



Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Publication details, including instructions for
authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajp20>

Reviews

Published online: 29 Mar 2006.

To cite this article: (1982) Reviews, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 60:3,
282-311, DOI: [10.1080/00048408212340691](https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408212340691)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048408212340691>

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REVIEWS

Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S., *An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations: Vol. I, Wittgenstein Understanding and Meaning*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, pp. xii, 692, £35.00.

Gier, Nicholas F., *Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A comparative study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty*, State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y., 1981, pp. xx, 268, US \$34 (cloth), US\$9.95 (paper).

Block, Irving, ed., *Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, pp. xii, 322, £15.

It is a paradox that the most illuminating chapter in these books is Kripke's seventy-five page paper in the Block collection, 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'. Kripke throws a flood of light on what *Investigations* is about and on the structure of its argument. His interpretation is obviously false, almost self-consciously false, yet in a way because of its falsifications it is much 'truer' to Wittgenstein than more literal readings. The core of Kripke's position is that Wittgenstein's scepticism about the determination of future usage by the past contents of our mind is analogous to Hume's scepticism about the determination of the future by the past (causally and inferentially). "The paradox can be resolved only by a 'sceptical solution of these doubts', in Hume's classic sense". (p. 294) Neither occurrent nor dispositional facts warrant the feeling of confidence a person has that he or she is following a rule correctly. We must bring in the community. 'If an individual passes enough tests the community . . . accepts him as a rule follower, thus enabling him to engage in certain types of interactions' (p. 295). This depends only on the brute empirical fact that we agree with each other in our responses. The obvious counter-examples are mathematics and our direct awareness of our inner states. Wittgenstein deals with the first by discussing a range of mathematical examples in the course of the main argument. The argument against the possibility of a private language is given prior to §243, where it is usually supposed to begin, and is summed up in §202. The paragraphs subsequent to §242 that are usually taken as the private language argument are mainly answers to objections. A bald summary cannot do justice to the detailed interest of Kripke's argument. This central contention is not entirely new, but Kripke does bring a whole range of things into focus in a striking and provocative way.

What Kripke has achieved, I think, is the first successful translation of what Wittgenstein was saying into the idiom of the contemporary Anglo-American mainstream in philosophy. Very roughly, most attempts to interpret the private language argument in this tradition have sought to reconstruct it as a transcendental argument about the conditions of possibility of meaning, based on a semantic theory that perpetually eludes interpreters. Kripke breaks away decisively from this line of interpretation. More radically than Quine or Goodman, Wittgenstein is a semantic sceptic. Indeed he 'has invented a new form of scepticism'. It 'appears that he has shown *all* language, *all* concept formation to be impossible, indeed unintelligible' (p. 268). Moreover, his solution, like Hume's, is to accept the sceptical conclusion, denying its practical importance.

This radical change of tack in the attempt to grasp what Wittgenstein was getting at

is, it seems to me, completely right. But even Kripke has to admit that 'Wittgenstein, perhaps cagily, might well disapprove of the straightforward formulation given here' (p. 273). That puts the matter mildly. Wittgenstein thought that language was *perfectly* intelligible, if only we drop the demand for causal or logical explanations. We have a practical knowledge of our language, and understanding it is simply a matter of becoming fully aware of what we are doing in practice, a matter of describing it correctly and perspicuously. Moreover, his arguments are not directed against causal or logical explanations of language or concept formation. He did not deny that the way things are limits possibilities of language. What he argued against was a deep tendency to demand that such explanations play a role that they cannot fill, namely explaining what language means and what are the grounds of meaning. What such arguments produced for Wittgenstein was a sort of bewilderment, not knowing one's way about. Such bewilderment was not to be met by a sceptical shrug of the shoulders, or a facile acceptance that it did not matter in practice. Nothing could be more contrary to Wittgenstein's view of what he was doing than to characterise his achievement as inventing a new form of scepticism, another paradox for academic philosophers to juggle with. Profound changes in our whole approach, not just to this or that problem, nor even just to traditional philosophy, but to life itself were called for. We must get rid both of this paralysing bewilderment and of the temptation to facile acceptance of it. For Wittgenstein, the fact that what he is saying translates most accurately into another philosophy as a sceptical argument would show that there is something deeply wrong with that way of doing philosophy. Important problems are not solved in philosophy by clever men inventing ingenious theories, as they may be in science.

There are, I believe, some things that are profoundly right and others that are profoundly wrong about Wittgenstein's sort of seriousness even as a response to his own situation, let alone to a situation that has changed significantly since his day. Gier's book reminds us of how much Wittgenstein was a European philosopher belonging to a definite cultural matrix and draws very interesting parallels between the evolution of the phenomenological movement from 'pure' to 'existential' phenomenology and Wittgenstein's development from a 'pure' logicism to the 'forms of life' of his later work. Gier builds up his picture by carefully noting a variety of resemblances and differences in what the philosophers say, tracing influences and invoking the authority of a host of commentators. He does not go in for analyses of key works and their specific problematics, so that his thesis lacks the depths that can come only from grappling with the problematics that underly a philosopher's work. We are reminded, for example, of the phenomenological aspects of Wittgenstein's work, and of the linguistic aspects of the phenomenologist's work, but are left with only vague indications of the link between language and 'looking' in each case. Not that either Wittgenstein or the phenomenologists had clear *doctrines* about these relationships. The presuppositions of their ways of relating the two need to be uncovered. It seems clear that they cannot be uncovered simply by using the tools that these philosophers used. Gier sees the transition from preoccupation with form to preoccupation with *Lebenswelt* as a triumph for the tradition of *Lebensphilosophie* with its emphasis on the primacy and ultimate recalcitrance to formal categories of 'life' itself. But that is a not very illuminating redescription of what happened. It leaves both its dialectical and social origins completely unexplained. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of accurate detail assembled in Gier's book. As an essay in the 'history of ideas' it is very good indeed. One interesting contention is that Spengler had a very strong influence on Wittgenstein, who held *The Decline of the West* in high regard, as von Wright had already noted. I must confess that his affinity with Spengler provides a focus for most of my misgivings about Wittgenstein's acumen and 'seriousness'.

Reverting to the Block collection, it is full of excellent things. Inevitably it suffers from being the umpteenth collection of articles on Wittgenstein. One has to struggle against the sense of *déjà vu*. In fact what these essays amount to when taken together is a clear picture of the current state of the debates in some crucial matters of the

interpretation of Wittgenstein, which are well set out in Block's introduction. That these debates have very important relations to current debates in semantics and philosophy of mind is not so clearly spelled out, but emerges from any attentive reading. Very roughly, Kenny, McGuinness, Ishiguro and Winch line up with Kripke in support of the view that Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a theory of language, while Dummett thinks of him as trying and failing to produce one. Anscombe, if I understand her correctly, says that there is no such theory other than grammar, in the ordinary sense of that word. She pulls up short of a reversion to 'ordinary language philosophy' because she regards the claim that vast numbers of philosophical and metaphysical statements are disguised statements of grammar as 'contentious'. But she admits that this was Wittgenstein's view. So was he an 'ordinary language' philosopher after all? Surely not.

More peripheral to current debates are the articles on the 'picture theory' of meaning. Hacker, Kenny and Stenius clearly do not believe it is dead and buried. Hacker does want to bury it, because it is inextricably bound up with the logical atomism of the *Tractatus*, which is 'madness'. Stenius disagrees, mainly because his version of the picture theory is much 'thinner' than those which connect it with the *Tractatus* ontology (and logic). He connects the theory not with ontologically, epistemologically or logically basic sentences but with semantically 'basic' sentences. Now it seems to come down to the point that the syntactic structure of a sentence has, in some cases at least, a fairly straightforward relation to the structure of a fact that it states, like a diagram, a map or a musical score. But to pass from a map to taking the right road (or indeed the *wrong* road) or from a score to a performance (or vice versa) requires a key, and the question is: 'How is the key of interpretation given to us?' (p. 127). If Kripke is right the later Wittgenstein does not *fail* to give an adequate answer to this question. The key cannot be 'given' in the required sense. So the picture theory cannot be rehabilitated in the context of his later position. But Stenius does make a strong argument that a semantic realist must give a substantial semantic role to the structure of at least those sentences that are taken as semantically primitive.

Kenny's article is of interest both as a reading of the theory of mind in the *Tractatus* and in relation to recent theories of a language of thought. Winch rightly argues that Wittgenstein was neither a truth-conditions nor an assertability-conditions semanticist. In many ways his article complements and corrects Kripke's, and is probably best read after it. Taken on its own it might well appear to be of interest only as a 'theological' argument about the correct exegesis of the master. Cioffi, D. Z. Phillips and Paul Ziff contribute characteristic pieces. Kenneth Blackwell presents a very interesting piece on the early Wittgenstein and the middle Russell based on a great deal of new material from the Russell archives.

The first volume of Baker and Hacker takes us only to §184 of the *Investigations* in six chapters. Each chapter contains an introductory essay, followed by an exegesis of the text. The introductory essays contain a summary of the argument, an attempt to articulate its structure by tree diagrams, and references to parallel passages in other writings of Wittgenstein. What is absent is any reference to parallels such as Gier's book makes with other philosophers. Only a tiny handful of living philosophers are mentioned, incidentally and by way of illustration. Commentators on Wittgenstein are rigorously excluded, irrespective of their sympathies, though the index is no guide to who is cited in footnotes and who is not. Wittgenstein's commerce with other philosophers is seen as almost wholly a matter of his relations with Frege and Russell. Kant, for example, is mentioned only twice, Brouwer not at all. The object is to arrive at a wholly internal reconstruction of Wittgenstein's thought.

A few minor points: the index is a rather casual affair for a book that will be primarily used as a reference book rather than one that is read straight through. The authors excuse this by referring the reader to the index of (the later editions of) the *Philosophical Investigations* to find passages that can then be looked up in the exegetical sections of the commentary. Again, the authors give no concordance of passages,

claiming that it would be of little philosophical interest and that the Tübingen project of computerising and publishing the total *Nachlass* would render it redundant. They do not mention the fact that there is already an excellent *Concordance to Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen* by Hans Kaal and Alastair McKinnon, Brill, Leiden, 1975. It is to this work that the student must go to find the materials for investigating Wittgenstein's usage of key terms, very few of which are even mentioned in the index to Baker and Hacker. The minutiae of philological analysis are not always devoid of philosophical interest. In particular they may pinpoint slides of usage that are quite revealing.

In general Baker and Hacker give very little attention to philological analysis. What they mostly offer is extended paraphrase of the text. The result is almost inevitably a certain blandness. The rough edges are smoothed over, the tentativeness of many of Wittgenstein's remarks is obliterated, the tensions, the precariousness of Wittgenstein's thinking are hidden behind a clearly legible surface. 'Wittgenstein's philosophy is like a stone arch', they write, 'each stone supports all of the others — or at least nothing stands up until everything is in place' (p. 7). Its not at all like that, but more like a painter working on a portrait, adding a touch here and there that calls for another somewhere else. At successive stages something of the sitter is captured, but the total effect that the artist is seeking continually eludes him. What he is striving to do is not to construct some monumental work of art that can be contemplated for its own sake, that stands or is intelligible simply because of its internal coherence, but to induce us to look at the sitter in a new way. In this sense the whole enterprise is radically unfaithful to what Wittgenstein is attempting to do. Kripke's attempt to see for himself, in his own terms, what Wittgenstein was doing is in this respect more faithful to Wittgenstein's intentions than Baker's and Hacker's attempt to display his achievement as a timeless monument.

Perhaps the deepest defect in Baker's and Hacker's work is that they constantly interpret Wittgenstein in terms of an oversimplified dichotomy between the logical and the causal. This dichotomy was indisputably present in the work of the early thirties, and many symptoms of it linger on in the *Investigations*. But even at the terminological level 'logical' is not normally used in the *Investigations* to characterise the 'internal' links between elements of a practice. On the contrary the links in question are practical, a matter of what can be done with specific means in specific circumstances.

This tendency to try to interpret practical connections as logical connections often distorts what is otherwise an admirably clear exegesis and introduces incoherence into Wittgenstein's position. For example, the discussion of explanation (pp. 69ff) acknowledges but fails to account for the gap between understanding a word and applying it successfully. Most people afflicted with red-green colour-blindness understand perfectly well the meaning of the word 'red', even though they cannot apply it reliably, and, of course, there are plenty of more theoretical terms that have a relatively clear meaning but no known application. That does not stop us from looking for an application. An explanation of word-meaning is not itself, in general, an explanation of word application, contrary to what Baker and Hacker allege (p. 75). It does not *necessarily* show how the word is applied or even how it is possible for it to be applied. (Neither the realist nor the constructivist is right.) We may be able to *discover* a way of applying it, and even a theory that enables us to understand how that application works. But the test and justification of such an application lies in practical assessment (which includes theoretical practice) of the results of such applications, not in any attempt to represent the relations between meaning and application as 'logical'. They are, indeed, 'internal' to the structure of the specific practice that arises, but no practice is self-justifying or fixed for all time. It is true we cannot in general stand outside our practices and assess them. We must for the most part take them as given. But they do generate problems internally and because of changes in external conditions, and we can make progress to the extent that we find workable solutions to those problems.

My criticism of the Baker-Hacker book, then, is that it tends to distort the

significance of Wittgenstein's later work by relating it back to the preoccupations that arose from the work of Frege and Russell and forward to the standard assumptions of contemporary British philosophy. It does not open up the problems that arise from Wittgenstein's philosophy or question its residual dogmatism. Nevertheless it is a very substantial philosophical achievement both as construction that stands on its own and as a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's work. It is, I think, both more lucid and more subtle than, say, Dummett's work on Frege, to which it supplies an answer, and is probably more important. It is extremely thorough without being boring or repetitious, very sophisticated and scholarly yet accessible to the uninitiated.

One outstanding merit of Baker's and Hacker's book is the attention given to elucidating the nature and role of what Wittgenstein calls a 'picture' in constituting philosophical problems. For them a 'picture', *Bild*, in this context, is a set of propositions that are taken for granted, held together not by tight logical connections but by natural associations and which determine the questions that arise within a given field of philosophical inquiry, at least for some large group of philosophers. The Augustinian picture at the beginning of the *Investigations* is spelled out as no fewer than fifty-one theses! These theses seem so obvious both individually and collectively that the major effort of philosophers who are captive to the picture is to find ways of overcoming the discrepancies between it and recalcitrant phenomena and of elaborating the possibilities it opens up. It constitutes something like a Kuhnian paradigm, or what Althusser calls a problematic, or Lakatos the hard core of a research programme. But while in science problematics are justified by their fruitfulness, in philosophy they result only in confusion, for they stand in the way of our getting a clear view of our situation. Whether or not this wholly negative evaluation is correct, there can be no question that a major task of the philosophy of any era is to expose to view the 'absolute presuppositions', in Collingwood's phrase, underlying its intellectual life, and Baker and Hacker have made a very determined and persistent effort to do so. This is only one instance of the ways in which their commentary fills out Wittgenstein's work in very fruitful ways.

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O'Hear, Anthony, *Karl Popper*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. xii, 219, £9.75.

To scientists, Popper is arguably the most famous philosopher of science; to his peers, his status looks more equivocal. Accolades quoted with approval by Magee (*Popper*, Fontana, 1973, p. 9) from such scientists as Eccles, Bondi and Medawar ('... Popper is incomparably the greatest philosopher of science that has ever been') are typical. Amid philosophers there appears to be a geographical aspect to this. On the English scene he towers over his contemporaries — viewed by Lakatos, for example, as in the league of Hume, Kant and Whewell (Lakatos, I. 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, pp. 241-273, Open Court, 1973). In ironic contrast to such departures from English reserve, philosophers of science in the United States have tended to regard Popper more soberly. There his stature seems not markedly higher than that of Carnap, Reichenbach and other major figures in the empiricist tradition; certainly he has been the subject of profound criticism in the U.S., by, for example, Wesley Salmon. Whatever may be the reasons for these hyperboles and differences in estimations of Popper, they show the need for a balanced appraisal of his work — to date, at least, for he may not yet be exhausted. O'Hear's fine critical study answers this need very well; that such a timely volume comes from an English pen makes it doubly welcome. Within its modest length, the book treats all the main themes in Popper's philosophy. I shall confine my remarks to a handful of the more prominent issues, emphasising my (comparatively few) disagreements with O'Hear's renderings of them.

Popper's epistemology is centred on his vision of science as induction-free. This dream embodies two theses: a sceptical one, which is straightforwardly Humean — namely, that induction is irrational; and a (re)constructive one, namely that science does not require induction, but can fairly be viewed (or reconstructed) as employing only deduction, in the form of a *modus tollens* falsification procedure. According to Popper, science progresses by a method of conjecture and refutation; falsifiability is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. His reconstruction relies on several key concepts — falsifiability, corroboration, verisimilitude — together with a breakdown of any interesting distinction between theoretical and observational statements, and a conventional view of all such — sitting uneasily with his theoretical realism and Tarskian truth-theory. O'Hear gives a very lucid, systematic and fair account of these well-known features of Popper's philosophy of science, and of their ramifications in other philosophical theatres. In the course of this he provides a thorough-going critique of the whole picture — a critique that, while perhaps not wholly original, deserves to be widely broadcast, especially in his native England, and particularly among scientists.

The deductivist account of science, developed by Popper, is premised on Humean inductive scepticism; but how well, in fact, does he avoid induction? For a start, it should be remarked that a number of authors have argued strongly that his notions of corroboration and verisimilitude are, in the final analysis, inductive. (See Salmon, *Foundations of Scientific Inference*, Pittsburgh, 1967 and 'Rational Prediction', *B.J.P.S.* 32 (1981); and Lakatos, 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction', *ibid.*) The essence of this criticism is that Popper can give no account of *rational* choices or preferences among theories without (tacitly) invoking induction. Since he (unlike some others) insists that such selections among theories are rational, he cannot avoid a 'whiff' of inductivism (Lakatos). O'Hear develops this central point with some originality in his Chapter IV. Its significance can hardly be over-stated, for if induction is inescapable in science, then a great part of Popper's program is vitiated from the outset.

Popper's reconstruction of scientific method, centring on the notion of falsifiability, has been criticised over the last fifteen years on two main counts: (a) any hypothesis logically can be, and historically many have been, shielded from refutation by the utilisation of some 'saving hypothesis'; (b) his 'basic statements', needed to falsify hypotheses, themselves have a hypothetical status, and on his own account cannot be justified by observation. These difficulties render *falsifiability* impotent as a criterion of demarcation between science and non-science. Among others, Lakatos has pressed home the first point ('Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', 1970) and Deutscher, in a powerful piece in this *Journal*, has articulated the second ('Popper's Problem of an Empirical Basis', *A.J.P.* 46 (1968)). O'Hear echoes these main lines of criticism; his treatment of basic statements merits comment. Against Popper's insistence that even basic statements are hypothetical, O'Hear argues that such statements ought to be considered indubitable: 'To question a bedrock belief like this [e.g. that I am sitting at my desk now] would appear not to be possible within our system of theory and evidence; it would be rather to cast doubt on the system as a whole.' (p. 81) Surely this goes too far the other way. There are circumstances where we may rationally doubt such 'bedrock' beliefs, without doubting the system as a whole — indeed, by using it: as when we seem to see, but doubt that there is, an oasis in a desert where we already rationally believe that mirages often appear. The point is that we may acknowledge, with Popper, that basic statements (like more 'theoretical' ones) are always *in principle* corrigible, without thereby denying — as Popper seems impelled to deny — that there are ever, or often, *good grounds for accepting* them. Nor does this insight require that basic statements be 'theory-free', in at least one sense of 'theory'. O'Hear's criticism of Popper does not affect the latter's view (shared by many) that basic statements depend for their *meanings* on the conceptual framework of the observer, just as do statements couched in some more 'theoretical' language.

The denial of a sharp distinction between observational and theoretical language has led to the notion advanced by some authors, most famously Feyerabend, that there can be no theory-neutral observation base; hence that different theories must be incommensurable, there being no rational basis for preferring one to another. O'Hear explicitly rejects this 'incommensurability thesis', and provides an admirable critique of it (his Chapter VI), utilising arguments by Davidson in particular to show that even among quite different theories, there must be large-scale agreement of reference at the (theory-laden) observational level. His thesis here is that 'having a language at all depends on having a largely correct view of the world.' (p. 118) The strength of this critique, however, does not depend on setting up an inflexible dichotomy between theory and observation — a point not fully appreciated, it seems, by O'Hear.

In fact, his apparent acceptance of a dualism between observation and theory weakens his treatment of Popper's avowed realism with respect to theories. Certainly, as O'Hear notes, Popper's refusal to allow that a theory can be confirmed by evidence seems at odds with the realist thesis that theories are putative descriptions of the world. Popper's position here is awkward, but O'Hear still overstates his difficulties. Scientific realism is a thesis about the meaning-status of theories; it is logically prior to claims about the truth-values of individual theories. A theory can only be falsifiable if it *has* a truth-value, that is, if it is understood realistically. This I take to be one of Popper's main grounds for his realism — a point developed quite early by Feyerabend also (Feyerabend, 'Realism and Instrumentalism' in M. Bunge (ed.) *The Critical Approach — Essays in Honor of Karl Popper*, Free Press, 1963). Another ground is the denial of any strong dichotomy between observation and theory: *this* seems to me to strike at the heart of instrumentalism, which cannot even be *stated* without such a dualism (see my *Theoretical Entities and Philosophical Dualisms: A Critique of Instrumentalism*, University Microfilms: Ann Arbor, 1967). O'Hear, who seems to favour the observational/theoretical dualism, is insensitive to this strong anti-instrumentalist case in Popper's epistemology; for his own defence of realism, he relies, fairly enough, on the well-known 'cosmic coincidence' argument of Smart and others.

Popper's treatment of creativity is one of the weakest features of his philosophy, and O'Hear's discussion of it is equivocal. To his credit, in Chapter VII he does dispose of one of Popper's arguments for psychological indeterminism, based on the application of Gödelian sentences to Turing machines. This argument shows the logical impossibility of completely predicting one's own behaviour; but, O'Hear notes, in no way would this prevent *others* from doing so, and in particular from predicting one's problem-solving or creative activity. (p. 146) *This* argument for psychological indeterminism fails; but of course there are other powerful ones, especially from quantum theory, as O'Hear remarks. However, all this is beside the point. There is no important connection between determinism/indeterminism and creativity: O'Hear errs when he says, of indeterminism, 'We then have a possible arena for creative activity on the part of human beings' (p. 146) — implying that creativity would be impossible in a deterministic world. In the same vein, Popper has insisted that creative or inventive activity is essentially irrational (*The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, p. 32). This notion is the merest superstition, quite unfounded, deriving apparently from the 'Eureka!' experience, where a new idea comes 'out of the blue', without immediately-preceding conscious thought. Both authors seem to say here (but contrast O'Hear's last Chapter) that creative activity cannot be *rule-governed* — that creativity, being free, must 'transcend' rules and rationality. This view has always seemed to me quite gratuitous, sustained by neither experience nor reflection. I have urged elsewhere that inventive thinking is often rational, its rationality typically consisting in following (sometimes unconsciously) correct *inductive* inferences (see my 'Invention and Appraisal' in McLaughlin (ed.) *What? Where? When? Why?* pp. 69-100, Reidel, 1982). This conception, at least in so far as it relies on induction, is closed to the deductivist Popper — but it is open to the inductivist O'Hear, who ignores it nonetheless. Although he is insensitive to this deficiency in Popper's view of creativity, O'Hear does compensate by

his neat criticism of Popper's attempted 'World 3' account of invention, to which I turn.

One of the nicest elements of O'Hear's study is his closing discussion of Popper's conception of the 'Three Worlds', of which World 3 seems reminiscent of Platonism. According to Popper, World 1 comprises physical states and objects, World 2 embraces states of consciousness, and World 3 consists of abstract entities, namely the 'objective contents of thought'. As O'Hear emphasises, the items of World 3 are non-Platonic in that they are invented by humans, but Platonic in that, once invented, they are autonomous, i.e. they endure independently of human thought; furthermore, they can *develop* independently. Popper's main argument for the existence of World 3 appears to be that ideas can have consequences unintended and unforeseen by any human; they seem, therefore, autonomous. But, as O'Hear succinctly shows, this proposal raises more difficulties than it removes. It does not explain, as we might expect it to, how we solve problems when in fact we do; for World 3 contains an infinity of falsehoods, as well as truths. Again, there is the great problem of accounting for *causal* relations between World 3 and World 2 (just as there is a problem of causal connection between Worlds 2 and 1 — namely, the Mind-Body Problem, not yet solved — certainly not by Popper, even with Eccles' assistance!). Basically, there is a 'destructive tension in the combined view that World 3 is partially constructed by us and partially autonomous' (p. 187) — that is, in Popper's view that some of our inventions result from or are discoveries by us of problem-solutions, etc. already in World 3, but that others of our inventions occur in World 2, and only after this are injected into World 3. Against these difficulties, Popper's argument for World 3 in terms of unforeseen consequences of ideas seems thin. As O'Hear puts it, 'To talk of rule-governed activity as having consequences unforeseen when the rules were first elaborated does not show that those consequences are laid up in heaven awaiting discovery independently of the dispositions of agents to recognise how the rules are to be applied and their ability to recognise when they are being so applied'. (p. 191)

There is a great deal more in O'Hear's good book — much more with which I agree than disagree. He ably meets the challenge, confronting anyone who sets out to discuss Popper, to say something new and worthwhile. In the course of his treatment he addresses many key problem-areas in contemporary philosophy of science — considering not only Popper, but others who have dealt with these issues. The overall result is a sound piece of scholarship, valuable reading for all who would learn about, and from, Popper — especially, perhaps, from his mistakes.

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Hamlyn, D. W., *Schopenhauer*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 181. £9.75.

This book forms part of the series entitled *The Arguments of the Philosophers*, edited by T. Honderich, and in it Professor Hamlyn accordingly undertakes the difficult task of providing a systematic survey and criticism of Schopenhauer's diffuse, unsystematic writings. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, his performance is uneven, and it is a pity that the very first chapter of substance (the one following the Introduction and headed *The Fourfold Root*) is the least arresting. I say this not for the sake of beginning on a critical note, but rather to warn the prospective reader not to be put off; the book is worth persevering with. It contains, for example, a most useful chapter on the points of divergence between Schopenhauer and Kant (dealing with their views on the categories, judgment, sensation and perception, empirical claims as a basis for metaphysics, and so on), and another which constitutes the best discussion I have yet seen on the place of 'Platonic' Ideas in Schopenhauer. And happily its two most interesting chapters are also those which are the most central to Hamlyn's discussion of Schopenhauer's philosophy: *The World as Representation* and *The World as Will*.

It would not be possible to comment on all or even much of what Hamlyn has to say — given the range of his topics — and because of this, rather than pick on isolated discussions from here and there, I wish to focus on what I hold to be the main issue dealt with in the book: Schopenhauer's claim that the world is representation. I hold this to be the main issue on the grounds that it lays the foundations for that more striking and characteristic claim made by Schopenhauer, that the world is will. By focussing on this single issue I will be able more easily to give an idea of the way in which Hamlyn goes about his task.

All readers of Schopenhauer will recall that his doctrine concerning the world as representation is inseparably tied to that concerning the faculties: in other words, to his views on sensation, understanding and reason. Not unexpectedly then, Hamlyn begins with an assessment of these. He starts out by arguing that what Schopenhauer has to say on the part played by sensation in man's awareness of the world will not do at any price, since Schopenhauer tries to make sensation at once both conceptually contentless *and* a datum from which the faculty of understanding makes an epistemic (albeit non-inferential) move to perception. Little if any sense can be attached to this. In any case, argues Hamlyn, the function attributed by Schopenhauer to the understanding is for a further reason more than it could accomplish: the application by it of the principle of causality could not warrant a transition from sensation to something else as its cause, unless the general form of the principle of causality could bring with it knowledge of *particular* causal connections — something which patently it cannot do. Further, perception is said by Schopenhauer to involve having representations of the causes of our sensations, and yet at the same time to be direct, intuitive knowledge. This is frankly unintelligible. Then when we come to the faculty of reason, continues Hamlyn, we find that again Schopenhauer's claims are unsatisfactory. He holds that reason has the sole function of forming concepts, a function which it is supposed to carry out by a process of abstraction from the representations afforded it in perception. But there is a fatal objection to this doctrine. Such a process of abstraction could take place only if the perceptions supposedly made use of had already some sort of conceptual content. But such a content of course Schopenhauer disallows.

Having in this manner deprived the scheme of the faculties of all plausibility, Hamlyn moves on to consider Schopenhauer's related commitment to transcendental idealism. He presents only two positive arguments in support of this doctrine, we are told, and both of them are worthless. The first amounts to the blunder of thinking that because the functioning of the brain is a necessary condition of our having experience, it is also sufficient for the latter: that because our awareness of the world requires the functioning of the brain, it is for that reason a mere product of it — in the same boat as our dreams. The second argument is, if possible, worse, and goes as follows. All objects of certain and immediate knowledge lie within consciousness. Philosophy must depend for its data on what is certain and immediate. Therefore, philosophy must be essentially idealistic.

As Hamlyn has stated these arguments, they are indeed of an embarrassing kind, and in what concerns the very foundations of his world-view Schopenhauer is made to look foolish. But surely Hamlyn has been rather less than sympathetic here. For, while taken *ad litteram* Schopenhauer's arguments are unsatisfactory, interpreted with more liberality they make good sense to not a few philosophers, including myself. It can be argued along the general lines pursued by Schopenhauer (in Section 21 of the *Fourfold Root* and elsewhere), that the part played by the brain and the organs of sense is very much more than the fulfilment of one necessary condition to our confronting reality as it is *in se* (as it is independently of us). I do not wish to suggest by this that Professor Hamlyn is unaware that such arguments might be deployed (indeed he makes reference himself to an argument from 'creeping assimilations', p. 66). What I wish to suggest rather is that by contrast with, say, Gardiner in the latter's treatment of many issues, Hamlyn on the question of transcendental idealism is needlessly harsh, leaving the reader wondering how a philosopher as incompetent as Schopenhauer is here made out

to be, can later be described as a 'great mind indeed' (to quote Hamlyn's own words).

This sort of criticism is doubtless open to discussion, and in any case is not meant to belittle the book's merits. What is less open to discussion is what needs to be said concerning the general state of the text. Whether the fault lies with the publishers, the editor, proof-readers or Hamlyn himself, I am not sure, but the text in many parts reads like the roughest of drafts. It has an excessive number of misprints, repetitions, glaring examples of bad punctuation, awkward sentences, grammatical absurdities, and eccentric uses of English (we are told, for example, on page 76 that Schopenhauer is 'sometimes misconceived about' certain scientific ideas). I suspect that even the most tolerant reader will be exasperated at this.

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Kortian, Garbis, *Metacritique: The Philosophical Argument of Jürgen Habermas*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 134, \$31.50 (cloth), \$10.75 (paper).

The intention of Dr Kortian's book is to reconstruct the philosophical argument of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School by concentrating on the work of Jürgen Habermas (born 1929). Habermas is mainly concerned with the revealing of deep-level links between theoretical activity as pursued in the traditional disciplines and the interests, motivations and needs of theorists and their social surroundings. Although his project might seem to fall within the currently vigorous sociology of knowledge, Habermas himself would insist on important differences. Whereas the former engages in specific analyses, Habermas describes his work as a 'metacritique'. This title covers two broad groups of contentions. First, Habermas denies to epistemology the pre-eminence which it has acquired in the modern era; he argues that the essential connection between knowledge and interest places epistemology in a position where it must itself be illuminated by social science: 'A radical critique of knowledge is possible only as a social theory'. Secondly, Habermas continues the line of thought revived by Horkheimer and Adorno that the modern but well established dichotomy of fact and value, or of theory and policy, is itself socially determined and must be questioned. Indeed, by distinguishing several basic types of interest Habermas makes the unusual assertion that some theories may in themselves be value-bearers in so far as they are 'emancipatory'; someone familiar with the Frankfurt School will spot here an association with the School's spirited determination to give a 'substantial' rather than 'instrumental' meaning to the notion of rationality.

As far as the first part of Habermas's metacritique is concerned, he is not alone in his programme. The pre-eminence of epistemology has been criticised by the later Wittgenstein and, independently, by writers of Marxist orientation. But Dr Kortian is right in stressing that Habermas's springboard is different: Habermas derives his inspiration from the attack on Kant by Hegel in the Introduction to his *Phenomenology* in which Hegel argues that epistemological programmes start with weighty assumptions, do not achieve their goals and more often than not run into self-contradictions. Indeed, as Hegel puts it, 'the fear of error', which is the moving spirit of epistemology, may impede acquisition of knowledge by 'setting up a mistrust of science'; fortunately, science 'in the absence of such scruples gets on with the work and actually cognizes something; it is hard to see why we should not turn round and mistrust this very mistrust' (*Phen.*, Miller's trans., p. 47). Rejecting the paradigm of correspondence, Hegel puts forward the coherence theory of truth and reinforces his standpoint by a number of 'immanent' criticisms intended to show that the more pretentious aspirations to some foundational certainty must collapse of their own accord. For example, if we insist on some *formal* criterion of truth such as certainty, then certainty characterises all contents of consciousness *qua* immediate, and

characterises none if they are supposed to refer 'with certainty' beyond themselves. Or, if we select a *type* of item as foundational, such as e.g. Hume's 'impressions', before long it fails to be sufficiently veridical.

Dr Kortian tends to follow the Frankfurt School's claim that after Kant's revision of epistemology Hegel aimed at the whole enterprise a blow which was meant to be final. This, strictly speaking, is not correct. Hegel retains a sort of theory of knowledge, his phenomenological method. Moreover, Hegel's attack on Kant was a by-product of a thrust which was essentially ethico-social, not epistemological. Thus though the early parts of the *Phenomenology* do have an obvious epistemological import, the bulk of the work consists of a series of 'immanent' critiques which are meant to show that an inadequate attitude to the world is governed by a principle of thought or action which by its very nature cannot attain the desired goal — and that the actor is not aware, or not fully aware, of this defect. But Dr Kortian is right in maintaining that an important intention in Hegel's display of inadequate attitudes is precisely the uncovering of these opaque presuppositions, the 'phenomenal knowledge of natural consciousness', and that it is the task of the philosophical observer to acquire 'insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge' (ibid, p. 50) by a radically sceptical questioning of these presuppositions. This questioning Hegel calls 'a self-completing scepticism'; it is the process of '(self-)reflection'.

The process of reflection, the realisation that a practical or theoretical view with its cognitive elements exists in a life-situation and has its social genesis, is for Habermas an essential complement to any epistemology. Part of the metacritique, for Habermas, is this: that the subject engaged in critique reflects on its relation to the object criticised. It is at this systematic junction that Hegel's work on socio-ethical attitudes is supplemented, in Habermas's project, by Karl Marx's analyses of socio-economic determinants of knowledge. As a result, the knowing subject which for example in the Kantian epistemology was considered exclusively in its cognitive capacity, is now seen as a socio-historical subject in whom cognition is intertwined with willing and acting. Knowledge cannot be considered in isolation; it is also a reflection of interests.

Dr Kortian draws attention to the fact that although Habermas benefits from Marx's emphasis on the role of labour in man's self-creation, it is original of Habermas to argue that the general phenomenon of labour is not, as it were, monolithic, but conceals two directions which may even conflict: labour may be manipulating in the sense of controlling and dominating, but labour may also be a praxis without these authoritarian features. It is by adapting Hegel and Marx, with some acknowledgments to Peirce, Nietzsche and Dilthey, that Habermas eventually arrives at his threefold division of 'knowledge-constitutive interests': the *technical* (interest in technical control and domination over natural and social reality; the sciences most natural for this motivation are the nomological ones); the *practical* (interest in human interaction and communication; the disciplines expressive of it are history and hermeneutic humanities); and the *emancipatory* (knowledge arising out of self-reflection in Habermas's sense of the word; among rare examples psychoanalysis is one because of its repression-removing activity, and so would be a universal pragmatics having for its task the diagnosing of distortions in communication and the constructing of a domination-free language).

A neglect by any discipline to consider its social determinants or indeed to deny them is, for Habermas, avoidance of self-reflection. And 'that we neglect reflection is positivism'. Habermas sees 'positivism' as that attitude which isolates, in the subject, the cognitive activity from other activities and, in particular, reduces 'proper' knowledge to one basic paradigm, the one used in the nomological sciences. As Dr Kortian puts it, 'The *socio-political praxis* of subjects in dialogue and communication with one another is replaced by *social technology*' (p. 56). When this systematic claim is considered from a historical point of view, Habermas concurs with Horkheimer and Adorno in seeing 'positivism' as the decline of the atmosphere of the Enlightenment when knowledge was naturally opposed to social forms of privilege and domination.

And as theory had not yet divided the socio-historical subject into watertight compartments of cognising, willing, acting, and so on, knowledge was at the same time a moral force. Truth, enabling emancipation, was good; falsity, assisting oppression, was evil. Subsequent developments have, however, produced the emergence of 'value-free' science and the dichotomy of theory and policy, with the result that science as technology came to be ever more subordinated to dominant ideologies. In particular, the success of science and technology has produced the conviction that problems can be solved by 'rational decision-making', thereby obscuring the fact that technocratic decision-making can be rational only in relation to a goal (usually decided by the socially powerful) and is essentially 'instrumental'. In a world in which values are taken to be mere preferences, the very idea of 'rational decision-making' appears as a solid rock in an ocean of subjectivity, but what in fact happens is that this 'rationality' conceals covertly selected goals. Thus, to the Frankfurt School the quest for a new Enlightenment and the interest in emancipation is bound up with ethical characteristics anchored once more in facts. In Habermas's theory, ethical differentiations are provided by the differentiation of interests.

The chief merit of Dr Kortian's book is that it places Habermas's complex arguments in direct relation to their philosophical background, especially among the German Idealists and their critique by Marx. The book is a pretty faithful representation of Habermas's work and aspirations. (It is a pity that the translator chose to be more literal than was necessary; for example, the reader is all too often puzzled and occasionally misled by unnatural successions of syntactic emphases.) But there are defects, too. Attempting to be faithful, the author not only plays down controversial contentions but also overlooks related materials that would have supported Habermas's cardinal argument. As an example of the former defect, one would have expected a more solid discussion of Habermas's dissatisfaction with the fact-value dichotomy. As an example of the latter defect, it was surprising to find no mention of Erich Fromm's interesting attempt to produce a theory of substantial rationality — and Fromm was, after all, a one-time member of the School. While Habermas's theory of rationality suffers from a somewhat arbitrary connection of *concepts* (just as his threefold division of interests hardly does more than postulate a separate interest for each of the three types of knowledge), Erich Fromm has a psychologically credible theory in which rationality or reasonableness is the manner in which certain emotions operate. When Fromm distinguishes, in *The Sane Society*, between intelligence and reason, the latter is an empirical dynamic factor of an emotional nature, which tends to be cognitively objective rather than prejudiced, behaviourally reasonable rather than selfish, egalitarian rather than exploitative. On Fromm's account, reason is not a separate faculty but a different label for a set of observable phenomena; this account is superior to Habermas's theoretical reification and could give content to Habermas's concept of 'the interest of Reason' (borrowed from Kant) or 'the interest of Reason in emancipation' (Habermas's own construct).

The book also contains a sympathetic and helpful 21-page introduction by Alan Montefiore and Charles Taylor, in which Habermas's enterprise is considered 'From An Analytic Perspective'; 'analytic' here means, roughly, the Empiricist tradition.

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Mackie, J. L., *Hume's Moral Theory*, London, Boston and Henley, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. viii, 166, £8.95 (cloth), £4.50 (paper).

John Mackie's characteristic virtues are fully in evidence in this work. It is a clear, historically informed and concisely argued account of the views on morality which Hume developed in the *Treatise*. It is critical, but in a constructive spirit. Penetrating criticisms of the views of Hume and his opponents lead to a reformulation of the

arguments and a sharpening of the alternatives between which we must choose. Mackie's own philosophical views had so much in common with Hume's that it is not surprising that his conclusion is that Hume's most striking doctrines can be interpreted in such a way as to survive the criticisms made by his successors. The interpretation that is necessary to enable them to survive uses the analytical tools of recent moral philosophy, and accordingly develops a view which is, in association with Mackie's other work, a significant contribution to the contemporary debate.

After a brief introductory outline of the main features of Hume's theory, Mackie succinctly but incisively reviews the work of his predecessors from Hobbes to Butler. Mackie firmly believes that "Hume's theory is best seen in the context of, and as a contribution to, an extended debate on moral philosophy which we can take as beginning with Hobbes, being continued by members of both the 'rationalist' and the 'moral sense' or 'sentimentalist' schools, and concluding with the writings of two of Hume's critics, Richard Price and Thomas Reid" (p. vii). Most of the material to which Mackie refers in this review is readily available in Raphael's *British Moralists 1650-1800* (Oxford, 1969) to which Mackie gives references. My only reservation about the chapter on Hume's predecessors concerns the discussion of Hutcheson's theory of moral goodness (p. 33). Mackie appears to formulate one alternative erroneously: where he says that Hutcheson might have regarded an action's being morally good as consisting in our seeing it as calling for benevolence and love, the subsequent argument requires that we see its benevolence as calling for our approbation.

The next five chapters (III-VII) are respectively devoted to a critical analysis of the sections of the *Treatise* concerned with the psychology of action, the claim that morality is not based on reason, the claim that it is based on sentiment, the 'artificial' virtues and the 'natural' virtues. Mackie's analysis of the earlier sections has much in common with that of Jonathan Harrison, whose *Hume's Moral Epistemology* is fairly extensively referred to. The value of the intellectual background sketched in chapter II also becomes apparent. For example Mackie comments on the difficulty of reaching a consistent interpretation of what Hume meant by saying that moral distinctions are not derived from reason as follows:

We may surmise that Hume himself was not quite clear about what he was doing; perhaps he set out only to argue against rationalists like Clarke and Wollaston, but found that he had, without intending this developed arguments with more sweeping implications. It may, therefore, be impossible to find *the correct* interpretation of what Hume says; but we can examine and evaluate some of the different arguments which can be constructed with his materials. (p. 52)

In the pages which follow Mackie frequently distinguishes different arguments by identifying possible targets for them in Hume's opponents. His conclusion is that this section of the *Treatise* (III. i. 1) is neither as neat nor as conclusive as it initially seems to be. He regards the famous passage about attempts to derive 'ought' from 'is' as a statement of a thesis which is in need of supporting argument, and argues that the necessary support is to be found not just in this section, but also in the doctrine of the 'artificial' virtues.

Mackie also believes that Hume's account of the basis of moral distinctions in *Treatise* III. i. 2 presents serious difficulties of interpretation. He distinguishes four different versions of sentimentalism (dispositional descriptivism, emotivism, prescriptivism and the objectification theory) and concludes that while much of what Hume says would be consistent with a mixture of the different subdivisions of dispositional descriptivism there are some hints of the objectification theory. This theory has obvious connections with the 'error' theory of moral judgments defended by Mackie in his *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Penguin, 1977) in that it holds that we ascribe features such as obligatoriness to actions by a process of projection. The discussion of this process in the chapter under discussion and its further elaboration by Mackie in his concluding chapter add to the earlier theory by giving a more detailed

account of how the features which we ascribe to actions are created in thought by the operation of the moral sentiments which the actions evoke.

Chapter VI contains an extended and illuminating discussion of Hume's account of the artificial virtues. Mackie believes that important truths can be distilled from this account, which is required not just to fill out the case against rationalism but also to remove some significant flaws in the doctrine of the natural virtues given in the next main section. But the process of distillation involves some revision. Mackie detects both confusion and undue reliance on weak argument at crucial points of Hume's discussion.

An interesting example of the former is Hume's attempt to show that there would be a vicious circularity in holding that the motive which constitutes virtue is 'regard to the virtue of the action'. Mackie argues that the impression that there is a vicious circularity here is the result of failing to realise that the question 'What makes the action virtuous?' is ambiguous. It may mean 'What makes this action really virtuous and not just apparently so?', in which case it can be answered by saying that the action was done from the right motive. This would not answer the question if the original inquiry was equivalent to 'why are actions of this sort approved of?'. An adequate answer to this question needs to explain why the conduct under discussion is favourably regarded, which, in the case of the artificial virtues, requires some reference to the general advantages of the adoption of such behaviour. Mackie argues that Hume must, to make his view of the artificial virtues coherent, relax his principle that actions count as virtuous *only* in so far as they are signs of virtuous motives. For he believes that we need to be able to approve of, for example, honest behaviour because it is generally advantageous and not as a sign of a particularly admirable motive. I am not convinced that Hume is compelled to choose Mackie's option. For it appears to imply that the agent is to be praised and to gain moral credit for a mere outer conformity in the case of virtues such as honesty. This conflicts with the answer given above to the first interpretation of Hume's main question about the virtue of actions. What seems to be required is a distinction between approving of the agent as we do when we praise or blame, and determining what it is right for him to do, leaving it open that the right act may be done for the wrong reason. Mackie's solution to Hume's admitted problems does not fully resolve them.

Mackie is sympathetic to Hume's account of how co-operation problems can be resolved by what he calls 'conventions'. He gives an excellent summary of the doctrine, supplementing what Hume says in places. For example, he shows how the practice of promise-keeping once established would be reinforced by moral feelings. He proceeds to argue that Hume was mistaken to speak of the willing of an obligation when we promise as a 'fiction'. It is consistent with Hume's account that I can voluntarily do what I know will expose me to condemnation by others if I break my agreement. Hume should have said that this was what willing myself to be under an obligation amounts to.

The discussion of the natural virtues is understandably briefer, but it makes several valuable points. The most significant amendment which Mackie proposes is that the natural virtues must be seen as having a systematic character and thus as sharing some of the features of the artificial virtues. The form taken by the dispositions which embody these 'natural' virtues is to be explained by sociological as well as psychological factors. Thus the two sorts of virtue are more similar than Hume's account implies. This amendment also enables certain difficulties in that account to be met. Mackie argues in addition that Hume needs to accept assistance from Aristotle to enable him to draw a necessary distinction between virtues and natural abilities; he was too ready to discount the importance of the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary because of its use by certain 'divines' to whom he was opposed.

Having now surveyed the relevant sections of the *Treatise*, Mackie turns in chapter VIII to a consideration of how Hume's successors reacted to them. One advantage of this discussion is that it enables him to argue that only one version of rationalism — an intuitionism of the type favoured by Price — and only one version of sentimentalism — the objectification theory already referred to — remain as defensible options. A

powerful criticism of Thomas Reid leads to the conclusion that he did at least show that no non-cognitivist view, whether emotivist or prescriptivist in form, can give a plausible account of our normal moral thinking and language. We do not take ourselves to be relying on our feelings, rather we claim 'that there are objective requirements for or against possible actions'. (p. 144). The objectification theory survives because it accepts this correct moral phenomenology, but explains it as an illusion.

The final chapter seeks to add to this conclusion. Mackie first sharpens his characterisation of the objectivist alternative, which assists in identifying exactly what it is that his preferred theory objectifies. The key element is the sense that actions are categorically imperative. This impression is acquired because we take as objectively valid a system of evaluation which is in fact embodied in an inter-personal system of practices and which also includes pressures derived from sentiment for or against actions of the types involved in the practices. We do not need to give a utilitarian account of these practices; Mackie argues that Hume did not. Hume is seen as closer to Hobbes than to Hutcheson because of the leading role played by self-love in this interpretation. But is morality on this account a good thing? Mackie briefly develops a line of objection which makes an ingenious use of the unpublished views of Ian Hinckfuss, to the effect that we would be more satisfied with our lot without the categorical element. He concludes that as long as we understand it for what it is, the dangers can be averted.

The conclusion also indicates that Mackie saw that further work needed to be done to defend this conception. We can only regret that he did not live to take these matters as far as he would have wished. But we can be grateful that we have works such as this to remember him by.

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Casteñeda, H. N., *On Philosophical Method*, Bloomington, Nous Publications, 1980, pp. 151. Review No. 6 US\$6.25.

The problems of what philosophy is and how we should go about doing it are perennial ones. This book contains Casteñeda's reflections on the subjects. The book is a very short one, with just 118 pages of text. Consequently much of the discussion is brief and often alarmingly vague. Moreover the book bristles with jargon which does not receive sufficient explanation. In this review I will explain what I understand to be Casteñeda's position and assess it. In the course of this I will substantiate the above criticism.

The aim of metaphysics is, according to Casteñeda, to determine the most general structure of the world. It might be thought that this is the province of physics, not philosophy. However the categories of the structure that Casteñeda has in mind are things like *object*, *property*, *event* and *action*, which belong to metaphysics. Forty years ago, this sort of enterprise would not have been looked on favourably. However, determining the behaviour of these categories is an integral part of modern semantics. Casteñeda's goal is therefore not only legitimate but essential. However Casteñeda has an idiosyncratic view of what the world is. He says 'Let us call the complex of a person's world and totality of experiences, together with his/her true beliefs and their consequences, the *person's reality*' (p. 18). A person's reality seems to be a horrible cross-categorical mixture. However it is quite clear that it is subjective. Casteñeda does admit that there is an objective reality too. (p. 53). Why then does metaphysics not determine the structure of *that*? The reason, Casteñeda thinks, is that there might be a radical disjuncture between reality and *my* reality (p. 18). This is supported by Cartesian arguments (p. 46). Now if radical sceptical arguments like this are legitimate, Casteñeda is in trouble since such arguments can be deployed at various places against the adequacy of his method. For example the problem of induction can be raised against his hypothetico-deductivism. Casteñeda's metaphysical method is termed 'empirical

semantico-syntactical structuralism'. It has three main steps.

Proto-philosophy. First we collect relevant data. This is of various kinds. However the most important type of data is linguistic: the basic semantico-syntactical categories and their contrasts (e.g. indicative/subjective). Why should we suppose the categories of language to reflect the categories of reality? Casteñeda's answer (p. 45) is a fairly familiar one: the fact that our language has been filtered through an evolutionary sieve gives us some reason to believe that it now meshes with reality. Whatever its cogency this argument is certainly not available to a subjectivist such as Casteñeda, depending as it does on very general scientific facts whose verification go beyond his subjective experience, and to which he is not therefore entitled. Casteñeda is clear that data is not to be taken at its face value: it has to be *exegecised*. This is some kind of process which sifts the data, but its exact nature is never explained. One example we are given is that certain contrasts are idiomatic and should be ignored. However we are not told on what grounds we are to judge that a contrast is idiomatic, and it is difficult to see how this could be done without begging the question against some theory which the exegecised data will have to judge.

Sym-philosophy. Once we have enough data we may start to theorise. (Casteñeda warns us about premature theorising (p. 112) but never explains how we know we have enough data). Theories are tested *à la* hypothetico-deductivism, and if necessary, developed in such a way as to account for recalcitrant data, possibly by being embedded in a more general theory. (p. 102) Finally, any theory that is not simple enough is eliminated (p. 125). All this is familiar from the philosophy of science, but unfortunately so are its problems. For example both the nature of simplicity and the rationale for discriminating in favour of the simple are standard problems. But Casteñeda has little to say on them.

Dia-philosophy. Once we have completed stage two we will be in possession of a number of maximal (p. 15) or total (p. 54) theories. (Though what these mean exactly is not explained.) We then 'establish, through isomorphisms among [the maximal theories], a system of invariances'. (p. 15). This is problematic for three reasons. (i) Why should a theory ever be maximal (especially in virtue of general incompleteness theorems)? Casteñeda realises that this stage of philosophy is as yet a 'visionary dream' (p. 103). Why it can be anything else he does not explain. In fact it is not even realisable on Casteñeda's own principles. For he insists that a theory is not acceptable unless it can be embedded in a larger system (p. 119) — in which case it is not maximal. (ii) Even if we had some maximal theories what exactly are we supposed to do? Find isomorphisms. But what are they? In the context of mathematics 'isomorphism' has a determinate meaning. It is a one-one function between two sets which preserves structure. But a philosophical theory is not a set. And even if we suppose the theories to be formalised and we identify the theory with the set of its theorems, what sort of structure are we supposing to be preserved? In the absence of an explanation it would seem that Casteñeda is playing fast and loose with mathematical terminology in a regrettable way. The notion of invariance is similarly obscure in this context. (iii) Even if we could find invariances, what would be the point? Casteñeda's suggestion is that it is the invariances which 'constitute the ultimate structure of the world'. (p. 104). This seems to draw on the idea frequently invoked by physicists that any quantity that depends on the observer is not an objective property of an object, and conversely, that it is those properties that are frame-invariant which are real. Casteñeda's move depends on assimilating a 'maximal' theory to an observer and the intertheoretic to the intersubjective. The idea is interesting but it is not at all obvious that the analogy will take the required weight.

I have discussed the trees of Casteñeda method. I want finally to have a look at the wood. Casteñeda sees the correct philosophical method to be essentially the same as the scientific method (p. 128). As will now be clear, his conception of scientific method is a variety of empiricism. It is rather ironical that he should be recommending this as an account of philosophy when, as an account of science, it has for some time been fighting

a pretty desperate rear-guard action. Moreover many of the fundamental problems of Casteñeda's method spring from this empiricism (for example, the problems of how data can be pre-theoretically screened and how method can be justified a priori). And Casteñeda's notion of dia-philosophy is an attempt to solve the problem of the relativism into which empiricism so often collapses. In fact, it is not uncommon since the scientific revolution for philosophers to advocate doing philosophy as they think science is done. Neither is this necessarily wrong. But it does mean that an inadequate account of science, such as empiricism, can become an inadequate account of philosophy, which is what, I think, is in Casteñeda's book.

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Monro, Hector, *The Sonneteer's History of Philosophy*, Clayton Ancora Press, 1981, pp. 32, \$20 (limited cloth), \$5 (paper).

This is a *Sonneteer's History of Philosophy*. Poets are, perhaps, various in kind, but sonnet writers — modern ones at least — can be relied upon, I think, to be pretty cavalier about history and, when they sonnetise at least, to be not strongly bent on argument. Once upon a time I wrote some sonnets. That's my title to write the present review and to speak from the sonneteer's *inside* (donning, as I do so, my faded English lit. club tie of yore). Actually, I retired, completely unsuccessful, from the sonnet to the cleriheW and gained some approval for a piece which, though false and somewhat scurrilous in content, did achieve a certain style in rhythm which was not entirely conventional. I ended two sentences in the middle of disyllabic rhymes! However, these liberties with the muse — if liberties they were — pale beside the boldness of Hector Monro's prosody, to which I will shortly return.

Twenty five witty and irreverent sonnets, together with a prefatory one and a coda, make up this slim volume. Clearly, as history, this leaves a lot out, the more so since Descartes and Berkeley each get two (however Heraclitus and Parmenides share the same fourteen lines). On the other other hand, would you have put Bernard Mandeville among your top twenty five (leaving Socrates out)? No great heed is paid to finer points of exegesis. Did Hegel really say, precisely?

That what's supremely Real and Rational
The Absolute's completest avatar
Is that inhuman, disembodied Czar,
The all consuming, all demanding national
(And guaranteed non-shrinking) sovereign State.

So this history says. Other judgments — judgments abound — have a similarly terse, rough justice. As I began by saying, this *is* a Sonneteer's history, wry but engaging, an entertainment not a study.

I compared Monro's Poetic diction with the rhythmic adventures of my own unprintable cleriheW. But Monro's rhymes — such as, for 'Plato'

... young Hamlet's mate O-
Phelia ...

and for 'Leibniz'

Too bleak and cramped and chilling to describe, 'n' its
Quite windowless; and then Voltaire's old gibe knits
Those doubts together ...

quite eclipse my best juvenilia. Nor did the happy thought ever occur to me to rhyme 'bewilder' with '—'. He makes equally free with the sonnet form. Some appear as Petrarch, Shakespeare and others wrote them but some, I suspect, as no one ever

patterned them before. All lines in the sestet of sonnet VI rhyme together. To get the best from them, in my opinion, they must be paused, in reading, as prose — no stops or accents for rhymes and a line's end. Go boldly on till the *sentence* finishes; the rhythm is quite able to impose itself.

Searching a meagre memory — much have I *not* travelled in the realms of gold — my best comparison of Monro and a great poet is with Byron's acerbic *Don Juan*. I recall Byron's disdain for the end line pause, his often shatteringly chaotic and dissonant rhymes, and his unswervingly sardonic tone. Monro's History is altogether more genial — no bitter tastes — but pungent enough to bear the analogy. I end this review with a sample (not necessarily the best) and my commendation.

DESCARTES

Rene Descartes, A Mercenary Warrior,
Seated one afternoon upon the stove,
A place, he found, where inspiration throve,
Dug deep into his consciousness to quarry a
Proof of his own existence; life is sorrier
If mankind is unable to remove
Those nagging doubts that will arise to prove
That we are, in a word, phantasmagoria.
And if you say: "No doubts like these alarm me,
I've never felt that life is Kafkaesque,
That I, and all about me, are grotesque,
A farce with neither humour nor cohesion"
It's clear that you, unlike the first Cartesian,
Have never been a soldier in the army.

Graham Nerlich

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Anderson, John, *Education and Inquiry*, Phillips D. Z., (ed.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980, pp. xi, 228, £12.

Few would have thought of a Welsh connection for John Anderson, and certainly not with some of the leading Swansea Wittgensteinians. This book, edited by D. Z. Phillips, brings together Anderson's main writings on education, nine essays and a series of lectures, spanning thirty years. Phillips was introduced to Anderson's work at Swansea by his teacher Rush Rhees; and Rhees had studied with Anderson in Edinburgh in the 1920's before Anderson left for Sydney.

The author and editor of the book are not its only begetters. It is the outcome of eleven years of broken preparation; and during that time Phillips was assisted notably by Ruth Walker and T. A. Rose, sometime members of the Sydney Philosophy department, and by W. H. C. Eddy of Sydney among others. Rose and Walker prepared the version of the 'Lectures on the Educational Theories of Spencer and Dewey' (1949) which forms one third of the Andersonian text in Part Two. (The version is based on lecture notes lent by Dr R. E. Dowling of the University of N.S.W. I believe — though the point is not made clear — that they are Anderson's 'ipsissima verba' and that they have not been published previously.) Rose also drew up the very useful index and did much of the proofreading. Part One consists of three essays on Anderson and educational themes by P. H. Partridge, John Mackie, and Eugene Kamenka respectively. These essays, occasional pieces written for other Andersonian occasions, certainly provide an appropriate if over-long introduction. But one may regret that Phillips did not take the opportunity to explore the intellectual connections which mark the Swansea association of Andersonian and Wittgenstein thought. *That* would have made an interesting introduction.

The Anderson essays, comprising Part Two of the book, are grouped loosely on a basis of subject affinities. The first two, 'Classicism' and 'Socrates as an Educator', bridge the years, the former published in 1960, the latter in 1930. The lectures on Spencer and Dewey of 1949 can be linked with them. Four essays mainly concerned with educational reform and social questions, and mainly written in the war years, form a second group. Two essays from the same period, 'Art and Morality' and 'Religion in Education', indicative of two of Anderson's leading critical concerns, follow; and the collection closes with a short 1960 paper which returns to the theme of the middle period, 'The Place of the Academic in Modern Society'. (Data concerning the original publication of the articles can be found in the Acknowledgements, pp. vii-viii. It would have been helpful if at least the appropriate year of publication or writing had been given with each of the items.)

Anderson's thinking about education is one with his thinking about philosophy. The themes which emerge and re-emerge in these essays belong to the familiar corpus of his philosophical ideas, in metaphysics and epistemology briefly, in political and social philosophy more insistently. In many cases the essays provide valuable witness to the issues of their time — the fervour of the 'social reconstruction' debate in Australia during the Second World War for example (Essays 8, 9 and 10) or the matter of literary censorship (Essay 11). But the character of the discussion transcends the original setting. The collection does not constitute a developed or comprehensive philosophy of education. There are many philosophical questions about education which Anderson did not have occasion to discuss; on many issues, too, he presents views for which argument is lacking in this source and he sometimes ignores opposing views or dismisses them with a sharp but inconclusive sentence. There is no question, however, about the general interest and strength of these essays as expressions of Anderson's thought. And in regard to the topic of education they deal with ideas and arguments of enduring importance.

Two themes dominate the essays. There is a relentless criticism of utilitarian ideas and a persistent affirmation of the value of critical thinking. The two themes are pursued most characteristically as a defence of classical education, primarily the study of language, literature and thought in classical Greece and Rome. The educational pre-eminence of the classics is the thesis of the 1960 essay 'Classicism'; it is also a main theme in the lectures on Spencer and Dewey of 1949 and is an important element in Anderson's critique of wartime discussions concerning the future of education (originally pursued in the pages of this journal). Its relevance to the other essays is more indirect but no less real. Classical or liberal education, as Anderson conceives it, is anti-utilitarian and essentially critical; it is concerned with the permanent and the general as opposed to the merely temporary and the particular; it is marked — as were the classical ages themselves so Anderson believed — by the objective outlook, the practice of 'seeing things as they are'. Observation and experiment are the universal educational methods, he says in 'Religion in Education' (p. 203); but he associates these methods with the study of the classics, not the sciences which are seen as largely uncritical and too much taken up with the utilitarian idea of trying to improve things.

Anderson's discussion of these ideas involves frequent reference to two of the central topics of his social philosophy: his rejection of voluntarism, the belief that how things go in a society depends on individuals or groups of individuals making choices and implementing policies; and his allied rejection of solidarism, the idea that a society can be thought of as a unity with needs and interests as a whole which might be served, for example, by education. For Anderson, a society is pluralistic, the locus of diverse and often antagonistic movements reflecting different ways of life; and movements and institutions are often themselves the locus of diverse sub-movements; and all are prior to individuals and their choices.

Against this complex background he is critical of any thinking of a means-end type in regard to education: education is not vocational, it is not for personal or social development. (Anderson has a very broad understanding of what counts as utilitarian

thinking.) He is critical of any talk which links description with policy recommendations in the social sphere (which is invariably talk of trying to make things better). On these grounds alone, to say nothing of specific views, he is critical of Spencer and Dewey and the Australian Council for Educational Research (especially the writers of its 1940's series 'The Future of Education'). What he favours is an education which is intellectual, systematic, elitist, the finding of a way of life which is in all things the expression of the critical, that is, the classical or objective, outlook. It is possible to applaud the main force of Anderson's anti-utilitarian stand and his emphasis on critical thinking and yet to believe that certain things are wrong or open to question in his general position.

Anderson, making much of the distinction between description and advocacy, pillories "the familiar conjunction of description with projects of 'reform'" (p. 170). But his account of education as critical is strongly normative in regard to educational structures, teaching methods, and curriculum content and has definite social implications. (The essay 'Religion in Education' provides very clear examples.) He engages in criticism with coolness, but the argument is everywhere suffused with moral force. Again, his claims on behalf of classical ages carry an echo of tales of some golden age and would have to be considered as immoderate if treated as merely descriptive. The account he gives of classical education also has a measure of partiality. Anderson points to the way in which science develops in terms of social interests; but he neglects the once powerful role which classical studies exercised in social and political life.

The case against solidarism is associated in these essays with a strong defence of educational autonomy, especially in universities, against the encroachments of governments and business interests and professional bodies. It is also linked with a strong elitism. It is not simply that Anderson insisted on high academic standards and saw them as everywhere in decline. For him, education is a distinctive social activity in conflict with other movements and is, of its nature, a minority interest. He was not merely critical of the egalitarian rhetoric which commonly surrounds the idea of universal education. More strongly, he thought of universal educability as a false conception and he was critical, therefore, of education for the masses.

It is important to note that his elitist view turns on a specific understanding of education — and of culture — as defined by classical learning and the classical outlook. Universal educability might then indeed appear dubious and the idea of a broadly shared culture seem silly. On the other hand, Anderson, in a more liberal frame of mind, interprets his criterion of education as equivalent to the development of critical powers and of the capacity to see things as they are. But he fails to recognise that such an understanding of education can allow for a wide variety of levels of capacity and achievement. In these terms the repudiation of general educability becomes the dubious thesis; and his implicit rejection of most human cultures (including much of western culture) appears absurdly narrow. Anderson's radical elitism was obviously associated with his social pluralism; but it is clear that it is not entailed by it. (For education could be treated as a distinctive movement in which all might share, albeit in different ways.)

The opposition to voluntarism, part of the general critique of utilitarian thinking, draws support from the third of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. The problem for those who think that society might be improved by education is the education of the educators. Traditional materialism, Marx contended, sought to deal with this problem by positing a distinctive group, superior to society in effect, which is assumed to have the necessary knowledge; in place of this, Marx proposed his theory of working-class revolutionary practice. By the 1940s Anderson had come to think of Marx's solution as utopian. But he endorsed the first paragraph of the third thesis as posing an insuperable problem for social reform through education ('to improve society we have to improve education, but to improve education we have to improve society' p. 163). With Marx, Anderson rejects the idea of a body of improvers standing above society who 'presumably get their own education by revelation from on high'. But he concludes too readily to an apparent policy of self-contained spheres of action between education and

social and political movements. The point is that the exercise of critical powers fostered by education is itself a social and political phenomenon; and the fostering of these powers can be seen as a major contribution of education to general social conditions — perhaps even to their improvement. No one, one would think, could have been more aware of this than John Anderson. But his opposition to social utopianism and authoritarianism leads to a form of quietism, a theoretical standpoint at odds with his own practice as an academic. Anderson was right to insist that education be determined by educational criteria. But the opposition to utilitarian ideas, taken to an extreme, comes into conflict with the insistence on the value of critical thinking for it must suppose that criticism has no point other than its exercise. One is forced to conclude that there is a tension between the two dominant themes in Anderson's thinking about education.

I am aware that there are resources in Anderson's thought to take up the problems I have raised. But perhaps this review could be seen as a limited contribution to the dialectic which the welcome publication of these essays and lectures should provoke in a new era.

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Rescher, Nicholas, *Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress*, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980, pp. x, 122, US\$8.95.

Nicholas Rescher has over thirty book-length publications to his credit. *Unpopular Essays* is not his magnum opus. The title appears to be appropriated from Bertrand Russell's work of the same name, and the analogy seems to be that Rescher, like Russell, is a famous philosopher descending from the ivory tower to grapple insightfully with some of the harsh problems of reality. The difference is that Russell's grapplings were unpopular because they were reformist, whilst Rescher expects his grapplings to be unpopular because they are not. There are eight unpopular essays; some are of philosophical interest. Some others have nothing in common with philosophy apart from the fact that they are entirely *a priori*. I will discuss a selection of the better ones.

The first essay is entitled 'Technological Progress and Human Happiness'. Rescher quotes public opinion surveys to support the conclusion that Americans perceive themselves as richer, but less happy, than their predecessors. However, massive majorities also say that they would rather be living now than in the good old days. The paradox, Rescher says, is resolved by seeing the discontent as the consequence of a failure of aroused expectations. Improvement leads to arousal of expectations, which must be disappointed, since other opinion polls show that the things people worry about most are health and vigour, aging, getting ahead, and their relationships. These things, Rescher claims, do not readily lend themselves to manipulation by science and technology. So little does he think that programmatic improvement is possible that he says, again relying on opinion polls 'The advice to offer would seemingly be: be female, be under 29, be married, be childless.'

Rescher's belief that problems of health and vigour do not readily lend themselves to manipulation by science and technology is, to put it mildly, somewhat counterinductive. His parallel claim concerning aging is stronger, though his view is at odds with that of thousands of American scientists who are working full-time on a cure for that very disease. And, although 'getting ahead' and 'personal relationships' may present problems rooted in the contingencies of the human condition, such problems are often partly social. If biochemists and atomic physicists cannot manipulate such variables, social scientists may recommend some ameliorative policies, while philosophers may even deploy some therapeutic arguments — as Bertrand Russell did in his *Conquest of Happiness*. Rescher's view that intractable difficulties are grounds for abandoning important projects appears repeatedly in the sequel.

The third essay is 'The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy'. Where the

demand exceeds the supply for transplants, artificial organs, etc., criteria of selection are necessary. Rescher sees the need for a two-stage process beginning with criteria of inclusion, and further culling the included group with criteria of comparison. The criteria of inclusion are three. The 'constituency factor' allows in those the hospital's charter defines as existing for it to serve (e.g. inhabitants of a region). The 'progress of science' factor gives priority to particular types of patients from whom science may learn as a result of the surgeon's operating. The third criterion of inclusion is the 'prospect of success' factor. The next phase of sorting is subject to the 'criteria of comparison'. These are the length and quality of expectable life after the operation, the 'prospect of success factor' again, and three rather controversial criteria relating to the patient's value as a human being. These are the family role of the patient (mothers of young children getting priority), the potential contributions of the patient (brilliant surgeons getting priority over labourers), and the 'services rendered' factor, which Rescher claims is justified on the basis of both utility and equity.

The problem is how all these criteria are to be weighed. Rescher suggests a point rating system, with the different criteria being given roughly equal points. Application of the two-stage procedure would yield a homogeneous group, probably still larger than the supply of therapy. In these circumstances Rescher suggests a lottery. He gives three reasons for this alarming suggestion: firstly, the 'element of chance prevents the results that life and death choices are made by the automatic application of an admittedly imperfect selection method'. It appears not to occur to Rescher that randomness is an odd palliative for imperfection. If it really did in fact improve on imperfection, he wouldn't need his elaborate criteria at all. One could simply toss a coin. The second reason he offers is that it would make matters easier for the rejected patient. This, however, is *a priori* psychology, and reasons for believing it do not spring immediately to mind. The third reason is that it would relieve administrators of an awesome burden. But again, if this were really an important consideration, it would tell against the whole exercise, not just in favour of abandoning it at the crunch point. Nevertheless this paper is a serious attempt at a difficult problem, and while his criteria are rather sketchily argued for, the essay is perhaps the most generative in the collection.

The fourth essay 'Ethical Issues regarding the Delivery of Health Care' features a *a priori* political economy, with the undefended assertion that nationalised medicine is inefficient. It also features the statistically supported conclusion that much disease is caused by bad personal habits, like smoking and drinking, a fact which Rescher suggests argues for a redeployment of funds from curative to preventative medicine. The rest of the essay depends on the fact that the rate of decline in mortality in developed societies, a rate of decline which was so spectacular when major killer diseases like tuberculosis and pneumonia were being overcome, has dropped to almost zero. Now we are up against the really tough ones, cancer and heart disease. Rescher believes that this takes us to the point of diminishing marginal utility — expenditure is increasing, but success is not being attained. We would be better off, he says, to settle for less than the best, and redeploy funds from research to therapy.

Rescher's claim that we are at the point of diminishing utility involves a logical leap. The fact that there has been a levelling in the rate of decline in mortality is no more evidence for the proposition that we have reached the point of marginal utility than it is evidence for the proposition that we are on the point of a qualitative breakthrough. It is neutral between them. It is evidence only for the proposition that it is easier to find cures for infectious diseases than to find cures for cellular and cardiac malfunctions. Rescher's desire to redeploy funds from research to therapy (which latter could equally be boosted from other funds) merely evidences an attitude that when success is uncertain, even though its rewards be astronomical, one should abandon the attempt. Such an attitude is, as Rescher anticipates, unpopular, and justly so.

'Ideals, Justice and Crime' is the fifth essay and hardly bears examination. It is too *a priori* to be competent criminology, and too unargued to be competent legal philosophy.

'Economics versus Moral Philosophy' is the sixth essay, and is a critique of the Pareto

principle. A proposal is Pareto optimal if some gain from its implementation, and none lose. Characterising it as an automatic assumption of economists, Rescher asks how it might be defended. He suggests that the economist might say that if everyone were told how they would fare under the new arrangement, those who would profit would vote for it, and those who would be unaffected would abstain, thus providing the Pareto principle with all the weight of the democratic. But this begs the question at the outset, Rescher points out. The 'economic man' of economic theory construes rationality as pursuit of his own economic self interest, and so will vote simply according to whether his economic interests are touched. But the moral individual will be concerned with other desiderata. For example, even if a proposed distribution is Pareto optimal it might impede the realisation of other objectives, like equality. So the proposed legitimisation of the Pareto principle is undercut, for the moral individual will not vote on the basis just of his own narrowly construed self interest, but on the basis of community interest.

The seventh essay is 'Why Save Endangered Species?' Rescher describes the disappearance of a species as an irreversible change in nature. This is false: recent studies suggest that the sabre-tooth tiger became extinct and re-evolved nine times. And the aurochs, extinct since 1627, has been recreated through selective breeding. But correcting this premise does not detract from the interest of the argument. There are three reasons for saving endangered species, says Rescher. Because we may ourselves have an interest in them, because other human beings may have an interest in them, and on ethical grounds, because of their embodiment of metaphysical value. The last reason is the most controversial, and, of Rescher's three reasons, obviously some species will have only this as a claim on our forbearance. He claims that 'There is no reason why one cannot take the stance of a Leibnizian value metaphysic and see the basis for value to reside in the ontological nature of things'. While the matter will not be quite as crystal clear to most of Rescher's readers, who will be searching assiduously through the preceding paragraphs to find an argument supporting this conclusion, everyone will agree with Rescher's remark that rational evaluation in the ontological sphere is neither easy nor comfortable. His other controversial suggestions are that our duty to save species is owed to the species and not its individual members, that the duty is not a moral duty, and that the duty is defeasible. Finally, he notes that if species are bearers of intrinsic value, we must have a duty to create new species as well as save existing ones. This might upset the balance of nature here on Earth, but if we could create new species by operating through remote control in an otherwise unpopulated galaxy, then we should. It would be uncharitable to regard this as a *reductio ad absurdum* of his central argument.

The final essay, entitled 'Scientific Progress and the "Limits to Growth"' offers the thesis that in a non-growth economy, advances in pure science must slow down. However a greater proportion of G.N.P. should be spent on pure science, he suggests, with the aid of reductions in conspicuous consumption and defence. By parity of reasoning he could have afforded less pessimism in essays three and four.

In the judgement of this reviewer, *Unpopular Essays* contains a few points about which philosophers may fruitfully exercise themselves, and some others the articulation of which constitutes an admirable popularisation of philosophy. However, the unwelcome but inevitable qualification is that Rescher seems also to be attempting to use his *ex cathedra* status as a famous philosopher to lend authority to certain other dubious and sometimes non-philosophical propositions, which are at best unargued, and at worst unarguable. Since the issues he discusses are of the greatest practical importance, the attempt should not go unremarked.

Amy Gutmann, *Liberal Equality*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. xi, 318, £6.50.

In her preface Amy Gutmann writes that '... I want to supply more reasons for citizens of contemporary liberal democratic societies to be concerned with equality ...' (p. ix). In one respect this does indeed set the tone for much of the book, for it does sometimes seem as if Gutmann's main aim is to supply arguments that support her commitment to liberal equality. Thus, for example, she draws upon Mill's developmental psychology, Tawney's 'egalitarian fellowship', Waltzer's and Williams' ordinary language analysis and Rawls' original position for egalitarian arguments. However, despite this somewhat unsettling feeling that she is sometimes simply searching for arguments to bolster her prior commitments, Gutmann actually presents an original and not unpersuasive interpretation of modern liberal egalitarian theory.

As Gutmann sees it, classical liberal theory was premised on two 'equality assumptions': utilitarian equality was premised on a conviction that all men possessed equal *passions* while the Locke-Kant strain focused upon equal *rationality*. Although she acknowledges that, for instance, utilitarians like Bentham and James Mill also drew on rationality as well as passion postulates, Gutmann wants to argue that equality of passions and equality of reason have been distinct, though related, bases of arguments for equal rights throughout the liberal tradition. Now as Gutmann recognises, a difficulty immediately arises: *viz.* that liberals have generally insisted that men share *similar*, not equal, capacities for reason and have *similar*, not equal, passionate natures. But if men possess the traits to different extents, how can they be used as a basis for a strict egalitarian distribution of rights? To be sure, that humans are similar in these respects suggests that all ought to have some rights, but why a strict equality? Gutmann has two responses to this objection. 'The most direct reply', she tells us, is for the egalitarian to deny that such an inequality exists (p. 44). But to do that would seem to entail abandoning any claim to be presenting an interpretation of the liberal tradition, for liberals have typically been very explicit that men are unequally endowed. In any event, Gutmann herself isn't very happy with the first reply, telling us on the next page that '[a] better direct response' is for the liberal egalitarian to deny that these inequalities are 'associated with any easily discernable traits, with any class, ethnic, racial or sexual characteristics of persons'. While this is certainly a legitimate argument, it seems to give a rather lot away. For now the 'equality assumptions' are acknowledged to be fictions: people are not really equal in passions or rationality, but out of ignorance we must treat them *as if* they were. From the perspective of Aristotelian distributive justice, liberal egalitarianism would thus be premised on an injustice, albeit an excuseable one: it is treating unequals equally. Moreover, this egalitarian reply suggests that it is entirely legitimate to distribute rights unequally if we can identify some of the underlying inequalities. In itself this need not be troubling, but Gutmann clearly wants a rock-solid foundation for equal rights (it is, I think, for this reason that she is generally cool to consequentialist arguments for equality). But her arguments do not seem to provide it. All things considered, Gutmann doesn't seem fully to appreciate the difficulties of deriving egalitarian prescriptions on the basis of traits that do not seem equally distributed. In this regard Alan Gewirth's argument in *Reason and Morality* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 119-25) is perhaps more helpful.

In any event, throughout the book, Gutmann uses the equal passions/equal rationality scheme to demonstrate the continuity of modern liberal egalitarian and classical liberal arguments, showing these equality postulates to provide the foundation for Millian, Fabian, 'relevant reasons' and Rawlsian egalitarian arguments. In particular, she argues that liberal egalitarians have sought to endorse two different sorts of equalities: whereas participationist liberals like Mill have endorsed equal participatory opportunities, distributionists such as Rawls concentrate on equal distribution of some resources (e.g. rights to liberty) and limiting the inequalities of others (e.g. income and

wealth). Gutmann's main theme is that a tension results from these two liberal egalitarian commitments: to encourage equal participation of all citizens in decision making does not ensure that an equal (just) distribution will result; on the other hand, a powerful centralised state such as that endorsed by the Webbs can ensure an egalitarian distribution but limits participatory opportunities.

Gutmann's proposed resolution of this liberal egalitarian tension is a priority of certain distributionist concerns over participatory opportunities. But this priority is not arbitrary. On her view, a real equality of participatory opportunity assumes an egalitarian distribution of basic resources. 'Democracy cannot work the way its advocates claim it ought to without a substantive foundation: an egalitarian distribution of basic civil liberties and primary goods' (p. 198). Constitutional guarantees of civil (and political) liberties and basic welfare rights are to be effectively beyond the reach of democratic decision making: they provide both a foundation for, and limitations upon, participation.

One is led to wonder why Gutmann is so worried by the possible conflict between substantive justice and democracy. After all, although liberals like Mill have feared a democratic despotism, the things to which Gutmann is committed — especially welfare rights — have been largely achieved through democratic agitation. Perhaps it is merely the response of the 'welfare liberal' to the elections of Thatcher and Reagan (Gutmann explicitly limits her focus to the U.S. and the U.K.) and to local tax revolts in the U.S. But I think a deeper, theoretical, explanation can be given. The key once again is the passion/rationality contrast. Although the equal passion/equal rationality distinction occurs throughout the book, no obvious and consistent relation obtains among it and the participation/distribution tension. However, at various places Gutmann appears to indicate that participation is essentially the realm of the passions while principles of distribution are informed by reason. Late in the book, for example, after proposing the priority of 'equal basic civil and political liberties, welfare rights, and the [just] distribution of residual primary goods' over democratic participation, she comments that '[a] fully egalitarian society thereby will allow for the representation of both the particular desires of all persons in some realms of decision making and the universal interests of rational beings in others' (p. 199). Although it is not clear just what is being said here, the point seems to be that participation is the realm of particularistic *desires* while justice protects the universalistic interests of men as *rational* beings. Again, on p. 188 Gutmann writes: 'Participatory government must operate within the context of just government. The former *allows* every person an equal right to employ and refine his passions; the latter *ensures* that the interests of all citizens as potentially rational beings are equally protected by egalitarian distributive principles.'

This association of participation with passions and distribution/justice with rationality helps explain Gutmann's attraction to seeing some democratic decisions as instances of pure procedural justice (e.g. p. 177). If something is a pure procedure for justice, no independent criterion exists for judging the justice of the outcome. Like a fair bet, the outcome is just if and only if the procedure by which it was reached is. And if the procedure is fair, it is senseless to criticise the outcome as unjust. (See John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 86.) According to Gutmann, in those cases where the possible decision cannot lead to a violation of rights (for that would certainly be unjust), democratic decision making is a pure procedure. Thus, for instance, regarding '[a]spects of educational policy and industrial and bureaucratic organization' (p. 177), the democratic outcome *defines* what is just and thus cannot sensibly be criticised on grounds of justice. Whatever her claim to be a follower of Mill, it cannot be made out here. For Mill sees all democratic deliberation as aimed at securing justice and the common good; one's position is not, as Gutmann would have it, the result of passion or mere desire, but a considered opinion about what ought to be done. At least as I understand Mill, if the majority decides on a course which a member of the minority thinks is unfair (and fairness will be an issue regarding almost every question on the agenda of modern democracies), he may well

insist that it is unjust or wrong, even while accepting its legitimacy. In contrast, if democratic participation is an assertion of mere passion or preference, then it makes sense to view the democratic outcome as a pure procedure with respect to justice: what the majority decides is *ipso facto* just, and nothing more can be said.

Ultimately, one suspects that her effort to demonstrate the continuity of classical and egalitarian liberal theory has led Gutmann to import an essentially eighteenth century model of man — one fundamentally divided between reason and passion — into her account of more recent thinkers. Depicting democratic participation as allowing each an opportunity to ‘employ and refine his passions’ is not only to use non-Millian language, but it is to imply a model of man quite different from Mill’s self-developmental theory. For Mill, development centres on an *integration* of capacities and reason and it is this which Gutmann’s Enlightenment bifurcation of reason and passion fails to capture. In the end, I think that there is a much wider gulf separating classical and egalitarian liberals than Gutmann would have us believe. But for all that, *Liberal Equality* not only provides us with a new perspective on the liberal tradition, but is itself an original contribution to it.

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Fishkin, James, *Tyranny and Legitimacy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. ix, 158, US\$12.95 (cloth), \$4.50 (paper).

‘Tyranny and Legitimacy’ is divided into three parts. The first part concerns tyranny and Fishkin’s set of criteria for identifying it. The second part sees Fishkin wielding his definition to strike down ‘virtually all of the principles currently prominent in political theory.’ All, he claims, would in some circumstances, legitimate tyranny. The third part, entitled ‘Justifying Non-tyranny’ is devoted to that admirable project.

According to Fishkin ‘a policy choice by the government is an instance of simple tyranny, when that policy imposes severe deprivations even though an alternative policy would have imposed no deprivations on anyone’. This is intuitively plausible, and neither the quaint preliminary obeisance to the authors of the Declaration of American Independence (who had, apparently, a faintly analogous notion), nor the inevitable controversy attendant upon spelling out subsequent details of the initially plausible, do much to alter this state of affairs.

The remainder of the first part contains material which is of interest not only because it is explanatory of Fishkin’s definition of tyranny. He there explains that a severe deprivation is the destruction of an essential interest, or the decisive defeat of a personal life plan, that a personal life plan is the contellation of one’s self regarding desires, while one’s interests can be destroyed either by the frustration of self regarding desires or by the denial of certain subsistence needs. Further that a life plan is decisively defeated when it is never allowed autonomous development, or when it encounteres reverses for which the agent would regard nothing as adequate compensation. This leads Fishkin to discuss, interestingly and sometimes illuminatingly, the problem of utility comparisons, the self-other regarding distinction, the problem of estimating intensities of preferences, and the dilemma of interests (namely that if interests are defined in terms of desires, some desires must be excluded, and if they are defined in terms of ideal principles, some paternalism seems inevitable.)

Armed now with his criterion of tyranny, Fishkin essays, in his second part, to demonstrate the tyrannical propensities of all currently favoured moral and political principles. These also obey the rule of three, the first being procedural principles, principles which prescribe adherence to a decision rule. Democracy may be tyrannical because a majority may insist on a course of action which induces severe deprivation in a minority. Even unanimity as a decision principle may be tyrannical, because one individual may veto a course of action that would *prevent* severe deprivation. For such

reasons, subscribing to any procedural principle without adding the principle of non-tyranny as a qualification of it, will risk a lapse into tyranny.

A democrat can cheerfully concede the force of this hoary argument. It is explicit in Fishkin's categorisation that democracy is a procedural principle. This makes it definitionally true that the democratic principle does not prescribe ends. It follows that there can be no causal relationship between a party's commitment to democracy and a subsequent commitment to a tyrannical measure.

But what if there is a numerical majority for a course of action that is, by Fishkin's test, tyrannical? Is not the democrat thereby implicated in an act of tyranny? No, the democrat is merely committed to a particular procedure, namely the democratic principle, as a means of getting the act undone. This assumes, of course, that the democrat in question has a non-tyrannical value system — and it is to that value system, to the ends one seeks, that Fishkin's test of tyranny is relevant. True, as Fishkin claims, democrats can, consistently with their democracy, advocate an act of tyranny. We all know that they can, and that many have. But we also know that they did not do so *because* they were democrats. So in proposing his principle of non-tyranny as a qualification of democracy (or of any other procedural principle) he is seeking to put this qualification in the wrong place.

A further complication is that to override a majority decision will sometimes, on Fishkin's own test, amount to an act of tyranny. Fishkin points out that where all courses of action involve tyranny, his principle does not provide a means of choosing between them. This means that his test identifies fewer instances of democratic tyranny than he thinks.

The second category of principles in Fishkin's architectonic is the category of absolute rights principles. Particularly he has in mind the system of Robert Nozick. The argument here is that since Nozick holds that *A* has an absolute right not to have his property appropriated, even though *B* is starving to death, it follows that Nozick is committed to the tyranny of supporting a policy which imposes severe deprivations. Refutation of the non-interventionist state by imputation of tyranny has a certain poetic elegance, which I would not disturb with further comment.

The third category concerns structural principles, especially utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and the theory of justice of John Rawls. All these share a common flaw, according to Fishkin. That flaw is their failure to have any concern for which individual is at which point in a given distribution. For these principles, a distribution of *x* units is as good whether *A* or *F* is at the top. But imagine that *A*, who was at the top of a distribution of *x* units, suffers a collapse in his fortunes so that he is moved to the bottom of an otherwise identical distribution; *F* and the others in between move up only one unit, so that none have gained perceptibly, but *A* has suffered a severe deprivation. Although this is tyranny, according to Fishkin, the structural principles see one distribution as being as good as the other. And this is not just an argument against utilitarianism, but against any structural principle, 'whether it be equality, utilitarianism, maximin or something else', because since the structures are identical, structural principles as such cannot choose between them.

As Mill remarked, there is no difficulty in discovering any principle to work ill provided you assume it to be attended with universal idiocy. All philosophers who have ideas about desirable distributions also have ideas about how to establish them. In most cases one's theory of change is logically connected to one's principles of distribution. Fishkin's argument is an argument against those who not only do not see any greater merit in distribution *x* than in distribution *y*, but moreover do not care about how they get from *x* to *y*. This is not an argument against Rawls, nor against utilitarians. Nor have I met any egalitarians without theories of change, although their theories are not analytically connected to the principle which individuates them. It would be vain for Fishkin to insist that he had demonstrated the inadequacy of the bare structural principles, and that by admitting the need for a theory of change philosophers who held to those structural principles were implicitly admitting the principle of non-tyranny as a

qualification of their theories. In the case of Rawls and the utilitarians at least, the 'qualifications' are advanced as logical consequences of their systems.

Part three 'Justifying Non-tyranny' is largely an essay on Rawls. It is in fact a piece of Rawlsian apologetics, for the argument is over whether the thought experiment concerning the 'original position' yields a more useful theory than would have been yielded by some other remarks Rawls makes elsewhere about 'the fair way to cut a cake'. It appears that a fair-minded 'cake cutter' would discover the principle of non-tyranny, since if one did not know who was getting which slice, one would cut them all to equal dimensions, thereby ensuring that nobody suffered any severe deprivations. This procedure, like the 'original position' has the advantage that it 'makes a deep appeal to reciprocity reminiscent of the Golden Rule', but it is preferable to the 'original position', because the Rawlsian notion of maximising primary goods is less coherent than Fishkin's own notion of minimising severe deprivations. All this may possibly amount to an advance in Rawlsian scholarship: but someone who was reading the section entitled 'Justifying Non-tyranny' only in order to do so might well wonder why such an apparently simple enterprise was proving so tortuous.

Fishkin sees his principle of non-tyranny as a qualification on all other principles of the procedural, absolute rights or structural kind. He believes that such principles should be held as *prima facie* principles, incomplete without the non-tyranny proviso. This reviewer sees a different value in Fishkin's work. He believes that many of the principles Fishkin discusses can find, within their own logic, safeguards against what Fishkin defines as tyranny. Nevertheless he believes Fishkin to have performed a service in proffering a definition of tyranny in the light of which we can examine the consequences of our own positions.

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Paskins, Barrie, and Dockrill, Michael, *The Ethics of War*, London, Duckworth, 1979, pp. xii, 332, £24.00.

The popular conscience is schizophrenic about war. On the one hand, there exists a widespread belief that war transcends morality, that it is too gruesome to come under moral or legal judgement. On the other hand, the notions of atrocity, war crimes and aggression are deeply entrenched in most public reactions to military hostilities and clearly appeal to moral or legal standards.

In this interesting book, Paskins and Dockrill follow what is, by now, the mainstream philosophical tradition and take questions to do with the morality of war seriously. Moreover, like many other recent writers in the area, they support a version of the once-despised just war theory. Much of their discussion is concerned with one important feature of the just war tradition — the moral immunity of non-combatants from attack. Their focus is sharpened by taking as a case study the Allied aerial bombardment of German cities in World War II which was primarily an attack upon non-combatants.

Paskins is a philosopher and Dockrill an historian. The idea of such a collaboration seems a good one but the product is rather compartmentalised. Nonetheless the detailed historical background to the philosophical discussion is welcome and very well presented. It provides another reminder of the way in which public men in a democracy are ready to deceive their citizens about the most important policy issues. The British government persistently denied, sometimes through the public statements of the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, that the attacks upon German cities were primarily aimed at civilian populations. The authors show how Sinclair, who privately endorsed a Cromwellian belief in 'slaying in the name of the Lord', dissembled valiantly in public in order to placate such critics of the bombing as the

Bishop of Chichester and the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, whose moral qualms were thought likely to affect the morale of the bomber crews.

The moral theory underlying the book's critique of the bombing and other aspects of modern war turns out to be a sort of ideal observer story seeking to blend Hume's concern for sympathy and sentiment with Kant's insistence on treating people as ends and never merely as means. The authors' ideal observer is christened 'Jim' after the Bernard Williams' character who faced that choice between killing one South American Indian at the behest of a thug called 'Pedro' and seeing Pedro kill all twenty Indian captives. Jim is a man 'of good wishes' which is the authors' Humeanised version of Kant's ethic of the good will. According to Paskins and Dockrill, Jim's 'good wishes' lead him to kill the innocent Indian but unhappily. They also lead him to endorse just war emphases on proportionality and non-combatant immunity but to allow exceptions, for instance, in the case of what they call 'the warfare of despair'.

Although this book makes many substantial contributions to our understanding of the difficult moral issues raised by war, it suffers from a number of weaknesses. A major one is the ethic of 'good wishes' and its embodiment Jim. The Jim device is not only jarring in its cuteness and occasional moments of condescension (Jim is described at one point as a 'grateful pleb!') but is seriously misleading in seeming to provide a test for moral problem cases when it does nothing of the sort. Trying to imagine what a fictional figure of 'good wishes to all men' may do in a crisis merely shifts the weight on to the interpretation of good wishes. Indeed, the device obscures the fact that what is problematic about good wishes is that they seem to reverse the conceptual priorities. We need a conception of the good, a morality, in order to determine what content to give to 'good wishes to all men' and not vice versa. This is a problem for all Kantian-style ethics but at least Kant tries to meet the problem by building a powerful, if ultimately unsatisfactory, idea of rationality into his conception of the good will. Eschewing this path, Paskins and Dockrill are hard put to avoid subjectivism and come close at times to mere sentimentality.

The recourse to Jim is partly motivated by the authors' strong sense of a modern collapse of consensus about moral matters. This seems to me a more complex and equivocal matter than the authors recognise but they are very exercised about it and cite it as their main reason for rejecting the natural law tradition in ethics. What they say about morality and consensus is sometimes suggestive but too often obscure and rhetorical. Their claim that 'the natural law tradition tacitly assumes that the *reality* of morality depends on consensus' (p. 206) is quite baffling. That tradition certainly bases morality upon a degree of communality of fundamental human response and constitution but there is, in its best representatives, no confusion of this with general agreement in specific moral beliefs and attitudes. Nor need 'the politics of great events in this century appear in this tradition as the product of merely corrupt minds' (p. 207) though I would have thought that (mere?) moral corruption could hardly be ignored in an explanation or description of Nazism, Stalinism or the politics of South Africa.

The authors attach much importance to the idea of loyalty to and solidarity with one's people. They are also fond of glory, the brotherhood of arms and so forth. Too fond by half for my taste. One can see merit in some military codes of conduct without giving blanket endorsement to 'the great moral dignity of traditional military values' (p. 258) or enthusing romantically about 'the strange glory of the soldier's calling'. They are understandably anxious not to fall into cheap condemnations of brave men but this leads them to see the soldier's calling as less problematic than it is. When talking of things military and political, the authors often seem committed to a simple role conception of ethics. There is a good deal of talk of people with jobs to do and so on but in the context of war, the limitations of such an approach should by now be clear. The man who takes refuge in the defence that he is just doing his ('necessary?') job may not only need a further defence for doing that job at all but must be able to defend the particular definition of the job provided by his social environment.

There are related questions of responsibility which receive insufficient attention in

the book and what answers are given are, at times, excessively sympathetic to warriors and politicians loyally doing their jobs. In the end, the bombing is condemned but the verdicts on its planners and perpetrators are surprisingly mild. Indeed, the academic community, or parts of it, are given as much or even more blame because they had the opportunity and capacity for reflection but failed 'to push into the public arena the moral issues relating to war' (p. 314). Certainly, there are legitimate criticisms to be made of the public roles (or lack of them) of academics but declaring them the 'moral criminals' while refusing to pass the same judgement on such as Churchill, Portal, Harris and company seems almost disingenuous. The responsibility of intellectuals is an important and complex issue but whatever one says of it should not distract from the real responsibility of men of affairs.

A final comment on Paskins and Dockrill's discussion of the crucial matter of the 'war of despair'. The basic idea here is that loyalty to his people may pose a cruel dilemma for a pacifist when his people are faced by overwhelming odds and are proposing as 'a last flicker of life' to go down fighting. The authors suggest that the pacifist is here faced with an 'existential choice' as also, more importantly for their discussion, is the man of good wishes who accepts the principle of non-combatant immunity since such a war of despair may, in their view, arise even at the level of nuclear retaliation. The authors' official line is that Jim's choice here is criterionless, morally impossible and so on but their discussion is plainly more sympathetic to the loyalist response of grateful solidarity. Moreover, at one point (p. 179), they urge that the bombing of German cities presented such an existential choice although it is not clear how this view consorts with their ultimate conclusion that the bombing was (morally) criminal.

This apparent inconsistency is not only symptomatic of difficulties inherent in the idea of 'existential choice' but it reflects a failure to have fully analysed the war of despair problem. Someone may acknowledge that loyalty requires (or at least bids) him to *die* with his people without thereby admitting, if he is a pacifist, that it entitles him to *kill* with them and certainly without admitting, if he is a just warrior, that it entitles or in any way morally enjoins him to express his solidarity by killing non-combatants. I don't myself think that loyalty should have the moral significance that Paskins and Dockrill give it but even if we accord it a high priority its expression must clearly be under moral limitations. The authors draw a comparison with the death camps and praise those prisoners who, set to guard their fellow-inmates, turned their guns in desperation on their captors. Unlike those who trudged passively to their deaths there was a flicker of life about the rebels — they were respecting their own humanity. I feel reluctant to speak at all of those who died 'passively' but two points need to be made about the alternatives: first, there are other ways than violence in which life may be asserted in the face of death and a preference for these may be morally defensible and, second, the example is not one of killing non-combatants. What if the prisoners had turned their weapons upon a passing busload of children or upon farmers working in a nearby field? Let us draw the nuclear parallel: the Russian rulers have launched their missiles at the United Kingdom which is now doomed but I am invited to push the button that will devastate Warsaw. A flicker of life or a flicker of death?

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