

BOOK REVIEWS

Life's Form: Late Aristotelian Conceptions of the Soul. BY DENNIS DES CHENE. (Cornell UP, 2000. Pp. viii + 220. Price \$45.00.)

Having explored late Aristotelian and Cartesian physics in his brilliant and prize-winning *Physiologia* (Cornell UP, 1996), Des Chene has now turned to another part of the Aristotelian *cursus*, the *scientia de anima*, the science of the soul. Unsurprisingly, he once again offers a rich display of erudition, kept within bounds by an unusually lucid and unpretentious style. This time he presents his argument in two separate volumes, relegating his discussion of Cartesian psychology and physiology to *Spirits and Clocks* (Cornell UP, 2001). In *Life's Form* he once more focuses on sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuits, considering the commentaries on Aristotle's *De Anima* by Toletus, the Coimbra commentators, Suárez, Arriaga and others.

The book has a remarkably broad scope. Unlike many other accounts of Aristotelian psychology, it does not deal exclusively with the threadbare issue of the immortality of the human soul. Des Chene shows a keen awareness of the fact that the *scientia de anima* treats the soul in general, comprising not only human but also vegetable and animal life. He is not afraid of descending into the particulars of late Aristotelian accounts of organic and sensitive functions and their relation to man's cognitive capacities.

Des Chene devotes several chapters to Aristotle's famous definitions of the soul as the form of a body potentially having life and as the principle of life. He offers a comprehensive survey of many, if not all, relevant aspects of these definitions as discussed by the manualists. One of the many interesting conclusions of this section is that late Aristotelianism clearly found it difficult to differentiate between living and non-living things. Like living bodies, heavy bodies such as stones have an intrinsic principle of motion, and by falling downwards to their natural place could even be said to strive for a degree of self-perfection. Although Des Chene shows how Suárez tries to avoid the conflation of life and non-life by a number of further distinctions, it becomes clear that the drift of Jesuit thinking on these matters runs completely counter to Descartes' reduction of animals to lifeless machines, whose behaviour can be fully explained by material particles working by impact and obeying the general laws of local motion. In this context, Des Chene also sheds light on the Jesuit reaction to the famous problem of the plurality of forms. In Scotus' view, the body has its own *forma corporeitatis*, independent of the soul. By contrast, Thomas Aquinas maintains that any individual substance can only have one single form, and consequently does not accept that the body is a substance in its own right. Interestingly,

despite their official allegiance to Aquinas, Jesuits such as Suárez try to steer a course between Scotus and Aquinas consistent with their views on the issue of the relation between matter and quantity, which Des Chene treats in his *Physiologia*.

In the section entitled 'Powers and Parts', Des Chene considers one of the central problems of Aristotelian psychology and physiology: how can the soul at one and the same time be responsible for such diverse powers as the vegetative and cognitive? How can the single human soul encompass both the production of excrement and the purely intellectual contemplation of the divine and eternal? Des Chene shows which conceptual tools and strategies the Jesuits employed in order to distinguish between the various powers (e.g., is seeing red a capacity different from that of seeing green, or is there just one single faculty of vision?). He further investigates Jesuit answers to the classic question whether or not the soul is distinct from its various powers, and if so, in what way. In this case, the Jesuits generally adopted a version of Thomism: the powers of the soul are really, and not just formally (the Scotist position), distinct from it.

The final part examines the unity of the soul. Since human and animal souls are corporeal forms, intimately linked with bodies, the question arises as to the extent to which they share an important property of bodies, *viz* divisibility. Des Chene gives a fascinating survey of the arguments used by Jesuits, ranging from sensible data, such as worms that keep on living if cut in half, to the metaphysical principle of plenitude. Again some Jesuits took issue with the Thomistic position that the souls of higher animals are indivisible. Of special interest are Arriaga's arguments in favour of the divisibility of all animal souls, which according to Des Chene are similar to the arguments Descartes later uses to combat the very assumption of animal souls.

Inevitably there are some minor disappointments too. Des Chene claims that the post-Cartesian introduction of vital qualities does not amount to a reinstatement of the Aristotelian soul, but should be seen as a remedy of the defects of Descartes' ruthless mechanism (p. 22), or even as a version of 'Cartesian monism' (p. 202). But here Des Chene neglects the persistent tradition of neo-Platonist and Stoic vitalism, pan-sensism and 'occult qualities', which not only pervaded Aristotelianism but, as John Henry and others have shown, was influential until the eighteenth century. Despite his own warnings, Des Chene here seems to suggest that the Jesuits are all there is to say about late Aristotelianism, which (fortunately) is not the case.

Further, Des Chene does not entirely fulfil his promise to 'provide understanding of the Aristotelian theories in their own right' (p. 2). He concentrates on the text of the Jesuit manuals, themselves the result of a complicated pedagogical process in which institutional, theological and even political factors played an important role. These factors may explain why certain *quaestiones* became so important for the Jesuits, while others receded into the background. As Des Chene shows, the Jesuits often worked with a codified set of answers to a codified set of questions. In order to evaluate the Jesuit answers 'in their own right', one would have to know how and why these codifications came about and how they were related to what had been going on in the Middle Ages. Although Des Chene devotes the first part of his book to what late Aristotelianism considered to be data for the study of the soul, and the propositions which the Jesuits had to accept on faith, there is no comprehensive and

systematic discussion of the relation between, for example, the theological constraints within which Jesuit institutions had to work and their actual teaching as contained in the manuals Des Chene has studied. In this area the book might have benefited from the inclusion of recent studies on the institutional context in which the Jesuit manuals were produced.

But, of course, I may peaceably and contentedly end by saying that all this is a subject for further research, for which Des Chene has once again laid a very impressive foundation stone.

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CEES LEIJENHORST

Leibniz and the Monadology. BY ANTHONY SAVILE. (London: Routledge, 2000. Pp. v + 247. Price not given.)

This is an excellent introduction to the *Monadology* and to Leibniz' mature thought. Well written and well argued, it may be advantageously read by students who want to be initiated into Leibniz' philosophy, and also by scholars looking for fresh ways of presenting time-honoured Leibnizian themes. In his exposition, the author does not get involved in tiresome discussions of secondary literature, but goes directly to the core of the issue, explaining the philosophical content of the *Monadology* in ten chapters. An English translation of this work appears in an appendix (pp. 227–47).

Instead of beginning from the beginning, Savile devotes ch. 1 (pp. 25–42) to §§31–7 of the *Monadology*, which mainly concern the two 'great principles' of contradiction and sufficient reason. He raises a question about the nature of the second: Leibniz does not explicitly say whether it is a necessary truth or a methodological postulate (p. 37). If the latter, we take it to hold 'as a condition of the world being genuinely comprehensible to us' (p. 36). Interpreted either way, however, the principle of sufficient reason is considered by Leibniz an essential tool on which a *post-eriori* demonstration of the existence of God is based. Once God has been called into play, he and his relationship to our world become the issue of §§38–48 of the *Monadology*. To these Savile devotes ch. 2 (pp. 43–61). From ch. 3 onwards, the remaining paragraphs, grouped on the basis of their main topics, are analysed (with some minor changes) in the order in which they appear in the *Monadology*. The reason why Savile anticipates the exposition of §§31–48 is his aim of attaining the greatest systematicity; but this purpose, in the last analysis, is grounded on the assumption that 'The main themes of Leibniz' metaphysics depend on his theology' (p. 43).

This assumption, however, which is surely true, is taken too rigidly by Savile, who does not mention other relevant sources of Leibniz' metaphysics. Thus in the book the importance Leibniz attaches to the concept of force, and consequently to dynamics, for understanding the nature of *monads*, is totally undermined. The same holds for his worries concerning the *labyrinth of the continuum*, which in Savile's account do not play any relevant role, even though in the *Theodicy* we are warned that monads are precisely the correct answer to those worries. Another aspect on which Savile's interpretation distinguishes itself from others current is dismissal of the complete concept theory. As is well known, from about the period of the *Discourse on*

Metaphysics (1686) onwards, one of the leading theses of Leibniz' metaphysics is that each substance corresponds to a concept including all the predicates that may be truly attributed to the substance itself. Whereas recent interpreters for the most part explain the main features of Leibniz' metaphysics by recourse to the complete concept, Savile sets it aside 'because it implausibly encourages us to see any set of compossible monads as a maximal world – even singletons, whose sole members are solipsistic items not acting in a world beyond themselves'. And the doctrine based on the complete concept 'would make it impossible for us to act in ways other than we in fact do and thus would undermine our free choice' (pp. 129–30). It is not clear whether Savile discards the complete concept theory because he thinks it contradicts Leibniz' attempts to safeguard our free choice, or whether he considers it a spurious creation by modern interpreters of Leibniz' philosophy. If the former is the case, given the emphasis Leibniz puts on complete concepts, it seems to me that we are forced to admit that some incoherence affects his claims about human freedom.

Recently, particular attention has been devoted by scholars to Leibniz' concept of matter and to the related themes of phenomenalism and of corporeal substances. Savile discusses these in chs 7–8 (pp. 145–85). He starts by ascertaining the fundamental role Leibniz attributes to bodies: 'So it seems that to fulfil their representational tasks monads must *have* bodies, without of course themselves *being* bodies, and it is through their bodies, which they perceive with special clarity, that they act. I believe that we may also say that it is in relation to their bodies that the idea of their well-being is given content' (p. 114). Then he discusses the thesis which attributes to Leibniz phenomenalism about bodies (i.e., bodies resulting from co-ordination of our perceptions). Phenomenalism is considered by Savile as an account which has the virtue of fitting well with many explicit claims on Leibniz' part, but it sits uneasily alongside the doctrine, also clearly stated by Leibniz, that bodies are *aggregates* of monads (p. 156). Thus Savile attributes a point of view to Leibniz which mediates between phenomenalism and realism: bodies, as we perceive them, are phenomena generated by aggregates of objectively existing (simple) monads. This part, together with ch. 5 (pp. 103–19), is one of the most interesting in the book, even though I found it difficult to follow Savile's thesis in favour of his solution concerning the nature of bodies, which pursues the topic of the spatial position of monads.

I conclude with two small critical remarks, which do not affect the interest of a good introductory work on Leibniz' thought. On p. 6 Savile writes 'the flourishing state of Leibniz studies today shows that his thought has survived even the extreme empiricism of the Vienna Circle in the 1930s'. Certainly 'extreme empiricism' is not at ease with Leibniz' metaphysics, but Savile is quite unfair to the members of the Vienna Circle, who never ceased to recognize Leibniz as one of their forerunners as far as logic (or better, logistic) and its application to reality were concerned. If Leibniz studies are flourishing in the USA today, this is probably a *consequence* of the great esteem and interest in which Leibniz' thought was held by many of the Circle (Carnap included). On the same page Savile states that Bertrand Russell's book on Leibniz appeared in 1901, but this is clearly a misprint for 1900.

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Descartes and the Possibility of Science. BY PETER A. SCHOOLS. (Cornell UP, 2000. Pp. x + 171. Price £22.95.)

This book addresses a novel question: ‘What must Descartes’ concept of human nature be, in order for it to make possible advancements in science?’ (p. 28). Schools formulates this question with an eye to the utility of Cartesian science: Descartes held that by investigating and manipulating the world, human beings are able to improve their daily lives and become ‘the lords and masters of nature’ (AT VI, p. 62). So what is it about human nature that makes it possible for us to improve our condition in this way? Some readers may be critical of the Kantian flavour of this question, but Schools thinks that it is justified by the ways in which answers to it illuminate Descartes’ project.

The main answer developed in the book involves a unique perspective of Cartesian dualism. According to Descartes, mind and body are not merely distinct but ‘opposite’ in nature: the mind is a purely thinking immaterial substance, whereas body is nothing more than extension. The opposition that Schools stresses, however, is between the freedom of the mind and the causal determination of body or nature. Indeed, one of the book’s main themes is the ‘limitlessness of human freedom’ (p. 4). Schools does not carefully distinguish between different kinds of freedom, but his thought is that through scientific endeavour the Cartesian mind is able to use its God-given freedom to increase the freedom of the mind–body union that constitutes a human being from the ‘drudgery of labour, from the suffering of illness, and from the anxiety of interpersonal and international quarrels’ (p. ix). He even contends that it is part of the essence of the mind to desire to extend freedom in this way (p. 42). But in order to engage in scientific activities the mind must already possess a modicum of freedom. The mind’s natural freedom is thus one of the ‘necessary conditions’ of Cartesian science.

Schools is correct to emphasize the importance to Cartesian metaphysics and natural science of the mind’s freedom, which Descartes takes for granted. But by insisting that to possess this freedom the mind must be separate from the realm of causal determination, Schools assumes without argument that Descartes is a thoroughgoing libertarian. Although some texts appear to support this view, there are passages such as one in the Fourth Meditation where he asserts that we are most free when our will is compelled by a clear and distinct perception (AT VII, p. 58). A full defence of Schools’ view would require an explanation of these texts, and also an account of Descartes’ notion of a cause.

Schools further attempts to characterize the mind’s separateness from nature by reference to various intellectual powers. In addition to being free from causal determination, the mind also has the powers of intuition, deduction, intellectual memory, and (in one of his boldest claims) intellectual imagination. There is a textual basis for all the other powers referenced here, and Descartes often speaks of the *corporeal* imagination, which depends on ‘traces’ in the brain and thus has a basis in the human body. But he never speaks of *intellectual* imagination, by which Schools means a faculty of the mind that operates without images. Schools contends that

Descartes has an unstated theory of the intellectual imagination, a faculty too long ignored by commentators, as it constitutes another necessary condition of Cartesian science (p. 49). What makes it necessary is the essential role it plays in Cartesian-style deductions, which are claimed to be at the heart of Descartes' science. In the early *Regulae* Descartes defines a 'deduction' as a chain of self-evident intuitions in which there is a movement of thought linking one intuition to another (rule 3, AT x, pp. 369–70). Again he makes no reference to the intellectual imagination *per se*, but Schouls thinks that this faculty is necessary in order to provide the 'links' from one intuition to another: it performs this role by proposing hypotheses, which are then tested by the method of doubt, and in the case of natural science by experimentation. Schouls calls this faculty a form of 'imagination', though it is devoid of images, because the hypotheses so proposed may be false. Like its corporeal counterpart, the intellectual imagination is a faculty of invention. One of the book's conclusions is thus that 'for Descartes, truth is reached through fiction' (p. 106). 'Poetry and philosophy, art and science have one common root in the indispensable role of intellectual imagination' (p. 94). Schouls notes the irony of the situation, given Descartes' legacy as the father of modern philosophy and science.

Although he graciously credits others when appropriate, Schouls' claims about the intellectual imagination are original, and, as I have suggested, also somewhat bold. He is to be commended for showing how Descartes' early theory of deduction is present in his mature work, but I do not think his arguments for a Cartesian faculty of intellectual imagination can withstand scrutiny.

In his central argument, Schouls claims that since Descartes' metaphysics operates under the supposition that nothing corporeal exists, nothing bodily can be used in its development, including the corporeal imagination. But some form of imagination must be present to propose the hypotheses which link one intuition to another; hence there must be a faculty of intellectual imagination (p. 46). Leaving aside the question of whether Cartesian deductions require the formation of hypotheses, Schouls' initial inference is invalid. There is no inconsistency in using the corporeal imagination, even while doubting that I have a brain or body, so long as I am ignorant of the fact that the imagination has a corporeal basis. To be sure, Descartes' meditator is taught to withdraw from the senses and the images with which they supply the imagination. But that does not mean that these faculties are ruled out of bounds. On the contrary, Descartes' strategy in *Meditations* involves taking the confused deliverances of the senses and the corporeal imagination and refining them into clear and distinct ideas.

Schouls offers other arguments for the intellectual imagination in the context of particular hypotheses which it is supposed to supply. One example that he discusses in detail is the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis from the First Meditation. Using an argument from elimination, he attempts to show that among the various faculties of the mind (including the corporeal imagination, reason and memory), the intellectual imagination is the only possible source for this hypothesis. I shall limit myself to a brief discussion of how he eliminates reason, as this part of his argument exemplifies what I take to be the fatal flaw in his claims about the intellectual imagination.

Schouls presents two arguments to show that reason cannot be the source of the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis. First, in the First Meditation Descartes urges his reader to give no credence to any of reason's utterances. Thus if reason were to propose the hypothesis in question, then 'circularity would erupt where no one has ever surmised its lurking' in *Meditations* (p. 98). Secondly, the hypothesis of a deceiving God (or evil demon) is ultimately discovered to be false. But Schouls cites passages where Descartes insists that reason or the understanding 'cannot incline to falsehood', and can never err (pp. 98–9). Thus reason cannot be the source of this hypothesis.

Against the first argument, it is difficult to see how Descartes would be guilty of circular reasoning, since he is not offering a proof but proposing a hypothesis. The meditator is not even supposed to affirm this hypothesis, but only to consider it as a way of generating doubts about former beliefs. Schouls' second argument, though valid, raises an important terminological issue, *viz* what is meant by 'reason' or the 'understanding'. In *Principles* Descartes distinguishes two main faculties of the mind, the intellect and the will; all other mental powers are 'modes' of one of these two (I 2, AT VIII A, p. 17). There is no faculty of reason or understanding *per se*, though Descartes sometimes uses terms such as 'light of nature' (*lumen naturae*), 'faculty of knowledge' (*facultas cognoscendi*), 'faculty of understanding' (*facultas intelligendi*) and 'power of understanding' (*vis intelligendi*) to refer to what the *intellect* perceives clearly and distinctly. Not everything that the intellect thinks or perceives, of course, is clear and distinct or true. So why cannot it be the source of the omnipotent deceiver hypothesis, rather than a faculty of intellectual imagination of which Descartes never speaks? Descartes does say that the intellect (rather than 'reason') can never err, but that is because, strictly speaking, error is ascribed only to judgements, not to perceptions or thoughts. For Descartes, judgements have both an intellectual and a volitional component. Using my intellect, I can think something false in a confused manner, but I have not erred unless I affirm it with my will. Thus the intellect is not restricted from proposing false hypotheses.

This last discussion is suggestive of a deeper problem with Schouls' claims about the intellectual imagination, namely, the assumption of a robust faculty psychology. Unlike his mediaeval predecessors, Descartes did not conceive the mind or soul as having diverse parts or faculties. As a purely thinking thing, the Cartesian mind is utterly simple. By reifying reason, and seeking to uncover other mental faculties such as the intellectual imagination, Schouls' argument upsets this simplicity. One can easily be misled on this issue, since Descartes often speaks of various mental powers such as remembering, doubting, perceiving, asserting, etc.; but, as noted above, these reduce to two, intellect and will, and even these are merely passive and active aspects of the same thing, *viz* thought. Other faculties such as sensation and the corporeal imagination belong properly to the union of mind and body, rather than the mind alone, and are distinguished by the different corporeal mechanisms associated with them (e.g., sense organs *vs* traces in the brain).

Although its most ambitious claims are unconvincing, this book is filled with insight into Descartes' theory of deduction, the relation between his early and late work on method and the role of freedom in Cartesian science. It is also very

readable, and usefully complements Schouls' impressive body of work on Cartesian and Lockean method, the notion of progress in the seventeenth century, and the relation between Descartes' philosophy of science and modern pragmatism.

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LAWRENCE NOLAN

Henry James and Modern Moral Life. BY ROBERT PIPPIN. (Cambridge UP, 2000. Pp. xi + 193. Price £37.50 h/b, £16.10 p/b.)

The novelist Henry James has seemed to some philosophers to have something significant to say about morality. With *Henry James and Modern Moral Life* Robert Pippin joins them, offering an original reading, the most comprehensive yet, of James' approach to morality. Pippin's accomplishment is astonishing: a detailed and critically informed study of James which engages with profound philosophical questions in an accessible manner. Pippin mounts a persuasive case that James' fiction is more philosophically acute than one might suspect; he provides original readings of James' works; and he offers the outlines of a moral theory addressing crucial problems which confronted James as well as moral philosophers today.

The first of these problems is an issue Pippin has written on before: a crisis associated with Western modernization, a crisis which (Pippin controversially argues) concerned James. New economic conditions – social and geographic mobility, the power of capital, mass culture – and the dissolution of communities have made customary ways of evaluating actions inaccessible. The variety and complexity of modernity not only deprive agents of stable schemes of evaluation, but create uncertainty as to whether any such schemes have warrant. Through detailed readings, Pippin shows how James elaborates the breakdown of meaning in his recurring theme of 'the great elusiveness of psychological meaning, determinate intentions, or even stable identities in his characters' (p. 63). It is not just that it is difficult to determine the fact of the matter: irresolvability is pointedly built into James' narratives. Unlike James' postmodernist fans, however, Pippin contends that, for James, 'understanding is still linked to the possibility of getting something right and to assessing the rightness of actions' (p. 66).

Pippin's explanation of how, for James, evaluation is still possible has distinct though unacknowledged Hegelian overtones. Pippin claims that James is an idealist about the reality of moral terms, one who thinks that 'moral terms ... depend ... (for their sense and authority) on the communities that institute such commitments and sustain them' (pp. 9–10). This extends to all modes of evaluation, even of one's own intentions: we know ourselves and the meaning of our actions through, perhaps *only* through, the reactions of others. (James' characters often find out what they intended only after they see how others react.) Consciousnesses, in James, are a hall of mirrors. As at several other points in Pippin's book, here the reader may wish for more precision: to what extent, and exactly how, is the meaning of our actions *determined* by the reaction of others? But Pippin does a great deal to show that we are so dependent on others for self-knowledge and evaluation that the breakdown of shared understandings raises problems for moral agents as well as philosophers.

These problems are familiar: given competing normative schemes, how can we determine what moral claims others have against us? And even if we had some sense of those claims, why should we respect them? A shopkeeper asks the character Charlotte Stant, when she finds a golden bowl with an imperceptible flaw, 'But if it's something you can't find out, *isn't it as good as if it were nothing?*' (cited by Pippin, p. 71). What is wrong with manipulation and deceit, if they go undiscovered? James' answer, according to Pippin, is that given the historically contingent conditions of social life, something vital is lost from a life when the claims of others are ignored.

That which is lost (and hence the solution to the ethical questions) is freedom. Ezra Pound wrote that James' primary theme was freedom from the influence of others, but Pippin shows James to have had a more complicated understanding of freedom. Again this concern is distinctly Hegelian: freedom is not the absence of restraints, but the development of personhood within and outwith social constraints. A conversation with Madame Merle in *The Portrait of a Lady* illustrates the conflicting views on freedom and personhood which must be transcended. She insists that identity cannot be extricated from society and its evaluations: 'What shall we call our 'self'? Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us – and then it flows back again.... One's self – for other people – is one's expression of one's self; and one's house, one's furniture, one's garments, the books one reads, the company one keeps – these things are all expressive.' To which Isabel Archer replies 'I think just the other way. I don't know whether I succeed in expressing myself but I know that nothing else expresses me; everything's on the contrary a limit, a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary one. Certainly the clothes which, as you say, I choose to wear don't express me.... To begin with it's not my choice that I wear them; they're imposed on me by society.' "Should you prefer to go without them?" Madame Merle enquired in a tone which virtually terminated the discussion' (cited by Pippin, pp. 61–2).

Pippin's striking reading of *A Portrait of a Lady* makes a strong case for seeing Isabel's return to her husband not as a defeat, but as an achieved acceptance of self-limitation and duty, in contrast to her earlier, and immature, understanding of freedom as negation, freedom from influence. (Oddly, Pippin overlooks the question, left ambiguous in the novel, whether she really does return.) The successful negotiation between self and society is the precondition of freedom, and this process both determines and grounds moral claims.

Pippin does not defend the view he presents – this would require a much larger work, including a metaphysics of the person and a theory of action. But he confronts a wide range of issues thought-provokingly: scepticism, modernity, identity, action under conditions of uncertainty. What may be most compelling here is the illumination of these issues through carefully assembled selections from James' fiction; I have seen few works in philosophy and literature which reveal so much philosophical content by guiding attention to the right passages. Finally, not least of the pleasures of reading this work is Pippin's style, which, polyclausal and linguistically rich, emulates James' own.

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ELIZABETH BRAKE

Twentieth Century German Philosophy. BY PAUL GORNER. (Oxford UP, 2000. Pp. 225. Price £12.99.)

For the first half of the twentieth century, neo-Kantianism in its various guises was by far the most important and influential philosophical movement in Europe. After the Second World War it quickly faded out. I had hoped Gerner's book *Twentieth Century German Philosophy* would throw some much needed light on the question of why it faded out so suddenly. Disappointingly, it does not. Gerner touches only cursorily upon neo-Kantianism and the hermeneutic strands of *Verstehensphilosophie*, in the course of six chapters devoted to the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas and Apel. It is not that Gerner's book is itself disappointing: it has many virtues. But it is not really a book about *Twentieth Century German Philosophy*. Gerner has a much narrower project, with more modest aims, than his imposing title suggests: to introduce the work of these five German thinkers to non-specialist readers, and to situate their work in relation to the Kantian tradition of transcendental philosophy.

There are many good things about Gerner's book. The works of these five thinkers are, for different reasons, not easily comprehensible, so introducing them to a readership of undergraduate philosophy students, without trivializing them, is a useful and difficult undertaking. For the most part Gerner presents the ideas of Husserl, Heidegger *et al.* in a clear, concise and jargon-free way. Understandably, he does not succeed quite as well in the case of the late Heidegger, but at least he explains the meaning of Heidegger's terminology in more familiar terms. Throughout the book Gerner points out, where necessary, the nuances of German terms and indicates the limitations of the possible translations, and he does so in a helpful and unfussy manner. He makes judicious use of examples to illustrate trickier points. Gerner's style of writing is appropriate to the *genre* of an introduction to philosophy. His book is easier to read than, say, Julian Roberts' more ambitious and comprehensive *German Philosophy: an Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), which deals with German philosophy right through from Kant to Adorno. Whereas Gerner concentrates on the presenting the underlying ideas, Roberts provides a philosophical commentary which cleaves more closely to the texts.

That said, Gerner's book is still too long on exposition and too short on evaluation to fulfil his ancillary aim of saying something of interest to graduate students and specialists. For example, he objects that Husserl's phenomenology, despite its claim to be 'scientific', is idealist (p. 56), and that Gadamer's hermeneutics is threatened by relativism, since he has no way to explain why one interpretation of a text might be truer or better than another (p. 158). This is not news. Gerner does not add anything significantly novel to the standard objections to Husserl and Gadamer.

His evaluation of the work of Habermas and Apel is more flimsy. Is it, he asks, an adequate response to Adorno and Weber's despair at the meaninglessness of existence 'to hold out the prospect of endless debates directed towards reaching understanding?' (p. 191). This question, and its negative implication, rests on a misconception of the role of *Verständigung* in the formal pragmatic theory of meaning,

a theory which underlies Habermas' conception of communicative action and, to a lesser extent, discourse ethics. Besides, Habermas gives lengthy and elaborate responses both to Weber's theory of rationalization and to Adorno's critical theory. He shows precisely why their respective diagnoses of the pathologies of modern social life are inadequate. In his final chapter, Gorner poses the following questions to Apel: how can discourse ethics explain the motivational power of moral norms? How ideal are the idealizing presuppositions of discourse? How can mere appeal to consensus-seeking discourse settle intractable moral conflicts? It would have been better to consider the answers (interestingly rather different answers) which Habermas and Apel actually give to these questions, rather than simply raise them and suggest, wrongly, that they do not and cannot give answers. One desideratum of any introduction to philosophy is surely that it should combine criticism with interpretative charity towards its subject-matter, and not simply knock down straw men.

The implicit guiding theme of Gorner's book is contained in the criteria by which he selects these five thinkers. First, they are all distinctively German, in that their work can be seen as a 'continuation and reinterpretation' of Kant's transcendental philosophy. Secondly, their work continues to exert an influence on philosophy more broadly. It is regrettable that Gorner does not provide anything but passing reference to the work of the first-generation Frankfurt School theorists, in particular to Adorno, who clearly meets both criteria and who also conducts a sustained, if polemical, critique of both Husserl and Heidegger. Moreover, Habermas' own social theory makes more sense when understood in the context of his diagnosis of the major failings of Adorno and Horkheimer's critical theory, namely, that they fail to provide an adequate diagnosis of the effects of rationalization on modern societies, and lack an adequate normative foundation for their critical social theory.

Certainly Husserl, Habermas and Apel meet these criteria (although Gorner misses a trick in not mentioning Habermas' dispute with Apel, a dispute about how 'transcendental' discourse ethics can afford to be). I am less persuaded that the work of the late Heidegger and of Gadamer can be understood as a 'continuation and reinterpretation' of transcendental philosophy. No doubt both Heidegger and Gadamer stand in *some* sort of relation to Kant's transcendental philosophy. That is unavoidable. It is a measure of Kant's greatness that he is an unavoidable point of reference for most modern philosophy. But *prima facie* it is just as plausible, if not more plausible, to see the turn towards an ontological understanding of language as a rejection of transcendental philosophy rather than as a radicalization of it. Gorner's thesis remains largely implicit, or simply asserted (e.g., pp. 12, 138). But it is contentious, and requires more detailed interpretation and argument than he provides. Indeed, the thesis is interesting enough to merit a concluding chapter all to itself. As it is, the book tails off unexpectedly with Gorner's rather cavalier dismissal of Apel's discourse ethics.

Finally, I wonder whether an introduction to the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas and Apel does not after all require a chapter on neo-Kantianism, or at least a substantial discussion of the crucial methodological distinction between understanding and explanation and of the central neo-Kantian concept of validity. As Gorner notes, Gadamer and Heidegger were schooled in

neo-Kantian philosophy, Husserl lived through it, and Habermas and Apel can be fruitfully understood as refurbishing a neo-Kantian conception of understanding with insights drawn from American pragmatism and the analytic philosophy of language. Even if, as Gorner claims, this book is not intended to be a history of twentieth-century German philosophy, it would have been helpful if he had spent more time painting in the wider philosophical picture. His very brief (ten page long) introduction to Kant, Fichte and Hegel and his passing references to neo-Kantian and neo-Hegelian thinkers of the period do not provide enough of an intellectual context for the works he discusses. After all, they are all supposed to be a 'continuation and reinterpretation of the idea of transcendental philosophy'. But, as Gadamer would rightly point out, Kant's idea has an effective history. The idea which according to Gorner these authors are continuing to reinterpret was transmitted and transformed by various representatives of the Marburg and the Southwest Schools.

In spite of my reservations, I should reiterate that Gorner succeeds in his main aim, to provide a concise and accessible introduction to the work of five influential and important German philosophers. To that extent *Twentieth Century German Philosophy* makes a welcome contribution to the secondary literature.

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J.G. FINLAYSON

The Later Heidegger. BY GEORGE PATTISON. (London: Routledge, 2000. Pp. xiii + 230. Price not given.)

This is the second of the couplet on Heidegger in the Routledge Philosophy Guidebook series, the first being Stephen Mulhall's *Heidegger and Being and Time* (1996). The two books have somewhat different styles. Mulhall's is denser and very textually focused. Pattison's is more fluid and wide-ranging. But between them they provide a very creditable introduction to this important, influential, but difficult philosopher.

The most obvious question that the title of Pattison's book raises is whether it is appropriate to separate the philosophy of Heidegger into a later and an earlier period. An answer to this question was pre-empted, presumably, by the Routledge series editors who bisected Heidegger. The policy is partially defended by Pattison in his first chapter, where he argues that 'there is a complex of themes, methods, topics and even stylistics that, taken together, define a distinctive body of writing that can be read and studied in relative independence of *Being and Time*'. I doubt this. Compare the situation with that concerning another great twentieth-century philosopher, Wittgenstein. It is clear that the philosophy of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is quite distinct from that of *Philosophical Investigations*. We know this since, amongst other things, the later book constitutes a direct attack on the earlier. The situation is quite different with Heidegger. Certainly in his later works the style, language and focus change. But there is no direct evidence that Heidegger took back anything in *Being and Time*. The great themes of the later period, such as Being and *aletheia*, are all present in *Being and Time*; indeed, as Pattison himself puts it (p. 13), 'we are able to trace lines of continuity running back from the later works to *Being and Time*, such that the later work appears more as a deepening or taking further what was begun in

Being and Time, rather than a 180° turnabout' – a quotation which also illustrates Pattison's tendency to see an issue from both sides, without coming down firmly on either.

It is just as well, then, that his first chapter spells out some of the themes of *Being and Time*. I think that a little more would have been helpful. For example, little is said to introduce the reader to the notion of Being: it appears, fairly cold, on p. 7. Now of course in a sense one cannot say simply what Being is – that, after all, is what the rest of the book is about, in one way or another – but the remarks on Being in *Being and Time* provide what is perhaps the most intelligible way into the maze. For this reason, I would not recommend that someone largely ignorant of Heidegger should read Pattison's book without first reading Mulhall's, or, maybe even better, Michael Inwood's excellent *Heidegger: a Very Short Introduction* (Oxford UP, 1997).

Once over this initial hurdle, the book proceeds very smoothly. Ch. 2 is an analysis of the connection between Heidegger's philosophy and his involvement with Nazism. Pattison argues that Heidegger's *Volk*-psychology takes him towards Nazism, but his critique of technology ultimately takes him away. (His philosophy of art plays an ambiguous role in the process.) Ch. 3 is an excellent exegesis of the view of technology itself, and introduces readers to the important notions of enframing, truth and thinking. This leads naturally into ch. 4, which provides an account of Heidegger's phenomenology of seeing, and in particular, of how art can reveal the truth of things, their world and their ground. The important notion of the *fourfold* (earth, sky, gods and mortals) enters the discussion here (and looms larger in ch. 7). I have always found this one of the more opaque of Heidegger's metaphors; the absence of a more detailed exegesis of the notion was, I thought, one of the few exegetical shortcomings of the book.

Ch. 5 is entitled 'Nietzsche', and indeed provides an account of Heidegger's view of Nietzsche as the culmination and bankruptcy of 'metaphysics'. But much of the chapter is devoted to an illuminating discussion of Heidegger's general hermeneutical principles for textual interpretation, including its insistence on hearing what is *unsaid*. Ch. 6 then takes us back to Parmenides, or at least Heidegger's account thereof. Heidegger's view on Being shines brightly through this chapter. Which takes us to ch. 7, for Heidegger's account of the nature of language and poetry, via his discussion of Hölderlin.

There is a delicate balancing act to be performed in exegeses of Heidegger. His language is often opaque and difficult. It is tempting for an exegete merely to parrot the language in a quite unilluminating way. On the other hand, Heidegger's language is such an integral part of his philosophy that one cannot simply avoid it and hope to do him justice. The balancing act is thus between obscurity and faithfulness; and it is one that Pattison gets just about right, I think.

He also gets right the choice of topics: the coverage gives a very balanced account of Heidegger's later thought. Naturally, though, one cannot cover everything pertinent in a book such as this. There are a couple of points not mentioned on which I, at least, would have welcomed more clarification. One thing that has always puzzled me about Heidegger is his apparent personalization of Being. The thinker is a witness to Being's 'self-bestowing' (p. 119), its 'generosity' (p. 132); thinking is called

to life by the 'summons' of Being (p. 153); Being 'gives', 'reveals', 'withholds' itself (pp. 195–6). It is clearly wrong to think of Being as a person of any kind. So it might seem natural to think of the use of these terms simply as poetic licence. But Heidegger never uses his terms innocently; and in any case, for Heidegger, poetry reveals truth. So why did he use these terms? Another issue, and one which cuts cleanly across the earlier and later Heidegger, is whether he is a realist or an idealist. Much of his language is strongly realist: art *reveals* reality to us; technology can *conceal* what is actually there. Yet so often he seems to suggest that reality without *Dasein* is impossible, or even that language produces reality. Thus, as Pattison puts it, 'poetry ... is ... a naming of beings that calls them into the beings they are' (p. 169). There is at least some tension here. I suspect that Heidegger might have wanted to resolve it by rejecting the dichotomy between realism and idealism, but how, I have no idea.

I come now to the final chapter of the book, 'What Kind of Thinker?'. This is an attempt to put Heidegger as a whole into perspective. Should he be thought of as poet, mystic, deep ecologist or philosopher? The answer given is, in effect, all and none of these. Perhaps we do best to describe Heidegger in terms of one of his own neologisms, 'thinker'. Actually, if you have to put Heidegger in a box, then the best one, it has always seemed to me, is 'neo-Platonist'. Heidegger's dialectic of Being and *Dasein* is a version of neo-Platonism's ineffable One, its internal relation to humankind, the alienation of the one from the other, followed by their ultimate *rapprochement* in some future way, as yet unspecified.

In a sense, though, these are not very important questions. Whatever category one puts Heidegger in, he had many interesting, and possibly profound, ideas. The important question is: was he right? And it is mainly on this matter that Pattison leaves me unsatisfied. He says 'I shall suggest why only an appreciation of the philosophical intentions of the later Heidegger provides a point of view from which adequately to evaluate his way of thinking' (p. 190). Yet even in this chapter there is little critical engagement with Heidegger's claims. And one of the central lessons of Heidegger, after all, is not to accept a philosopher at face value.

Of course, it is hard to know where to start an evaluation of a 'big-picture' philosopher such as Heidegger. But here is one place. Pattison neatly summarizes perhaps the most central aspect of Heidegger's thought as follows: 'everything we have known as philosophy, from Plato to Nietzsche ... , is but one way of enframing truth and, indeed, a way that has led us to the dangerous situation of virtually forgetting Being' (p. 188). But philosophy has gone a long way since Nietzsche, and indeed since Heidegger. If Nietzsche was the disintegration of Western metaphysics, what are we to say about Wittgenstein or Foucault, Kripke or Rorty, and what are we to make of critics of Heidegger as diverse as Carnap and Derrida?

Well, it is no criticism of Pattison that he does not venture into any of this in his book. It is intended, after all, as an introduction to Heidegger's later thought. If it takes readers in an intelligent and illuminating fashion to the point where they can engage with these questions for themselves, it must be accounted a success. And this it does.

Logical Properties: Identity, Existence, Predication, Necessity, Truth. BY COLIN MCGINN.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. vi + 114. Price £17.99.)

This book is not typical of contemporary work in philosophical logic, since it is both ideological in conception and polemical in execution. The advertised aim is to bring philosophy back into philosophical logic. The general theme is a defence of a realistic anti-naturalism about the logical properties specified in the subtitle. The main specific conclusions reached are as follows. Identity is unitary, undefinable, fundamental and genuinely relational (ch. 1). The naïve view of existence is right and the orthodox view is wrong. On the naïve view, 'exists' expresses a predicate, existence is a property, and we refer to things that do not exist. On the orthodox view, existence is not a property that individuals instantiate but a matter of some 'other', genuine, property's having instances, and 'exists' is subject to higher-order definition in terms of the instantiation of an appropriate property. Among further theses endorsed are that 'some' has no existential import, that possible objects and some impossible objects exist, and (necessarily) all non-existent objects are objects of thought (ch. 2). The semantics of natural languages ought to employ the relation of instantiation between objects and properties, properties (universals) being the appropriate category of semantic values for predicates. Semantic theories (of languages that are not overtly set-theoretic) ought to eschew appeal to the relation of set-membership, the extensions of terms or any other features of set theory (ch. 3). The analysis of modal expressions in terms of quantification over possible worlds is fundamentally flawed, since the resultant analyses will be (extensionally) inaccurate or circular. The treatment of modal expressions as modifying predicates and as having modal properties as semantic values is better. But the best proposal of all is that modal expressions are (syntactically) copula modifiers, and that the semantic value of any such expression is an entity of an unfamiliar kind, *sui generis* – neither individual nor property but mode of instantiation (ch. 4). Truth is essentially disquotational, but truth is a real property that sustains disquotation, and neither metaphysical nor conceptual deflationism about truth is merited (ch. 5).

In arguing for these conclusions Colin McGinn's writing is fluent and elegant. He draws effortlessly and impressively on a broad knowledge of twentieth-century philosophical logic and on the history of analytic philosophy more generally. On every other page the reader will find an illuminating phrase turned, an interesting connection forged or an insightful comparison drawn. The author does the reader, and the profession, a great service by reminding us of how profound issues can be addressed in philosophical logic without premature retreat to the fine detail of formal semantic theorizing. In that respect the book recalls the approach to philosophical logic characteristic of the golden age of the subject (the first half of the last century), and it is admirable in eschewing, as intended, 'the formalistic fetishism and scholasticism that has characterized too much philosophical logic in recent years' (p. vi). These are the good things about the book.

The bad things about the book can all be filed under the heading of failures to live up to those values that its author associates with the discipline of philosophical

logic. McGinn lauds philosophical logic as a region of philosophy in which it is possible to achieve results, develop sharp arguments and come to definite conclusions: he commends its topics as abstruse, pure and rigorous (p. v). One could not complain of a lack of definite conclusions, as the earlier inventory will attest. Moreover, in fairness to the author, and acknowledging his prefatory remarks, if there are to be short books on philosophical logic that treat a variety of central topics, then one cannot expect to see every angle covered and all relevant literature encompassed. The worry, however, is that the material which is presented is often treated with a haste that leaves the reader dissatisfied. On some occasions, the treatment suggests a polemical or rhetorical determination to force the advertised conclusion; on other occasions, it suggests a lack of the rigour that the author values. Here are three specific points by way of example.

My first point concerns the treatment of orthodox views in general. Much of the interest of the book lies in its aim to debunk orthodox views. That aim is best and most fairly served when the author shows us that there are broad semantic approaches to cases (existence, predication or necessity) which are philosophically natural, *prima facie* viable and at odds with the received view. What is less compelling is his tendency to load the orthodox or received view with extraneous and unwanted baggage, and to offer no insight into why the view has commanded support. Sometimes the result is a straw orthodoxy; sometimes false alternatives. I would want to reject firmly McGinn's thesis that there are some things that do not exist, but I do not recognize it as part of the 'orthodoxy' to which I subscribe that all occurrences of 'exists' are analysable in terms of the satisfaction or otherwise of some descriptively analysable predicate.

My second point concerns lapses in distinguishing the linguistic from the non-linguistic. As an early instance of this we have 'identity is the only relation that is counted as a logical constant. All the other standard logical constants ... are operators on closed and open sentences' (p. 13). More significantly, it is not clear that due care is always taken to distinguish metaphysical from conceptual categories. This worry looms largest over the final chapter, where apparent slide back and forth between talk of properties and talk of concepts is a feature of the discussion of the essence of truth. I cannot produce here a quick case where the slide is both undeniable and harmful. But the effects of what is at least apparent movement between categories is that the aims and theses of the final chapter are often difficult to grasp, and argumentative moves are not always readily understandable – two charges that could not reasonably be made against any other part of the book.

My third point concerns the very casual approach to the notion of circularity (presupposition) that pervades the book. This approach results in quite unconvincing argument against proposed analyses in the cases of identity, existence and possibility. In each case, what appears to be adduced is an argument of the following form. By hypothesis, an analysis of the concept expressed by '*X*' as it occurs in some type of context '*A(X)*' is articulated by means of a biconditional '*A(X)* iff *B*'. But in order for the biconditional to be true, the *analysans* '*B*' must (be taken to) entail some truth that is expressible in *X*-terms. Thus the analysis is (viciously) circular. When the form of argument is so characterized it looks like a parody of the paradox of

analysis. The proponent of the hypothesis will naturally require that 'B' entails what is expressed by 'A(X)'. Moreover, other counter-examples displaying absence of vice in such 'circularity' seem readily available. Presumably analyses of the material conditional, say, are not inevitably and viciously circular just because any *analysans* will entail material conditional truths. The charge of vicious circularity should not be made so easily. But if there is any more compelling notion of vicious circularity underlying McGinn's various objections, it is not easy for the reader to see what it is. For there is no clear statement of what, in general, vicious circularity of analysis consists in, and appreciation of intent is often hindered by unqualified talk of what an analysis 'leaves open' or what it 'packs in'. I add that in the case of the topic with which I am most familiar, that of modality, the policy of 'not burden[ing] the text with detailed discussions of the recent literature' (p. v) further undermines the author's argument for the circularity of certain analyses. For the argument which McGinn adduces in seeking to undermine possible-world analyses of modal concepts is one that has been developed, criticized and superseded in an accessible literature over the last fifteen years. This leads me to wonder whether other readers will find themselves in a position to make the same kind of complaint about their own favourite topics.

McGinn leads his reader to expect sharp arguments for conclusions and rigorous treatment of topics. In the light of these expectations, I fear, many students and researchers in philosophical logic will find his book ultimately disappointing. Yet this is a book that ought not to be ignored. It is a book written by a philosopher who has insight, imagination, and a host of interesting things to say. It is a book that may turn out to be important and highly influential by provoking reconsideration of the received views that it attacks and by stimulating research into the new, or forgotten, views that it defends. In sum, *Logical Properties* is a book that overflows with ideas, many of which may prove fruitful when subject to more patient development and scrutiny elsewhere.

I have not found McGinn's case on any topic convincing, but I have always found the case interesting and engaging – variously suggestive, refreshing, stimulating, illuminating, ingenious, provocative and frustrating. With that distinction drawn, I do not hesitate in recommending that any philosopher who has an interest in any of McGinn's topics must read what he has to say.

University of Leeds

JOHN DIVERS

The Arguments of Time. EDITED BY JEREMY BUTTERFIELD. (Oxford UP, 1999. Pp. xvi + 253. Price £28.00.)

This volume is one of a number produced under the auspices of the British Academy to mark its centenary in 2002, and represents the philosophy section's contribution. Despite the intriguingly ambiguous title (does it contain a category mistake or not?), the focus is not so much on arguments, but on approaches to time. What we have here is for the most part an interdisciplinary collection, representing philosophically sensitive perspectives of time from a variety of fields, including

physics (particularly strongly represented), psychology, linguistics and literary theory. Nevertheless it is possible to discern an underlying theme in the essays.

The notorious indifference of the laws of physics to the psychologically pivotal direction of time is but one aspect of ‘the problem of time’. As Karel Kuchar neatly puts it in his essay, ‘the problem of time in quantum geometrodynamics is the same as in everyday life: there does not seem to be any’. There is thus a gap between what our best physical theories tell us about the world and what we take to be its most obvious features. Of course there is not just one problem here but several, depending on which feature of experienced time one focuses on: its direction, metric, order or flow. Locke included motion and number among the primary qualities of things, our ideas of which supposedly truly resemble the properties they represent, and it is natural to suppose our perception of such qualities to be a simpler, more direct, matter than our perception of the secondary qualities. But, warns Michel Treisman, who contributes the psychologist’s perspective to the volume, the perception of duration is in fact a complex matter, and importantly dis-analogous to the perception of spatial properties. Treisman’s intriguing suggestion is that the brain itself can be regarded as the sense organ for time, producing regular oscillations against which we time external events and our own actions. The complex model Treisman proposes does not, of course, imply that duration is a secondary quality, and Treisman himself is wary of drawing metaphysical morals from the perceptual facts, but it does nevertheless encourage us to consider the possibility that temporal experience derives from more fundamental aspects of reality, an idea which fits well with Jeremy Butterfield’s and Chris Isham’s long and detailed exploration of the ‘emergence’ of time from features of the world as described by quantum gravity.

One aspect of time that has been under attack as long as the British Academy has been in existence (I posit no direct causal connection here) is its *flow*, the endless recession of events into the past. As John Lucas points out in his opening historical survey of the philosophy of time, pleasantly entitled ‘A Century of Time’, pressure has been exerted from many directions – from relativity, logic and theories of indexicality – to ‘detense’ language: to replace, for the purpose of producing a language fit for science and logic (or even to avoid contradiction) temporal indexicals such as ‘now’, ‘then’, ‘last year’, with context-insensitive terms such as dates or relational expressions. Metaphysically, the result is a picture of the world from no temporal point of view, with no temporal becoming, all times regarded as equally real, and change simply the variation of properties from one point to another. Lucas wants to resist these pressures. Physics may after all have a role for becoming, and in any case removing tense from our picture of the world leaves mysterious our status as agents, whose effectiveness requires timely action, which itself requires an irreducibly tensed outlook. Recent philosophy of time has tried to reconcile the unreality of tense with its ineliminability from the agent’s perspective. Lucas, however, is suspicious of such a reconciliation, noting that it results in an error theory of time, in which our ordinary judgements about what features of the world correspond to our representations of it are systematically mistaken. ‘We could all’, says Lucas, ‘be mistaken, but the burden of proof lies heavily on those who would convict us all of error’.

Part of an adequate response to this challenge is to show that a 'detensed' picture can nevertheless provide an adequate understanding of a whole range of issues. The essays by Michael Tooley, James Higginbotham and Gregory Currie provide important contributions to just such an understanding. Although I characterized the detenser's view as implying the unreality of becoming, Tooley attempts to show how we can, by employing the notion of actuality as of a time, combine the view that facts are wholly tenseless with a conception of genuine becoming. If successful, this would be a significant contribution to the programme of reconciliation mentioned earlier. Higginbotham shows how a token-reflexive treatment of tense in language helps us to understand the inferential structures of tensed discourse. Currie's essay is concerned with the possibility of a literary philosophy of time. He takes issue with the more extravagant claims of literature to provide an image of time not expressible by non-literary means. However, Currie does think that reflecting on the temporal structure of fiction may cast light on time itself: in particular, it suggests that descriptions can be read as tenseless and yet genuinely temporal.

There are also contributions from Roberto Torretti (on relativity) and Julian Barbour (on Machian themes).

The Arguments of Time is certainly a distinguished volume, whose essays exhibit a high level of originality. I am not sure whether it was intended to celebrate the achievements of British philosophy since 1902 (perhaps this would have been thought too parochial), but what strikes one in reading it is the recent achievements of other disciplines and of other nations. Perhaps gaining nourishment from other disciplines is the right way for philosophy of time to go, but it is important not to lose sight of the fact that, as Tooley's and Currie's essays well demonstrate, philosophy is also capable of standing on its own feet.

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ROBIN LE POIDEVIN

Agency and Deontic Logic. By JOHN F. HORTY. (Oxford UP, 2001. Pp. 192. Price £22.50.)

Like several other philosophers, John F. Horty in his new book takes the distinction between *ought to be* and *ought to do* to be a very important distinction. He is primarily interested in the logic of *ought to do*, and approaches the subject through a refutation of 'the Meinong/Chisholm analysis', according to which *ought to do* is just a special case of *ought to be*, since you ought to do something if and only if it ought to be that you see to it that you do it.

Horty's argument, which he believes to be 'an incontestable objection to this philosophical thesis', is that it suggests an obviously wrong solution to 'the gambling problem', that is, the problem of whether an agent ought to gamble five dollars or refrain from gambling, in a situation where, with unknown probabilities, he might win ten dollars or lose his stake if he gambles, and will retain his five dollars if he does not gamble.

In what Horty calls 'the logic of the utilitarian ought to be', it ought to be that p if and only if p holds in the best available world. Hence, in the gambling problem, assuming that the more money the better, it is obvious that the agent ought to

gamble. But, Horty thinks, the correct conclusion of the given premises should *not* be that the agent ought to gamble (nor that he ought to refrain). Hence, Horty believes, the logic of *ought to be* cannot be applicable here.

This is hardly an incontestable argument. Situations with the same structure, but with no actions involved, can easily be imagined. Suppose, for instance, that a certain window may be open or not open. Suppose also that the wind will carry something good or something bad which will be carried into the house if and only if the window is open. Ought the window to be open or not? Again we have four possible histories (in Horty's version, the possible worlds are *histories*, linearly ordered sets of *moments*, time-slices of the worlds, so to speak) and just one ideal history: the one with the window open and something good carried by the wind. By Horty's logic of *ought to be*, we have to conclude that the window ought to be open, and, just as in the gambling problem, this is not the result we want. Hence the gambling problem can be reproduced with no doing involved, and thus it does not tell against the Meinong/Chisholm analysis.

Does it then tell against Horty's logic of *ought to be*? Well, that theory in essence follows the tradition from Bengt Hansson's *Synthese* paper of 1969, where it is shown that both standard deontic logic and its conditional version (von Wright, *Mind*, 1956) imply that the *ought*-operator can be regarded as a choice-function from sets of possible worlds to subsets, thought of as the optimal ones, and thus as determining, or being determined by, a preference ordering of the worlds. But most writers in that tradition are presumably extremely hesitant to assume that the preference ordering in question can generally be identified without using a normative *ought to*. A standard defender of standard deontic logic would simply argue that the plausible view of the gambling problem implies, contrary to Horty's assumption, that the history where the agent gambles and wins is not the only one that is optimal *in the sense relevant for the truth of the 'ought'-sentences*.

Yet Horty, in constructing the semantics of *ought to do* without any *ought to be* involved, may still be doing the right deed, although for the wrong reason. The basic idea is that what an agent ought to do is determined by an ordering of the actions he can do. If there is an optimal action, then an agent ought to see to it that *p* if and only if *p* will be the case in every available history where an optimal action is done. (If there is no optimum, a somewhat more complicated rule is used.)

This sounds like some kind of consequentialism, and Horty notes that when there is an optimal action, this first semantics (others follow) for *A ought to see to it that p* will agree with what he calls 'dominance act utilitarianism'. This brand of utilitarianism is a rather special one: a sufficient condition for an action ϕ to be better than another action ψ is that every history where ϕ is done is at least as good as every history where ψ is done, and some history where ϕ is done is better than every available world where ψ is done. As Horty notes, this rule is imported from the theory of rational choice under uncertainty. He apparently sees no need to discuss possible important differences between rules of rational choice behaviour, such as the one just cited, moral rules, such as different forms of utilitarianism, and rules of semantics. This makes the whole project somewhat unclear. Horty thinks that his theory closes the gap between utilitarianism and deontic logic first discussed by

Castañeda. Roughly speaking, he takes the semi-formal version of consequentialism introduced in Lars Bergström's book on the subject, *The Alternatives and Consequences of Actions* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966), adds some considerations from rational choice theory, and reformulates it all in terms of possible-world semantics. The agent's set of alternative actions at a certain moment reappears as a partition of the set of possible histories that contain that moment. Each member of the partition is a proposition stating that the agent does a certain action. But Horty's 'ought' does not, like the 'ought' of traditional utilitarianism, apply to just these actions. As in traditional deontic logic, there is a sentential operator that is applicable to any sentence, although here it also refers to an agent and is given a truth-value at a moment of a history. A sentence *A ought to see to it that p* is true at a moment *m* when *p* is necessitated by *A*'s choosing an optimal action at *m*.

As can be expected from the similarity of this truth-condition to 'the Andersonian simplification' from the mid-fifties, the valid formulae of Horty's logic of *ought to do* are essentially those of standard deontic logic. The ought-operator is a normal modal operator, as Horty carefully demonstrates for several versions of it, and he seems to be quite content with that; he does not even mention any of the (dozens of) arguments from the last fifty years to the effect that a plausible deontic logic cannot be a normal modal logic. (Most of the arguments are listed in J. Forrester's *Being Good and Being Logical*, London: Sharpe, 1996.)

But Horty's *conditional* deontic logic differs in a very important way from the standard. It does *not* license the inference from *A ought to see to it that p*, if *q* and *A ought to see to it that p*, if *r* to *A ought to see to it that p*, if *q* or *r*. And the new gambling problem which Horty produces to support his view is indeed compelling: suppose now that you can bet your five dollars on heads or on tails, and hence that you have three alternatives: to bet on tails, to bet on heads, and not to bet at all. It seems plausible that you ought to bet on heads if it will be heads, and that you ought to bet on tails if it will be tails. But then it is also true that you ought to gamble if it will be heads, and that you ought to gamble if it will be tails, and hence, if the rule under consideration is valid, that you ought to gamble if it will be heads or tails. But this is again a conclusion that we do not want to accept. Hence the rule has to be rejected.

This is, as far as I know, a new argument, and a good one, provided that what is necessitated by what ought to be (done) also ought to be (done). But that assumption is one of the favourite targets for standard criticism of standard deontic logic. It is also evident that the same kind of counter-example can be set up entirely in terms of *ought to be*. (This is perhaps why Horty does not present a conditional logic of *ought to be*; it could be expected to validate the rule in question.)

A great deal of the book is devoted to a discussion of different ways of ranking actions in terms of a ranking of the histories that are compatible with each action. This discussion is to a large extent a translation into possible-worldish of discussions of different forms of consequentialism that have earlier been worked out in less technical frames. Possibilism *contra* actualism is one subject, group actions another. It is all very well written, with due references and with rigorous proofs in an appendix.

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SVEN DANIELSSON

Moral Particularism. EDITED BY BRAD HOOKER AND MARGARET LITTLE. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. xiv + 317. Price £35.00.)

Moral particularism, the contributors to this volume remind us at various points, is *not* an uninteresting thesis about the way in which context and circumstance can make a difference with respect to the moral status of an act. To be a moral particularist is, rather, to affirm one or another of a set of very interesting theses, some closely connected to one another, some more loosely connected, concerning moral ontology and epistemology. The issues in moral ontology concern whether the strength and polarity of reasons for action are variable or invariable: so, according to one particularist thesis, for any reason to ϕ , that reason may in different circumstances fail to be a reason to ϕ or may even be a reason not to ϕ ; a *generalist* may deny this, holding that, properly understood, a reason has its polarity and even its strength invariantly across changes in context. The issues in moral epistemology concern the status of moral principles in assessing conduct: so, according to one particularist thesis, how an agent ought to act cannot be codified into a set of principles; a *principlist* may deny this, holding that principles, while perhaps unwieldy, could be formulated. The main focus in this volume is the viability of particularist theses in moral ontology and epistemology: the authors are concerned to distinguish carefully the various possible formulations of these views, to note their implications, and to consider what sorts of evidence for or against them would be relevant and what sorts of evidence for or against them are ready to hand. (A few of the papers treat the issue of impartiality and partiality in ethics, but so far as I can see this issue is orthogonal to these other debates.)

The first five of the twelve papers are centrally concerned to reject some particularist thesis or other in favour of its generalist or principlist counterpart. In 'Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad', Brad Hooker presents in an especially clear way the main lines of argument against the particularist's moral ontology (this is the 'wrong' part), wrapping up with an argument that those who take particularism to heart cannot be trusted in mutually advantageous co-operative schemes (this is the 'bad' part). Roger Crisp, in 'Particularizing Particularism', distinguishes among three forms of particularism, about rules, reasons and motivation, and argues that in each case the only true forms of particularism are uncontroversial. The thrust of Crisp's position, also considered by Hooker and taken up at length in Joseph Raz's paper, 'The Truth in Particularism', is that the presumption towards explanatory completeness pushes towards a generalist view, and that any stopping point short of generalism is bound to be arbitrary; as Raz suggests, to stop short of generalism is to generate an unintelligibility that is out of keeping with the intelligibility-conferring role of reasons. Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit and Michael Smith ('Ethical Particularism and Patterns') claim that while particularism is consistent with the supervenience of the moral on the natural, the ways in which supervenience can be respected given particularism produce deep mysteries concerning how we could learn to apply moral concepts. Terence Irwin, in 'Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotle's Ambitions for Moral Theory', calls into question the alleged Aristotelian

lineage of particularism. Irwin's paper, as advertised, concerns Aristotle exegesis, but it is philosophically very rich (more on this below) and those who skip it because they are uninterested in the history will be missing much. But it *is* an excellent piece of historical work: it seems to me that Irwin simply refutes those who would suppose that the only plausible reading of Aristotle is a particularist one.

The next four papers are centrally concerned to defend some particularist thesis or other and to reject its generalist or principlist counterpart. Jonathan Dancy, in 'The Particularist's Progress', clarifies some of his arguments for his particularist viewpoint, and extends his claims about the essential variability in reasons' polarity to claims about values and orderings. David Bakhurst, in 'Ethical Particularity in Context', attempts to wed Dancy's particularism with Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue* contextualism. Jay Garfield, responding to various of Onora O'Neill's animadversions against particularist views, clarifies and defends the Wittgensteinian bases for a particularist standpoint in 'Particularity and Principle: the Structure of Moral Knowledge'. And Lawrence Blum, in 'Against Deriving Particularity', argues against those who would attempt to legitimize the personal point of view by deriving its normative force from the impersonal point of view: on Blum's view, any such attempt must fail to meet crucial desiderata for the derivation.

Dancy's particularist view is that necessarily, for every reason R to ϕ , there is some state of affairs which includes R and in which R is not a reason to ϕ (and may even be a reason not to ϕ). The generalist claims that necessarily, for every reason R to ϕ , then in every state of affairs that includes R , R is a reason to ϕ . Upon reading the impressive arguments offered on these two sides of the matter, one naturally wants to know whether to opt for the third view – that some reasons are variable, some are not – is to ally oneself with the particularist or with the generalist or with neither. Dancy's own view is that even if he were to retreat to this position, he would have 'lost the battle but won the war' (p. 131), for it would follow from even this limited concession of variability that it is not true that reasons *qua* reasons are invariant. Invariance would result from the *content* of some reasons rather than simply from their nature as reasons (p. 136). I am not so sure. I do not think that we can conclude 'It is not of the nature of dogs to run' from the fact that this dog has no legs and thus cannot run, or from the fact that Fido, who is perfectly healthy, cannot run in this particular set of circumstances (e.g., someone is standing on his tail). It may be that many reasons have variant force, but this might mean only that those reasons are in some way defective, that they fall short of playing the role that reasons are supposed to play, or that they are operating in a set of circumstances that are in a teleologically charged sense *unusual*. This is why Irwin's paper strikes me as especially rich; for the Aristotelian view he explicates could, if defensible, underwrite just this sort of third way in the generalism/particularism debate.

The final three chapters are essays in conciliatory particularism: all of them are written by authors who have affirmed particularist views but who wish to show how generality can play a strong, legitimate role in moral enquiry and practice. Martha Nussbaum's paper, 'Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, and Bad Behaviour', is a critical discussion of anti-theory views in ethics. In 'Unprincipled Ethics', David McNaughton and Piers Rawling are concerned to

argue that ‘thick’ moral properties (e.g., cruel, just, amiable) should be held to have invariant polarity (though the strength of the reasons given by these properties may vary), and that this view is consistent with a particularist moral ontology. Margaret Little, in ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, provides a crisp presentation of particularist claims, and offers an ingenious account of how certain employments of generalities – beyond mere summaries – are legitimate even from a particularist standpoint.

Nussbaum’s paper counts as particularism-with-a-codicil, I suppose, because she herself has espoused Aristotelian particularism, and one might think that there is a natural alliance between the push towards recognition of particularity and radical devaluation of moral theorizing. Much of Nussbaum’s paper is powerful and persuasive; her response to the anti-theorists’ objections (she has in mind Annette Baier, Bernard Williams, Cora Diamond and, mysteriously, Alasdair MacIntyre) exhibit clear-headed good sense, though they are combined with Nussbaum’s usual insulting asides against theistic philosophy and philosophers. But her positive account of the good of theory is far less persuasive. She begins by noting that ordinary talk is theory-laden, and can be laden with bad theories. If this were brought forward simply to note that there is a sort of false opposition between theorizing about morality and engaging in moral practice, there would be little with which to quarrel. But her account is instead straightforwardly consequentialist: theory is a good thing because it can, with the help of those who have the power to institutionalize theory, affect ordinary moral practice for the better. She cites the influential theorizing of John Stuart Mill and Catharine MacKinnon; and with the positive influences of these thinkers I have no quarrel. But I find it incredible that a case for theorizing can be won in consequentialist terms: if I were an anti-theorist, I would place Hitler’s and Stalin’s theorizing up against Mill’s and MacKinnon’s any day.

This is a collection of extremely high-quality papers, which are (with the present exception of Raz’s and, we are told, the soon-to-be exception of Nussbaum’s) unavailable elsewhere. My only complaint, and it is a very minor one, is that the introduction does not attempt to give a picture of the lie of the land, opting instead for paragraph-length summaries of the included papers. The editors’ own contributions strike me as together a better introduction to the range of issues dealt with in the volume than their formal introduction is.

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MARK C. MURPHY

Virtue, Vice and Value. BY THOMAS HURKA. (Oxford UP, 2001. Pp. ix + 272. Price £55.00.)

One of the most striking developments in moral philosophy over the last twenty years has been the emergence of virtue ethics. Although virtue ethicists come in various shapes and sizes, they all agree that consequentialist and deontological accounts of rightness and wrongness are fundamentally mistaken. Right actions cannot, virtue ethicists maintain, be grounded in either the value of outcomes, or in a set of abstract universal principles, but must in some way be grounded in the virtues, or

in virtuous motives. On this view, a right act is understood as one which a virtuous person would do, as one that would be done from some virtuous motive, as one which expresses some virtue, or as something of this sort. If, however, rightness is grounded in virtue, then virtue cannot be understood as a response to (perceived) rightness – this would give rightness a priority over virtue which virtue ethicists deny. Rather virtue must be understood as making certain acts right, that is, as a rightness-conferring rather than a rightness-responding characteristic. Plato's *Euthyphro* should have alerted us to the implausibility of this view (do the virtuous perform certain acts because they are right, or are they right because the virtuous perform them?), though it does not seem to have impressed virtue ethicists very much.

In his excellent book Hurka's primary aim is not to refute virtue ethics (though the last chapter is entitled 'Against Virtue Ethics'). His primary aims are to offer an account of virtue as a higher-order value, understood as a love of the good and the right and a hatred of the bad and the wrong. But if his account is right, then virtue ethics is wrong. For if virtue is a love of what is good as good and as a love of what is right as right, then these thin properties must be logically prior to virtue, and virtue ethics is turned on its head. Unfortunately for virtue ethicists, Hurka presents a very compelling case indeed for his view. He is aware of a number of difficulties which it generates, and admits that his account does have some implications which, initially at least, are counter-intuitive. But on balance the view he outlines in impressive detail is far better than any rival account.

Although the fundamental aspect of Hurka's account of virtue is that it is a love of the right and the good, for most of the book he focuses on virtue as a love of the good. For the most part, rightness only figures in the account as something that is instrumentally good, and so as something that will be loved for the sake of the good to which it is instrumental. This focus is the result of Hurka's concern to show that consequentialists can value virtue for its own sake. For if virtue is an intrinsically good attitude to intrinsically good things, then consequentialists can value virtue for its own sake, rather than merely for the sake of something else.

But this focus gives a slightly misleading impression of what is central to Hurka's account, or at least makes it unclear what this is. For if, as consequentialists think, the right can in some way be subsumed under the good, then it seems that a recursive account of the virtues can be offered, that is, one which regards the virtues as intrinsically good attitudes towards the good. And for the early chapters Hurka seems to think that the recursivity of goodness is what is fundamental to his account. But he does not want his account to be restricted to consequentialism, and when he applies it to a deontological view, recursivity disappears. This is because deontological virtues such as conscientiousness are intrinsically good attitudes to rightness rather than to goodness, and according to deontology the right cannot always be subsumed under the good. Since the moral property ascribed to conscientiousness is not the same as the one ascribed to the object of conscientiousness, deontological virtues are not instances of the recursive value of loving the good. But although recursivity is not present in distinctively deontological virtues, Hurka claims that the central aspect of his account of virtue is preserved. For he here claims that the main feature of his approach 'is its treating virtue and vice as derivative moral properties,

ones involving a relation to other more fundamental properties' (p. 217). Given that so much of the book focuses on virtue as an intrinsically good response to value, and given his earlier definition of the virtues as 'those attitudes to goods and evils that are intrinsically good' (p. 20), we could be forgiven for missing this.

One of the basic goods to which the virtues are directed, according to Hurka, is pleasure. He maintains that a love of pleasure, like a love of any other intrinsically good thing, is a virtue. But there is a serious problem with the view that pleasure is intrinsically good, one which Hurka acknowledges, namely, that pleasure in something evil, such as in other people's suffering or ignorance, is itself evil. But if such pleasures are evil, then not all pleasures are intrinsically good. Hurka considers various ways of dealing with this problem, and argues that the best way to deal with it is to maintain that *qua* pleasure in something evil such pleasures are themselves evil, but simply *qua* pleasures they are always good. This is a tempting way of dealing with the problem, but I think it is mistaken. For if we think of such a pleasure as good, then even if its goodness *qua* pleasure is outweighed by its evil as a pleasure in something evil, we must think that the fact that the agent was pleased is, *qua* pleasure, a redeeming feature of the situation. But this seems mistaken. It seems wrong to say, of someone who has inflicted terrible suffering on an innocent victim for fun, 'What he did was all things considered bad, but at least he enjoyed himself'. This point applies with equal force to another of Hurka's basic intrinsic goods, namely, achievement. Achievement of evil ends seems to be in no way good, not even *qua* achievement.

Another problem with the view that pleasure is intrinsically good was pointed out by W.D. Ross. If one thinks that there is a *prima facie* duty to promote the good, and pleasure is intrinsically good, then there is a *prima facie* duty not only to promote other people's pleasure, but to promote one's own also. But there seems to be no such *prima facie* duty. If there were, then sometimes it would outweigh other morally relevant considerations, and then one's actual duty would be to promote one's own pleasure. But although it may be foolish not to pursue something that one will get pleasure from, it never seems to be morally wrong.

These points may not be fatal to the view that pleasure is intrinsically good. But even if we reject Hurka's list of basic intrinsic goods, the fundamental aspect of his view would remain. For we can still agree with Hurka that a central aspect of virtue is the love of the good, whatever those goods are.

University of Reading

PHILIP STRATTON-LAKE

Morals from Motives. BY MICHAEL SLOTE. (Oxford UP, 2001. Pp. xv + 216. Price £26.50.)

Revivals of virtue ethics usually take their cue from Aristotle and the Stoics. Not so Michael Slote's stimulating new book *Morals from Motives*, which instead develops virtue ethics approaches inspired, respectively, by the British sentimentalism of Hutcheson and the feminist ethics of care. The distinctive feature of these developments is that they are *agent-based*: they regard facts about an agent's motives or

character as ethically fundamental, and attempt to derive all other ethical evaluations from these. The theories are thus radical and ambitious, aiming to unify moral phenomena in ways which have hitherto been largely ignored. Given this remit, it is perhaps unsurprising that the results are somewhat mixed.

The book is divided into two parts. The first covers Slote's explanation and defence of a general agent-based approach to morality, and his detailed development of two models. Agent-based virtue ethics 'treats the moral or ethical status of acts as entirely *derivative* from independent and *fundamental* ethical/aretaic facts (or claims) about the motives, dispositions, or inner life of moral individuals' (p. 7). So facts about the rightness or obligatoriness of actions are entirely derivative from facts about the goodness or virtuousness of the motives expressed by those actions; on this view virtue is 'explanatorily primary' (p. 7). Slote's preferred model is termed *morality as caring*. This takes as ethically fundamental the motive of '*partial* benevolence, of caring *more* for some people than for others' (p. 29), and has its genesis in the ideas of Nel Noddings and Carol Gilligan. (The other model takes the motive of *universal* benevolence as primary.)

Slote argues that this 'ethic of caring' can be extended to accommodate obligations to others, deontological constraints, and issues of social justice and legislation. Much of the discussion here takes the form of responding to objections to any such treatment. For instance, one difficulty for an agent-based ethic of caring arises when it comes to our obligations to strangers, since the purported ground of obligations, caring, seems to require some kind of relationship. Slote's solution is to appeal to two kinds of caring, intimate (for near and dear) and humanitarian (for strangers), which in the good person will be 'balanced'. This does not mean that the good person has a concern for the *aggregate* well-being of intimates and strangers, any more than a good father has a concern for the aggregate well-being of his children; rather, just as the father will balance substantial concern for each child in a non-aggregative manner, so too will the good person balance intimate concern as such with humanitarian concern (which does aim at aggregate well-being). An ethic of balanced caring will thus be less demanding than consequentialism, which seems to require concern for the aggregate well-being of strangers *and* intimates, but more demanding than an ethic of purely intimate caring.

Similarly, deontological constraints might be thought to pose a problem for a model of partial benevolence, given that partiality towards, say, one's family might justify the sacrifice of one member, or of a stranger, in order to save the rest. Since, however, intimate caring is non-aggregative, Slote thinks it will naturally include deontological constraints: those who care for another person will thus be reluctant to kill him even for the sake of others they care for. There are, furthermore, patterns of caring or love that an ethic of balanced caring will treat as morally unacceptable: someone who has no concern for strangers is subject to criticism on this view, as also is someone who is willing to kill innocents so that others might be saved, since this reflects indifference to how one's actions causally affect the well-being of others, which itself reflects a 'defective kind of caring' (p. 86). If so, we 'have agent-based reasons to say that it is wrong to act on ... a willingness to kill in order to save extra lives, and this is deontology' (p. 83).

In the second part of the book Slote develops agent-based accounts of practical reason and ultimately of the human good. These are no longer versions of morality as caring or benevolence, however, but instead invoke a plurality of intrinsically good motives. Such motives, Slote argues, are both necessary and sufficient for well-being. He supports this by first arguing for a form of 'elevationism', according to which we are to understand the putatively lower ethical concepts (well-being) in terms of the higher (the virtues). On this picture there are certain *objective* goods which contribute to well-being, and which involve or require some sort of virtue. Thus the goods of friendship will require virtues of other-regarding concern, the goods of achievement the virtue of strength of purpose or perseverance, with even the 'common pleasures' associated with, say, food and drink requiring some degree of moderation. But Slote's view is not merely elevationist: in the final chapter he argues that 'to each and every (basic aspect of) moral and rational virtue there corresponds one and only one human good whose status as such derives from the way it corresponds to the relevant virtue' (p. 202). The picture is that the virtues both are required for objective goods and explain why certain things count as goods; for it is the correspondence of these to the particular virtues which explains their presence on the objective list.

These sketches should give a flavour of Slote's approach, which constitutes a suggestive and original contribution to moral theory. I have my doubts, though, about whether we can account for *all* of morality in agent-based terms. Indeed, a number of Slote's conclusions seem to derive their plausibility in part from phenomena which are not given agent-based treatments. I can show this by returning to the respective treatments of deontological constraints and well-being.

Despite Slote's arguments, an agent-based ethic of caring seems ill equipped to ground obligations to particular strangers, and as a result will struggle to rule out killing strangers when more lives might be saved. Humanitarian concern operates aggregatively: here 'one doesn't ... feel the need to help any given individual ... at some cost to considerations of overall ... good' (p. 69). But if humanitarian concern does not require us to help (indeed, requires us not to help) any given individual at the expense of the greater good, why should it urge against killing any given stranger so that a greater number of other strangers, or indeed loved ones, might be saved? For Slote, this is ruled out because such sacrifice displays a caring that is 'indifferent to *how* one's actions causally affect others' well-being' (p. 86). But indifference to this, as opposed to indifference to the interests of others, will only be morally relevant if the distinction between how one's actions causally affect others' well-being, i.e., the difference between killing and letting die, is morally relevant. No doubt it is. However, if Slote's account is to avoid borrowing plausibility from an independent source, he needs to show that the moral relevance of the distinction between killing and letting die can be accounted for on agent-based lines, and hence that killing people reflects greater indifference to their well-being than that reflected by letting someone die. This, it seems to me, he fails to do.

Similarly, Slote's account of well-being appears to inherit plausibility from an external source, in this case an *objective list* account of the human good. (We might think that the notion of an objective good precludes any kind of grounding relation

with the choices of humans, no matter how virtuous these might be. If so, it is certainly curious that Slote enlists the help of this notion.) For despite his arguments, his account as it stands is not purely agent-based. We can agree with Slote that the objective good of, say, achievement requires strength of purpose, if by this we mean that something does not count as an achievement unless it involves perseverance; and we can even agree that correspondence with this virtue explains why achievement gets onto the list of objective goods, if by this we mean that what objective goods have in common is their relation to particular virtues. This merely reiterates the fact that the virtues are *necessary* conditions for well-being. But this kind of explanation falls far short of constituting an agent-based account of the constituents of goodness, which requires it to be the case that the virtue of perseverance *makes* achievement good, or that perseverance is both *necessary and sufficient* for the existence of an objective good. This is what Slote must show if his account is to avoid borrowing plausibility from a non-agent-based source; to my mind he fails to do so.

It would, to repeat, be surprising if such an ambitious and ground-breaking approach failed to give rise to suspicions like these. It would be even more surprising if this book did not generate significant interest in agent-based forms of virtue ethics, along with vigorous defences of the approach against the kinds of worries I have raised. It certainly deserves to.

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MICHAEL BRADY

Ideal Code, Real World: a Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. BY BRAD HOOKER.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 213. Price £25.00.)

According to consequentialism, arguably the dominant paradigm in twentieth-century moral philosophy, morality is chiefly concerned with the promotion of value. One natural interpretation of this view construes rightness in terms of the set of rules whose adoption by everyone would produce the best consequences. Although appealing, this form of rule consequentialism (RC) has been traditionally thought to face fatal objections. In an important and influential series of articles over the last ten years, Brad Hooker has challenged this received wisdom, arguing that RC can be reformulated to avoid the standard objections. The result has been a resurgence of interest in an important moral theory. Consequentialist moral philosophers have been awaiting Hooker's book-length defence of the new RC with considerable interest. They will not be disappointed. Hooker constructs his complex theory in a clear and logical manner, introducing significant innovations to defeat old objections. The book passes succinctly from meta-ethical innovations, through detailed comparisons with other major moral theories, to a series of provocative real world applications. Future discussions of RC will begin with *Ideal Code, Real World*. This is the best available interpretation of the collective strand of the consequentialist tradition.

In response to many familiar objections to RC, Hooker now formulates his theory as follows: 'An act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each

new generation has maximum expected value in terms of well-being (with some priority for the worst off). The calculation of a code's expected value includes all costs of getting the code internalized. If in terms of expected value two or more codes are better than the rest but equal to one another, the one closest to conventional morality determines what acts are wrong' (p. 32).

A key feature of this account is the shift from compliance to acceptance, or 'internalization'. This enables RC to avoid one common objection: would it not be best if everyone followed the simple rule 'Always seek to maximize the good'? RC would then collapse into act consequentialism. Hooker's response is that it would be impossible to get ordinary human beings to internalize such an extremely demanding rule. Even if it were possible to do so, the costs would be prohibitive. We should teach a rule better suited to the psychology and limitations of ordinary human beings.

Three other broad features of Hooker's RC are significant. The first is the focus on the expected value of internalizing a code, rather than the actual consequences. This preserves a close tie between wrongness and blameworthiness, since agents cannot reasonably be blamed for failing to predict perfectly the actual consequences of inculcation. The second feature is the adoption of what Hooker dubs 'wary rule consequentialism', the use of closeness to conventional morality as a tie-breaker. This raises the probability that the recommendations of RC will be in tune with conventional morality. A final feature is the focus on internalization by an overwhelming majority, rather than by everyone. Hooker explains and justifies this move as follows: 'We should not imagine that the code's internalization extends to young children, to the mentally impaired, and even to every "normal" adult. A moral code should be suited to the real world, where there is likely to be, at best, only partial social acceptance of, and compliance with, any moral code. An adequate ethic must provide for situations created by people who are malevolent, dishonest, unfair, or simply misguided ... a moral code needs provisions for dealing with non-compliance' (p. 80).

Hooker's defence of RC relies heavily on its plausibility. 'The best argument for RC is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions' (p. 101). However, RC does not merely provide a list of plausible moral judgements. It also explains, underpins and justifies those particular judgements. RC aims to offer a principled rationale for plausible moral rules. Hooker explicitly acknowledges this when arguing for the superiority of RC over Ross-style pluralism.

Hooker's argument for RC is explicitly comparative. We should favour the theory because it does a better job than its rivals. Going beyond Ross-style pluralism, Hooker argues that RC is superior to contractualism too, partly because the latter has no natural way to grant moral status to animals. Within the utilitarian tradition, of course, RC's main rival is act consequentialism, the thesis that the right action is whatever produces the best consequences. Hooker argues that RC is more plausible than act consequentialism. He addresses two issues in particular: euthanasia and famine relief. Both discussions are worthy of careful study, but I shall focus on the latter.

Under act consequentialism, I can keep money for myself only if I would produce more good by spending it on myself than by donating it to a reputable aid agency. That agency could significantly improve the lives of a number of people with a small amount of money. So I can keep only enough money to keep myself alive. All the rest must be given away. I should also devote (virtually) all of my time and energy to fund-raising efforts. These demands strike many as unreasonable.

Hooker argues that, by contrast, RC recommends a much more modest approach to charity: 'Over time agents should help those in greater need, especially the worst off, even if the personal sacrifices involved in helping them add up to a significant cost to the agents. The cost to the agents is to be assessed aggregatively, not iteratively' (p. 166). Hooker suggests that, in the present global situation, such a rule would require 'contributions of at least 1 per cent to 10 per cent of annual income from those who are relatively well off by world standards' (p. 163).

Hooker's new rule certainly seems much less demanding than act consequentialism. His argument that the ideal code will contain some such rule is original and largely compelling. What is less clear is whether this rule really is as moderate as it appears. The true spirit of Hooker's theory seems to require that we ask ourselves not what *we* regard as a significant cost, but what would be regarded as significant by someone who had internalized the ideal code and who lived in a society where its internalization was the norm. The inhabitants of such a world might be much less selfish and materialistic, and much more sympathetic and other-regarding, than we are. They may take it for granted that the appropriate rule governing donations to charity requires sacrifices at which we ourselves would balk. This raises a more general problem. The world of general internalization will be very different from our own. It is very hard to imagine it in any detail. It is thus unclear how much guidance Hooker's new theory can provide. Yet, if we cannot tell what RC recommends, how can we evaluate its comparative plausibility?

Hooker's account of RC offers many useful innovations, which serve to defeat old objections and render the theory considerably more congenial and powerful than many would have thought possible. Perhaps even more important are the book's methodological innovations. Contemporary moral philosophy is full of vague references to reflective equilibrium, the role of 'intuitions' and the need for comparative evaluation of moral theories. Hooker's discussion provides this comparative approach with a much needed rigour. He begins with a clear set of desiderata against which to compare moral theories. The theories should 'start from attractive general beliefs about morality', be internally consistent, cohere with our reflective moral convictions, identify a fundamental principle explaining and justifying those convictions, and 'help us deal with moral questions about which we are not confident, or do not agree' (p. 4). Hooker uses these desiderata to compare his theory with its rivals. Whether or not his readers agree with his conclusions, as moral philosophers they have much to learn from Hooker's careful and judicious method.

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TIM MULGAN

The Mismeasure of Desire: the Science, Theory, and Ethics of Sexual Orientation. BY EDWARD STEIN. (Oxford UP, 1999. Pp. xi + 388. Price \$35.00 h/b, \$18.95 p/b.)

Several years ago there appeared a cartoon with the caption ‘Scientists Discover the Gene for Heterosexuality in Men’. The accompanying diagram indicated such characteristics as interest in football, fear of asking directions and stoic indifference to Judy Garland. The cartoon parodies a popular tendency towards an oversimplified view of the nature and origin of sexual orientation. Against this tendency, *The Mismeasure of Desire* serves as a useful corrective. In this lucid, engaging and ambitious book Stein aims to convince readers that ‘much of what most people think about sexual orientation is probably wrong, or at least misguided’ (p. 5). More specifically, he criticizes the scientific research programme on sexual orientation that has emerged over the last decade, stemming from the work of Simon LeVay, Dean Hamer and others. Stein argues that much of this work, and even more of the popular conclusions that have been drawn from it, rest upon faulty assumptions about the nature of sexual orientation and its relevance to moral and political issues.

The book is divided into three parts: Metaphysics, Science, and Ethics. Part I (Metaphysics) explains the essentialist/constructionist debate on sexual orientation. Essentialists claim that sexual orientation is an objective, intrinsic and culturally independent property of persons; social constructionists deny this. (Following John Boswell, philosophers might say that essentialists are realists about sexual orientation, whereas constructionists are nominalists.) Interestingly, Stein construes the essentialist/constructionist debate as a debate about whether sexual orientations are natural kinds (more on this below).

Part II (Science) consists of a comprehensive survey of the recent scientific literature, followed by a critique. Stein argues that much of the research rests on problematic assumptions, including essentialism about sexual orientation and an oversimplified direct causal model of biology’s role in its formation. He explores alternative explanations for the existing data (e.g., that the alleged genetic markers for homosexuality actually track a tendency to ‘buck the system’, so that those who have it are more likely to be *openly* homosexual and thus more likely to participate in the relevant research).

Part III (Ethics) is the shortest section of the book and comes largely from Stein’s earlier published articles. Here he focuses on the potential moral costs of sexual orientation research (e.g., psychologically damaging attempts to alter the sexual orientation of children). A minor quibble: although Stein acknowledges the claim that truth is valuable even though it may be misused, he does not seem to appreciate this position fully. He writes ‘It is the case that, all else being equal, it is better to believe things that are true rather than things that are false: truth has a certain stability to it and arguments based on truths fare better than those based on uncertainties or falsehoods’. But this response construes the value of truth as extrinsic, which misses the point of those who claim that, all else being equal, *including stability and argumentative success*, it is better to believe true things than false things.

In order to argue against prevailing views about sexual orientation, Stein introduces a helpful analogy to which he refers back regularly. In the imaginary land of Zomonia, residents are especially concerned with one another's sleep habits. Most Zomnians sleep on their stomachs ('fronters'), and until recently there has been pervasive discrimination against the minority who sleep on their backs ('backers'). But backer rights groups have begun to form, and there has been an emerging interest by Zomnians in the historical and scientific study of sleep orientation. In other words, Zomnians treat sleep orientation much as we treat sexual orientation.

Stein contends that 'the Zomnian categories are *scientifically* and *metaphysically* inappropriate.... Implicit in the Zomnian use of the terms "backer" and "fronter" is a view of human nature according to which a person's sleep orientation is a deep and important fact.... [But] it is a mistake to think that there are groups of these people that fit into these categories in virtue of natural and objective facts' (p. 74). Stein clarifies this claim by appealing to the metaphysical notion of natural human kinds. He defines natural kinds as non-arbitrary groups that 'play a role in scientific laws and explanations'; he defines natural human kinds as natural kinds that apply to people (pp. 81, 84). Natural human kinds include such categories as haemophiliacs, people with XY chromosomes, and biological mothers; they do not include such categories as registered Democrats or readers of *The Philosophical Quarterly*. These latter categories are merely social, or 'artefactual', kinds: they have a common property only in virtue of human intentions. Stein explains that the problem with the Zomnians is that they mistake a merely social kind for a natural human kind. The central goal of the book is to uncover a similar mistake in contemporary research on sexual orientation, which typically presupposes, rather than demonstrates, that sexual orientation is a natural human kind amenable to scientific study.

The Zomnian analogy is useful because it helps to eliminate some confusions regarding the essentialist/constructionist debate. In arguing that the Zomnians are mistaken, Stein is not denying that some people sleep on their fronts and others on their backs. Nor is he making a claim about the possible causes of these 'sleep orientations' or the possibility of changing them. (If sleep orientations were genetically determined, then sleep orientation would be a natural kind, but the converse is not true.) Rather he is denying that sleep orientation constitutes a category in nature independent of human intentions, as well as arguing that the Zomnians give this category undue significance in social and political life.

But the Zomnian analogy also suggests a problem with Stein's characterization of the essentialist/constructionist debate. For whether sleep orientation (or sexual orientation) is a natural human kind is independent of how much significance we should give it in social and political life. Some natural human kinds (e.g., people with type AB blood) have little, if any, such significance; some merely social human kinds (e.g., convicted felons) have a great deal. Yet the debate between essentialists and constructionists seems to be more about significance than anything else – at least, that seems to be the salient and fruitful aspect of the debate. Thus essentialists argue that Aristophanes' myth in Plato's *Symposium* proves that the ancients considered gender-preference in sexual object-choices as a distinctive and constitutive feature of personality, whereas constructionists argue that Aristophanes' myth

proves that the ancients' way of organizing their sexual self-understanding was quite different from our own. By Stein's own admission, settling these questions about significance does not settle whether sexual orientation is a natural human kind (p. 90).

It follows either that Stein has misconstrued the essentialist/constructionist debate, or that he has construed it correctly, and, in doing so, has highlighted the confusion of many of its participants. Knowing whether sexual orientation is a natural human kind tells us nothing about the personal, social or political importance it has or ought to have in any given culture; conversely, knowing that people give it such importance tells us nothing about whether it is amenable to scientific study. That said, Stein has done more than anyone, in this and earlier works, to bring clarity and rigour to these issues, and for this we are deeply in his debt. *The Mismeasure of Desire* deserves a wide readership.

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JOHN CORVINO

From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. BY ALLEN BUCHANAN, DAN W. BROCK, NORMAN DANIELS AND DANIEL WIKLER. (Cambridge UP, 2000. Pp. xiv + 398. Price £17.95 or \$29.95.)

The subject-matter of this book is at least as much theoretical as it is practical. The authors argue that new developments in genetic knowledge and technology not only give rise to previously unencountered practical moral problems, but also challenge ethical theory itself. Their aim is 'to develop a systematic, defensible moral framework for choices about the use of genetic intervention technologies' (p. 14). In doing so, their focus is primarily on ethical principles for institutions, even though ethical principles for individuals are also discussed. The authors reject what they call the public health model of genetic intervention, according to which the primary aim of such interventions is to benefit groups. This model, they argue, leads quickly to unacceptable infringements of liberty. They also reject a view they term the personal service model, a non-directive model that defers all decisions about genetic intervention to parents. This model, they argue, while respecting the autonomy of some people, restricts that of others.

Following an introductory chapter, the authors present a brief history and an 'ethical autopsy' of the eugenics movements of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. This 'old eugenics', which was often characterized by bad science, racism and class prejudice, forced sterilizations and, in the Nazi incarnation, mass murder, has cast a shadow over the 'new genetics'. The authors argue that although the history of eugenics provides grounds for exercising great caution in applying new genetic knowledge and technology, the new genetics is not irredeemably connected to and tainted by the evils of the old eugenics. There was a morally acceptable, and even desirable, motivation behind the old eugenics – to improve the lives of future people.

Any account of how genetic interventions may be used, argue the authors, must include principles of justice and harm-prevention. Ch. 3 is devoted to a discussion of

one principle of justice, equality of opportunity. Natural inequalities, note the authors, have traditionally not been viewed as falling within the domain of justice. However, some recent theorists have argued that because natural inequalities are undeserved, there ought to be compensation for these in the distribution of social resources. The authors argue that the new genetics challenges this notion of equality of opportunity in two ways. First, it raises the possibility that natural inequalities may some day cease to be a matter of chance and become subject to choice. If and when they do, it would be possible to equalize natural talents and abilities themselves without having to compensate for them in the distribution of social resources. Secondly, the new genetics poses a threat to the traditional distinction between the subjects of distribution (persons) and the objects of distribution (natural and social goods). This is because altering natural goods may actually amount to altering persons. These are fascinating observations, with potentially radical implications for equality of opportunity. However, the authors show that in practice the implications are unlikely to diverge significantly from the view that the only inequalities which should be addressed are those that result from unjust institutions (rather than from natural differences).

A second principle of justice to which the authors devote considerable attention is what Allen Buchanan has called the 'morality of inclusion'. In an excellent chapter (ch. 7) on this issue, the disability rights critique of the new genetics is sensitively and intelligently discussed. The authors first raise and reject the argument, advanced by some disability rights advocates, that preventing disability by preventing the conception or birth of people with disabilities constitutes a devaluing of disabled persons. The authors then distinguish between an impairment (a limitation of some aspect of normal species functioning), and a disability (an inability, attributable at least in part to the social environment, to perform tasks or functions that most other people in one's reference group are able to perform). Thus not being able to walk is an impairment; being unable to access a building that has only stairs but no ramp is a disability. The authors agree with advocates of disability rights that our social co-operative framework excludes some people by rendering them disabled. They argue that justice requires that reasonable steps should be taken to adapt the social environment in order to make it more inclusive. However, because there are costs to adopting more inclusive frameworks, there are limits on how inclusive a framework justice requires.

The prevention of harm by means of genetic knowledge is the subject of another chapter (ch. 6). The authors first provide an account of reproductive freedom, and reject the idea that the right to this freedom is so strong that it can always override the prevention of harm to the offspring of those exercising it. They then confront the immensely puzzling problem of whether a person can be harmed by being brought into existence with a disability, especially if the disability is not so bad as to make life not worth living. This is what Derek Parfit called the 'non-identity problem'. He has argued that neither of the rival theories, person-affecting and impersonal ones, can resolve this problem. Regrettably, although the authors provide a clear account of the issues, their conclusion is unsatisfying. They themselves acknowledge that they do not provide a full solution. The immensity of the non-identity problem makes this

understandable. None the less it is a pity that so theoretically sophisticated a book concludes only that any adequate moral theory would have to include both person-affecting and non-person-affecting (impersonal) principles.

Questions of justice (and, to a lesser extent, harm prevention) are also addressed in other chapters. Ch. 4 examines the distinction between positive and negative genetic interventions, that is to say, interventions that respectively either enhance normal traits or correct defective ones. The authors argue that although this distinction cannot do the moral work it is often thought to do, it can bear some moral weight. Developing the discussion of enhancement, ch. 5 contains a discussion of whether parents might employ genetic means to produce the best children they can. The authors argue that there are reasons to limit the pursuit of this goal. These include fairness, 'a child's right to an open future', and the avoidance of self-defeating enhancements.

The final chapter of the book is devoted to policy implications of the book's deliberations. There are two valuable appendices. The second of these is an explanation and defence of the methodology employed in the book. The other was written by Elliott Sober, who is not a co-author of the rest of the book. He provides a lucid explanation of the meaning of genetic causation. It is essential reading for anybody who wants to understand some of the complexity behind what has popularly been called the 'nature–nurture' debate.

This book is filled with clear, nuanced and enlightening arguments. Even where one finds oneself disagreeing with the authors, one profits from their analysis and discussion. To avoid disappointment, however, prospective readers should be cautioned that this book does not cover all issues one might expect in a book on genetics and justice. For instance, the authors elected not to examine in any detail the risks of genetic discrimination in insurance and employment, and only a few pages are devoted to cloning. The authors have good reasons for not further broadening the already extensive range of issues they treat. They have tended to focus (although not exclusively) on the more theoretical and less extensively discussed issues. Their readers will be well rewarded.

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DAVID BENATAR

Merit, Aesthetic and Ethical. BY MARCIA MUELDER EATON. (Oxford UP, 2001. Pp. v + 252. Price not given.)

Marcia Muelder Eaton's recent book is a comprehensive study of both the aesthetic aspects of ethical life and the ethical aspects of aesthetic experience. It represents an attempt to reconnect art with life and reveal its true importance. What this entails, however, is an attack on formalism, broadly conceived. Formalism in aesthetics brings together a number of claims about the value and status of art. These include the claims that an appropriate aesthetic response involves sustained attention only to the perceptual and structural features of an artwork, that form and content are separable and only form is aesthetically relevant, that a work's moral value has no bearing on its aesthetic value, and that criteria for aesthetic judgement cannot

include instrumental, practical or extrinsic considerations. All of these claims stem from a desire to protect art from life and have it considered solely on its own terms. Thus formalism requires a strict separation between the spheres of aesthetic value and other life values, particularly ethical value. According to Marcia Eaton, this requirement is misguided, and the claims it supports are mistaken. Instead, she proposes an integrated theory of value, a theory that recognizes the way one kind of value, say, ethical value, can create and sustain another kind, say, aesthetic value. This theory clearly suggests a new direction for both philosophical aesthetics and moral philosophy, one which requires mutual consultation. Ultimately, then, Eaton's book represents an ambitious project, perhaps too ambitious, but desperately needed for the progression of current thinking about art and ethics.

There are four sections. In the first, Eaton characterizes aesthetic experience and its objects in such a way as to allow for the possibility that ethical considerations partly shape the aesthetic. The second section identifies some indicators of the importance of aesthetic experiences in meaningful lives. These include the possibility of aesthetic dilemmas, and the possibility of aesthetic considerations taking precedence or demanding equal consideration. Once the seriousness of aesthetic concerns is established, Eaton devotes the third section to explaining the importance of art in life through an integrated theory of value. Finally, the fourth section examines the consequences of this theory for the creation of sustainable environments and communities and for defending the importance of arts education.

The first central claim of the book is that the aesthetic is socially constructed. Art cannot be isolated from the culture within which it is created and experienced, nor therefore from the system of values which establish its importance in that culture. Thus the value of art, its unique contribution to meaningful lives, depends on a range of considerations, not merely formal but broadly ethical. The way in which Eaton links an argument for the social construction of the aesthetic to claims about the integration of ethical and aesthetic value is suggestive. The crucial point that she needs to emphasize, however, is that one can recognize a range of considerations determining the value of art, while remaining committed to the non-instrumental evaluation of art. If the aesthetic is socially constructed in the way Eaton claims, it seems that evaluating art on its own terms could include attention to ethical considerations. Moreover, if the formalist is right to insist that aesthetic experiences involve direct attention to the intrinsic properties of an artwork, then Eaton simply needs to argue that some artworks have moral properties which are intrinsic and thus aesthetically relevant. Instead, however, she argues only that extrinsic moral facts about a work can affect aesthetic experience indirectly. This weaker claim cannot support the existence of an intrinsic connection between aesthetic and ethical value. But it is just this kind of connection that Eaton requires for an integrated theory of value.

Such a connection is implied, however, in the book's close analysis of a range of cases where aesthetic and ethical considerations mutually inform modes of deliberation, action and assessment. In the third section, Eaton considers the aesthetic aspects of the way we structure our lives and deliberate over courses of action. Strangely enough, she tends to use literary characters to demonstrate points about

aesthetic value in real life. Nevertheless she confirms the ethical importance of various skills which we typically exercise through aesthetic experience, skills for perceiving things as they really are in all their subtlety. Eaton's analysis of a life which involves exercising these skills has one far-reaching implication: it is not only the content of one's actions and decisions but also their form which has ethical significance. The best kind of life, according to Eaton, is a life made meaningful by the pleasurable discernment of its organizing patterns and rhythms. The ethical significance of form clearly establishes a link between aesthetic and ethical value, and it allows her to make a promising contribution to the debate over the ethical criticism of art. At this stage, her contribution is limited to an argument for the moral relevance of a work's aesthetic value, and not for the aesthetic relevance of a work's moral value. Her claim is that the moral success of some artworks depends not just on what is being said or shown, but on the way it is said or shown. A work's mode of presentation is aesthetically significant, according to her, because its discernment requires sustained attention to those intrinsic features of a work which are culturally valued. Thus it is the aesthetic features of a morally significant work, one with moral content, that determine that work's moral success, or its ability to contribute to moral understanding. What is most promising about this claim is that it suggests a way to make cognitivist arguments for ethical art criticism work. So far, most cognitivist arguments have failed to show how an artwork's ability to provide ethical insight has aesthetic relevance. But with Eaton's insistence on the inseparability of form and content, this ethical function is shown to depend on a work's aesthetic features.

Just as form and content are distinguishable but inseparable, so, Eaton claims, are ethical and aesthetic value. But what does this mean? One thing it does not mean is that ethical and aesthetic value are just the same. The book successfully avoids a conflation of the two spheres of value. It is essential that it must avoid this; otherwise any argument for the aesthetic relevance of ethical considerations cannot even get off the ground. Eaton's point is that aesthetic and ethical value are inseparable in experience. It is through an analysis of the complex nature of aesthetic experiences that the book supports an integrated theory of value. As Eaton explains, when we give our full attention to an artwork and its intrinsic properties, we do not shift back and forth between experiencing it aesthetically and experiencing it in other ways, say, morally. We have one experience with aesthetic and moral aspects. This implies that the same feature of a work may be relevant to both aesthetic and moral assessment. Through the example of sentimentality, Eaton argues that many of the evaluative terms we apply in art and life have ethical and aesthetic aspects. Although it remains to be seen whether the example is unique or widely instantiated, it is clearly shown that the term 'sentimental' picks out a combination of ethical and aesthetic properties. Thus it serves as the perfect case study for value integration.

The analysis of sentimentality draws attention to the particular strength of Eaton's book, namely, its informed appraisal of contemporary debates in both aesthetics and ethics. The debates over the supervenience relation, ethical art criticism, and the relation between art and moral understanding, are also surveyed

in a balanced and insightful manner. Most importantly, Eaton uncovers certain assumptions at work in these debates. For instance, she points out that the debate over the overridingness thesis in moral philosophy assumes the separation of ethics from aesthetics. If this assumption is mistaken, as Eaton takes it to be, then the structure of this and other debates collapses: it makes no sense to rank and demarcate integrated spheres of value. This is an important point, and one that receives support from Eaton's carefully selected examples. But it is not enough for this point to be inserted after every critical survey; it must stand as the conclusion of a fully developed argument for Eaton's own position within each debate she considers.

It is in the final section of the book that we see the partial nature of some of Eaton's own claims. As it stands, her theory of integrated value, when applied to policy-making, yields at best only a sketchy course of action – positive and thought-provoking, but sketchy. Eaton is right to dissociate herself from arguments about the improving or corrupting effects of art. The effects she is interested in are those on policy-making that follow from adopting a certain theoretical approach. This approach rests on the assumption that aesthetic experience is shaped by culture. Thus it is possible to learn to see beauty in what is good, and possible also to use skills for discerning beauty to create meaningful lives. These are very interesting suggestions. In fact they deserve a book of their own. If the final section of this book had been dedicated to further development of an integrated theory of value, and if the consequences of this theory were to be fully developed in a further work, then Eaton's contribution to current thinking about art and ethics would be exceptional.

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