paper concerns interpretations of the paraconsistent logic LP which model theories properly containing all the sentences of first order arithmetic. The paper demonstrates the existence of such models and provides a complete taxonomy of the finite ones.Download PDF
On a Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1997, 26 (1) 45–56.
The paper is a discussion of a result of Hilbert and Bernays in their Grundlagen der Mathematik. Their interpretation of the result is similar to the standard intepretation of Tarski’s Theorem. This and other interpretations are discussed and shown to be inadequate. Instead, it is argued, the result refutes certain versions of Meinongianism. In addition, it poses new problems for classical logic that are solved by dialetheism.Download PDF
Paraconsistent Logic, M. Hazenwinkle, 400–401. Encyclopaedia of Mathematics: Supplement, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.Download PDF
Language, its Possibility, and Ineffability, P. Weingartner, G. Schurz and G. Dorn, 790–794. Proceedings of the 20th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 1997.Download PDF
Everett’s Trilogy. Mind, 1996, 105 (420) 631-647.Download PDF
On Inconsistent Arithmetics: A Reply to Denyer. Mind, 1996, 105 (420) 649-659.Download PDF
The Definition of Sexual Harassment, J. Crosthwaite. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996, 74 (1) 66–82.
Reprinted in G. Lee Bowie and Meredith Michaels (eds.), “13 Questions in Ethics and Social Philosophy”, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 2nd ed., 1997.Download PDF
Paraconsistent Logic (later editions with K. Tanaka and Z. Weber. In E.N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1996. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/
Logic, Nonstandard. In D. Borshert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Supplement, MacMillan, 1996, 307–310.Download PDF
Some Priorities of Berkeley, B.J. Copeland. Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior, Oxford University Press, 1996.
Multiple Denotation, Ambiguity and the Strange Case of the Missing Amoeba. Logique et Analyse, 1995 (38) 361–373.Download PDF
Gaps and Gluts: Reply to Parsons. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1995, 25 (1) 57–66.
Presents a reply to the article `Assertion, Denial and the Liar Paradox,’ by Terry Parsons from a 1984 issue of the `Journal of Philosophical Logic.’ Proposal of numerous solutions to the semantic paradoxes; Case against a gap solution to the semantic paradoxes given in `In Contradiction,’ by G. Priest; Parson’s rejection of the existence of gaps.Download PDF
Etchemendy and Logical Consequence. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 1995, 25 (2) 283–292.
Discusses author John Etchemendy’s views on the characterization of logical consequence and related issues as explained in his book `The Concept of Logical Consequence.’ Definition of deductive validity; Epistemic considerations; Undergeneration; Overgeneration.
What Could the Least Inconsistent Number be? Logique et Analyse, 1994, 37, 3–12.Download PDF
Derrida and Self-Reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1994, 72 (1) 103–111.Download PDF
Is Arithmetic Consistent? Mind, 1994, 103 (411) 337–349.Download PDF
The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference. Mind, 1994, 103 (409) 25-34.Download PDF
Gödel’s Theorem and Creativity, T. Dartnall. Creativity, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
Can Contradictions Be True? With T. Smiley, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 1993, (67) 17-33, 35-54.Download PDF
Another Disguise of the Same Fundamental Problems: Barwise and Etchemendy on the Liar. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1993, 71 (1) 60.Download PDF
Yu and Your Mind. Synthese, 1993, 95 (3) 459–460.
This note is a brief reply to the main argument of Qiuen Yu: 1992, ‘Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind’, “Synthese” 90, 145-79.
Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logics, R. Sylvan. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1992, 21 (2) 217-232.Download PDF
Contemporary Australian Research in Logic: Introduction (with C. Mortensen). Logique et Analyse, 1992, 137-138, 3–4.Download PDF
What is a Non-Normal World? Logique et Analyse, 1992, 35, 291–302.Download PDF
On Time. Philosophica, 1992, 50, 9–18.
Sorites and Identity. Logique et Analyse, 1991, 135-136, 293–296.Download PDF
The Limits of Thought – and Beyond. Mind, 1991, 100 (399) 361–370.
In this article, the author discusses views of several philosophers related to the endless limitation of thoughts. He refers the famous argument of philosopher George Berkeley in his book “Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous,” where he differentiates the independent existence of perception and conception. He mentions the relation of reason and thoughts in the works of philosopher Immanuel Kant. However he asserts the paradoxes of absolute infinities proposed by mathematician Georg Cantor.Download PDF
Minimally Inconsistent LP. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 1991, 50 (2) 321–331.
The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial.Download PDF
Intensional Paradoxes. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1991, 32 (2) 193–211.Download PDF
The Nature of Philosophy and its Place in the University, 1991.
Paraconsistent Dialogues, J. McKenzie. Logique et Analyse, 1990, 131-132, 339–357.Download PDF
Boolean Negation and All That. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1990, 19 (2) 201–215.Download PDF
Was Marx a Dialetheist? Science & Society, 1990/1991, 54 (4) 468–475.
Focuses on the contradictions in the socioeconomic dialectics of sociologists Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx. Nature of formal logic in the argument posed by the two sociologists; Consideration for the difference between idealist and materialist dialectic; Critical interpretation on the formalism of quantum mechanics and its formulation of a consistent view on society.
Contradiction, Assertion and ‘Frege’s Point’, R. Sylvan. Analysis, 1989, 49 (1) 23–26.Download PDF
Reasoning About Truth. Artificial Intelligence, 1989, 39 (2) 231-244.Download PDF
Primary Qualities are Secondary Qualities Too. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1989, 40 (1) 29–37.Download PDF
Gegen Wessel. Philosophische Logik, 1989, 2, 109–120.Download PDF
Denyer’s $ Not Backed By Sterling Arguments. Mind, 1989, 98 (390) 265–268.
The article discusses the legitimate form of criticism, ad hominem which convicts the position in question of being guilty with the context of article “Dialetheism and Trivialisation” by Nick Denyer. He criticizes the dialetheic solutions to the semantic paradoxes by giving an ingenious argument. He also states that failure of Denyer’s triviality argument have an intellectual integrity which protects it from the ad hominem argument.Download PDF
Relevance, Truth and Meaning. With J. Crosthwaite, R. Sylvan and J. Norman. Directions of Relevant Logic, R. Sylvan and J. Norman, 1989.Download PDF
Reductio ad Absurdum et Modus Tollendo Ponens. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 613-626.Download PDF
Classical Logic Aufgehoben. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 131-148.Download PDF
First Historical Introduction: A Preliminary History of Paraconsistent and Dialethic Approaches. With R. Routley. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 3-75.Download PDF
An Outline of the History of (Logical) Dialectic. With R. Routley. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 76-98.Download PDF
Systems of Paraconsistent Logic. With R. Routley. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 151-186.Download PDF
Applications of Paraconsistent Logic. With R. Routley. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 367-393.Download PDF
The Philosophical Significance and Inevitability of Paraconsistency. With R. Routley. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag, 1989, 483-702.Download PDF
Dialectic and Dialetheic. Science & Society, 1989/1990, 53 (4) 388–415.
When Inconsistency is Inescapable. South African Journal of Philosophy, 1988, 7 83–89.Download PDF
Reasoning About Truth. Technical Report TR-ARP-2/88, Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University, 1988.Download PDF
Consistency by Default Technical Report TR-ARP-3/88, Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University 1988.
Tense, Tense and TENSE. Analysis, 1987, 47 (4) 184–187.Download PDF
Unstable Solutions to the Liar Paradox, S.J. Bartlett and P. Suber. Self Reference: Reflections and Reflexivity, Nijhoff, 1987.
The Logic of Nuclear Armaments. Critical Philosophy, 1986, 3, 107–113.Download PDF
Tense and Truth Conditions. Analysis, 1986, 46 (4) 162-166.
Inconsistencies in Motion. American Philosophical Quarterly, 1985, 22 (4) 339–346.Download PDF
Hume’s Final Argument. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1985, 2 (3) 349-352.Download PDF
Contradiction, Belief and Rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1985/1986, 86, 99-116.Download PDF
Introduction: Paraconsistent Logics, with R. Routley. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 1984, 43, 1-2, 3–16.
The papers in this volume are all on the subject of paraconsistency. This introduction locates the papers in their context and also provides a survey of the general area.Download PDF
Semantic Closure. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 1984, 43, 117–129.
This paper argues for the claims that
a) a natural language such as English is semanticaly closed
b) semantic closure implies inconsistency.
A corollary of these is that the semantics of English must be paraconsistent. The first part of the paper formulates a definition of semantic closure which applies to natural languages and shows that this implies inconsistency. The second section argues that English is semeantically closed. The preceding discussion is predicated on the assumption that there are no truth value gaps. The next section of the paper considers whether the possibility of these makes any difference to the substantive conclusions of the previous sections, and argues that it does not. The crux of the preceding arguments is that none of the consistent semantical accounts that have been offered for solving the semantical paradoxes is a semantic of English. The final section of the paper produces a general argument as to why this must always be the case.
Logic Of Paradox Revisited. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1984, 13 (2) 153-179.Download PDF
Hyper-Contradictions. Logique et Analyse, 1984, 107, 237–243.
The Logical Paradoxes and the Law of Excluded Middle. The Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, 33 (131) 160–165.
This article argues that a prima facie plausible, uniform way of solving the logical paradoxes fails. The proposed solution starts from the observation that in many cases the proof of the contradiction, which is the paradox, goes via the proof of an assertion. This suggests that a uniform way of avoiding the paradoxes is to reject the reductio principle. This move, perhaps not so plausible at first, gains strength from many considerations. The reductio principle is, under weak assumptions, equivalent to the law of excluded middle.Download PDF
An Anti-Realist Account of Mathematical Truth. Synthese, 1983, 57 (1) 49-65.
Reprinted as ch. 8 of D. Jacquette (ed.) Philosophy of Mathematics, Blackwell, 2002.
Lessons from Pseudo Scotus, with R. Routley. Philosophical Studies, 1982, 42 (2) 189–199.
To Be and Not to Be: Dialectical Tense Logic. Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, 1982, 41 (2/3) 249–268.
translated into Bulgarian and reprinted in Filosofska Missal XL(8), 1984, 63-76.
The paper concerns time, change and contradiction, and is in three parts. The first is an analysis of the problem of the instant of change. It is argued that some changes are such that at the instant of change the system is in both the prior and the posterior state. In particular there are some changes from p being true to ⅂p being true where a contradiction is realized. The second part of the paper specifies a formal logic which accommodates this possibility. It is a tense logic based on an underlying paraconsistent propositional logic, the logic of paradox. (See the author’s article of the same name “Journal of Philosophical Logic” 8 (1979).) Soundness and completeness are established, the latter by the canonical model construction, and extensions of the basic system briefly considered. The final part of the paper discusses Leibniz’s principle of continuity: “Whatever holds up to the limit holds at the limit”. It argues that in the context of physical changes this is a very plausible principle. When it is built into the logic of the previous part, it allows a rigorous proof that change entails contradictions. Finally the relation of this to remarks on dialectics by Hegel and Engels is briefly discussed.
Ockham’s Rejection of Ampliation, with S. Read. Mind, 1981, 90 (358) 274–279.Download PDF
The Truth Teller Paradox, with C. Mortensen. Logique et Analyse, 1981, (95-96) 381–388.Download PDF
Merely Confused Supposition: A Theoretical Advance or a Mere Confusion? With S. Read, Franciscan Studies, 1980, 40 (28) 265–297.Download PDF
Indefinite Descriptions. Logique et Analyse, 1979, 22, 5–51.
Two Dogmas of Quineanism. Philosophical Quarterly, 1979, 29 (117) 289–301.
Argues against the views of philosopher, Quine on analytic and conventional truths. Attacks made by Quine on positivist claims; Analyticity; Dogmas of empiricism; Arguments against the existence of analytic truths; Difference of meaning; Account of belief change without any concessions to analyticity; Logical connections; Rule and theories on analyticity.
The Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1979, 8 (1) 219–241.
Translated as ‘La Logique du paraqdoxe’, Philosophie 94 (2007), 72-94.Download PDF
The Formalization of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition, with S. Read, Mind, 1977, 86 (341) 109.Download PDF
A Refoundation Of Modal Logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1977, XVIII (3) 340–354.